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By Captain Clark Graham, U.S. Navy
The first Arleigh Burke guided-missile destroyer launched only last September, but the time to commit to the technology that will go into her successor is fast approaching. The time is ripe; the U.S. Navy is in an era of transition and a single ingredient—leadership—can overcome the service’s inherent resistance to change.
There is no customer for change—particularly in the military. Throughout history, the real breakthroughs in military systems came when technologists pushed new concepts into operation. Often, the operating forces strenuously resisted the change. The U.S. Navy is typical:
► We have had few major successes in identifying, developing, system-engineering, and introducing technology breakthroughs rapidly into the fleet.
► Our failures stem from our inability to focus a fragmented technology community and a fragmented decisionmaking apparatus on long-term objectives at a broad system level.
► The weakest element in the process is the linking of technologies to requirements.
The problem is vast; it cannot be solved simply. What follows is an attempt to provide direction based on insight.
Linking Technology to Requirements: We must always anticipate the need to make the transition to new systems. The capability of technologically intensive systems increases with time in something like an “S-curve” (see Figure 1). The curve reflects the initial slow increase in capability as the new technologies are integrated. Capability then advances more rapidly as deficiencies are corrected. Further increases are achieved as operators develop tactics to exploit the new system’s advantages.
Inevitably the capability reaches an asymptote as inherent system shortcomings become dominant. At this stage further upgrades to the system produce only marginal improvements.
Obviously, a system need not be abandoned as long as it meets performance requirements and is affordable. Unfortunately, requirements are constantly increasing and the technological planner is faced with three decisions:
- What is the new system?
- When should the transition occur?
- What technologies must we commit to now?
The strategic planner cannot answer any of these questions without appreciating the operational and affordability requirements of the customer—the fleet. Technology and strategic planning must begin with an understanding of the requirements of the Navy’s future operating forces.
Unfortunately, our Navy takes an average of 23 years to turn new technology into an operational system in the fleet. Assume that we determine that the transition from System A to System B should occur as shown. We must commit to the underlying technology building blocks for System B 23 years in advance, when System A is at its most useful stage of development and deployment. Is there any wonder why the bureaucracy is reluctant to commit to a major expenditure for a new system that might, some day, 23 years in the future, replace the current system just going into production?
You can imagine the unpopularity of pointing out ultimate shortcomings of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers or the Seawolf (SSN-21)-class submarines early in these ships’ lifetimes. But it has to be done if we are to alleviate if not eliminate inherent shortcomings of these systems. We must preplan product upgrades to the existing system and anticipate moves to new systems when current equipment no longer meets requirements.
Our planning over the past decade has been based on the maritime strategy described in the pages of Proceedings over the years. Shortcomings must be viewed in the per-
Table 1 OPNAVINST 5000—24 March 1988
By design, the Navy does not maintain a formal, centralized Long-Range Plan. Instead, long-range planning is accomplished at appropriate responsible organizational levels through a wide array of master plans and programming documents which include:
- Conventional Strike/Anti Surface Warfare Master Plan
- AAW Master Plan
- ASW Master Plan
- U.S. Navy Electronic Warfare Master Plan
- Surface Warfare Plan
- Surface Ship Combat System Master Plan
- Naval Aviation Plan
- Attack Submarine Warfare Plan
- Naval Special Warfare Master Plan
- Naval Space Warfare Master Plan
- Navy Command and Control Plan
- Mine Warfare Master Plan
- Navy Long-Range MPT Strategy
- Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and Extended Planning Annex (EPA)
- Investment Strategy Review
If we accept the statement that it has been the technologist who has made most of the major system breakthroughs in military history, then reality dictates that they, and not the operational side, must establish long-term operational and affordability goals. Projecting the Navy’s mission, the technologist can propose quantitative, time- phased, and prioritized operational and affordability goals. These goals are established in parallel with the identification of existing system shortcomings. The goals help identify the combinations of technologies—called technology clusters—that will serve as technological building blocks for future system. The technology clusters become the basis for the Navy’s long-range R&D plan.
Of course, only OPNAV actually establishes requirements. The operational and affordability goals proposed by the technologists serve as surrogate requirements to provide direction to the R&D community. Only when endorsed by OPNAV, do these goals become the requirements for the future acquisition projects.
We must develop a dialogue for successful technological strategic planning. We must determine the requirement; the relative priority and the quantification of the requirement; and the time frame set for filling it—the time the new capability is required in the fleet. Only after a strategy is properly laid out, can we intelligently commit to technological building blocks and system concepts that will provide the most cost effective technology impact.
The real world will never be quite so orderly, but the planning perspective just described should be our goal.
Strategic planning: A master chess player has a long term vision and well thought-out sequential moves; his plan involves all his pieces and all of the board. Unfortunately, we give less freedom to our strategic planners. We do not take full advantage of the breadth and depth of our country’s technological strength because we play predictable chess; we plan using a process that is near-term, fragmented, and too narrowly focused. We do not consider all of the pieces and all of the board at once.
The Navy system is large and highly integrated. It requires strategic planning of equally grand scope and degree of integration. But the Navy’s planning system is fragmented (see Table 1). As a result, the vast majority of planning focuses on one chess piece at a time. Many planning documents are produced by this fragmented process. In addition, many ad hoc studies are often in progress at any given time; Table 2 lists the current ongoing studies and corresponding sponsors within the Navy.
This fragmentation and constraint assures us of only slow, evolutionary advances. When imagining advanced concepts for the bishop—one of our chess pieces, for example, we are guaranteed a predictable outcome if the other chess pieces are ignored or intentionally held constant. The advanced concept will be an evolutionary upgrade to the “bishop” system. Likewise, rigid ground rules that ignore the broad system and focus on masking shortcomings will guarantee the outcome of strategic planning studies sponsored by the “OPNAV Barons” (submarines—OP 02; surface—OP 03; and air—OP 05.) These studies will certainly recommend evolutionary upgrades to current system concepts because there is no customer for
change from within an advocacy group. The shortcomings of system concepts past their prime will be masked. The conceptual models—or paradigms—that drove the initial decisions to commit to current systems remain strong in today’s Navy.
One of the most popular arguments used to rationalize holding the majority of the chess board constrained is: “The systems already in the fleet will be around for a long time. We are not going to do away with these assets.”
Since most of the studies project ahead at best 20 years, these statements are true; but some segment of the Navy’s strategic planning infrastructure must focus on an ideal Navy that could exist 40 years from now—beyond 2030, when most of today’s Navy will have retired. Some of the assets in today’s Navy will still be in the fleet in 2030, but much of it will be in its last overhaul cycle—few will be front line assets. The ideal Navy of 2030, unencumbered by the investment in today’s Navy, can shed itself of system concepts past their prime. We have the opportunity to conceptualize a Navy on a blank canvas. We need a vision of the ideal future Navy unencumbered by outmoded para-
\
Table 2 Ongoing Strategic Studies—1989
Sponsor | Study |
OP 02 | Advanced Submarine Technology |
OP 03 | Revolution at Sea 2020 |
OP 05 | Carrier Air Wing Study 2010 |
OP 06 | Strategic Plan 2010 |
OP 07 | Warfare System Architecture and Engineering |
OP 098 | Quo Vadis II |
digms. The aggressive, forward thinking Navy should 'niagine a Navy consisting of systems that eliminate rather than mask the most significant of today’s shortcomings.
But how can we plan long-range strategy when no one can predict the future? Who could have predicted the present condition of the communist world even two years ago? For answers, we must look at the world of sports.
A great team must have outstanding players, a knowledgeable coaching staff, and a solid game plan. To play as a unit, the team must scrimmage constantly during prac- dee, under conditions that simulate a real game. The value °f constant and vigorous scrimmaging becomes clear dur- >ng the real game, when the team must perform effectively under pressure and adjust to unexpected situations. The championship-caliber team practices and drills—then wins by improvisation.
Similarly, the Navy’s strategic thinkers and planners must scrimmage consistently in an unconstrained arena and develop a long-range strategic plan for winning in the real world. Fragmented, ad hoc study groups do not provide the necessary continuity. They will guarantee only the perpetuation of the status quo.
Our Navy invests $9-10 billion in research and development each year. When we formulate the R&D budget we are laying the technological foundation for the future
In strategic planning, the Navy’s technologists have been playing a near-term, fragmented, predictable game— showing little of the long-range sequential vision of the chess master. It is time to use the entire board and all the pieces on it. Technology shortcomings must be acknowledged; parochialism and the dead hand of tradition must yield to a broad vision that links technologies to requirements, within affordable limits.
Military Effectiveness
- Ordnance on Target
- Signatures
- Survivability
- Mobility
- Readiness
They have one common element: strong technical leadership. The three leaders, Admirals Rickover, Levering- Smith, and Meyer, overcame organizational and cultural resistance; they had vision and technical expertise to establish the system engineering structure that bridges the gap between vision and reality; and they forced the numerous components to come out of the development pipeline together. Successes representing real breakthroughs such as these will not happen without extraordinary leadership and focus.
As I look over the Navy’s current R&D program, I see many opportunities but little focus and momentum building for the next great breakthrough. We are pursuing too many initiatives inspired from the bottom—from the component level instead of the system level. Rear Admiral Meyer summed up the situation quite well when he preached the importance of systems engineering: “In I960 we made one of the best decisions ever. We decided to invest in the Aegis architecture. . . . you must have a
Navy. Unfortunately most of the decisions are based on looking behind us; we focus on today’s Navy as a point of departure. We need an added perspective, a vision of the ideal future Navy. We can then ask ourselves the question: “Does this year’s investment begin the transition to the ideal future Navy?”
Clustering Technologies: Proposing such change in strategic planning is admittedly idealistic, but breakthrough progress will not be achieved by playing it safe.
Three imperatives govern the selection of the foundation technology moves:
- Attack the source of the shortcomings. The best foundation technologies attack the source of shortcomings, rather than merely masking them.
- Link the technology to the goals. The foundation technologies must be linked to the customer’s operational goals and affordability requirements.
- Enable additional moves. The best foundation moves enable successive moves and keep our options flexible and unpredictable.
A successful R&D program correctly balances flexibility and discipline. Tightly disciplined priorities must ensure that the technologies with the highest leverage on customer operational and affordability goals receive enough resources and attention to guarantee timely transition to the fleet. On the other hand, some percent of the R&D program should be relatively loosely structured, to encourage free-wheeling innovation and risk.
The Navy’s R&D program nurses along too many inadequately funded technology initiatives because we have failed to set priorities. We must identify the major technology clusters and rally around them—they should be the center-pieces of our R&D program. We must ensure that systems engineering proceeds concurrently with component development; in fact, systems engineering should dominate component development.
The links among technologies must be system engineered in parallel with the development of each component. Concurrent systems engineering provides the overriding system perspective required to ensure a balance within the cluster, preventing over- or under-design of any one component.
Clustering technologies represents a change in both the technical and the programmatic approach to our R&D program. The current environment encourages extreme competition among the many individual technology initiatives. Each program—Shipbuilding Conversion Navy (SCN); Aircraft Procurement Navy (APN); etc.,—competes for the various categories of R&D resources.
We must aggregate resources and focus more programmatic attention on the high-priority clusters of technology. Consider cluster A targeted for a ship Y with a schedule where all of the technologies within the cluster must mature at a pace that readies the entire cluster for the ship’s introduction. Funds from multiple sources must be combined and assigned to a program manager to control. If the two following conditions are met, then the entire cluster must be ready for transition at the same time: ship Y benefits from the synergistic impact of technologies within a cluster and this synergism is essential to attaining future operational and afforcability goals.
The only way to force this concurrent transition to occur is by aggregating and assigning resources to strong program managers and giving them a charter to make it happen.
Technology clusters should be linked to system acquisition programs but current organizational and cultural barriers hinder full cooperation between the R&D and the acquisition communities.
I submit that we should set an objective to decrease the lead time to transition technology to the fleet from the current 23 years to a realistic level of 15 years; and when we achieve this, we should shoot for 10 years.
The most significant block to this strategy is the organizational fragmentation and cultural mistrust within the Navy’s bureaucracy. Only one ingredient can overcome this resistance—leadership. The Navy has had three great naval engineering successes during the past 30 years:
- Nuclear power
- The fleet ballistic missile system
- The Aegis system sound architecture—that’s where systems engineering begins. . . . You will be doomed to failure if you don’t invest in systems engineering. I hope today’s engineering community follows suit.”
Integrated electric drive: In September 1988, Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost,'the Chief of Naval operations, made an unexpected landmark pronouncement at an R&D symposium attended by the government and industry leaders of the community, when he said, “I am declaring that integrated electric drive, with its associated cluster of technologies, will be the method of propulsion for the next class of surface battle force combatant.”
This revolutionary concept is an excellent example of a cluster of technologies that can vault us toward the ideal Navy of 2030.
The seven elements of the integrated electric drive (IED) cluster are:
- Integrated electric-drive—electric propulsion and propulsion-derived ship service power
- Advanced propulsor system
t!
I
I
^ Intercooled regenerated gas turbine engine ^ Integrated electrical distribution system with pulse power
► Machinery monitoring and control
^ Advanced auxiliary system
y Low observability-loiter power system
These seven elements of the cluster provide the synergism
necessary to meet the surface Navy’s war requirements, as
established by the surface ship community:
^ Ordnance on target ^ Signature reduction and control ^ Survivability ^ Sustainability ^ Affordability
These requirements flowed out of the recent OP-03 Revolution at Sea studies. They were presented to the CNO Executive Board in April 1989 as the basis for justifying the integrated electric drive program. The first four military effectiveness requirement categories are listed in Priority order. Affordability, while listed at the bottom, Was not prioritized in relation to the military effectiveness requirement categories at the time of the presentation. Quantitative, time-phased goals have been established for each of these five requirement categories.
The integrated electric drive cluster strongly reflects the jhree imperatives of a foundation move—attack shortcom- >ngs, link technology to goals, and enable additional moves. The integrated electric drive cluster attacks current surface ships shortcomings—the most significant of which are their susceptibility to detection based on distinctive signatures. The compelling justification for the electric drive cluster is that the composite goals in the five requirements categories cannot be reached without the synergism of the seven technologies.
The central attribute of the integrated electric drive concept is flexibility. This flexibility in ship architecture will lead to ship configurations with inherently low susceptibility to detection and, thus, improved survivability. Flexibility in power architecture will allow on board, high power combat systems—directed energy weapons, powerful sensors, electromagnetic weapon launchers and aircraft catapults—without the proliferation of stand-alone power sources.
The integrated electric drive cluster involves the production, distribution, and control of electrical power. Electrical power is produced by two electrical generators driven by either a marine gas turbine or a nuclear-powered steam turbine.
The larger propulsion generator provides prime power to the propulsor through an electric motor. The flexibility of an electric versus a rigid mechanical transmission system enables selection of the advanced propellers needed to meet the acoustic quieting goals. A flexible arrangement allows the naval architect to separate components along the length and depth of the ship, leading to significantly improved survivability.
The second generator provides primary ship service electric power for the combat systems and ship loads. This “propulsion-derived ship service” power system results in fewer prime movers on the ship. The key is to allow
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future high power combat systems to share power between the propulsion and ship service systems. A system composed of pulse power storage and distribution components will be developed to enable this economical sharing of Power.
The electrical distribution and control systems of the cluster are the two key architectural elements. Here again systems engineering becomes critical. The control system must be system engineered not only as part of the machinery system but also as part of the ship’s combat system. It must also have an architecture that enables the ship to control its signatures and to fight on despite damage. (The integrated electric drive cluster is described in greater detail in the September 1989 issue of Naval Engineers Journal.)
Admiral Trost was sending a far more significant directive to the Navy than merely calling for the development °f the integrated electric drive system. He was directing the Navy to revise its modus operandi and abandon its fragmented approach to technology development.
He wanted to focus resources on the electric drive cluster with its compelling linkage to operational and affordability requirements. He saw the value in investing initially in a flexible cluster that would enable successive moves. “I am directing all the major Navy organizations mvolved in these efforts to concentrate their energies toward that objective,” he said. In the context of the philos- °Phy outlined in this essay, Admiral Trost told the Navy to take more of a systems engineering approach to its research and development efforts.
The affordability crisis: Although an extraordinary leader can occasionally cause change, more often it is precipitated by a crisis. Military history is replete with examples. The abandonment of static land defenses when the German army overran the French Maginot line in World War II, and the abandonment of the battleship as the centerpiece of the U.S. Navy’s battle force after Pearl Harbor are but two.
Today the military is facing a crisis that is likely to force radical change. The crisis is one of affordability. Shipbuilding budget trends in constant 1990 dollars over a period of 40 years show that the 1960s were characterized by a decline in naval ship building followed by the relatively stable decade of the 1970s. Under the Reagan administration, strong budgets supported the highly successful naval recovery program that promised a 600-ship Navy.
Projections for the next decade indicate a different trend. The five year defense plan shows a 15-20% decrease in naval shipbuilding resources as compared to the Reagan budgets of the 1980s. Some budget analysts are now forecasting funding levels approaching 50% of earlier optimistic predictions.
One conclusion is evident. If the Navy holds on to today’s force architecture and system concepts, the fleet will be far smaller. As the Navy faces budget cuts, the initial tendency is to pro-rate the cuts across existing resource sponsor budgets. This strategy, when coupled with the reluctance to depart from today’s force architecture and system concepts, will guarantee a decline in ships, aircraft, systems, force numbers and strength. The afford-
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ability crisis will force the Navy to address shortcomings that will lead to costly solutions. Solutions that mask shortcomings are inevitably more expansive in the long run.
The time for change is now: In few eras other than war has the world changed as dramatically in such a short time.
I submit that this is the time to depart from the status quo. Let us embark boldly into new system concepts, vaulting our Navy ahead of the competition. Many segments of our society would advocate a significant disarmament during this period of when peace seems to be breaking out all over. I advocate instead a move to systems concepts that address today’s shortcomings far more rapidly than if we were in more intense military competition.
The following five shortcomings of the current surface Navy must be corrected:
- The force is observable
- Individual ships can be identified
- Functions are concentrated
- Logistics are demanding
- Our whole Navy is expensive
These five shortcomings are of such global proportions that component-based rather that system-based changes will be totally inadequate. Fundamental changes to today’s force architecture and system concept will be required. The Navy should begin to transition to a force architecture that emphasizes two thrusts:
- Low observability and signature masking
- Common interchangeable ship components and systems
leading to reduced production costs and logistics demands
The goal should be a surface force that is as mobile as today’s force but which is stealthy, and is distributed rather than concentrated. Today, the enemy is able to mass fire power from ranges outside our shipboard defensive systems because we have ignored signature reduction on the large capital ships of our battle forces—aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and logistic ships. The signatures of these critically important ships of the battle force are equal to or greater than their counterparts of World War II, even though detection and weapon targeting capability have advanced markedly. Furthermore, each of these ships has a recognizable, easily differentiated signature because the ship characteristics are so different.
The capital ships of the battle force are inherently vulnerable. To ensure an acceptable level of survivability, we must invest in extensive defensive systems in the form of aircraft for the outer air battle and shipboard combat systems on Aegis ships. As the threat becomes more challenging, the defensive investment must increase. We can no longer afford the cost of protecting these valuable assets through the combination of expanding our defensive battle space and adding layers of defense, which has been our strategy since World War II. It is a strategy of masking the shortcomings. The more affordable strategy is the modification of ship characteristics that will lead to signature reduction and control. A battle force of ships with significantly lower signatures that are difficult to discriminate will require less extensive and therefore more affordable defensive systems. This is the strategy that will alle-
Wate current shortcomings.
The second part of the transition strategy is to develop multimission ships with far greater commonality of systems. Common machinery design characteristics for the Propeller, prime mover, exhaust system, and auxiliary machinery is consistent with blurring signatures and Would make far more producible systems while reducing logistic demands. Modular components and common outfitting products for berthing, messing, damage control, and other ship functions will allow adoption of much more modem shipbuilding practices.
To achieve breakthrough affordability, we will have to make equally significant changes to the shipbuilding and fleet support infrastructure. Our current shipbuilding process has shortcomings that can be corrected only by a massive restructuring of the industry. Today very nearly all Procurement of ship components and all ship assembly is carried out within a particular shipyard with the help of a government team. Competing shipyards rarely cooperate, even within a given program. A far more distributed industrial infrastructure and a more coordinated shipbuilding Process is attainable. The emphasis would shift to the incorporation of common modular systems produced in efficient process flow lanes. Fully tested modules would be shipped to the various shipbuilder assembly points. The Process flow lanes and fabrication of the modules could be located in supplier factories or supplier shipyards. The fime has come to commit to changes in product and process together. The affordability crisis will force us to make bold, integrated moves.
Conclusions: Radical change is needed in the planning, development, and transition of new technology in the fleet. We must find that customer for change. We can no longer afford to live by slow evolution from the status quo. Let us establish the operational and affordability goals that will meet the fleet’s future requirements and then define and rank the technology clusters to make them attainable. The first such cluster—the integrated electric drive—is already in place. Let us adopt the force architecture and system concepts that can alleviate if not eliminate the shortcomings of today’s Navy, and provide the funding, acquisition, and industrial infrastructures to make true revolutionary change possible. In this period of world change, we should forge ahead of the competition.
The changes I have outlined will not be achieved through evolutionary planning from the bottom up. We need to establish quantitative, time-phased goals to serve as the basis for broad solutions based on overall systems engineering of both the product and the process. I have suggested an alternative force architecture and an alternative industrial infrastructure that can serve as an example for the type of broad thinking and planning needed in this critical transition period for the Navy.
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