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By Michael A. Palmer
The battleships (here, USS Wisconsin [BB- 64] off Kuwait) displayed brawn and brain in providing naval gunfire support during Desert Storm. Their 16-inch guns showed us that the battleships’ big guns have a place in naval and ground operations, while their crews demonstrated exceptional innovation in using remotely piloted vehicles to hunt targets.
At 1835 Eastern Standard Time on 16 January, Americans found their regular nightly newscasts interrupted by live reports from Baghdad—of antiaircraft fire lacing the early morning skies over Saddam Hussein’s capital. An allied air armada swept across Iraq, and in the van were U.S. Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles. Operation Desert Storm had begun. At President George Bush’s direction, U.S. and Coalition forces had begun the liberation of Kuwait.
Desert Storm reflected the traditional American strategic approach to warfare, outlined in a work well known by the American military—Russell F. Weigley’s The American Way of War. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General Colin Powell, remarked, the Coalition would cut off and then eliminate Saddam Hussein’s army in the Kuwaiti theater of operations, in a classic battle of annihilation.
The Joint Air Tasking Order assigned U.S. Navy aircraft and missiles significant missions throughout the campaign. In the early hours of 17 January (the first day of the war, in local time), nine Navy warships, led by the Aegis cruiser Bunker Hill (CG-52), launched Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs) from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. TLAM-Cs and Ds were used against well-defended targets that required precision warheads. Tomahawks also were used successfully to lead strikes in an effort to confuse the enemy before manned aircraft arrived. In an early assessment of the air campaign, General Powell termed the Navy’s Tomahawk “extremely effective.’’ Preliminary, conservative estimates indicate that more than 80% of the TLAMs launched hit their targets.
As the first Tomahawks reached Baghdad in the early morning hours of 17 January, hundreds of allied aircraft swept across Iraq. Both U.S. Air Force E-3C Sentry AWACS (airborne warning and control system) and U.S. Navy E-2C Hawkeyes directed the complex effort that included more than 2,000 first-day sorties. Navy EA-6B Prowlers jammed Iraqi radars, working with both Navy and Air Force strike planes. Navy aircraft flew 415 missions, while surface combatants fired about 100 TLAMs during 17 January.
As the campaign progressed. Navy aircraft flew the entire range of air missions. F-14 Tomcats flew MiGCAP (combat air patrols against Iraqi interceptors), conducted reconnaissance flights, and hunted mobile Scud surface- to-surface missile launchers in western Iraq. The Navy’s integrated carrier air wings proved particularly capable flying suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions. Intruders and Hornets worked in teams destroying such targets as hardened aircraft shelters and bridges. A-6E Intruders lased targets while F/A-18 Hornets released laser- guided bombs. Readers who followed the war closely will recall seeing Royal Air Force Buccaneers and Tornados using similar tactics against Iraqi bridges. Unfortunately, most U.S. Navy aircraft lacked state-of-the-art gun cameras and few successes achieved by naval aviators were captured on quality video.
Because of geographic considerations, aircraft flying from carriers in the Red Sea—initially the John F. Kennedy (CV-67), Saratoga (CV-60), and America (CV-66)— generally concentrated on targets in western Iraq and the Baghdad area. Planes from carriers in the Persian Gulf— the Midway (CV-41) and Ranger (CV-61), later reinforced by the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), which had been steaming east through the Gulf of Aden on 17 January, and the America, shifted around from the Red Sea— concentrated on targets in southeastern Iraq, such as bridges near Basra and naval facilities near Umm Qasr. Despite this geographic focus, the air effort was not divided—as it had been during the Vietnam War—into distinctive service-exclusive “route packages.” Alliance forces conducted theater-wide joint and combined air operations during the entire campaign. And U.S. Navy aircraft did not, despite some media reports, conduct shuttle missions between carriers and bases in Saudi Arabia.
Nor were there any Vietnam-style bombing pauses during Desert Storm; the air war continued without cease. U.S. Navy and other Coalition aircraft continued to pound Iraqi targets and to destroy whatever enemy aircraft took to the air. On 18 January, a pair of VFA-81 F/A-18s carrying iron bombs on a strike mission from the Saratoga downed two MiG-2 Is in an air-to-air duel. On 19 January the nuclear-powered attack submarine Louisville (SSN- 724) launched a Tomahawk from the Red Sea, one of 216 fired by then, and the first in combat from an American submarine. Intruders and A-7E Corsairs from the John F. Kennedy and the Saratoga successfully fired stand-off land attack missiles (SLAMs). These launches were the first for the newly developed SLAM, a ground-attack version of the Harpoon. By the end of the first week of the air war, the allies had achieved “air superiority” over Iraq
and Kuwait. As their air defense system collapsed, the Iraqis moved aircraft north away from the front and then, in late January, to airfields in neutral Iran. Saddam’s air defense system had not only collapsed, but had also failed to down more than a handful of allied aircraft. Throughout the air campaign, the attrition rate remained far below that projected by many “experts,” and even significantly below the forecasts of Desert Storm’s planners.
By 30 January, the sortie total had reached 33,300; Navy aircraft had flown 4,700. More than 250 Tomahawks had been launched. All 31 strategic targets— including nuclear, chemical and biological sites—had been hit, and most destroyed. Of 26 command-and-control centers, 60% had been severely damaged or destroyed, leaving a third of Iraq’s command-and-control system inoperative. A quarter of Saddam’s electric-generating plants were out of operation and the system as a whole had been reduced in effectiveness by half. Allied aircraft had bombed 29 major air-defense installations. Of the 44 targeted airfields, 38 had been hit and 9 rendered inoperative. About 70 hardened aircraft shelters had been destroyed. Of 36 targeted bridges, 33 had been bombed. The average daily flow of supplies from Iraq into the Kuwaiti theater of operations had been reduced from 20,000 to 2,000 tons. And 29 Iraqi aircraft had been downed in air- to-air combat, without an allied loss.
Of particular interest to the U.S. Navy were those targets that posed a threat to its operations in the northern Persian Gulf, such as Iraqi missile-capable ships, Silkworm launchers, minelayers, offshore oil rigs, and missile and mine-storage depots near Kuwait City, Basra, and Umm Qasr.
On 18 January the frigate USS Nicholas (FFG-47), supported by Army helicopters and a Kuwaiti patrol boat, attacked 11 oil platforms from which Iraqi troops had launched surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). In a small but effective combined operation, five Iraqis were killed, three wounded, and 23 taken prisoner. On 22 January, four Intruders disabled an Iraqi T-43 minelayer. On 23 January, Navy A-6Es disabled an Iraqi tanker acting as an intelligence collector. Other Navy aircraft sank a Zhuk patrol boat and a hovercraft. On 24 January, Intruders sank another Zhuk and a minelayer. The frigate Curts (FFG-38) took 51 Iraqi prisoners during an engagement that led to the recapture of Jazirat Qurah Island. A-6s and F/A-18s attacked Iraq’s Umm Qasr naval base and damaged four ships.
Throughout late January, Navy aircraft continued to attack minelayers, patrol boats, and shore installations. On 29 January, Intruders destroyed a pair of Silkworm missile-launcher sites along the central Kuwaiti coast; Hornets bombed an oil refinery near Basra. On 30 January, A-6Es attacked three amphibious landing craft near the Shatt-al- Arab, fleeing toward Iran. The Curts later rescued 20 Iraqis from a sinking amphibious craft. On 2 February, the Navy had a busy day. Intruders bombed the A1 Kalia naval facility. An Exocet-capable patrol boat was struck by two laser-guided bombs. A string of 500-pound bombs straddled a second boat and generated secondary explosions on the adjacent pier. Helicopters from the Nicholas engaged four Iraqi patrol boats near Maradim Island, destroying one and damaging two. Other A-6Es scored a direct hit on an Iraqi patrol boat in Kuwait City harbor. By 3 February, the destruction of all patrol craft capable of launching antiship missiles rendered Iraqi naval forces “combat ineffective.” By the time the campaign ended, allied forces had sunk 13 Iraqi combatants, three auxiliaries, and three amphibious ships and had damaged one combatant, four auxiliaries, and one amphibious vessel.
The virtual elimination of the Iraqi Navy opened the way for the next phase of naval operations in the northern Persian Gulf. On 3 February, the Nicholas, using mine avoidance sonar, led the Missouri (BB-63) through the mined waters toward the coast. The battlewagon fired 16- inch shells at prefabricated concrete bunkers along the Kuwaiti coast. On 6 February, the Wisconsin (BB-64) re-
lieved the Missouri on the gun line. Operating with the Nicholas, the Wisconsin continued the bombardment of Iraqi positions. On 8 February, the battleship, using her unmanned remotely piloted vehicle to spot, supported a Marine Corps probe into Iraqi defenses in southern Kuwait. Over a two-day period (8-9 February), the Wisconsin fired 112 16-inch shells.
The air war was now nearing the conclusion of phase three—the isolation and preparation of the battlefield. On 11 February, after a two-day tour of the Gulf, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and JCS Chairman General Colin Powell gave President Bush a progress report on the campaign. The President gave the go-ahead for the ground war and Commander in Chief, Central Command (CinCCent),
Front-line Lessons_________
As the “Mother of All Battles” turns into the “Mother of All Retreats,” it has exposed a number of lessons for us to learn or relearn. That said, let’s wade right in.
Amphibious Operations
Planning, as always, proved to be critical in a chain of events that addressed an assault, then a raid, and, finally, a feint. The time-line for execution proved to be exceedingly difficult to forecast, implement, and meet. Three major obstacles delayed operations: mine clearing, weather conditions, and the question of whether the anticipated operation actually contributed to the commander-in-chiefs overall campaign plan. The delays, which were also greatly affected by a significant enemy threat, brought the wisdom of conducting any amphibious operation into question. The limited area in which any operation could occur further exacerbated the problem. The Marines faced the prospect of having to land and attack into Iraqi strength. The only value of a continued effort to conduct an amphibious operation was that the Iraqis expected such a move and committed significant forces to counter the landing that never came. The deception worked, even if it did tie up a considerable amount of our assets, too.
Amphibious doctrine appears to have been disregarded. One can only surmise that all the doctrinal planning was done and subsequent documents drafted. This was not in evidence at higher staff levels, however. A lot of second-guessing followed. To confuse the situation further, a new vocabulary of expressions and phrases replaced the standard terminology. Fortunately, telephone communications held, and the various staffs worked through problems as they cropped up. Maybe that was part of the overall deception plan; if so, it also worked (on us, too).
Naval Gunfire Support
Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) became critical to the Navy’s support of the ground campaign. The battleships’ big guns definitely have a place in naval and ground operations. Sadly, the same cannot be said for the five-inch guns, which we never brought into action.
It was a matter of great fortune that the battleships were already activated and available to contribute to the war effort.
The concept of NGFS employment was slow in evolving, and failed to consider all the potential users. There was concern that apportionment was unduly constrained as a result of politics rather than military reasons. Once the ice was broken, NGFS became a major contributor in breaking the Iraqis’ will to fight.
We need to work on applying doctrine, or changing it. We did not use the standard documents associated with naval gunfire support, which resulted in confusion. We need to familiarize the Army with the current concept of NGFS, as well as its capabilities and limitations. Supporting documentation, such as lists of targets, fire support overlays, and standard naval gunfire support plans also require review. A number of Navy and Marine Corps personnel would benefit from this study, too.
There was hesitation in the allocation of firing platforms because of the considerable mine threat. And because we did not employ the five-inch gun platforms, some questioned the Navy’s overall support of the ground campaign. We massaged NGFS until it worked.
On the brighter side, the battleship crews showed exceptional innovation in using remotely piloted vehicles to generate valid targets, and to obtain battle damage assessments (BDA) from their firing missions. That may have helped solve the greatest problem of NGFS—communication.
Battle Damage Assessment
The accuracy of BDA reports left much to be desired. If you believed everything you read, the U.S. Navy sank the entire Iraqi Navy a number of times. Loose terminology also created confusion at a time when factuality was crucial. Ambiguity must be reduced to the lowest possible level. It would be better to report “target(s) missed” than to pass “hits in target area.” Granted, pilots had their hands full with enemy tire and the effects of weather and other artificial impediments (i.e., smoke from the oil fires), but the impact of inaccurate reports must be properly weighed against submitting ambiguous reports. We still have much work to do on BDA.
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf set the date for the attack—21 February, later delayed for in-theater reasons to 23 February.
As D-Day drew near, U.S. naval forces concentrated in the northern Persian Gulf for a possible amphibious assault. Unfortunately, on 18 February Iraqi mines damaged the amphibious assault ship Tripoli (LPH-10) and the
Aegis cruiser Princeton (CG-59). The Tripoli remained combat capable, although she had a 20-foot x 20-foot hole blown in her bow. The Princeton, although still mission capable, returned to port. Clearly, the Iraqis, having had five months to mine the coastal approaches to Kuwait, had made a Marine landing problematic. U.S. amphibious and support forces nevertheless remained on station. On
• By Lieutenant Commander Michael C. Braunbeck, U.S. Navy
Mine Warfare
Another topic that came back to haunt us was the venerable, cheap, unexotic, and highly effective mine. Iraqi mines significantly affected our plans to conduct amphibious operations and employ NGFS. They also promise to occupy our attention for some time to come. They significantly damaged the USS Princeton (CG- 59) and Tripoli (LPH-10). It wasn’t that long ago that the Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) provided us the same lesson. What did we learn?
Mines are still difficult to clear, and this war has shown that aerial mine-clearing measures are not the best way to address this problem. Six new mine countermeasures ships are not the best way, either. We need to stop waffling and get down to the business of building a force of real mine countermeasures ships. How many more ships must we sacrifice before the lightbulb comes on?
The Unconventional Threat
We witnessed massive oil slicks in the Persian Gulf that will have long-lasting effects on the environment. While that does not seem to be a military problem, the fact that we steam in the area of those slicks and make feed and fresh water from those polluted waters adds military operational significance to that act of environmental terrorism.
US NAVY (B MORRIS)
The other unconventional threat worth reviewing was the threat of the use of biological and chemical weapons against Navy and Marine Corps personnel (and everyone else, too). The lessons we learned were that simplicity in protective equipment design (i.e., masks and filters) and lightweight protective clothing are necessary to function in these threat environments. The climatology needs to be factored into future designs, too. Put on the gear we have now, and go into an operating fireroom if one has any doubt.
The battleships’ 16-inch guns (here, the Wisconsin's) were impressive during Desert Storm. In fact, there are reports that at the first signs of impending 16-inch gunfire—i.e., one of the battleships’ remotely piloted vehicles overhead to spot for the firing—Iraqi soldiers surrendered.
We need to update the training of all personnel in the latest self-protection equipment and techniques. We may not have the luxury of time in the next crisis.
There are many new experts on a host of topics as a result of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I encourage those people to share their experiences so we get it all right the next time.
Commander Braunbeck was assigned as an augmentee to the Navy Desk of the Coalition, Coordination, Communication and Integration Center, throughout Desert Storm, in addition to his normal assignment to the Joint Section, U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia.
The date of 18 February punctuated the mine threat to a potential amphibious landing of Marines in Kuwait. On that day, both the cruiser Princeton (CG-59) and the amphibious assault ship Tripoli (LPH-10)— here, on 17 February, operating her mine countermeasures helicopters and sleds—struck mines.
23 February, the Missouri shelled Iraqi positions on Faylakah Island.
At 0400 local time, 24 February, the fourth and final phase of the campaign began. In the northern Persian Gulf, U.S. battleships went into action as amphibious forces moved toward the coast and mine countermeasures (MCM) assets tackled the minefields. The Iraqis fired a pair of Silkworms at the Missouri. One fell harmlessly into the Gulf. The British destroyer Gloucester, alerted by a U.S. Navy Prowler, destroyed the second Silkworm with two Sea Darts. U.S. Navy attack aircraft, flying from the four carriers now operating in the central Persian Gulf, responded quickly, striking the launching site.
The Navy’s movements in the northern Persian Gulf were meant to exploit Saddam’s demonstrated fear of an amphibious assault and to pin as many Iraqi units as possible to the Kuwaiti coast. Since the fall, Central Command had allowed the media to cover in-theater amphibious exercises, including Sea Soldier IV, staged on 24 January, which involved elements of the Marine Corps’s 4th and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigades and Amphibious Task Forces 2 and 3. The exercise was the largest amphibious operation since Inchon.
But the presence of Navy and Marine forces in the northern Persian Gulf in mid-February was not just a deception operation, for the units involved were fully capable of landing and had plans for a variety of amphibious contingencies. As General Schwarzkopf made clear in his 27 February briefing: “We had every intention of conducting amphibious operations if they were necessary. . . .” But given the rapid advance of allied ground forces, including those of I Marine Expeditionery Force, between 23 and 25 February, the risks to men and ships outweighed the possible benefits of an amphibious landing.
Nevertheless, the Navy still had an important role to play in the continuing air war. Bomb and missile-armed Hornets and Intruders provided close-air support to Coalition ground forces. On 26 February, A-6Es joined other allied aircraft striking Iraqi columns fleeing north from Kuwait City along the highway to Basra. The battleships fired their final salvos. During the campaign they expended 1,100 16-inch shells—more than two million j pounds of ordnance. The Navy-Marine Corps aviation team, which included about a quarter of all alliance aircraft, flew 25%—about 26,000—of the 103,000 sorties flown. On 28 February, President Bush declared a cessation of hostilities. The campaign had ended.
Desert Storm was a model military operation, brilliant in conception, equally brilliant in execution. To destroy an army of a half-million men, be they first-, second-, or even third-rate troops, while losing fewer than 150 killed in action is a masterful, almost miraculous achievement.
While air power was critical to allied success in Desert Storm, ground and naval forces also played important roles. Marine, Army, and Coalition ground units provided the “Shield” that protected the Saudi bases from which most of the Allied aircraft flew, and ultimately provided the coup de grace to the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. United States and allied navies covered the early buildup and supported the air and ground campaigns.
In fact, Desert Shield/Storm was an extension of U.S. sea power, broadly defined. About 95% of the material intheater—more than 18 billion pounds—arrived by sea.
The operation was also a triumph of jointness. That is not to say that there were no problems. There were, and efforts to maximize interoperability will continue. But the success of the campaign makes obvious the advances achieved in recent years. For example, despite the scale and complexity of the air effort, there were no “blue-on- blue,” that is, friendly-versus-friendly air engagements.
While detailed studies to identify the “lessons” of the war have yet to be completed, there are certain preliminary judgments that can be made. Jointness, electronic i countermeasures, stealth, cruise, and other high-technolo-
Table 2 U.S. Navy Aircraft Losses
Combat l F-14 Tomcat 4 A-6E Intruders 1 F/A-18 Hornet
Note: Total allied aircraft losses, both combat and non-combat, fixed- wing and rotary, during Operation Desert Storm totalled 67: United States, 56; Allied, 11. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps losses totalled 21. Iraqi losses in air-to-air combat included 36 fixed wing and 6 rotary.
Non-Combat
- A-6E Intruder
- F/A-18 Hornets
1 SH-60 Sea Hawk 1 CH-46 Sea Knight
I
.
VF-14
VF-32
VA-46
VA-72
VA-75
VAW-126
VAQ-130
VS-22
HS-7
F-14A
F-14A
A-7E
A-7E
A-6E/KA-6D
E-2C
EA-6B
S-3B
SH-3H
America (CV-66)
CVW-1
VF-33 F-14A
VF-102 F-14A
VF/A-82 F/A-18C
VF/A-86 F/A-18C
VA-85 A-6E/KA-6D
VAW-123 E-2C
VAQ-137 EA-6B
VS-32 S-3B
HS-ll SH-3H
Saratoga (CV-60) | Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71 | ||
| CVW-17 |
| CVW-8 |
VF-74 | F-I4A + | VF-41 | F-14A |
VF-103 | F-14A+ | VF-84 | F-I4A |
VF/A-81 | F/A-18C | VF/A-15 | F/A-18A |
VF/A-31 | F/A-18C | VF/A-87 | F/A-18A |
VA-35 | A-6E/KA-6D | VA-36 | A-6E |
VAW-125 | E-2C | VA-65 | A-6E |
VAQ-132 | EA-6B | VAW-124 | E-2C |
VS-30 | S-3B | VAQ-141 | EA-6B |
HS-3 | SH-3H | VS-24 | S-3B |
|
| HS-9 | SH-3H |
Ranger (CV-61) |
|
| |
| CVW-2 | Midway (CV-41) | |
VF-I | F-14A |
| CVW-5 |
VF-2 | F-14A | VF/A-151 | F/A-18A |
VA-145 | A-6E | VF/A-192 | F/A-18A |
VA-155 | A-6E | VF/A-195 | F/A-18A |
VAW-116 | E-2C | VA-115 | A-6E/KA-6D |
VAQ-131 | EA-6B | VA-185 | A-6E/KA-6D |
VS-28 | S-3A | VAW-115 | E-2C |
HS-14 | SH-3H | VAQ-136 | EA-6B |
Patrol (VP) Squadrons (P-3C) | HS-12 | SH-3H | |
VP-4 | VP-46 |
|
|
VP-8 | VP-91 |
|
|
VP-19 | VP-MAU |
|
|
VP-40
Electronic Warfare (VQ) Squadons
VQ-1 EP-3E
VQ-2 EP-3E, EA-3B
(Compiled by LCDR Richard R. Burgess, Naval Aviation News)
VFA-151/GREG MATHIESON/MAI
gies worked. But simple, dumb weapons worked, too. Extensive Iraqi minefields in the northern Persian Gulf did limit alliance amphibious options.
And let us not forget that despite the dramatic successes of the campaign, more than 300 Americans lost their lives during the course of Operation Desert Shield/Storm. For the families and friends of those Americans, the “low” human cost of the operation provides little comfort. Remember, too, the hundreds of Coalition soldiers, sailors, and airmen who likewise made the ultimate sacrifice for victory. And the people who paid the heaviest cost were the thousands of Kuwaitis who were tortured and killed in a country purposefully and systematically devastated by Saddam Hussein. Nor should we forget that many thousands of Iraqi soldiers and hundreds of civilians paid with their lives for Saddam’s miscalculations.
Deterrence, be it of global or regional crises, remains preferable to—and more economical than—conflict. The United States needs a strong, clearly annunciated national policy backed by a powerful, capable military.
And in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean basin, naval forces will provide the cutting, visible edge of that American capability. When the current Gulf crisis finally ends, most, if not all American ground forces and land- based air assets will return to the United States or Europe. But the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team, albeit in reduced form, will remain in the region, maintaining an American presence that can be traced back to the late 1940s and the establishment of the U.S. Navy’s Middle East Force.
Dr. Palmer is a historian with the Contemporary History Braneh of the Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C. He is the author of several books and articles on naval policy, strategy, and operations, including a forthcoming official history of the U.S. Navy and the Persian Gulf.