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By Captain Douglas M. Norton, U.S. Navy
Eight days after a no-notice start, our first heavy ground combat equipment arrived by sea in Saudi Arabia, opening a maritime bridge that would carry 95% of the cargo for Desert Shield/Storm. Was this a triumph of foresightedness, a final dash across a thawing pond, or all of the above?
President George Bush’s decision on 7 August 1990 to deploy U.S. Forces to Saudi Arabia found the Military Sealift Command (MSC) conducting normal worldwide operations with 137 ships. Eight days later, MSC’s Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Two delivered the first heavy ground combat equipment at the Saudi port of Jubail. On 13 August, the first of eight 55,000-ton fast sealift ships left the U.S. Gulf Coast with heavy equipment of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, on an 8,700-mile voyage at an average speed of 27 knots.
These were the first elements in a bridge of ships
The deployment was a human triumph of initiative, training, and organization; a payoff from $7 billion invested in strategic sealift during the 1980s; validation of the recently formed U.S. Transportation Command (USTransCom); and proof that the concept of afloat prepositioning is sound.
If misunderstood, however, this triumph can become a facade, putting a too-pleasant face on reality. That will happen if government and industry fail to look behind the success, fail to acknowledge the contribution of unusually favorable circumstances, and thus fail to attack the wasting disease from which a key component of that success, the U.S. maritime industry, is dying. That industry supported Desert Shield, but in the manner that melting ice supports a skater on a final dash across a thawing pond. Only the ready availability of foreign-flag shipping kept this fragile maritime condition from seriously limiting the deployment of U.S. forces.
Sealift Readiness
thrown across the oceans, over which tanks, trucks, helicopters, artillery—and other unit equipment and fuel— flowed into Saudi Arabia at an unprecedented rate. After three weeks, more tonnage had been deployed than in the first three months of the no-notice deployment to the Korean War. Within four months, the initial sealift was complete: 1.18 million short tons of cargo and more than two million short tons of fuels—95% of the total cargo deployed. Sea lift was the keystone of logistic support of operation Desert Shield.1 work together to meet military needs for sea transportation of cargoes, under the aegis of the Defense Transportation System (DTS). After coordinating with the shipping unit to determine the requirement, MTMC schedules the lift and arranges cargo handling. In turn, MSC accomplishes the sealift as requested, primarily through U.S.-flag shipping lines, but using the MSC-controlled fleet or foreign- flag ships, if required.
The Transportation Command remains abreast of DTS sealift operations, but—until a contingency or war occurs—
remains focused upon joint deployment planning.2 When the National Command Authority directs a joint deployment, USTransCom’s Commander-in-Chief (US- CinCTrans) executes it, commanding all the machinery of deployment, including the Military Airlift Command (MAC), MSC, and MTMC. Following a schedule developed with the supported commander-in-chief, US- CinCTrans delivers the people and their equipment to their specified destinations.
The Military Sealift Command is a global sea-transportation organization, and provides the sealift needed to deploy and sustain U.S. forces overseas. To do this, it relies heavily on the U.S.-flag merchant marine and is the largest single employer of U.S. merchant mariners. Functionally, its ships are organized into the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force, the Special Mission Force, and—of highest recent interest—the Strategic Sealift Force.
The Strategic Sealift Force includes active and standby ships. The active force—sized each year to handle those predicted requirements beyond the capability of U.S.-flag commercial shipping companies—consists of roll-on, roll-off (RO-RO) and breakbulk ships and handy-size tankers chartered from U.S.-flag ship owners and run by U.S. ship-operating companies. The standby force is on call, at readiness periods ranging from immediate to 20 days.
Immediately available—loaded and forward deployed with full crews on board—are 11 afloat prepositioning ships (APSs) and 13 specially configured maritime prepositioning ships (MPSs). All APSs and MPSs are U.S.-flag merchant ships with merchant crews. They are assigned to squadrons commanded by Navy captains, embarked with their staffs.
Berthed in U.S. ports are a squadron of fast sealift ships (FSSs), two hospital ships (T-AHs), and two Marine Corps aviation-support ships (T-AVBs). The FSSs and
standby for MSC use.3
The Commander of the Military Sealift Command and the Administrator of MarAd collaborate in the running of the RRF. Except for certain ship modifications, MarAd funds all aspects of the RRF. For its part, the MSC specifies the mix of ship types, the size of the RRF, and the readiness levels of the ships. Readiness is assessed by both scheduled and no-notice activations. MarAd responds as possible within funding limits. Contingency activation may occur by presidential action or at the request of the MSC commander, when commercial ships and other segments of the active strategic sealift force cannot meet the supported commander’s requirements. MarAd is responsible for activating the requested ships and turning them over to MSC operational control.
No-Notice Joint Deployment
Following the 7 August deployment order, US- CinCTrans became a supporting commander for Operation Desert Shield, exercising command of all joint airlift, sealift and traffic management assets, worldwide. Operational control was exercised by component commanders MAC, MSC, and MTMC. The supported field commander was the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command (USCinCCent).
Like so much else in 1990, Operation Desert Shield differed significantly from planning scenarios. The Transportation Command thus had to deploy forces while simultaneously responding to USCinCCent’s developing deployment-flow plans. Some equipment clearly needed to move immediately, but much more of the total requirement had to evolve in accord with USCinCCent’s changing needs.
The experienced partnerships in the Defense Transportation System proved quite valuable in this climate of ur-
T-AHs are Navy-owned; the T-AVBs are owned by the Maritime Administration (MarAd). The eight FSSs are in four-day readiness status with nucleus crews, and are designated Fast Sealift Squadron One, also commanded by a Navy captain with an embarked staff. The hospital and aviation ships are in five-day readiness. Also in U.S. ports, unmanned, is the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) of government-owned merchant ships, which have been modified as necessary to make them militarily useful, and which are maintained by MarAd in 5-, 10-, or 20-day
gent and changing movement requirements and priorities. With contacts and knowledge developed through support of major live exercises with troops such as Reforger (Germany) and Team Spirit, (South Korea), the transportation veterans in MAC, MSC, and MTMC knew how to reach deploying unit transportation officers, what questions to ask and how to assess and select needed commercial and Reserve-unit capabilities quickly. Automated systems helped, but this network of experienced people was the key to success at every level.
Rapid Response By Afloat Prepositioning
Two of three MPS squadrons and ten afloat prepositioning ships sailed immediately for Saudi ports. The Commander, MSC, also directed the activation of the eight fast sealift ships.
First to arrive in Saudi Arabia, on 15 August, were the maritime prepositioning ships, uniquely equipped commercial ships leased by the Navy and operated by the Maersk Line, American Overseas Marine Corporation, and Waterman Steam Ship Corporation. Met by airlifted Marines who had practiced the procedure in periodic exercises, the ships were unloaded rapidly in a large, modern port. MPS Squadrons Two and Three delivered heavy combat equipment and 30 days’ supplies for 33,000 airlifted Marines.
The payoff from some special aspects of the MPS program was apparent. Equipment emerged in good shape from the temperature- and humidity-controlled storage holds. The benefits of a program that included both minor checks on board ship and depot-level maintenance every 30 months—plus the periodic unloading exercises by the Marines—were clear. The load-planning concept was proved as well. Spread loading meant that the later arrival of three ships, which were off-station on 7 August for exercises or depot-level cargo maintenance, did not leave the Marines short of any particular items of equipment.
The MPS approach of long-term lease from commercial owners and operation by U.S. merchant crews was validated, too. The crews had every reason to expect that they would be sailing into combat when they rang up flank speed on 7 August, but there was no delay: the orders came and the ships went. The owners insisted on the reassurance of commercial insurance for their investments, and MSC obtained this without delaying the employment of the ships.
As expected, MSC naval reservists filled key roles in the deployment. They enabled MSC headquarters and area commands to conduct intense, around-the-clock operations. As they had in training exercises. Reservists augmented the staff of MSC’s European commander, who directed MSC Middle Eastern operations until the establishment of MSC’s Southwest Asia Command in Saudi Arabia. As the second-phase deployment gathered momentum, reserve flag officers established a “watch bill” at Military Sealift Command Office, Northern Europe, for liaison and trouble-shooting with the U.S. Army, Europe, and the U.S. European Command. Other reservists filled critical roles at the embarkation ports.
Deploying By Fast Sealift
On 7 August, Fast Sealift Squadron One, at layberths with maintenance crews in 96-hour readiness, was directed to activate. The eight modified SL-7s, one of which was undergoing major maintenance, made ready. Operated under contract by International Marine Carriers, Inc. and Bay Tankers, Inc. their immediate task was to load the equipment of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division at U.S. East Coast ports and deliver it to Ad Dammam, Saudi Arabia.
The first, the USNS Capella (T-AKR-293) arrived in Savannah on 11 August and sailed for Ad Dammam on 14 August with 130,000 square feet of outsize cargo, including M-l tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and trucks. Covering the 8,700 miles at an average speed of 27 knots, the Capella began unloading in Ad Damman on 27 August. Six more FSSs and three commercial ships followed. The sealift of the division’s equipment was completed on 13 September, 12 days behind schedule, owing to an engineering casualty that required transfer of the USNS An- tares’s (T-AKR-294) cargo to another FSS.4
Ships From Many Sources
Following sealift acquisition plans, MSC turned to a variety of sources.5 When a U.S. company offered ships that met the requirement, they were employed. However, commercial service is concentrated in the container trade. Most unit equipment (for example, military vehicles and helicopters) cannot be containerized. This, combined with the urgency of the deployment, soon mandated entry into the charter market and the RRF—to obtain RO-RO, lighter aboardship (LASH), and breakbulk ships.
A need for RO-ROs, scarce in the U.S.-flag fleet, led the Commander, MSC, to request, on 10 August, the activation of all 17 RRF vessels of this type. This situation also required going to foreign-flag charter when all available U.S. RO-ROs had been chartered. By 13 September, MSC had chartered 10 U.S.-flag and 35 foreign-flag ships registered in 11 nations, and was operating 33 RRF ships.
Activation of ships from the RRF was challenging for the Maritime Administration, the ship operators, and the ship-repair facilities. Despite difficulties, RRF activation produced more successes than failures as MarAd employees, mariners, and shipyard workers put their backs into the effort. Speaking to a gathering in mid-October, the Commander, MSC said, “I thought the response of the Ready Reserve Force ships, considering their age and the fact that they have been lying idle, was excellent. Eleven of the first 44 ships we activated were ready to sail on time; 13 were one-to-five days late; 10 were six-to-ten days late and 10 were eleven-to-twenty days late.”6
Once activated and placed under MSC operational control the RRF ships, operated by U.S. ship companies, performed satisfactorily. Incidents such as the failure of the SS Gulf Banker's boilers within eight hours after sailing for the Middle East, and the cancellation of the SS Cape Florida's activation because of boiler problems produced some scathing press, but by MSC analysis the overall op-
erationally ready rate—for the 169 ships used in Desert Shield from 7 August to 30 November—was about 95%.
Phase One of the Desert Shield deployment was completed on 5 December, almost four months after the deployment order. Virtually all of USCinCCent’s planned requirement had been delivered by 11 November, however. Most of that accomplishment came through the resources of the U.S. Merchant Marine, but the contribution of foreign-flag ships and seamen—though in the minority— was significant. Of the 173 ships used in the initial deployment, 49 (28%) were foreign-flag. In terms of tonnage, however, only 15% was delivered by foreign-flag ships.7
The Second Deployment Phase_____________________
On 8 November, the Secretary of Defense directed the deployment of additional units, roughly 200,000 more people. This meant sealifting about eight million square feet of unit equipment from Europe and five million from the United States, in time for the units to be combat-ready by 15 January 1991. The time required to ready the equipment for desert warfare before shipment and the impact of North Atlantic winter weather upon voyages from Europe combined to impose a tight schedule. The availability of foreign-flag shipping became a significant factor in meeting the January 15 deadline, according to the Transportation Command’s deputy commander.8
This is a good example of the sensitivity of deployment lift requirements to the time available for movement—and the uncertainty this poses when planners are asked “How much capacity is enough?” The Military Sealift Command directed ships to European ports after their phase- one-deployment cargo was delivered. About a dozen were
there by 12 November. Had cargo been available in time to permit the MSC ships available in November to make multiple voyages, the requirement for foreign-flag ships would have been reduced.
The MPS force also had an important role in Phase Two. MPS Squadron One, not employed in Phase One, delivered its equipment 13 December for a third Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
Evaluating Sealift Operations
Space does not permit a full evaluation of the Desert Shield sealift operation, but an overview is possible. Any valid evaluation must commence by acknowledging the circumstances:
- There was no warning time to prepare for the deployment. “Come as you are” emerged from cliche as truth in Desert Shield.
- The President developed an international consensus supporting U.S. deployment. Other governments, in turn, favored participation of their merchant ships in this effort.
- The U.S. defense establishment had long been exercising NATO rapid-reenforcement plans. This called for the urgent sealift of many of the units that deployed in Desert Shield. Practicing the logistics with real people, ships and aircraft provided an edge of experience that was crucial, even in the very different circumstances of Desert Shield.
- The undamaged ports of Saudi Arabia are among the most modern in the world, and there was no attrition from the enemy as the forces deployed across 8,700-mile sea lines of communication.
► A major move to Southwest Asia has, for years, been rated the most difficult of all likely U.S. military deployments. However, embedded in that evaluation was the assumption that we would have to do it using only U.S. resources, or in the context of a global war. Desert Shield faced neither constraint.
Lessons Learned
Keeping the correct context in mind, we can measure the sealift support of the Desert Shield deployment from several perspectives, and offer some observations: First, how well were the deployment requirements met? The force did not arrive in Saudi Arabia as rapidly as we wanted. Nevertheless, the force deployed was much larger than the force described in the previously approved operations plan, and the pre-deployment-preparation time (warning time) assumed by that plan just did not exist. Under these circumstances, entering the arcane arena of the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to compare actual arrival dates to specified ear- liest-arrival dates and latest-arrival dates (EADs/LADs) is like tabulating the statistics of a place kicker trying to split moving goal posts. “Imperfect, but with remarkable success” is a realistic overall assessment.
To see what can be learned from an initial examination of the deployment, it is more useful to look at processes and resources. From such an approach the following observations emerge:
- Experienced people are the essential lubricant of the joint deployment mechanism. The JOPES is important but it is as vulnerable to GIGO (garbage in, garbage out) as any other management system. Military reservists, armed with experience gained on active duty during deployment exercises, and in many cases with the knowledge of a civilian career in transportation, helped a great deal.
- Familiarity breeds success. Joint deployment worked because it has been practiced and analyzed. Sealift requirements were established and ships with the right capabilities were assigned because MSC and MTMC do that every day on a smaller scale, to support forward deployed units and live exercises. The MSC calls for activation of a few RRF ships every year. And much is owed to the experience gained from live exercises involving the MPS and FSS Squadrons, Marines and Army.
- Foreign flag ships were readily available and used in both phases of the Desert Shield deployment. During Phase One, they delivered 15% of the dry-cargo tonnage. By the end of Phase Two, dry-cargo tonnage delivered by foreign-flag ships rose to 22%. In an interview after Desert Storm began, the Deputy Commander of the Transportation Command characterized the foreign ships as “essential” to meeting the 15 January deadline.9 Since the U.S. government was not compelled to use its authority to take control of all U.S. merchant ships—some powers, including requisition, were not employed—it is uncertain what the outcome would have been with fewer or no foreign- flag ships available. In other words, we have a shortfall in surge shipping capacity, but it is not necessarily 22%.
- The RRF met the challenge, but with difficulties that should remind the nation that such a force is no substitute for a large, healthy U.S. maritime industry. The RRF activation was hampered by unfunded maintenance. This rapid activation of about half the ships severely stressed both the supply of qualified American mariners and the nation’s maritime industrial capability, as well.10 The mix of ships and readiness levels did not match the needs of Desert Shield. Concerns about manning were sharpened because the mostly steam-driven RRF was at odds with the predominantly diesel experience of currently active licensed engineers.
- The marketplace responded well, but. Despite both good will and the profit motive, the laws of physics limited the markets’ ability to meet Desert Shield timetables. Some ships available for charter did not have the military- cargo capability needed. Others had prior cargoes to deliver, and could not arrive back in U.S. ports when required.
Implications—But Approach With Caution
It is tempting to use Desert Shield/Storm as the basis for assessing, defining, funding, and procuring future deployment requirements for sealift. Such a course would make significant investments on the basis of cart-before-the- horse analysis. The President has announced a revised national security strategy and a modified force structure. Requirements for deployment shipping should be assessed after the details of the modified force have been sufficiently agreed to permit sizing the contingency deployment force.
This does not say that we can conclude nothing from the operation, or that no measures can be undertaken until all analyses have been completed. Clear implications exist for afloat prepositioning, fast sealift and the RRF.
The afloat prepositioning program was validated by Desert Shield. Its rapid response was crucial, in this nonotice operation. The MPS equipment proved to be superior to APS in readiness, and MPS procedures should form the basis of future investments in afloat prepositioning. Analysts should examine the costs and other tradeoffs between afloat prepositioning and other means of meeting the surge requirement for early delivery of unit equipment. One outcome of such analysis might be to expand MPS to the maximum extent affordable, and then structure fast sealift and the RRF to fill in remaining unit-equipment sealift needs.
Reforger and other exercises had proved the worth of the fast-sealift ships. Desert Shield served to refine existing procedures. Under most scenarios, the numbers of FSS required and the speed they need is related to the amount of afloat-prepositioned equipment, which will be the first heavy unit equipment to arrive. Thus, until the extent of afloat prepositioning has been determined, there is little analytical basis for major expansion of fast sealift capabilities. The power plant of future fast sealift ships should be one which is commonly used in the merchant fleet. Reliance upon huge steam power plants, or upon other technologies unique to those ships, would impose severe operating challenges. Perhaps a useful interim measure to improve fast sealift would be a phased reengineering program for the FSS.
Desert Shield sends several clear signals about the RRF:
- The RRF is no better than the numbers and skills of mariners available for crews.
- The RRF is no better than the maritime industrial base available to activate the ships.
- Expansion of the RRF should not exceed the limits imposed by the human and industrial base. The current RRF may have reached that point. Analysts should consider procedural and budgetary changes to ease the activation bottleneck.
- A healthy U.S. Merchant Marine—of sufficient size and military cargo capability to fill in behind the early arriving afloat prepositioning ships and fast sealift ships to complete surge sea lift—would not face the difficulties of reactivation. But U.S. ships dispersed along the world’s trade routes would be malpositioned to carry the initial- surge deployment cargoes.
The numbers and types of ships required for surge deployment are very sensitive to the assumptions made about the forces to be deployed, the pace of deployment, and the destination ports. If capability to rapidly deploy an armored corps is required, the number of RO-ROs in the RRF should be increased. But one purpose of the RRF is to ensure the availability of ships appropriate for various military-cargo and discharge-port situations. Types less needed for Desert Shield could be very important in a deployment to less-developed or damaged ports.
The Merchant Marine And National Defense
The President’s Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense predicted the challenges that were overcome by good fortune and the work of skilled, dedicated Americans during Desert Shield. The Commission concluded in its first report (1987) that the Merchant Marine and its industrial base fell short of meeting national security requirements at that time, and would continue to decline, absent major effort by government and industry. Three additional reports were produced, including the final report, in 1989, “A Call for Action,” but little has occurred. The recently approved National Sealift Policy has had no effect on the waterfront.
In 1988 the Commission’s third report said “There is today insufficient strategic sealift, both [in] ships and trained personnel, for the United States, using only its own resources, ... to execute a major contingency operation in a single distant theater such as Southwest Asia.” The Commission stated that “. . . without decisive and effective action. . .” the number of ships and mariners would be only half the 1988 level by the year 2000. It asserted that increasing the size of the RRF was “an insufficient and inadequate response” since the maritime work force would dwindle to inadequacy by 2000 and the ships would age to unreliability."
It would be ironic and tragic if the success of the Desert Shield sealift became a facade that obscured the conclusions of the Commission. Many were illustrated by this deployment. Our sealift used more than U.S.-flag ships. The supply of mariners and the industrial support were heavily stressed by activating only about half of the RRF during Phase One. The difficulties experienced with this predominantly steam-powered fleet were consistent with the Commissioners’ prediction that RRF reliability would become suspect, no later than the beginning of the 21st century.
The need for a national commitment to redress the security deficit of the U.S. Merchant Marine remains undiminished. We must ensure that the true lessons of Desert Shield are not swept away by the euphoria over the stunning success of Operation Desert Storm.12 'This article is focused upon the first 120 days of Operation Desert Shield. This includes the initial deployment (frequently called “Phase One” and the first month of the additional deployment ordered on 8 November (“Phase Two”).
2On 30 November 1990, the Chairman, JCS, approved an initial step toward the reorganization of TransCom. The command will be given a peacetime mission in addition to its existing wartime mission.
3The RRF was created in the 1980s through government purchase of ships from private ownership. Most ships so purchased were no longer profitable to operate commercially but had militarily useful features, such as the capability to handle outsize, noncontainer cargo. The RRF is described as a stopgap, not a preferred solution, to the decline in numbers of U.S. flag ships capable of carrying military unit equipment.
4The Antares had been scheduled for boiler repairs but the need for her capacity and speed was great enough to warrant the calculated risk of sending her without repair. After both boilers became unserviceable she was towed by an MSC tug into Rota, Spain, where her cargo was transhipped.
5This calls for a progression through different sources to meet the sealift requirement; MSC-controlled force ships; APS and MPS; FSS; RRF; U.S.-flag charter; foreign-flag charter; acquiring control of U.S. ships in the Sealift Readiness Program; and requisitioning any U.S. ship by presidential authority.
6Speech to the Cleveland City Club, 12 October 1990.
7Before the House Armed Services Committee’s Sea Power subcommittee on 19 February 1991, the Commander, MSC reported that, as of 3 February, 209 U.S.- flag voyages had delivered 1.8 million short tons of dry cargo, out of a total of 2.5 million, and 88 foreign-flag voyages had delivered the remaining 0.7 million short tons. When fuels are included, U.S.-flag vessels had delivered nearly 83% of the total sea lift cargo tonnage.
"“Operation Highlights Weaknesses of U.S. Forces”, by George C. Wilson, Washington Post, 10 February 1991, p. A23.
9Ibid.
"’Owning to the availability of U.S.- and foreign-flag charters, neither crews nor industrial capacity actually fell short of demand. When the pace of RRF ship activation stressed the resources available, ships could usually be obtained by charter—a circumstance which cannot be taken for granted in the future.
1 'Third Report of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Defense, (Washington: Government Printing Office) 30 September 1988, pp. 1-2.
12The impetus for this article, and much useful information, was provided at the 5 October 1990 U.S. Naval Institute/Surface Navy Association Symposium, “America’s Sea Lines of Communication.” I thank the officials of MSC, the Navy and Marine Corps staffs, the Transportation Command, and the Maritime Administration for responding readily to my questions even while busy with Operation Desert Shield/Storm.
Captain Norton is a surface warfare officer and a joint-specialty officer. From 1987-1989 he was Commander, Military Sealift Command, Europe. He also commanded the Elliot (DD-967) and the Reclaimer (ARS- 42). Assignments in his political-military affairs subspecialty include the Joint Staff, International Affairs Fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations and the U.S. Mission to NATO. He is now Director of U.S. and International Studies at the U.S. Naval Academy.