The “Best” Route to the Target
By Captain Ronald S. Pearson, U.S. Navy
The scene is a ready room on a deployed aircraft carrier. The war is on and the air wing is preparing to conduct a strike against a heavily defended target. An A-6E pilot and bombardier-navigator—call them “Bags” and “Flaps”— head for the intelligence center’s state-of- the-art, color graphic, 32-bit, super Gee- Whiz tactical aircraft mission planning system. They plan to use it to get data for the concept of operations and then to compute detailed aircraft mission plans. Is this something out of the next Tom Clancy novel? Hardly. It is happening today in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.
Only five years ago, Bags and Flaps would have used manually drafted threat information and manually calculated aircraft time-distance-heading information. It was time-consuming and difficult to develop and compare alternative courses of action. Now, increases in computer speed and memory capacity, coupled with decreases in size and cost, have put computers into tactical aircraft units. Most tactical systems now use minicomputers such as the Micro VAX II or III used by the Navy’s tactical aircraft mission planning system (TAMPS). In the last five years, the Navy has installed TAMPS on all its aircraft carriers.
The system attempts to provide Bags and Flaps with a “real world” threat picture and to reduce to minutes the time required for mission planning. It can display holes in the enemy’s air defense system that Bags and Flaps would never detect by studying their charts. In the early 1980s, a U.S. Marine Corps study showed that air crews suffered 25% less attrition in exercises when they used an automated planning system rather than manually planning their strikes.
Thus, TAMPS appears to provide the best of everything for Bags and Flaps: better information in less time. But does it? The information that goes into the system has limitations that can affect the mission. Since Bags and Flaps are betting the lives of their squadron mates on the system’s predictions, they must be aware of its limitations.
After verifying that intelligence has keyed-in the latest enemy electronic order-of-battle data, Bags and Flaps begin looking at the target area for terrain that will mask them from enemy early warning radar coverage inbound and outbound. They find it and pick a route through the surface-to-air missile (SAM) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) coverage around the target, always balancing their weapon delivery requirements against the threat. Is what they come up with the “best” route? That depends on the quality of the information provided to Bags and Flaps. Everything is a compromise.
Terrain masking calculations are based on characteristics of the specific radars and their locations—provided by intelligence agencies—and digitized terrain information (a data point available every 96 meters that includes latitude, longitude, and elevation) provided by the Defense Mapping Agency.
Radar data provided by the intelligence agencies are usually accurate and are used to determine the radar’s maximum range. Radar locations provided by intelligence agencies are used to position the radar in relation to the digitized terrain. Although Bags and Flaps may assume that these locations are accurate, intelligence sources know that the locations are approximations—and can vary several miles from their plotted locations.
If, in fact, the radars are not where the computer thinks they are, the resulting calculations of terrain masking will mislead Bags and Flaps.
Also, the radar data may be out of date. This could kill them if what appears to be a gap in radar coverage has been plugged by a mobile SAM system—and TAMPS does not yet have the updated information. But a new system, the automated tactical plot (ATP), can maintain current radar locations and forward them to TAMPS through the Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS). Trained operators can integrate new intelligence from the airwing’s own aircraft with inputs from national agencies to provide near real-time radar locations to TAMPS.
Until accurate, real-time data are available, air crews can prepare for the worst by sampling the terrain within the circle defining a radar’s possible location, artificially placing the enemy radar on the highest terrain, and calculating the terrain masking while ignoring the terrain within the circle. This would be a worst-case for the radar elevation, and would reduce false terrain masking.
A possible solution to the requirement for accurate, real-time updates of radar locations would involve using near-realtime information from a prototype analyst workstation with data from systems such as the Tactical EA-6B Mission Support (TEAMS) or the Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES); TAMPS is scheduled for these upgrades.
Another variable in terrain masking is the digitized terrain information provided by the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). Depending on the source of the digital data, DMA’s accuracy may vary both horizontally and vertically from ground truth. The agency’s specification is that absolute accuracy—the difference between ground truth and DMA data— must have a 90% probability of a circular error probable within 130 meters horizontally and 30 meters vertically. DMA data accuracy is improving; in fact, most of the more recent data is much more accurate than the specification.
TAMPS presently samples about 5% of the DMA data points available when depicting terrain masking. This low sampling percentage may cause the system to miss some intervening terrain that would mask an aircraft, thus over-estimating a given radar’s capability. This conservative, low-fidelity terrain masking estimate favors Bags and Flaps.
To achieve the most realistic terrain masking, TAMPS should compute radar coverage by comparing each radar s line- of-sight visibility against every DMA terrain data point. Data accuracy, however, may prevent this. Basic error theory holds that the sampling interval of data must be supported by the error associated with the underlying data—the sampling interval must be at least twice the CEP. If the CEP is 78 meters, then the minimum sampling interval would be 156 meters (actually 192 meters since most DMA data is available only in 96 meter intervals). Thus, although more data sampling (higher terrain masking fidelity) provides more realism, data accuracy sets a limit to terrain masking fidelity.
While lower-fidelity terrain masking may appear accurate enough, Bags and Flaps may waste suppression assets against a threat that higher-fidelity information might disregard as a threat.
Higher-fidelity terrain masking, however, has costs. Higher fidelity takes longer to get an answer and requires greater computer memory. The dilemma, therefore, is trading off the requirement for the highest fidelity processing of terrain data against the practical limitations of computer speed, size, and cost. This could be solved by developing a software routine that considers site location accuracy, DMA terrain data accuracy for the strike area, computer speed, the time available for planning and computer memory space available, and automatically computes radar terrain masking at the optimum interval.
Thus, we see a number of areas where Bags and Flaps could be misled by the data, and where a better understanding of these data limitations could help them improve strike planning.
Once the route is chosen, Bags and Flaps will ask the system to calculate the aircraft fuel requirements and navigation information. They have confidence in this data since they routinely validate it during training missions. There is not the same confidence concerning the terrain masking information because validation of this information requires extensive use of expensive, specialized range facilities. Since TAMPS was developed and is maintained by a contractor and, since TAMPS is considered a mission-support item rather than a weapon system, it has not been tested by the Navy s Operational Test and Evaluation Force. Only some ad hoc efforts have attempted to validate the accuracy of terrain masking information.
There are other phenomena, though, which can affect the accuracy of terrain- masking information—and none of these is considered in TAMPS calculations.
Clutter and multipath reduce the low- altitude capability of radars to pick targets out of the surrounding terrain. The Army’s Missile and Space Intelligence Center at Huntsville, Alabama is working on a clutter model that will accurately duplicate the local clutter around any radar site. Multipath is not currently modeled in any mission planning system. Both clutter and multipath, however, reduce close-in radar detection ranges. Failing to account for them gives the threat a better capability than it really has; this error favors Bags and Flaps.
Anomalous electromagnetic propagation and knife-edge diffraction, on the other hand, sometimes allow radars to detect targets well outside the normal radar horizon. Thus, while TAMPS might show that an aircraft was masked from radar, these phenomena could in fact lead to its detection; here the error goes against Bags and Flaps.
Anomalous electromagnetic propagation is a weather-related phenomenon that permits ducts in the atmosphere to carry radar energy well past the radar horizon. The Integrated Refractive Effects Prediction System (1REPS) produced by the Naval Ocean Systems Center is used to predict surface or airborne ducting that can cause extended radar ranges; it is normally used for over-water applications. Similar ducting can occur over land, but there are more variables—which make predictions much more difficult. Although not integrated with TAMPS today, IREPS is available on aircraft carriers for off-line use. It is scheduled for integration with TAMPS, but its priority is so low as to delay it indefinitely.
Knife-edge diffraction occurs when certain lower-frequency radar waves are bent by terrain features. The effect permits detection of targets that would normally be beneath the radar horizon. Knife-edge diffraction can be predicted by using sophisticated computer models such as the path loss line of sight model (PLLM) distributed by the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center, Annapolis, Maryland.
The vulnerability of the strike aircraft to passive detection en route and in the target area is another concern, and Bags and Flaps can consult the hard-copy Blue Emitter Vulnerability Analysis Report data produced by the Naval Security Group Activity at Charleston, South Carolina—but it would be better if the passive detection coverage were integrated into TAMPS. There is an effort at the Joint Electronic Warfare Center to incorporate such data but it is a complex subject and may provide less accurate data.
The air wing commander expects Bags and Flaps to give him an estimate of the probability of mission success. This again is a complex task involving evaluation of tactics, the probability of SAM/ AAA losses, the effectiveness of electronic countermeasures, defensive electronic countermeasures, and decoys and expendables—chaff and flares. TAMPS currently assesses aircraft attrition based on exposure time in the threat envelope. This is a simplistic tool and Bags and Flaps understand that it provides only a rough approximation of the relative attrition on several mission routes. They would prefer attrition modeling in which they had more confidence.
SAM probability of kill data derived from a computer fly-out model called the Enhanced SAM Simulation (ESAMS) managed by the Survivability-Vulnerability Information Analysis Center seem to be the most generally accepted today. Other models are being evaluated.
Countermeasures and expendables effectiveness present a more difficult problem. As an example of the difficulty, jamming techniques encompass barrage noise, false targets, range gate pull-off, velocity stealing, and many other complex functions. Solving for them would be expensive because of the many uncertainties involved and the cost of range and aircraft time to validate the results.
Bags and Flaps have in TAMPS a force multiplier and a significant improvement over manual planning but the system’s limitations could cause it to be a false prophet Based on their current level of training, they do not know enough about the impact of higher fidelity terrain masking. They do not understand the significant negative effect of radar location uncertainty, or they would long ago have required the intelligence community to provide more accurate locations. They do not understand the negative effects of knife-edge diffraction and other anomalous electromagnetic propagation, or they would have demanded their priority incorporation into TAMPS. Bags and Flaps have asked for improvements in the modeling of SAM attrition and the effects of countermeasures, although it is unlikely that they understand the complexities of the task. As a result, they may receive a “best route” approximation that may not be accurate enough to be useful and could even be worse than nothing.
Although TAMPS will never be perfect, we must treat it as the critical force multiplier it can be and start chipping away at its limitations. We should:
- direct the intelligence community to provide more accurate radar locations
- develop software to alleviate errors in radar location accuracy
- help the mission planner optimize the terrain masking fidelity based on such factors as the planning time available, memory capacity available, number of radars in the threat area, etc.
- develop systems to provide near realtime enemy location data
- integrate IREPS and PLLM calculations with terrain masking to reduce false terrain masking and allow EM passive detection planning
- integrate effectiveness data to handle ECM, Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (DECM), and expendables
- instruct air crews—Bags and Flaps— concerning the effects of data errors and assumptions
- assign a Navy activity to coordinate, verify, and validate all aspects of TAMPS
Captain Pearson is the Strike Warfare instructor at the Tactical Training Group, Atlantic, Dam Neck, Virginia. Prior to assuming his present duties, he was the Deputy Director for Operations at the Joint Electronic Warfare Center, San Antonio, Texas. He flew 177 combat missions in A-6s while assigned to VA-165 on the USS Constellation (CV-64).
The Coast Guard Patrols the Persian Gulf
By Captain Carmond C. Fitzgerald, U.S. Coast Guard
Since the enactment of the Espionage Act of 1917, the U.S. Coast Guard has been responsible for port security in all U.S. ports. In wartime, the Coast Guard has performed these duties overseas— today Coast Guards Port Security Units (PSUs), manned by reserves, are serving in the Persian Gulf.
The units provide security in a noncombat, resupply environment with a low to moderate threat. They use small boats, equipped with automatic weapons and grenade launchers, to patrol docked or moored ships. Safety monitoring of hazardous cargo unloading and dockside storage is also provided shore side. The units are structured to combat small-scale terrorist operations aimed at sabotaging the vessels and interrupting the off-loading of military supplies. In addition, there is the ever-present threat of personnel error caused by fatigue, lack of knowledge, or mere inattention to the task at hand, which can result in mishandling or improperly storing hazardous materials.
When the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force—now the U.S. Central Command—was established in 1980, the Coast Guard offered to participate in any role involving logistic support. By March 1982, that offer resulted in the development of Port Security Units for use overseas. In November 1982, the Ninth Coast Guard District, which is located on the Great Lakes, was directed to equip and train reservists for three PSUs. Today these units are committed to seven different regional contingency plans under the Central Command, the U.S. Atlantic Command, and the U.S. southern Command.
Each PSU is task-organized and consists of from 90-140 Coast Guardsmen organized into three elements: a port security element, a port safety element, and a unit support element. These elements contain personnel with a mix of Coast Guard skills:
- The port security element consists of 40-60 Coast Guardsmen who provide water side security for port operations utilizing 22-foot transportable port security boats.
- The port safety element of 30-45 Coast Guardsmen performs dockside supervision for off-loading and storage of military supplies. It consists of an explosive loading supervisory team, a fuel transfer supervisory team, facility inspectors, a hazardous material supervisory team, a marine security team, and a fire fighting coordinator. These personnel perform the same services overseas as Coast Guard Captains of the Port provide in the continental United States.
- The unit support element consists of 20-35 Coast Guardsmen who provide limited maintenance, medical, engineering, electronics, communications, subsistence, logistical, and small arms maintenance support for the PSU. The PSUs depend upon the supported commander to provide the bulk of basic support services such as medical, food services, berthing, and transportation. Each PSU has four to six patrol boats along with organizational equipment that includes such as battle dress uniforms, personal field gear, and chemical/biological/radiological (CBR) gear.
Coast Guard PSUs have participated in large-scale exercises such as Bright Star, Gallant Knight, Gallant Eagle, and Ahuas Tara as part of Central Command and Southern Command forces. To date, only the port security elements have been exercised regularly because of air-lift restrictions on overseas exercises. While these restrictions are understandable, the PSU commanding officers would, of course, like to train the way they’ll fight and exercise with their full complement of personnel.
The PSUs have operated with U.S. Navy Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare Units (MIUWs), as a parallel command under a Port Security and Harbor Defense Group. The MIUW with its detection capabilities, and the PSU with its •nvestigative-pursuit capability, have proved to be an effective team for achieving maximum water side security.
The units also have been called upon to perform short-notice duties in the United States. In August 1988 the Coast Guard Marine Safety Office in Mobile, Alabama, was directed to enforce a security zone around the waterside of the Naval Air Station at Pensacola, Florida during a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The operation was designated Potent Archer and the Ninth Coast Guard District was directed to provide a patrol boat and 25 Coast Guardsmen to assist with security. With three weeks advance notice, the requested number of volunteer reservists, with the right qualifications, were obtained for the seven-day security mission. A Coast Guard C-130 picked up the boat and crew at Niagara Falls Air Force Base in New York, and flew them to NAS Pensacola. This contingent performed around-the-clock security and demonstrated the unit’s capabilities.
The transportable port security boats are versions of the commercial Napco Raider, built by Napco International, Incorporated. They are formidable small craft, when fully armed, and capable of protected water operations. The Raider’s hull is similar to that of a Boston Whaler; the stable boats are propelled by two 155- horsepower low-profile outboards and are quite maneuverable at high speed.
Each boat can carry a .50-caliber machine gun mounted on a skate ring, which allows 360° freedom of action. The skate ring will also accept 7.62-mm. machine guns. Other armament includes a Mk 79 40-mm. automatic grenade launcher, plus individually carried M16 rifles, 9-mm. pistols, and grenades for each crew member. The crew communicates using an inter-communications system similar to those found on aircraft. Top speed for a fully loaded (6,500 pounds) boat is more than 30 knots. The fuel tanks are resistant to explosion and the boat is capable of eight-hour patrols. The boats can be shipped on trailers in a standard 8 x 40-foot ocean container, carried externally by helicopters, or carried—two per sortie—by C-130s.
Each Coast Guardsman assigned to a PSU is required to complete a combat skills course taught by the U.S. Marine Corps at Quantico, Virginia. This last two weeks and was developed specifically for the unit’s mission. Unit members receive basic defensive combat training that includes weapons training on the M16, the Mk 79 grenade launcher, grenades, plus the 7.62-mm. and .50- caliber machine guns. A two-day field exercise is provided at the end of the two weeks to test the skills learned.
The three PSUs are home ported in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Cleveland, Ohio; and Buffalo, New York. Each PSU has one patrol boat to conduct training locally while the remaining inventory kept at the Ohio National Guard Base, Camp Perry, Ohio. Camp Perry facilities provide an excellent location for realistic, hands-on training for the PSU elements. Restricted offshore areas on Lake Erie—contiguous to the base—permit firing the machine guns in multi-boat training scenarios, and allow intercept and defensive tactics training.
The port safety personnel receive their training at local Coast Guard Marine Safety Offices during their two days per month inactive duty for training. Active- duty training for specific elements—such as explosive loading supervisory teams— is conducted at installations such as the Blount Island Explosive Loading Terminal at Jacksonville, Florida.
The PSU forces, composed entirely of reserves, are subject to the same call-up procedures and limitations that apply to the reserve components of all the armed forces. There must be a Presidential callup of the reserve to active duty to insure that the proper mix of trained personnel is available. The PSUs can be used for low intensity conflict or JCS exercises without such a call-up, but only on a voluntary basis. Volunteers can always be obtained but whether they will be the people with the right qualifications is always an unknown until they are individually polled. A representative, smaller-size unit can normally be assembled that is capable of performing its mission on a limited basis; a full-size unit must be deployed to sustain 24-hour operations over an extended period.
The Coast Guard Port Security Units represent a potent and necessary capability. The ability to protect ports and ships would be a key factor in most scenarios. The units exemplify the Coast Guard’s military capabilities as the nation’s fifth armed service—they are “Semper Paratus."
Captain Fitzgerald is the Chief of the Ninth Coast Guard District Readiness and Reserve Division. He served on board the Coast Guard Cutter Taney (WHEC-37), was designated a naval aviator in 1969, and has flown the 1IU-16E, HH-52A, HH-3F, and the HH-65A. He formerly commanded Coast Guard Air Station Detroit.
Reorganize Our Helo Squadrons
By Commander George V. Galdorisi, U.S. Navy
The beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century was a time of significant growth and change in sea-based rotary-wing aviation. Key events included the following:
- Completion of the final SH-60F operational evaluation and the introduction of the SH-60F to the fleet
- The standup of ten SH-60B LAMPS Mk-III helo squadrons, the approval of plans for another two squadrons, and the appearance in the Six-Year Defense Plan of many more SH-60Bs than were called for in the early 1980s
- The standup of the Navy’s strike rescue squadrons, HCS-4 and HCS-5 (These squadrons, with their HH-60Hs, were important elements in all planning for the Persian Gulf crisis.)
- The decision to strengthen each carrier-based SH-60F antisubmarine squadron with two HH-60H helos
- The uncertainty of the future of the V-22 Osprey program
- The potential reduction in size of carrier-based fixed-wing S-3 squadrons from eight to six aircraft
Battle group air power appears to be in a state of disarray. Events such as the proposed reduction in numbers of S-3s are symptomatic of the increasing scarcity of carrier (CV) deck space. Delay of the technologically advanced V-22 demonstrates the difficulty of attempting new aircraft starts, particularly in the present financial climate. The entire Naval Aviation Plan is complicated by shortfalls, aging aircraft, delays, cancellations, severe budget constraints, and changing threats worldwide.
Conversely, the steady production of front-line helicopters and the growing importance of their missions make this an important time to ensure we are fully capitalizing on their capability to provide air power for our carrier battle groups.
One Airframe . . . One Squadron . . . Many Missions: A carrier battle group (CVBG) operating today may include as many as six different types of naval helicopters (Table 1). If a CVBG is escorting an amphibious ready group (ARG), another four types of helos may be added (Table 2). Special operations, such as minesweeping, can add still different helos, while occasional operations with helicopters from different services are not at all uncommon. Most of these different types of helicopters are supported by different squadron infrastructures, each with differing command organizations, logistics pipelines, and standard operating procedures. Separate shore-based LAMPS Mk-I squadrons support the SH-2F and soon the SH-2G; LAMPS MK-III squadrons support the SH-60B. Seagoing helicopter antisubmarine (HS) squadrons support the SH-3H, while different HS squadrons support the SH-60F. Deployable reserve strike rescue squadrons support the HH-60H strike rescue helicopter. Another type of shore-based squadron supports the CH-46 vertical replenishment helicopter.
With the exception of the HS squadrons, all these helos operate in one- or two-aircraft detachments using packup kits placed on board the surface combatants or replenishment ships from which they operate. Space, size, weight, and particularly cost constraints all contribute to the austerity of the packup kits, and, as a result, one of the key functions of shore-based parent squadrons is to speed replacement parts to deployed aircraft.
The costs and inefficiencies associated with doing business in this manner make it incumbent upon us to find a better way to equip and organize our sea-based helicopter squadrons. Fewer new aircraft starts have forced the services in general, and the Navy in particular, to go to multiple-use airframes. Fixed-wing carrier aviation has taken steps in this direction by seeking to buy one airframe to perform the missions of the early warning E-2C, the long-range ASW S-3, and a number of other electronic and early warning aircraft. Similar decisions need to be made about the types of helos we fly and how we operate and deploy them. Some important elements of a restructuring might include:
- Elimination of the SH-2F and SH-2G from carrier battle group operations, primarily because the ships associated with these helos (older frigates) are not really battle-group capable. Use of these aircraft and their ships for other roles would capitalize on their strong points (especially the SH-2Gs’ self-contained acoustic capabilities), minimize their weak points (lack of range and survivability), and open up new avenues for other ship interoperability such as Arapaho—i.e., placing a aviation capability on board merchant ships by using specialized containers.
- Replacement of the CH-46 with a naval H-60 variant. The HH-60H might be an attractive option. The vertical replenishment community saw its inventory of aircraft dwindle dangerously while it was waiting for the now seemingly moribund V-22. To build new H-46s would perpetuate 1950s technology in the fleet for another 30 to 40 years. Although the H-46 can do some things that the HH-60 cannot (make rapid downwind landings and handle palletized internal cargo), the increase in availability of the H-60 and its multi-mission capability may make fairly minor changes to operating procedures a reasonable trade-off.
- Accelerated replacement of the SH-3H with the SH-60F, which would bring a quantum increase in capability to a much more reliable and survivable aircraft. Upgrades to the SH-60F will give it more commonality with the SH-60B.
- Deployment of two LAMPS Mk-III SH- 60B aircraft on every surface combatant, thereby realizing increased warfighting capability along with vastly enhanced operational and material readiness. Upgrades to this aircraft will give it more commonality with the SH-60F.
- Achievement of a similar commonality among the helicopters of the air combat element of an amphibious ready group. This might call for replacement of the CH-46E and the UH-1N with an H-60 variant.
Improved Helicopter Squadron Organization: Important as they are, the foregoing initiatives are merely a first step toward improving the warfighting capability of battle-force helicopter aviation. Simply replacing various fleet helicopters with derivatives of one family of helicopters does not improve the diverse and fragmented infrastructure that now supports squadrons designed for only one, or at most two, primary missions. What is sorely needed is the creation of a new, streamlined, infrastructure to support inner-zone SH-60Fs, outer-zone SH- 60Bs, strike rescue/utility HH-60Hs, and vertical replenishment CH-60Hs. Such a structure would not add to the numbers of helicopters on board a carrier. Those aircraft now dispersed on other platforms would remain so, but they would realize significant gains in warfighting capability, material readiness, and operational efficiency while offering a valuable saving in personnel and overhead.
The new structure would place a parent helicopter squadron (or squadrons) on board each carrier. This squadron would be part of the carrier air wing, would be the parent squadron for all helicopters in the battle group, and would provide command oversight to diverse detachments previously separated from their command dement for extended periods. Although the CH-60H, HH-60Hs, SH-60Bs, and SH-60Fs assigned to this squadron would not be absolutely identical, the basic airframes of each type would be quite common.
The concept is not new to naval aviation. A similar structure is currently used hy Marine Corps aviation combat elements (ACEs) deployed on board our LPHs, LHAs, and LHDs. The ACE is made up of helicopters from four different squadrons that all send aircraft and men to serve under the command of one helo squadron. Four different helos (Table 2) are assimilated into one squadron with Marine technicians from all the squadrons sharing maintenance duties while more senior Navy and Marine technicians provide engine, airframe, systems, and calibration support. The advantages to the Navy from such a structure could be even more significant.
- A carrier-based squadron would conduct major maintenance and phase inspections of all H-60s in the battle group. That squadron could “lend” aircraft when needed to allow each ship always to maintain an operational helo.
- The carrier-based squadron would support the H-60s in the battle group via the carrier’s maintenance department and logistics train, thereby increasing material readiness.
- The carrier-based squadron would gain flexibility by being able to position any H-60 on any ship as the tactical situation warranted, thereby increasing warfighting capability.
- The merging of these diverse helicopter communities into a single community based on an essentially common airframe could cut down on the costs of training and personnel.
- Table 3 displays the reduction in both types and models of helicopters that could be achieved by these changes.
In addition to such advantages, a restructuring could offer additional benefits. Having many different models of the same type helicopter in the same squadron, and having to live with the necessity of making them as interoperable as possible, should move fleet operators and Navy planners to design upgrades to these aircraft that would drive them toward still more commonality and ease of maintenance.
A decade ago, a rapidly growing defense budget and a strong Soviet threat encouraged each aircraft community to hold out for new aircraft and new technology. Now times have changed. Naval aviation must move boldly toward a master plan for sea-based helicopter aviation and more warfighting capability for our battle groups.
Naval aviation can and will benefit from a thorough restructuring of sea- based helicopter aviation. Battle group helicopters will all become part of the air wing. Increased interoperability will add to war-fighting capabilities and allow the battle group to do more with less. Providing support for helicopters dispersed throughout the battle group will become a natural part of the battle group’s everyday function instead of the oftentimes complex evolution it is today. Significant economies of scale will reduce long-term acquisition costs and naval aviation will reach a new level of cohesivencss.
Table 1 |
Carrier Battle Group Helcopters |
CH-46D |
Vertical Replenishment |
HH-60H |
Strike Rescue |
SH-2F |
Middle zone ASW |
SH-2G |
Middle zone ASW |
SH-60B |
Outer Zone ASW |
SH-60F |
Inner Zone ASW |
Table 2 |
Amphibious Ready Group Helicopters |
AH-1W |
Closein Fire Support |
CH-46E |
Vertical Assault |
CH-53E |
Vertical Assault |
UH-1N |
Utility/SAR |
Table 3 |
Sea-based Helicopters 1990 vs. 2000 |
Carrier Battle Group |
|
CH-46D |
CH-60 |
SH-60B |
SH-60B |
SH-60F |
SH-60F |
SH-2F |
N/A |
SH-2G |
N/A |
SH-3 |
HH-60H |
Amphibious Ready Group |
|
CH-53E |
CH-53E |
CH-46E |
CH-60 |
UH-IN |
CH-60 |
AH-1W |
AH-1W |
6 Types |
3 Types |
10 Models |
6 Models |
Commander Galdorisi is Commanding Officer of Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light 41 (HSL- 41). He has served in LAMPS squadrons on both coasts and most recently served as executive officer on board the USS New Orleans (LPH- II). He holds a masters degree in oceanography from the Naval Postgraduate School, a masters degree in international relations from the University of San Diego, and graduated from the Naval War College with Highest Distinction.
Special Operations Demand Better Casualty Care
By Lieutenant Commander James A. Norton, Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy
Medical planning in support of Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable missions is a challenge; some of the issues have never been addressed. The traditional method of establishing medical support—establishing beach evacuation stations and collecting and clearing companies in the beach support area—no longer apply in many of the eighteen MEU(SOC) missions. More will be demanded from the forward echelons of medical care units and there will be greater demands on evacuation capabilities—casualties will become tactical rather than logistical problems.
The mission of the medical department within the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) is the conservation of the combat power of the command. This mission never changes, regardless of FMF unit’s assignment. The key to success, regardless of the size of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), lies in planning for the use of the medical assets—and we have some guidelines:
- Conformity addresses the need to provide support to the sick, injured, or wounded Marine at the right time and place; to do this, the medical support plan must conform to the tactical scheme of maneuver. Medical planners must be included in all aspects of planning from the very first steps of the command and staff sequence. If this is not done, the medical support plan will be an after-thought. Moreover, medical planning must be coordinated, rather than done piece-meal by ground, air, and logistic elements of the MAGTF and the Navy’s amphibious forces.
- Proximity addresses the need to keep injuries and mortality to a minimum by getting casualties into the medical system quickly. To do this, planners must ensure that medical support is provided as close to the tactical situation as feasible. Parallel planning must take place between the Commander Amphibious Task Force and Commander Landing Force medical personnel to ensure that adequate transportation is available to move casualties from battalion-level directly to the casualty receiving and treatment ships. At the expeditionary unit level, particularly, transportation assets are limited and have heavy tactical commitments.
- Flexibility addresses the requirement to shift medical resources to meet changes in the tactical situation.
- Mobility dictates that medical resources must stay close to the maneuvering forces. Traditionally, the MAGTF ground combat element has had its own hospital corpsmen and battalion aid stations. Emergency resuscitative treatment and surgery, however, have not been conducted by this forward echelon of medical care, whose task has primarily been emergency first aid to the casualty. But we may need to expand this basic capability without sacrificing mobility. The British, for example, employed mobile evacuation units in Libya in 1941 (and the Israeli Defense Force did the same in the Sinai in 1973), which contained additional professional medical personnel and equipment for treatment of casualties en route.
The Israelis, combining the best elements of British, French and Norwegian deployable surgical units, formed small, mobile, independent resuscitation and surgical units. These were configured them for air drop or backpack, and were used as the surgical support in the attack across the Suez Canal in 1973. Our experience in Grenada underscores the need for similar U.S. capabilities.
- The final principle, continuity, requires that we provide optimum care in an uninterrupted manner through the various echelons of medical care. In most MEU(SOC) missions, this means getting casualties to the ship. Will ready evacuation by air be assured? Following the seizure of the Mayaguez in the Gulf of Thailand, nine U.S. Air Force helicopters landed at Koh Tang Island on the first mission. Of these, eight either returned with battle damage or were lost; only one of the nine was capable of a second mission. Using helicopters for evacuation of casualties may not be possible; the forward echelon of medical care may require augmentation until such time as the casualties can be transferred to casualty receiving and treatment ships.
Special operations capable expeditionary units can be assigned one or several of 18 distinct missions. Each mission requires a different amount and type of medical support and it is vital to mission success that the medical planner examine the mission carefully to determine the medical support required.
The characteristics of the area of operations are of great importance to the medical planner and will directly influence the number and types of casualties and their collection and evacuation. Climate often contributes to the incidence of casualties. In fact a great majority of casualties throughout history have been climate- or weather-related. Frostbite, trenchfoot, sun bum, dehydration, heat exhaustion, and hypothermia all relate to non-battle injuries and equate to losses that can be prevented.
Certain kinds of insects, animals, and vegetation encountered in the area may also contribute to losses. When combined with other non-battle losses from terrain and climate, they can devastate a unit. A loss is a loss is a loss. The experience ol Merrill’s Marauders, operating behind Japanese lines in Burma during World War II, is instructive: in just 90 days, illness and disease almost crippled the unit.
Iraq is just one of several Third World countries that can deliver chemical or biological weapons. In the future, planners must be prepared to cope with casualties inflicted by these weapons.
Casualty estimates are a necessity. They are the basis for the medical plan, since they define the magnitude of casualties that must be supported. With a good casualty estimate, medical planners can develop the medical requirements for any mission.
A casualty’s chances for survival depend on the speed at which the commander can get him to a resuscitative treatment facility. On a raid, this could pose real problems, especially during clandestine operations. Transportation assets with the raid force will be minimal and so will the raid force’s medical capabilities ashore, depending on the means of insertion. If the raiders go in using small craft, equipment will be limited. Options include the establishment of predetermined points for collecting casualties, equipment, and prisoners. Prearranged air or surface craft could then pick up casualties. The medical detachment could provide basic medical coverage at each site, similar to—but smaller than— the doctrinal beach evacuation station. Medical supplies and equipment should be carried in backpacks. A good model would be the Israeli system discussed earlier. Another possibility, used by the U.S. Army Special Forces units under extreme conditions, would be to leave casualties hidden with a corpsman, and picked up on the way out.
The challenge is to develop alternative methods of casualty care and evacuation that can support the diverse missions of a MEU(SOC). Regardless of the mission, the medical planners must ensure that we can continue to provide optimum care in an uninterrupted manner throughout the mission.
Medical regulating continues to be of great concern, since it the primary method of ensuring priorities in operating rooms and hospital beds. Medical regulators must be located in key positions on the amphibious task force shipping. A medical regulating section from the amphibious task force should be collocated with the primary control officer on the primary control ship to coordinate movement of casualties arriving on landing craft. A medical regulating section should also be collocated with the helicopter direction control officer to coordinate the movement of casualties arriving by air. In addition, medical regulators should also be stationed on board each of the primary and secondary casualty receiving and treatment ships. The location of the regulating sections on board ship is important because it is unlikely that there will be any regulators ashore. Thus, as casualties are moved from forward areas out to the amphibious shipping, someone must be available to screen the incoming casualties. Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada taught us the importance of ensuring we put medical regulators in the proper locations.
These new missions call for changes in medical training. The need for corpsmen to stabilize casualties in remote areas operating independently is the driving factor. The Field Medical Service Schools at Camp Pendleton, California, and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, have lengthened their curriculum from five to seven weeks, and now present classes in trauma and minor surgical procedures. In addition, each Marine Expeditionary Force has developed an advanced training course for corpsmen.
Attendance at the U.S. Army’s Special Operations School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is desirable but only limited billets are available. Since the MAGTF Master Plan prescribes special operations as the Marine Corps’s primary effort 2000, it is time for FMF medical planners to establish a formal training program. The curriculum for corpsmen should be the same throughout the FMF and we should attempt to gain additional billets for students at other schools. The need is upon us. Corpsmen must be able to provide additional care to casualties to sustain them ashore longer prior to evacuation.
Commander Norton is the Landing Force Medical Staff Planning Course Director and Head, Medical Section, at Landing Force Training Command, Pacific, Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California.
New Lifeboat Goes on Sea Trials
By Lieutenant Colonel Melvin R. Jones, U.S. Army (Retired)
In late September 1990, an unfamiliar gray, aluminum 47-foot Coast Guard motor lifeboat slipped into the Columbia River ship channel, passed under Cape Disappointment, and headed toward the Pacific Ocean. Citizens around the National Motor Lifeboat School at Ilwaco, Washington, were familiar with the white 44-foot motor lifeboats in which the students trained for heavy weather rescue, but they had never seen anything like the 47-foot prototype built by Textron Marine Systems.
At the Cape, a six-man test team, formed in 1989 as part of the Coast Guard Commandant’s Office of Acquisitions, had waited for nearly a year to get its hands on the new craft. But the interval between the arrival of the first 44-footer and its replacement has been even longer for the rest of the Coast Guard, 27 years to be exact. The self-righting 44-footers were introduced in 1963 and have been the mainstays of inshore, heavy-weather search and rescue (SAR) ever since.
The prototype 47-footer represents a significant change from the ’44 in terms of operational capabilities and design features. Its most notable characteristics are higher speed and improved crew protection. The ’47 reflects changes in Coast Guard missions and advances in technology.1
The test and evaluation team was established to:
- Ensure that the 47-footer is in every way as capable as the ’44, and that it is superior to the ’44 in certain areas where the ’44 is considered to be weak (speed, operating costs, and crew comfort)
- Develop operational, maintenance, and training plans for the new lifeboat
- Train pre-production crews in the operation and maintenance of the boat
Technicians from the Coast Guard’s Research and Development Center will join the test team to conduct the first of four stages in the test and evaluation plan for the new boat. For this technical verification, the prototype craft will head for Puget Sound and the calmer waters around the San Juan Islands.
For the second phase of testing, scheduled a week after completion of the technical verification, the motor lifeboat will return to Cape Disappointment to undergo 30 days of design performance testing. The tests in this stage are critical to the boat’s acceptance and represent the most dangerous and demanding operations performed by Coast Guard boat crews. Primary test areas are:
- Surf operations in heavy weather— evaluation of the boat’s ability to transit and effectively perform missions in surf conditions up to 20 feet while minimizing the hazards to boat crew and boat
- Towing—evaluation of the boat’s towing capability to take vessels weighing up to 150 tons in astem-tow in seas up to 13 feet, and also to take vessels in along- sideAow for mooring
- Personnel recovery—test the boat and crews’ ability to retrieve people from open water in breaking seas up to 13 feet.
In addition, the test team will evaluate characteristics of motor lifeboat operations such as piloting, mooring, anchoring, fire fighting, alongside operations, and helicopter operations.
Speed, crew fatigue and self-righting capabilities are scheduled for testing in both the design performance and design limit verification stages of the evaluation. In the third phase of the test program, the replacement team will verify the boat’s reliability, availability, and maintainability in the extreme ends of the operating envelope. This means a one-on-one confrontation between the prototype and Cape Disappointment—which has been called the “grave yard of the Pacific.” (See sidebar).
According to legend, Cape Disappointment got its name when Captain John Meares discovered in 1788 that he could not cross the bar at the mouth of the Columbia River, which has since been “recognized worldwide as one of the most awesome examples of what happens when ocean swells meet and oppose the current of a powerful river.”1
This river entrance is one of the roughest inlets in the world with a treacherous bar two miles wide where it enters the Pacific Ocean. The river drains an area of 259,000 square miles and is more than 1,200 miles long. As many as one million cubic feet of water per second can cross over the Columbia River bar, bringing sand down the river to form shoals on the bar and creating dangerous currents. Storm-generated waves from as far away as the Gulf of Alaska can cause swells of 30 to 40 feet on this coast.
In winter, the ocean is continuously rough with the average wave height of eight to ten feet. The bar contains varied areas of deep river channels, sand, spits, shoals, and rock jetties with nearby ocean beaches. The combination of the sea swell, river currents, and bottom contours causes a variety of breaking seas, large swells and fast water. In brief, the seas off Cape Disappointment are ideal for testing the 47-foot boat.
From tests already conducted, it is clear that the speed of the new boat will enable Coast Guard crews to make rescues in half the time as it takes in the current 44-footer.
“The idea behind this is that you can go out and get back a lot faster than you did before,” said Chief Warrant Officer William Ham, the test director. “For example, top speed for the 44-footer is 10-12 knots, whereas the 47-footer can get over 25 knots. Plus, compared to the ’44, the stability and motion of the new boat should be a lot better. The ’44 is a very lively boat; it rolls from side to side. The ’47 has a wider beam and planing hull that gives it stability and speed, while the ’44 has a semi-displacement steel hull and aluminum super structure. On the other hand, the ’47 is totally constructed out of marine-grade aluminum. Since your case [rescue] time should be reduced considerably while the crew also benefits from increased stability, the 47 should cause less crew fatigue, but we will find that out in testing.”
Another factor in crew comfort is the design of the ’47’s topside conning station configured in a flying bridge type arrangement. “It’s open and it s up high,” said Ham. “It’s slightly exposed, but the visibility up there is very good. The ’47 also has a completely enclosed conning station inside so the crew can get out of the weather. You can operate the craft from either station.
‘‘Since every boat in the Coast Guard has a multi-mission role, speed, stability and handling are important considerations, especially during law enforcement and environmental protection operations,” he added. “Because of the motion on the 44-footer, it’s very difficult to go along side another boat and put on a boarding party. If the ’47 turns out to be more stable platform, it’ll increase our ability to board and carry out other operations at sea.”
Of all the tests conducted on the ’47 so far, Ham and his colleagues are most impressed with the prototype’s self-righting capabilities.
“The ’44 depends on wave motion to re-right it. If it is in flat, calm water, it would remain inverted. The ’47 sits so high out of the water and the cabin is at such an angle with the center of gravity so high, that is [she goes] inverted, [she] will roll . . . back over in a few seconds.”
A state of the art navigation and electronics package on the new craft also received initial high marks from the test team. Included in the package arc an electronic compass and an auto pilot.
“This electronics package appears to be well thought out. The ’44 was equipped with a radar but it didn’t have an electronic compass or auto pilot linked as it is on the ’47. This contributes to the ease of operations as it takes some of the burden off the helmsman or coxswain during long cruises,” Ham said.
If all goes according to plan, 47-foot motor lifeboats will replace more than 100 ’44s now in service at Coast Guard stations across America.
1Don Sharp, “Passing the Bar Exams," THE WESTERN BOATMAN, March/April 1988, p. 36.
Colonel Jones is a former Pentagon press aide and speechwriter and frequent contributor to military publications.
Prototype Rescues Fishermen in 20-foot Seas
The crew of the Coast Guard’s prototype 47-foot motor lifeboat rescued six fishermen from the fishing vessel Sea King, which sank while under tow in 20-foot seas off Oregon's Columbia River on January 11. Two injured fishermen and a Coast Guardsman who was providing emergency medical treatment were lost.
The motor lifeboat crew then rescued five Coast Guardsmen who had gone to the aid ot the Sea King, but whose inflatable boat had lost power and was drifting into breakers on the treacherous coast near Cape Disappointment. The 47-footer’s ability to sustain 28-knots in difficult conditions—twice the speed of the 44-footer it is replacing—was instrumental in the rescue, a Coast Guard official said.
Petty Officer First Class Charles W. Sexton, who was lost, was a Coast Guard veteran. "It would be just like Sexton to go on board and see that everybody was taken care of . . . he was a very competent, very brave person" a friend told the Associated Press.
The 47-foot motor lifeboat, built by Textron Marine System, has been undergoing tests since last summer at the Coast Guard’s National Motor Lifeboat training school at Ilwaco, Washington, near the Coast Guard base at Cape Disappointment.