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By Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Navy
^ For the Soviet Navy, 1989 brought 8°od news and bad news. November saw the first arrested landings and ski-jump ‘akeoffs of an Su-27 Flanker, a MiG-29 ulcrum, and an Su-25 Frogfoot on the aew 65,000-ton aircraft carrier, Tbilisi. urely that was good news. The year 989 also saw a highly successful exchange of visits by Soviet and U.S. warships as well as the much-acclaimed vis- hs to the Soviet Union by the U.S. avy’s two most senior officers: Admiral •lliam J. Crowe, Chairman of the Joint niefs of Staff, and Admiral Carlisle r°st, the Chief of Naval Operations. oviet Navy leaders surely viewed these events as lending stature and considerable Prestige to their navy.
It needed it, for 1989 also brought several bitter pills for the Soviet Navy to fallow. The tragic loss of the Mike nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and most of her crew in April, the fire on oard a Northern Fleet Echo II guided-
he Soviets in 1989 sent 30 vessels to 0verseas scrapyards. Most of the 15 submarines, including these eight on heir way to Spain, were of the * 950s-vintage Whiskey class. But even as they were ridding themselves I’1 “yard queens,” the Soviets were Pudding a newer, leaner, and Planer fleet.
missile submarine (SSGN) in June, and the reported fire on board an Alfa SSN the following month raised many questions about the capability of the Soviet submarine force—the elite of the Soviet Navy.
The picture of Whiskey-class submarines being towed away for scrapping but sinking before they could arrive at the ship-breakers did not help the Soviet Navy’s image either.
The Soviet naval leadership must also bemoan its image problems—particularly in these times of contracting defense budgets and increased oversight by the Congress of People’s Deputies and others outside the coterie of Politburo and Ministry of Defense officials who had traditionally decided defense budget size and allocation. But as the Soviet naval leadership toasted the arrival of 1990, I would be surprised if they did not allow themselves at least a moment to reflect that 1989 really was not a bad year for the
Soviet Navy at all. While the press carried pictures of Soviet warships and submarines being towed to the scrapyard, a very vibrant modernization program was replacing the superannuated hulks with new ships and submarines of vastly improved capability. In fact, the tonnage of new construction surface combatants and submarines entering the Soviet Navy far exceeded the tonnage of the obsolete
hulks that were sold for scrap.
Context is the element missing from much Western commentary about Soviet naval developments. A great deal of attention is paid to the scrapping of antiquated warships and the reduction in Soviet Navy distant deployments and operating tempo since the mid-1980s, which many casual observers see as directly related to a reduction in the Soviet Navy’s capabilities. This premise needs to be examined.
The units being removed from the Soviet Navy are, for the most part, more than 30 years old, and most had been inactive or in mothballs for some time. In 1989, we saw 15 surface combatants and 15 submarines arrive at overseas scrapyards (three additional submarines sank en route and one surface combatant ran hard aground in the Black Sea). There are plenty more 1950s-vintage ships where these came from. Most are inactive, some are derelicts that would probably be too expensive to get ready for tow, and others are “yard queens” that have not operated in some time. Their removal from the inventory allows the Soviet Navy to save on maintenance and manning costs and free scarce pier and shipyard space while losing little or no combat capability. Most of the surface ships are labor-intensive, steam-driven ships whose replacements are powered by gas turbines and marine diesels, require much less maintenance and far fewer watchstanders. The departure of the steam fleet will alio reduce the requirement for auxiliary vessels and their crews, and a whole fleet of water tankers needed to provide make-up freshwater to the Skoryys, Sverdlovs, Kotlins, and the like (because of the inadequacies of Soviet evaporator design) will no longer be needed.
This year will almost surely see more of these relics sold for scrap. Ship-breaking yards are scheduled to be opened in all four Soviet fleet areas. By 1995, the Soviet Navy will be substantially smaller in numbers than it is today—perhaps by as much as 30%.
But again, we need to place all of this in the context of history. Nikita Khrushchev, in his mid-1950s great reduction of the Soviet military, caused the Soviet Navy to be cut even more dramatically
A mother mourns her son, who died when the Komsomolets caught fire and sank. This Mike-class SSN was the only one of her class, and her loss—along with that of two other Soviet subs—tarnished the image of the Soviet Navy’s elite force.
than we are seeing today. As today, the ships discarded were old and obsolete; in fact, one of them had been built in 1895. Khrushchev also received considerable publicity when he ordered a halt to the Sverdlov-cUss light cruiser building program, proclaiming: “Cruisers are great iron eaters.” Some Western observers, at the time, sounded the death knell for the Soviet Navy.
Yet this same Khrushchev witnessed the launching of the first Soviet SSNs, air-capable ships (Moskva helicopter cruisers), the world’s first gas-turbine- powered major surface combatants (Kashin guided-missile destroyers), and the first long-range antiship-cruise- missile-equipped submarines, destroyers, and cruisers. He also signed the authorizations that led to the Alfa- , Charlie- , Victor- , Yankee- , and Delta-class submarines and for the follow-on generations of surface combatants that would make up the Soviet Navy of the 1970s—a navy much smaller than the Soviet fleet of the 1950s. But the question to be asked to put this in proper context is not which Soviet Navy was larger, but which navy was more capable. While he reduced, Khrushchev also modernized. The navy that emerged—albeit substantially smaller— was a vastly more capable force with new missions.
It can be argued that we are seeing history repeat itself. While cutting obsolete units from the inventory, the Soviet Navy is embarked on a major modernization program that promises to make the Soviet fleet of 1995—albeit substantially smaller—a greatly more capable force.
Shipbuilding: As 1989 ended, the second Tbilisi-class carrier, the Riga, was fitting out, and construction continued on the first unit of a follow-on class of carrier, the Ulyanovsk, which is expected to be some 10,000 tons larger and possibly nuclear-powered. At the same time, construction continues on two classes of destroyers, two cruiser classes, two classes of frigates, and several classes of smaller missile combatants and corvettes. Twelve major combatants (Grisha-sized and larger) were accepted by the Soviet Navy in 1989, an increase of three from the year before. The energetic pace of Soviet surface combatant production is expected to continue at least through 1990 and into
1991. In all the Soviet Union is building at least 16 major surface combatants.
The year 1989 was an even more impressive year for the Soviet submarine construction program. Not only did the total number of combatant submarines accepted by the Soviet Navy exceed 1988 production, but the total tonnage of the submarines launched was the greatest since 1980. Again, 1990 is expected to see approximately the same number of submarines launched, although probably of somewhat less total tonnage.
A similar pattern was observed in the surface combatants accepted by the Soviet Navy (ships completing sea trials and formal acceptance): The tonnage accepted in 1989 was the highest of the decade—primarily because of the delivery of the carrier Tbilisi.
Where, then, are the much-heralded reductions in Soviet Navy expenditures? The sale of obsolete hulls to the scrappers has reduced some costs and comparatively small personnel reductions have saved some more. And the continuing reductions in operations tempo we have seen since 1986 save a little more. The cancellation of Kirov hull five, despite the sunk costs involved in long-lead items, probably saves a fairly significant sum over the next several years. But there is little evidence of other slowdowns in naval expenditures at this time. Ship construction has built-in momentum, of course, and a slowdown ordered today might not be evident for some time to come. Nonetheless, no reduction in the pace of ship construction is anticipated before the next Five-year Plan, which begins in 1991. When Khrushchev made his reductions, he cut ships under construction, and even some already launched were cut up for scrap; today, with the sole exception of the fifth Kirov, we see nothing like that happening.
Soviet Navy Priorities: Whatever slowdowns may be contemplated in the pace of Soviet naval force modernization would probably affect the submarine force least of all. Moreover, few details of the Soviet submarine program are likely to be made public, in hopes of retaining maximum negotiating leverage in support of the long-term Soviet goal of luring the West into naval arms reduction negotiations.
While operating tempo and distant deployments remained at lowered levels and crew certification and practice missile firings were also at a low level in 1989, Soviet Navy research and development appears to have continued unabated. Whatever force level reductions the Soviet Navy may experience, it is a safe assumption that research and development into new weapons or new capabilities will remain funded at high levels. Areas in which research-and-develop- ment investment continues to be high include more accurate submarine-launched ballistic missiles, improved acoustic and nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare capabilities, improved submarine technology, and investments in space and electronics warfare. Technology demonstrator platforms (such as the Mike SSN and Papa SSGN) will continue to be built with a focus on increased submarine quietness, speeds, and depths. The late 1989 rollout of an Alfa-class SSN that had been in overhaul for some five years may be an example of a platform converted for use
as a technology demonstrator.
Senior Soviet Navy officials have long stated that the submarine is the number one platform of the Soviet Navy and that *je aircraft is number two. For Soviet aval Aviation, 1989 was indeed a banner year and demonstrated the high prior- ^at Soviet Naval Aviation enjoys; a ditional bombers were phased in to Replace aging Badgers, while Su-27, iG-29, and Su-25 tactical aircraft were 'ntroduced for land-based use and, ultimately, for inclusion in carrier air wings, ther tactical fighter bombers were trans- erred from Soviet Frontal Aviation organization into Naval Aviation, including a ditional Su-17 Fitter fighter-bombers and Su-24 Fencers—the first time such a Ual'Capable, long-range-ground-attack aircraft has been assigned to Soviet Naval viation. Development continues on the ak-41 second-generation vertical/short nkeoff and landing attack fighter, which appears to be slated to replace the Yak-38 horger. The An-74 MADCAP airborne ®arly warning aircraft (similar in function 0 the U.S. E-2C) and the Boeing 707- S|zed A-40 Albatross, the largest sea- P ane ever built, also continue in development.
. The SSBN force continued its modem- ■zation with the launch of the sixth Typhoon (probably the last) and the sixth elta IV. Yankee patrols off the U.S. coast were almost eliminated in 1989, yllh the remaining 13 Yankees (a dozen ankee Is and the unique Yankee II) making theater patrols to cover Europe and the Far East. No Golf IIs patrolled in . e Baltic; the Soviets removed these six .''Os-vintage diesel-powered ballistic-
missile submarines from the inventory and readied them for scrapping.
The Soviet Navy’s abiding interest in
SOVFOTO space continued to be demonstrated, not only in launches of naval support satellites (although in smaller numbers) and dedication of ships to missile range and space event support, but also in the deployment to the Pacific of the nuclear- powered Kapusta-class auxiliary SSV- 33. Displacing more than 30,000 tons and equipped with extensive space- related and intelligence-collection electronics and nuclear power, this unit’s full war-fighting role is still to be demonstrated. It is clear, however, that she represents a very high priority in the Soviet Navy, since her cost must have approached that of a Kirov or a Kiev.
The Foreign Connection: Other than the Soviet ship visit to Norfolk in August, Soviet distant deployments were at a low ebb in 1989. There was a Bear F deployment to Cuba early in the year, but no Soviet combatants visited Cuba in 1989 and the overall level of Bear D and Bear F deployments to Cuba was well down from that of years past. The presence of submarines and surface ships in both the Mediterranean and Cam Ranh Bay was reduced from that of 1988, with all evidence pointing to even greater reductions in Soviet use of foreign facilities— particularly Cam Ranh Bay, where the MiG-23 fighter squadron was shipped back to the Soviet Union and the composite Bear and Badger regiment was markedly reduced by the removal of all the flyable Badgers. Only one submarine remains at Cam Ranh Bay, together with a handful of small combatants and auxiliaries and several Bear D and Bear F pairs. The Soviets continue to use Cam Ranh Bay as a staging area for transiting or forward-deploying naval units, however, and will probably keep the elabo-
rate facility active for that purpose, at least for the near term.
The Soviet-occupied facility at Tartus, Syria, also has received rather less attention than we had expected. Development stopped short of the anticipated mediumsized logistics support facility, and use by Soviet naval units has decreased in keeping with the general decrease in Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. The most dramatic reductions in Soviet Mediterranean presence, however, have been in Soviet Naval Aviation deployments to Syria and Libya, which were off by two- thirds, and in the Soviet Mediterranean nuclear submarine presence, which saw unprecedented gaps. Soviet Navy and Naval Aviation deployments to Luanda, Angola, were off markedly (no Bears have deployed to Angola since 1987) and may be further reduced, or even eliminated. Likewise, Soviet deployments to the Persian Gulf were reduced in 1989 as the Iran-Iraq ceasefire took hold.
In the meantime, the proclaimed Soviet “defensive doctrine” appears to be taking hold in the navy. Out-of-area exercises were fewer (there was no large- scale Soviet naval exercise in 1989) and those detected seemed to focus on defensive themes and combined-arms coordination, in addition to the traditional theme of fielding, protecting, and employing the SSBN force in strategic attack.
The Future: The outlook for 1990 should be for more of the same. The scrapping of obsolete units will be limited more by the overcrowding of the shipbreaking facilities than by any lack of available units or the will to scrap them. Modernization will continue apace, with Tbilisi becoming operational late in the year and overall ship and submarine construction remaining at least at the same levels as in 1989. Operating tempo and out-of-area deployments will continue at reduced levels, and continued emphasis will be placed on defensive doctrine and on combined-arms warfare. If 1989 was a good year for the Soviet Navy, 1990 could be even better.
The longer-term future is rather more difficult to project. Budgetary pressures may force a slowdown in ship construction in the next Five-year Plan, but the overall Soviet Naval modernization will continue. Investment and research and
Soviet Naval Aviation enjoyed high priority. The Su-27 (here, on the Tbilisi’s flight deck), MiG-29, and Su-25 tactical aircraft made their first arrested landings and ski-jump takeoffs in 1989. They may become carrier air wing aircraft.
Foreign observers, including the Deputy-Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnamese Navy (left, with briefcase) watched the Soviet Pacific Fleet’s 10-12 July exercise in the northwest Sea of Japan from the destroyer Stoiky. The Soviets held no large exercises during the year.
development in high technology will continue unabated.
Another effort that we expect to continue, or even to pick up in pace, is the Soviet drive to convince the West to discuss naval arms control. In this area the Soviets have everything to gain and virtually nothing to lose, since their strength is as the predominant land power in Europe—a position that they will continue to hold despite the reduction in the size of their land forces. The Soviets recognize that they lag behind the West in naval power—that, technologically and economically, they cannot hope to build a navy that would match those of the Western and Pacific naval powers.
How then to redress the imbalance in the naval correlation of forces? Ideally, the Soviets must hope that the naval powers, lulled by the euphoria of “peace in our time,” will make unilateral reductions. It has happened before. But taking a chance on Western cooperation is fraught with too much uncertainty for the Soviet planner. How much better to get the West to enter some naval arms control regime that would introduce a degree of certainty into Soviet planning as they look to reduce the defense budget, including the navy. And better still if the Soviets could persuade the West to give up essential naval capabilities in return for things the Soviet intended to scrap anyway! Witness Marshall Akhro- meyev’s offer to trade 100 submarines (all of which would be scrapped in the next two or three years anyway) for five to seven aircraft carriers, the backbone of the U.S. fleet.
The Soviets end the 1980s perceiving that their navy is well ahead of its position when the decade began, but they also perceive that the overall naval correlation of forces still favors the West. The Soviets hope to slow Western naval technological momentum to give their own naval modernization program time to provide a dramatically improved nuclear submarine force, a much-expanded and more versatile Soviet naval aviation capability with three different classes of aircraft carriers at sea, and a smaller but significantly more capable overall naval force. Soviet naval leaders are hoping that, by the middle of this decade, they will have achieved what Khrushchev’s reduction and modernization program achieved some 25 years before. The Soviet admirals are hoping that, as happened 25-30 years before, the United States also will have dramatically reduced its Navy—either unilaterally or through naval arms control agreements, or possibly even both. If they can bring this about, the Soviet naval planners could achieve a net improvement in the naval correlation of forces, while reducing naval expenditures to boot.
Thus, the bottom-line question in putting Soviet naval developments in 1989 into the proper perspective: Will the smaller Soviet Navy of 1995 be more or less capable of performing its assigned missions than it is now? The Soviets obviously hope that it will be more capable and that, by reducing Western naval strength, we will help them to assure that it is. The Soviets have watched some unilateral Western reductions that took place in 1989, but the ships and aircraft deleted have been fully operational, not equipment in a caretaker status such as the Soviets themselves are removing from the fleet.
No, 1989 was not altogether a bad year from the Soviet perspective. They are hoping we will help them make the years to come even better.
Admiral Brooks is Director of Naval Intelligence- Proceedings / Naval Review 1990