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Under Siege
Stephen Coonts. New York: Pocket Books, 1990. 408 pp. $19.95 ($17.95).
Reviewed by Joe Weber
Under Siege is a realistic novel that explores the terror and violence of the Medellin drug cartels. Coonts, author of the Naval Institute’s best-seller Flight of the Intruder (1986), has been involved in law enforcement as a police officer and an attorney; he knows his subject well.
The leader of a Colombian cartel is extradited to America and subsequently brought to Washington, D.C., to stand trial for smuggling cocaine. In an attempt to avoid prosecution, the brazen crime lord issues warnings and threats of terrible reprisals during an appearance on national television.
The ensuing terrorism that grips the besieged capitol is painted graphically. The cartel arranges to have Marine One, the President’s personal helicopter, shot out of the sky while George Bush is on board. The President is gravely wounded, which forces Vice President Dan Quayle (portrayed as a credible leader) to assume responsibility for waging the war against the cartel.
The conflict between soldiers and civilians engulfs Washington in a power struggle that involves brutality and incompetence. The ultimate result is a state of martial law. Caught in the maelstrom of events are municipal policemen, FBI agents, Pentagon officials, members of the National Security Council, and White House staff. The American military, facing this major crisis at the heart of the nation, is very nearly overwhelmed by their opponent’s forces.
Navy Captain Jake Grafton, the protagonist of Coonts’s first three novels, is once again the lead man. Grafton works for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ol Staff and is involved in the efforts to regain control of our nation’s capitol. His Navy friend Toad Tarkington (from Final Flight and The Minotaur) also returns in this thriller. Jack Yocke, a Washington Post journalist, is another strong, effective character, tenacious in his efforts to uncover the truth of the appalling events.
Under Siege is a fascinating look inside the squalid world of drug dealers and political corruption. Coonts’s picture of what might happen in Washington politics—with crooked senators, special- interest groups, and corrupt political
action committees—is dismal indeed. With stinging prose he describes the underlying strength of the drug kingpins and the devastating influence they have on our citizenry.
More than an entertaining novel, Under Siege raises a number of difficult questions about our nation s unsuccessful drug war and its cost to society. Coonts asks why a powerful nation with the resources of the United States is doing such a poor job of eradicating this national threat. He does so in a gripping, powerful story crammed with action, suspense, and drama based on current world events.
Author of the best-sellers Defcon One and Shadow Flight. Mr. Weber is a former Marine Corps officer and naval aviator. His novel Rules of Engagement will be released this fall.
America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program
Jeffrey T. Richelson. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1990. 375 pp. Append.
Bib. Gloss. Ind. Notes. Photos. $24.95.
Reviewed by Captain Tom Grassey, U.S. Naval Reserve
The Keyhole program, Jeffrey Richelson asserts, is “one of the most significant military technological developments of this century and perhaps in all history. Indeed, its impact on post-war international affairs is probably second only to that of the atom bomb.” He has written a highly readable history of the U.S. photo-reconnaissance satellite program to substantiate that claim.
How, you might ask (knowing that since 1962 all U.S. military space activity has been classified), could a civilian with no clearances learn enough to write this history? Twenty-six pages of sources—six of which list government documents—show Richelson’s diligent open-source research. He used declassified records from the program’s early years, testimony at the William Kampiles and Samuel Morison trials, and satellite data from the Royal Aerospace Establishment. Richard Bissell, William Colby, Andrew Goodpaster, Bobby Inman, Robert McNamara, Walt Rostow, and Stans- field Turner were among the 26 prominent individuals who agreed to be interviewed for attribution. Finally, Richelson acknowledges that some individuals “spoke on a not-for-attribution basis.”
The result is a study that recounts the rivalries and frustrations and requirements that drove the technology and national intelligence arrangements, and the importance of the eventual successes. Regardless of how much one knows about Keyhole, most of this history will be intriguing. For example:
- In March 1946, Major General Curtis LeMay directed RAND to conduct a three-week crash study on the feasibility of a space satellite because the Army and Navy were reacting to Wernher von Braun’s proposals about space, which LeMay felt should be Army Air Forces territory.
- RAND initially preferred televisionlike imaging to film. Although RAND reversed its view in 1956, the Air Force clung to television through 1962. By 1969, the CIA wanted the next generation of satellites to have an imaging system; the Air Force fought for a less ambitious line-scanning film system right up to a 1972 showdown meeting with President Richard Nixon.
- Discoverer II, the first U.S. satellite with a de-orbitable capsule, dropped that capsule on Spitsbergen Island, Norway, where it was recovered by the Soviet Union in 1959.
- Of the next ten Corona/Discoverers, Bissell lamented, “one after another was a failure. It was most heartbreaking. . . . In the case of a recce satellite you fire the damn thing off and you’ve got some telemetry, and you never get it back. There is no pilot . . . and you have to infer from telemetry what went wrong. Then you make a fix, and if it fails again you know you’ve inferred wrong. In the case of Corona, it went on and on.”
- After Discoverer XIlI’s capsule was recovered by the USNS Haiti Victory in 1960 and displayed by President Dwight Eisenhower at a White House press conference, “High officials . . . ordered that the [next recovered] capsule be kept under lock and key. By the time the oral orders made their way down the chain of command, however, it was believed that the instructions demanded that the capsule be destroyed. The [Air Force] officers spent several hours pounding the capsule into oblivion with hammers, then loaded it into a helicopter and dropped it into the Santa Barbara Channel.” Thus, the “Discoverer XIV” on display at the
Air Force Museum is not the authentic first successful U.S. photo-reconnaissance satellite capsule.
- On 25 August 1960, President Eisenhower established a national-level organization to run space reconnaissance because, Ike said, he “wanted to make damn sure” that the Air Force did not control this vastly important effort.
- At what he thought was to be an off- the-record 1961 press conference, Secretary of Defense McNamara (having studied the satellite photography) found that “all hell broke loose” and “you couldn’t hold the door locked” when he admitted there was no missile gap.
- After Kampiles’s 1978 arrest for selling the KH-11 system technical manual to a Soviet military attache in Athens for $3,000, the CIA ordered an inventory among the holders of the 350 copies; 16 of them could not be found.
Besides learning about the Keyhole program, readers are introduced to the photo targets, particularly the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile force. Future targets are explained, and many of the dilemmas that national program managers face are also discussed.
Among the greatest of these is the classification issue. Richelson presents the arguments: “It is not clear that the best means of protecting secrets is to classify, classify, classify. Numerous observers, including government panels, have noted that overclassification serves to devalue secrecy. Prolonged exposure to information that is clearly overclassified only serves to cast doubt on the need to protect any particular item of information. Further, the wider the net of secrecy, the more difficult it is to physically protect and keep track of truly secret documents such as KH-11 manuals.”
Additionally, overclassification imperils military capability. In the mid-1970s, Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, U.S. Army (then Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency), “discovered that target folders shown to bomber pilots had sketches of the targets rather than the satellite photos from which those sketches had been derived. The pilots were not cleared ... to see photos of the targets they were to risk their lives trying to destroy. That discovery, [William E.] Colby [then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency] recalls, sent Graham and Colby ‘up the wall.’”
Those who wish to know what someone with no clearances can learn about Keyhole should read America's Secret Eyes in Space.
Captain Grassey is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
Scream of Eagles
Robert K. Wilcox. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990. 291 pp. Gloss. Photos.
$22.95 ($20.65).
Reviewed by Vice Admiral Gerald E. (Jerry) Miller, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Describing human emotions experienced in combat has always been difficult: for the individuals involved to accurately relate their feelings and for professional authors to capture those feelings in words. Robert Wilcox has done an admirable job of surmounting those difficulties in Scream of Eagles. He has done so by researching the recordings of naval aviation crews and air controllers from the Vietnam War; reviewing the written records of their aerial combat; and conducting personal interviews with many of the pilots and their teammates.
The result is a historical record of real people who performed in real combat situations. Any reader interested in getting a feel for the emotions experienced in modern aerial combat—which involves surface-to-air missiles and air-to-air missiles, mixed with airborne guns and cannon—will do well to read this book. An account that professionals and amateurs alike will find rewarding, it presents
Top-gunners learn to dogfight in the skies. Here an A-4 chases an F-4.
ROBERT L LAWSON
aerial combat in exciting terms.
Equally valuable and commendable is the author’s coverage of the frustrations encountered in the creation and maintenance of a professional air-to-air combat training program, the now-famous Top Gun school established in southern California. Naval aviators who flew in Vietnam realized the need for such a program. Their efforts to establish a school, particularly their dedication to the concept despite discouraging bureaucratic obstacles, are well recorded by Wilcox.
What he doesn’t cover in as much detail is that the concept was also enthusiastically supported by most senior naval aviation professionals in the Pentagon, but they were unsuccessful in convincing civil authorities of the need for the school. The Top Gun training program was started on a shoestring budget as an unofficial cumshaw effort, which the proponents at the Pentagon verbally approved of. Their arduous efforts eventually led to the official establishment of Top Gun as a full-fledged unit of the U.S. Navy. (That experience also contributed to the creation in the 1980s of a similar program for the strike warfare element of naval aviation.) The Navy and the nation
are indebted in many ways to these ‘Screaming Eagles.”
A graduate of the Fleet Air Gunnery Unit (Top Gun’s Predecessor), Admiral Miller participated in three Wars.
The Cuckoo’s Egg
Clifford Stoll. New York: Doubleday, 1989. 326 pp. Bib. Fig. $19.95.
Reviewed by Commander Carl O.
Schuster, U.S. Navy
The Cuckoo’s Egg tells the true story °f the author’s pursuit and the ultimate capture of a ring of computer hackers who worked for the KGB. It both exposes ar>d highlights America’s most serious security problem of the 1990s; namely, Protecting its computer networks without destroying the free exchange of informa- lion so vital to our way of life.
Clifford Stoll was a relative newcomer lo the Lawrence Berkeley Lab Computer Center when he was asked to ‘‘look into” a minor computer-time billing problem. What began as a simple investigation of a 75-cent accounting error turned into a one-year chase through a maze of domestic and international computer and communications networks. Finding evidence °f an unauthorized user on his system, Stoll decided to let the intruder continue to penetrate the system so he could be traced and identified. The intruder left a trail that led through the computer networks of some of the most sensitive U.S. research and defense-related agencies and university programs. (The title derives from bogus programs the hacker set up as one technique to gain unlawful access to C.S. files.)
Written clearly and concisely, with a minimum of computer jargon, The Cuckoo’s Egg depicts the author’s difficulties *n trying to track his prey across state and national borders without official law- enforcement or government-agency support. This is more than a true-life detective story; it is an expose of the security weaknesses of U.S. computer networks and the complexities faced by law- enforcement agencies when investigating this type of crime. The computer-security charters of the many federal agencies involved are revealed to be inadequate, and the reader shares the author’s frustrations in trying to bring the government to bear on this serious problem.
This is a must read for any professional naval officer who uses computers.
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Command, Control, and the Common Defense
Lieutenant Colonel C. Kenneth Allard, U.S. Army. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990. 337 pp. Bib. Figs. Ind. Notes. $25.00 ($22.50).
Reviewed by Commander Ronald Fraser, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve
During the late 1940s, the hot topic of debate (drawing on American experiences in World War II) was unification of the military establishment—an effort to better fit the many bureaus into a coherent whole. Though seriously raised, the issue was certainly not resolved. If during the military restructuring that is sure to follow the thawing of the Cold War and the lessons learned from Desert Storm the topic is revisited in the 1990s, this timely book will help set the stage for such a debate.
“The subject of this book is precisely that tension between the traditions of service loyalty and the need to seek the often elusive synergy of joint combat power,” states Allard. Referring to Grenada, he asks, “How could it be that forty years of joint experience were not enough to ensure that the armed forces could at least talk to one another?”
Allard takes the time to place these present-day concerns in their historical context. We are reminded that this troublesome autonomy-versus-unity dilemma is no accident. Rather, it is rooted in America’s earliest institutional designs and congressional aversion to centralized military power. Until World War II, a culture of separatism fostered the growth of independent sea, ground, and air traditions that stressed both service loyalty and hero-based (for example, Mahan, Jomini/Clausewitz, Douhet, etc.) belief systems, called paradigms. Each stressed
the decisive wartime effect to be commanded by a single service’s unique weapons and strategies.
According to Allard, the cumulative effect of that separatist tradition now retards the formation of a higher-level, joint strategic paradigm. Such a paradigm is the organizational missing link in the evolutionary path that could lead to true unification. It is needed to ensure that interservice norms are cast in terms of a common, higher-plane strategy rather than in terms of their impact on service autonomy, as is the case today. In fact, Allard concludes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff is “an organization in search of a paradigm.”
That being the problem, Allard is at • first optimistic that a solution is within reach. He writes,
“As I have shown throughout this book, the principle of the combined arms came to be accepted as a fundamental organizing principle in each of the services, as various components grew to maturity (for example, armored forces, naval aviation) and were integrated into the war-fighting apparatus of their respective forces.
. . . looking at the services as components of a larger whole requires both an acceptance of the primary purpose of their individual forces and a need to look long and hard at where they fit together at the margins. . . . Title II of [the 1986] Goldwater-Nichols [Act] enhanced the power of the unified and specified commanders over their service components. . . . [which is] certain to produce the kind of trial and error that will answer the all-important questions: what is ‘service,’ what is ‘joint,’ and how do we tell the difference?”
A first step in sorting out service and joint domains was the joint doctrine master plan developed in 1987, which compared service doctrines across a wide range of topics such as fire support, airspace control, command and control countermeasures, etc. As the next logical step, Allard sees the need for the development of a consensus among the services on a set of joint principles in each topic area. These agreements will ultimately lead to the emergence of a unifying, strategic paradigm.
His scheme calls for a delicate balance between single service and collective interests. Construction of the joint strategic paradigm will, for instance, embrace the operational expertise of each service’s paradigm while rejecting the self-serving ideological overtones of the five services.
In other words, the joint paradigm is to be nothing less than a work of administrative art.
That’s the grand design. Allard is also a realist, however, and he acknowledges that perhaps “a joint strategic paradigm may never be reduced to a well understood set of principles, either because joint warfare really is nothing more than successive application of land, sea, and air power or perhaps because the organization of joint forces into unified commands at the theater level prevents the derivation of a useful series of principles at the global level.”
Another obstacle is that “the JCS sys- | tern is above all a consensual one, and the real merits of the joint doctrinal refinement process will be seen when that quest confronts the hurdles of established procedural and institutional interests—as it ! inevitably must.”
In the end Allard looks to the field, not the Washington, D.C., bureaucracy, to determine what is possible; he would turn the change process largely over to the consensus-prone services. He concludes that the service parts still count more than the collective whole.
Allard is not alone in his faith in change from the bottom up. In another recent book. Making Defense Reform Work (Pergamon, 1990), analysts James A. Blackwell, Jr., and Barry M. Blech- man identify the essence of military reform as a cultural reformation in which the Pentagon’s officer corps substitutes a joint perspective for “insular service self-preservation instincts.”
I’m not so sure. What ultimately may be needed is a better balance between what is and what ought to be, together with the involvement of a wider slice of society in the joint paradigm construction process. The services must be involved, for sure. But, given the fact that their vested interests are at stake, how can we expect them to willingly sacrifice themselves for the collective good?
Ending on a sober note, Allard acknowledges that “the American military institution itself is a peculiarly pluralistic one, a basic character trait that makes it extraordinarily difficult to achieve the tight standardization seemingly demanded by warfare in the information age. . . . These are depressing thoughts, which foster still another: Is it all worth it? The answer is: probably yes.”
I don’t see that we have a choice; therefore, I would substitute the word definitely for Allard’s probably.
A Naval War College graduate who has written for Navy Times, Commander Fraser is a defense analyst in Washington, DC, and a doctoral student in public administration.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
American Women and World War II
Doris Weatherford. New York: Facts on File.
>990. 350 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $29.95 ($26.95).
Among the casualties of World War 11 were many of the outmoded beliefs about the role of women in American society. The state of national emergency occasioned by U.S. participation in a global war allowed women to abandon their traditional roles and shoulder more v>tal tasks both on the home front and in the theaters of war. This meticulously researched book is enhanced by firsthand interviews as it comprehensively recounts the varied experiences and important contributions of women to the war effort as nurses, housewives and mothers, members of the armed forces, and part of the industrial work force.
Desert Shield Fact Book
Prank Chadwick/GDW. Bloomington, IL: Game Designers' Workshop, 1991. 64 pp. Figs. Gloss, thus. Maps. Tables. $10.00.
The man who created the popular GDW war- game series has researched and written an up- to-date book that contains background information on the Persian Gulf crisis, comparative charts about Allied and Iraqi equipment, troops, and tactics, and a glossary of military jargon. Designed to help readers “understand events as they unfold,” the facts are presented ■n easy-to-read, easy-to-find short descriptions under such headings as “A Chronology: Desert Timetable,” “Tank Versus AntiTank,” “Workhorses and Chargers: Allied AFVs,” and “Iraqi Fighting Techniques: Battle Doctrine.” A guidebook that features a color wall map of the region, Desert Shield will help someone sort through the opinions about and coverage of the war offered by other news media.
Dirty Little Secrets: Military Information You’re Not Supposed to Know
James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi. New Vork: William Morrow, 1990. 468 pp. Ind.
Tables. $19.95 ($17.95).
This grab bag of information on the military forces of the world is a mix of the important, the trivial, the humorous, and the scandalous. Chapters focus on ground, naval, and air forces, as well as technology, logistics, and the human factor. Among the many facts provided: a tank uses as much fuel standing still as it does moving; because of the Soviet penchant for security, troops in the field are often denied accurate maps, causing them to get lost frequently; the Swedish Navy has a 250-ton ship whose primary mission is laundry; and, by including the words “sink the army,” the U.S. Navy’s “Anchors Aweigh” is the only service song in the world that identifies a specific enemy.
Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle
Richard B. Frank. New York: Random House.
1990. 815 pp. Append. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. $34.95 ($31.45).
Publishers Weekly calls this comprehensive new work “highly readable” and “first-rate military history.” Tapping hundreds of sources, including official Japanese Defense Agency accounts, recently declassified U.S. radio intelligence, and the thoughts and emotions of both Japanese and American veterans of this pivotal Pacific campaign, this monumental work will likely live up to its subtitle.
23 The Heart of a Man: A Naval Pilot’s Vietnam Diary
Lieutenant Frank C. Elkins, USN, edited by Marilyn R. Elkins. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 160 pp. Photos. $17.95 ($14.36).
Frank Elkins flew A-4 combat missions over North Vietnam in 1966. His diary reveals, in intimate detail, his thoughts and feelings in those early days of what would prove to be
America’s longest war. Elkins eventually lost his life on one of those missions. He left behind a poignant account that evokes our pride and respect while revealing those things that made him very human. Author Stephen Coonts writes that this book’s “honesty about war, fear, and the love of wife and country moved me deeply.” First published (and largely ignored) in 1973, this timely revival takes on new significance in light of the hostilities in the Persian Gulf region.
In the Men’s House: Alt Inside Account of Life in the Army by One of West Point’s First Female Graduates
Captain Carol Barkalow, U.S. Army, with Andrea Raab. New York: Poseidon Press. 1990. 285 pp. Append. Photos. $19.95.
Captain Barkalow was among the 119 women who entered the first sexually integrated class at the U.S. Military Academy. This is her story, beginning with her landmark days at West Point and continuing through her varied duty assignments abroad and in the United States. While this is certainly an important account of pioneering assaults on bastions of gender exclusivity, it is also a revealing look at Army life in general.
Military Periodicals: United States and Selected International Journals and Newspapers
Michael E. Unsworth. editor. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990. 448 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss. Ind. Notes. $75.00 ($67.50).
Detailed profiles of prominent military journals and newspapers provide a publishing history of each as well as an analysis of its impact upon the armed forces and military thought. More of an encyclopedia than a mere dictionary of these publications, the entries are comprehensive, insightful, and well researched.
The Rocketmakers: The Dreamers Who Made Space Flight a Reality
Harry Wulforst. New York: Orion Books, 1990.
304 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $18.95 ($17.05).
Described as “a kind of Right Stuff that focuses not on the astronauts but on the scientists and engineers,” this awe-inspiring and often humorous account begins in the 1920s when space travel was science-fiction fantasy to all but a few who dared to believe. The story continues through the years of frustration when “the greatest obstacles came not from Mother Nature but human nature,” and culminates in what most would agree is humanity’s greatest triumph.
Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for Government, Journalists, and the Public
Yonah Alexander and Richard Latter, editors. New York: Brassey’s (U.S.), 1990. 160 pp. Append.
Bib. Notes. Tables. $19.95 ($17.95) paper.
Government officials and academic experts from the United States, Great Britain, and Western Europe offer their views on the proper role of the media in covering stories about terrorists, who thrive on such coverage. Since a free press is an essential element of democracy, dealing with this dichotomy is a real challenge. This book meets it head-on.
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To the Bottom of the Sea: True Accounts of Major Ship Disasters
John Protasio. New York: Lyle Stuart/Carol Publishing Group, 1990. 225 pp. Append. Bib. Gloss. Photos. $18.95.
Along the northeast Atlantic coast of the United States in November 1898, some 70 ships sank in the midst of a terrible storm. One of those ships—the City of Portland—caught the nation’s attention because of the mysterious circumstances of her disappearance and because not a soul among the 300 passengers and crew survived. Her story, along with 18 others, testifies to the risks taken by those “who go down to the sea in ships.”
War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century
Colin S. Gray. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990. 445 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. $24.95.
“Strategy is a bridge connecting means with ends.” “Policy makers should ask neither too much nor too little of their armed forces, while the forces should be developed and applied only for feasible purposes set by policy.” “There is certainly no single correct way in which to think strategically . . . though there is an abundance of wrong ways.” These and many other ideas are presented in a thought- provoking blend of the historical, geographical, technological, and cultural factors that Gray contends should guide strategic thinking. Asserting that “strategy is about winning in peace as well as in war, ” Gray sees the search for a meaningful strategy as even more critical in the aftermath of the Cold War than when the superpowers were clearly contentious.
Other Titles of Interest
Air University Review Index (1 May 1947- March 1987)
Major Michael A. Kirtland, associate editor. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1990. 428 pp. Ind. Order direct: Air University Press/Building 1400/Maxwell Air Force Base, AL 36112-5532.
The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists
Barry S. Strauss and Josiah Ober. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990. 272 pp. Bib. Ind. Maps. $18.95 ($17.05).
Beneath the Visiting Moon: Images of Combat in Southern Africa
Jim Hooper. Lexington, MA: Lexington'
Books. 1990. 261 pp. Gloss. Maps. Photos. $22.95 ($20.65).
The Last Mission Tanker
Captain Walter W. Jaffee, U.S. Merchant Marine. Sausalito, CA: Scope Publishing, 1990. 76 pp. Bib. Ind. $8.95 paper. Order direct: Scope Publishing Company/1050
Bridgeway/P.O. Box 1689/Sausalito, CA 94966-1689.
The Mongol Warlords
David Nicolle. Dorset, UK: Firebird Books Ltd., 1990. 192 pp. Color Plates. Figs. Ind. Maps. Photos. $24.95 ($22.45), distributed by Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., New York.
The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II
David M. Glantz. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990. 262 pp. Append. Ind. Maps. Notes. $27.50 ($24.75).
Terror and Triumph
Rear Admiral John Harllee, U.S. Navy (Retired). Fowlerville, MI: Wilderness Adventure Books, 1990. 328 pp. $12.95 ($11.65) paper.
Verification of Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Technological Constraints and Opportunities
Richard Kokoski and Sergey Koulik, editors. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1990. 322 pp. Figs. Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos. Tables. $18.95 ($17.05) paper. Order direct: Westview Press/5500 Central Avenue/ Boulder, CO 80301.
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