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gy Scott C. TTuver and Commander James A. Hazlett, U.S. Navy
In Aegis destroyers—consisting only ot the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) so far—and cruisers—here, the Bunker Hill (CG-52) and the Ticonderoga (CG-47)—the Navy has the makings of a battle force combatant group that could still be effective after some severe fiscal pressure.
Since the mid-1980s, Defense Department and Navy budgets have declined in real terms some 2 ^ per year. Pentagon officials expect that rate to accelerate during the coming decade. Daunting realities ot the ted- eral budget deficit, competition tor scarce resources, and I the widespread perception that the Cold War is over an global peace is at hand will generate strident calls lor greater defense economies, force reductions, operational , constraints, and role justification among all the services.
In spite of this situation, however, many thoughtful obi servers recognize that U.S. naval forces will continue to be a highly effective instrument of national policy in the | ambiguous, but still dangerous, future international secu- / rity environment.
The Navy’s surface combatant forces, as integral parts I of carrier battle groups, surface action groups, and amphibious task forces, will remain critically important to the successful exercise of U.S. sea power. The Arleigh Burke
(DDG-51) Aegis destroyer program—the only Navy new- construction surface combatant program in 1991—is the principal foundation of the future surface fleet. But even this program is now in doubt in some quarters. Why should the United States continue to acquire multimission, costly warships designed at a time when the Soviet threat— multiple regiments of Backfire bombers launching sophisticated antiship cruise missiles—loomed large? Are the
Arleigli Burke’s extensive combat features really needed in an envisaged future of small and low-intensity wars? Even if these features can be justified in some scenarios, how many DDG-51s are really needed?
To a certain extent, uncertainty about the true dimensions of the challenges confronting U.S. interests throughout the world and the importance of the oceans to the United States in the future raises these doubts. With a clear understanding of U.S. maritime interests, however, a sober assessment of the requirements for and capabilities of Aegis combatants, especially the Arleigh Burke destroyers, concludes as a bottom line that:
► The worst-case military threat of the Soviet Navy has not diminished, and in the future it will increase in sophistication and lethality, no matter how the hoped-for improvements materialize in the political-social dimensions of the Soviet Union and its relations with the United States and the West.
- Many other countries have already acquired, or will in the near future, highly sophisticated weapons (in some instances of a higher lethality than comparable Soviet weapons), in essence constituting regional high threats to U.S. naval forces and maritime interests.
- The potential for warfare in the littorals is increasing, not decreasing, as the Cold War recedes into misty memory. One dimension of this emerging style of chronic crisis-conflict, as dramatically illustrated in the 1987-89 and 1990-91 Persian Gulf crises, is that the future holds
the greatest potential for “tedious warfare,” with U.S. naval forces on station in a crisis area for months at a time. This puts a premium on those forces and weapon systems that can respond quickly and effectively when the tedium ultimately breaks. Indeed, in the aftermath of the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Navy’s surface combatants enforced the United Nations-sponsored quarantine of maritime traffic to and from Iraqi ports, a tedious, albeit dangerous, duty in the highest combat readiness. These forces also saw combat after the war commenced, and
Diffusion of Military Technology: Global Peace Is Not at Hand
- 103 countries have cruise missiles; 71 countries have antiship cruise missiles
- 21 countries have tactical ballistic missiles; by 2000, 15 countries will produce their own ballistic missiles
- 46 countries have naval mines
- At least 15 countries have chemical weapons; 11 others are suspected of having chemical weapon programs
- Four countries have modern bacteriological weapons; at least 15 others are suspected of developing such weapons
- 41 countries now have diesel attack submarines; the shallow- water submarine threat is increasing in the Third World; new air-independent propulsion technologies pose critical problems for future operations
One of the most striking elements of the military equation of the last decade was how quickly advanced military technology transferred to nations other than those in NATO, the Warsaw Pact, or those linked to the two superpowers. Some of the systems outlined here are in the hands of friendly countries; others are not. What this list illustrates is that the global marketplace also encompasses a global
Top to bottom: Indian Kilo-class diesel submarine Sindhugosh (S-55); Iranian contact mines recovered in the Persian Gulf; French Exocet MM-40 missile.
arms bazaar. No region of the world can be characterized as being completely “low threat;” American forces must be capable of defeating a wide range of capable, sophisticated threats— some even of U.S. manufacture—wherever they operate. For instance, the coalition forces in Saudi Arabia had to take into account the Kuwaiti Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries seized by Iraq in August as they conducted air strikes against Iraqi targets.*
What this summary demonstrates is that the world is not now, and probably will not be in the future, a peaceful place. There are numerous significant challenges to the well-being of the United States throughout the world. Many are not aimed directly at America or its interests, but nevertheless will inadvertently affect them. It is still possible that the United States will be forced to respond militarily to certain actions or situations—as was the case in the late summer and fall 1990 in response to Saddam Hussein’s adventurism—if it does not wish to see its vital security concerns, the safety of its citizens, and its economic or political interests endangered.
A
Bauxite | 97% |
Cobalt | 92% |
Petroleum | 52% |
Iron ore | 37% |
they will be the forces that remain in the area now that the crisis has run its course.
V Designed during a period when the Soviet threat was the Principal driver of U.S. weapons programs, the Aegis combatants—Ticonderoga (CG-47) cruisers and Arleigh Burke destroyers—nonetheless remain critically important to the success of U.S. military and maritime strategies during this period of global change, fundamentally because of their capability to defeat a broad spectrum of sophisticated and highly capable threats to U.S. interests at sea and in the vast littorals of the world, where the likelihood of crisis and “hi-tech” conflict will remain high for decades to come.
The United States is a Maritime Nation__________
From the earliest days of the republic, the seas have Provided food, avenues for commerce, and protection to the United States. Moreover, U.S. reliance upon its naval forces—the Navy and Marine Corps—to defend its political and economic interests and its citizens has been the one constant since the colonial period. In the post-World War II era, one of the crucial elements in ensuring protection of U.S. interests has been the on-scene availability and global reach of naval forces. As stated in The National Security Strategy of the United States:
“The economies of the United States and its major allies depend so vitally on trade, and on the security of sea lines of communication, that we have always defined a vital interest in freedom of the seas for all nations. Our Navy protects that interest.”1
General A. M. Gray, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, emphasized the same perspective in recognizing that “Our historical reliance on the seas for our economic and security requirements, coupled with the fact that the majority of potential conflicts will be located along the littorals, drives us toward the development of a strategy that is maritime in character.”2 Other claims notwithstanding, it is obvious that a continental nation separated by two oceans from important natural resources, markets, and allies must be almost by default a maritime power, if it wishes to protect its overseas interests from diverse and numerous threats.
All U.S. trading partners, except Canada and Mexico, are linked to the United States solely by sea and air lines of communication. With a truly global economic outlook, principal U.S. interests must therefore lie beyond its borders. Furthermore, despite recent claims by the U.S. Air Force—that the United States is primarily an aerospace nation, the maritime dimension continues to dominate. Sadly, hardly anyone in Washington or the heartland seems to understand this. For example, increasing by 50% since 1970, seaborne commerce comprised 69% of U.S. export and import trade by value in 1989—totalling 871.3 million tons (worth some $416.2 billion), while airborne trade comprised just 5.9 million tons (valued at $186.3 billion), according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. Thus, there is no other alternative to maritime trade for moving the vast majority of bulk goods upon which the U.S. economy depends.
The United States depends on overseas sources for a variety of these crucial commodities, almost 99% of which (by tonnage) arrives by sea. For instance, in the late 1980s, the United States imported:
Chromium 100%
Manganese 100%
Platinum Group 98%
Metals
Nowhere is this fact more critical than in the area of energy security. In 1989, the United States consumed 17.1 million barrels of oil per day (mb/d), while it produced an estimated 7.7 mb/d domestically. Imports of 2.38 mb/d from Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and Persian Gulf states—the highest figures since the oil crises of 1973-74 and 1980—helped make up the shortfall. Current projections for the year 2000 indicate that U.S. domestic oil usage will range from 17.5 to 20 mb/d, while domestic production capacity will decline to 6 mb/d (down from 8.3 mb/d in 1983). This means that the country will depend on foreign sources for 62 to 70% of its oil, even with extensive exploitation of reserves in the Alaska Natural Wildlife Refuge, a prospect likely to generate significant domestic political and environmental controversy. This, in turn, will require the United States to turn increasingly to oil suppliers in the Middle East, and particularly those in the Persian Gulf. The Middle East/Persian Gulf states will become even more critical to the health of the world economy in the future, since they hold two-thirds of Free World oil reserves and more than 70% of available surplus production capacity.
The political and economic importance of this area to the Western world was demonstrated in 1987-1989, when the United States and several European nations went to great lengths to ensure the security of crucial shipping through the Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Even moderate interruptions could have had a significant impact on price and supply, as demonstrated in 1973-74 and in 1979-80. The most recent crisis in the Gulf, incited by Iraq’s attack and seizure of Kuwait in August 1990, once again brought into sharp focus the importance and vulnerability of regional oil supplies, and the full dimensions of the threats confronting the political, economic, and military interests of the United States and its allies.
Despite the apparently greatly diminished politico- military threat of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the future model for Europe may turn out to be very similar to that of the pre-World War I period—a “Balkanization” of Central Europe with long-standing political, religious, and ethnic antagonisms resurgent. The threat of heightened political tension and military instability in Europe cannot, therefore, be ignored, and should continue to influence U.S. security policies and defense programs. As an example of the Navy’s perspective on this issue, Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, noted in early 1990 that the Soviet Union “. . .will retain the world’s largest military machine. Despite the Kremlin’s preoccupation with domestic political and economic reform, modernization of this vast military arsenal will continue .... [W]e must not forget that, whatever the change in the Soviet political-military landscape, the USSR will remain the principal military threat, as it retains the potential, using nuclear weapons, to destroy the United States and our Allies.”3 The mid- January 1991 Soviet military crackdown in Lithuania attests to the uncertainty and potential for conflict in the “new world order,” at least in Europe.
Moreover, the Third World will pose new, and continue old, threats to U.S. and Western interests. Paradoxically, the demands on the Navy likely will be even greater than in the past. Admiral Brooks noted other areas of grave concern: “unstable political situations, regional crises, and the odious activities of drug cartels and terrorists continue to threaten U.S. interests and threaten the safety of American citizens worldwide. These threats are paralleled and magnified by ever more lethal military hardware.”4 Military systems in many regions of the Third World are now so sophisticated and readily available from the major powers themselves that in the near future there will be very few low-threat regions of the world.
Global conventional, much less nuclear, war is certainly a low probability, but these levels of conflict must still be taken into some account in U.S. defense plans and force structure. Regional contingency and limited objective warfare (CALOW, formerly known as L1C for low- intensity conflict) has been the primary type of conflict in the post-World War II period, from Korea to Operation Desert Storm. Such “limited objective” warfare will be the most likely conflict faced by the United States for the remainder of the decade and into next century. Such conflicts, however, must be seen as limited only in temporal and geographic dimensions. To the sailors, aviators, and ground troops confronting “high-tech” weapons today and in the future, these will be anything but “low-intensity” wars. Furthermore, because of the pervasive maritime dimension of U.S. security and economic interests, the potential for conflict in the littorals of the world must be seen as posing the greatest requirements for maritime forces.
The Case for Modern Surface Combatants
Navy and Marine Corps forces have been well-suited to defend U.S. global interests in the past and should remain so in the future. U.S. postwar national security strategy has been a forward strategy that focuses on the wide geographical reach and comprehensive power of U.S. naval forces. Actual experience in the postwar era has encompassed peaceful demonstrations of U.S. national power and will, the threatened and actual use of armed force, and (in conjunction with other agencies, forces, and policies) limited hostilities to protect important U.S. interests. During all such incidents, however, the Navy and Marine Corps remained ready to fight global conventional war and nuclear conflicts. The Navy and Marine Corps, in peacetime, have been assigned many broad roles, including:
- Ensuring strategic deterrence
- Protecting freedom of navigation in general, U.S. seaborne commerce in particular
- Defending U.S. interests and citizens abroad
- Supporting U.S. foreign policy goals
- Supporting allies and promoting regional stability
- Responding to crisis situations
The Navy’s and the Marine Corps’s contributions to national strategy encompass both control of vital sea areas and projection of power ashore. Specifically, the overriding objective is to maintain air superiority and control of the ocean surface and subsurface when and where necessary. The result should be protected sea and air lines of communication and the ability to attack targets ashore with air and cruise missile strikes, the landing of expedi- tionary/amphibious forces, and naval fire support. All such taskings are, in the final analysis, intended to support and influence decision makers and events on land, either directly (by power projection) or indirectly (by protecting commerce and logistics). This, in turn, contributes to the achievement of national goals and the desired execution of national policies.
Although some jaded observers note that we have heard all this before, Navy and Marine Corps forces have been relied upon in more than 250 crises (80% of the total number) since the end of World War II (the Air Force participated in 29%, the Army in 18%). Of this total, 32% were in the Mediterranean Sea area, 25% were in the Latin America/Caribbean Sea region, 19% were in the Indian Ocean/Red Sea/Persian Gulf region, and the remainder were scattered around the world.
As with the 1990-91 situation in the Persian Gulf, the future undoubtedly will see more of these crises that jeopardize U.S. concerns. Particularly worrisome would be simultaneous, widely separated situations that require commitments of the Navy and the Marines. This drives the requirement for a force structure sufficiently robust to cover multiple, geographically distant contingencies with sufficient combat power to keep the peace. This is a need that could become even more pressing in the politically,
economically, and militarily multipolar world of the 1990s and beyond. Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney stated in mid-August 1990,
“There is little doubt that the recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have altered the social and political makeup of the world, and our ongoing planning assessments are based on the increased prospects for reduced world tensions. However, current events remind us of how fragile world peace can be. Therefore, we continue to require a superior naval force to maintain free and open use of the seas.
Indeed, we cannot predict when and where the next crises or conflicts will flare up. It is, however, realistic to plan for them. Navy leadership knows it must be ready to carry out the full range of missions and tasks in the future international conflict environment, for which the surface fleet will be an indispensable element. A comprehensive study of naval operations in the next century, Navy-21, recognized: “The ability to respond rapidly in time of crisis .. . and to maintain sustained and visible presence tor deterrent purposes, with minimal dependence on foreign bases, is much greater for a surface fleet than for either land-based army and tactical air forces or for a largely undersea and land-based maritime warfare force. ...
In order to carry out its broader, national-level mission, the Navy must ensure that its forces are superior to any adversary in four major warfare areas: air, undersea, surface, and strike warfare. With their larger role in mind, surface forces are also required to be flexible, survivable, and (if they are to be mission- and cost-effective) have diverse combat capabilities spanning several mission areas. The ability to adapt to changing threats is also a crucial element in keeping U.S. surface forces relevant to the tasks at hand. This calculus has resulted in the Navy s Aegis program. The emphasis on Aegis combatants is driven by the assessment that the current and expected future international conflict environment will require highly capable naval forces to protect important U.S. interests. In light of the various threats to U.S. surface forces, a full spectrum of offensive and defensive capabilities must be built into its combatants, all of which will see i service well into the next century.
The Congress has funded 27 Ticonderoga (CG-47)- class Aegis cruisers; 17 CG-47 combatants have been commissioned through January 1991, and the remainder will join the fleet by 1993. Additionally, through fiscal year 1991 Congress has provided funds for 17 Arleigli | Burke-class Aegis destroyers. They constitute the build-
/ ing blocks’ ’ of the future Surface Navy and will be one of the most critical factors in the Navy s ability to sustain the | aircraft carrier battle forces, surface action groups, and , Navy-Marine Corps amphibious/expeditionary forces that ( are the very heart of the country’s general-purpose naval r capabilities.7
How Many is Enough?_________________________
The Navy in the mid-1970s initially identified a future
battle force combatant building program of about 47 ships, in addition to 24 Ticonderoga Aegis cruisers, to satisfy the escort needs of 12 large-deck carrier battle groups (CVBGs), the general-purpose force level projected for the remainder of the century. More battle force combatants (eventually identified as the DDG-51) would be needed, however, if plans for at least 15 large-deck carriers and their associated battle force ships would come to fruition. (The CG-47 force level was eventually established at 27 ships for 15 CVBGs and 4 battleship battle groups.)
Attendant with the Reagan administration’s program for
a 600-ship/15-CVBG Navy, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in 1982 conceived a program of 63 DDG-51 destroyers to be built in at least three “flights,” beginning with the lead ship in fiscal year 1985, a one-year hiatus in fiscal year 1986, three ships to be requested in fiscal year 1987, and finally settling into a five-ship-per-year program beginning in fiscal year 1988. This acquisition rate would support the force-level goal of 137 cruisers and destroyers needed for the 15-CVBG fleet: 33 guided- missile cruisers (CGs/CGNs), 67 guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), and 37 antisubmarine warfare destroyers (DDs). According to notional force-level plans of the early 1980s:
- 27 CG-47s would provide escort protection to seven two-carrier battle forces (three CG-47s per CVBF) and one single-carrier battle group (two CG-47s), and four battleship battle groups (each escorted by a single CG-47)
- 67 antiair warfare destroyers (63 DDG-51s and 4 Kidd [DDG-993]-class) would escort the carrier forces (31
U.S. Navv Surface Unnihatants. 2000 | ||
27 | CG-47 | Ticonderoga Aegis cruisers |
4 | CGN-38 | Virginia AAW cruisers |
2 | CGN-36 | California AAW cruisers |
16 | CG-16/26 | Leahy and Belknap cruisers |
28 | DDG-51 | Arleigh Burke Aegis destroyers |
4 | DDG-993 | Kidd AAW destroyers |
31 | DD-963 | Spruance ASW destroyers |
51 | FFG-7 | Perry frigates |
The Bottom Line: 113 battle force combatants |
DDG-51s), battleship battle groups (12 DDG-51s), one amphibious ready group (10 DDG-51s and 4 DDG-993s, plus 8 frigates), and 10 underway replenishment groups (10 DDG-51s, plus 30 frigates)
With U.S. global commitments and naval operations in mind, an exhaustive analysis of future surface combatant force requirements was conducted by the surface warfare community during 1986-1988, culminating in the Chief of Naval Operations’ determination that the Navy’s 15- carrier/4-battleship force level objective actually drove a requirement for 120 “battle force combatants” to be reached by the end of the century. The new surface fleet would have, as well, 104 “protection of shipping” combatants, existing frigates, or in the future, as a result of a proposed “flexible transition” strategy, older destroyers and cruisers that would not receive extensive (and expensive) midlife upgrades to their combat systems to enable them to keep pace with the high-level threats to naval forces.8
Since then, however, the Secretary of Defense determined that a maximum of 14 CVBGs would be the force level goal for fiscal years 1990 and 1991, and more recent reports indicate 12 deployable carriers will be the force objective from fiscal year 1992 through the end of the decade, if not well into the next century. Furthermore, two of the four battleships are to be placed in mothballs or “ready reserve” status, leaving just two of the Iowa (BB- 61)-c!ass ships available for routine forward deployments or crisis response, such as the USS Missouri (BB-63) and the USS Wisconsin (BB-64) deployments to the Persian Gulf to support U.S. forces in Operation Desert Storm. While these decisions are being revisited almost daily in light of the Persian Gulf crisis, and indications are that the remaining two battleships will soon be retired as well, most observers admit it will be impossible to sustain the aircraft carrier and battleship force-level “cores” of the Reagan “Maritime Superiority Navy.”
In light of current and future building programs (i.e., an average of four DDG-51 s per year beginning in fiscal year 1991) and accelerated retirement plans, by the year 2000 the surface combatant force level will total just 164 ships, far fewer than the notional requirement.
But even this sobering analysis ignores the potential danger of the Navy not being able to maintain a credible presence of capable warships in critical world regions. In 1990, the Navy and the Marines identified several world regions—“deployment hubs”—in which the United States must maintain a forward-deployed naval presence. With the likely reduction in the number of deployable carrier battle groups to no more than 12 in the near future, in some analysts’ judgment it will be increasingly difficult to maintain the desired posture. More ships will be needed.
One way to assess future surface combatant needs is simply to examine a requirement to provide credible naval presence in forward areas in the face of constrained carrier and battleship force levels and to ensure the capability to “task-organize” surface forces for specific deployments and responses—such as the interdiction operations in support of Operations Desert Shield/Storm—in the absence of the carriers. For example, the required number of surface combatants and carriers is driven by U.S. political, military, economic, and diplomatic commitments, along with the President’s decision to maintain a meaningful presence in key world regions—the Caribbean, northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean, Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf, and northwest Pacific.
The near-term, budget-driven reduction from 14 to 12 CVBGs (and, similarly, from 4 to 2, and eventually no battleship battle groups) means the Navy will be barely able to meet existing commitments for carrier presence (e.g., in the Mediterranean) and deployment requirements (e.g., in the Indian Ocean), with very little (if any) margin for surge or crisis response. For example, the USS Eisenhower (CVN-69) was scheduled to return from her Mediterranean deployment when the President in early August 1990 ordered her to transit the Suez Canal for the Red Sea in support of Desert Shield. The USS Kennedy (CV-67) began working up early to replace Ike in the Red Sea, and an additional two battle groups, centered on the USS Independence (CV-62) and the USS Saratoga (CV-60), were sent to the region. By January 1991 six CVBGs were on station in the crisis zone. This was possible solely as a result of the Navy’s having 14 deployable carriers with which to organize such carrier battle forces. Should the carrier force decline to 12 deployable ships, and should there be a requirement to maintain an aircraft carrier battle group continuously in the Persian Gulf region following Operation Desert Storm, the Navy will be hamstrung to meet traditional forward deployments and satisfy surge requirements without violating personnel tempo guidelines established by the Chief of Naval Operations.9 Experience in the 1970s and early 1980s has shown that as these guidelines are violated it becomes very difficult to retain highly skilled and motivated sailors and aviators and to maintain the material condition of the Navy’s ships and aircraft.
If, however, the carrier and battleship battle groups retired as a result of budget constraints must be replaced by some other form of credible naval force, the opportunity exists to use the Navy’s battle force combatants in specific task-organized groups (“BFCGs”) to provide a significant measure of credible naval warfighting capabilities.10 Such a BFCG could comprise a single CG-47 Aegis cruiser, two-or-three DDG-51 Aegis destroyers, and avail-
able Spruance (DD-963)-class ASW destroyers, as required to satisfy the specific needs of the deployment. (In the future, according to the still-contentious Flexible Transition” concept, the Spruance-class DDs will be retired or placed in protection of shipping roles, with the demise of the current frigates, and the Flight III DDG-51s with embarked helicopters will fulfill BFCG ASW requirements.11) This is fully in consonance with the way the Navy currently deploys its general-purpose surface combatant and amphibious forces, only a fraction of which are specifically organized around a large-deck car; rier “core.”
Future battle force combatant shipbuilding requirements will be driven not only by deployment and crisis requirements, but also the need to replace ship classes reaching block obsolescence in the first decades of the 21st century. With the Knox (FF-1052)-class frigates and the Charles F. Adams (DDG-2) and Farragut/Coontz (DDG-37)-class destroyers decommissioned or placed in the Naval Rc- i serve Force by the mid-1990s, and the Spruance and 01- I iver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates beginning to
reach the ends of their 40-year service lives by 2015 and 2017, respectively, it is necessary today to begin planning for a continued program of battle force combatant new construction in order to replace these ships on an orderly basis. This does not necessarily mean a one-for-one basis,
/ however, as the new battle force combatants will have much greater warfighting capabilities compared to the ships they will replace. Furthermore, a follow-on battle force combatant for the CG-47s must be in the acquisition plans by about 2008 to replace the Aegis cruisers begin-
ning in 2013, as they begin to play less demanding roles. What should be avoided is a crash program of new- construction by the 2010-2020 period, when three of the four current classes of surface combatants will have reached the ends of their service lives. Also to be avoided is a program of buying cheaper ships, which might be acquired in greater numbers, but which individually cannot meet future warfighting requirements.
Assuming notional force planning objectives of 12 CVBGs and as many as 7 BFCGs through the first decades of the next century, there will be a requirement for as many as 145 DDG-51s (all flights) and future BFCs to be built during the period from 1991 to 2030. This will result in a minimum new-ship construction program of approximately 4 DDGs/BFCs per year beginning in fiscal year 1991. Should the Navy, the administration, and the Congress fail to support such a minimum program, significant difficulties in meeting future global responsibilities may arise, not to mention the severe depression within the U.S. domestic shipyard industrial base infrastructure. Drop below four surface combatants per year, and it is extremely questionable whether both of the yards now building such ships, Bath Iron Wofks, Litton/Ingalls Shipbuilding, and their many suppliers throughout the United States, can be sustained.
Future Developments ________________________________
A dwindling overseas U.S. basing structure puts a premium on forces that are mobile, flexible, self-sustaining, and effective across the broadest range of contingencies.
Future Surface Combatants
The United States, in early 1991, has access to 28 major air bases outside of U.S. territory; 18 of these are in Western Europe and six are in Northeast Asia. Several are scheduled to close or transfer by 1993; it is uncertain how much longer host countries will permit U.S. forces to continue operations after 1993. More likely, they will place increasingly stringent political constraints on those operations. As a hedge against such uncertainty, naval forces will therefore become even more relevant in the evolving strategic environment of the 1990s. Multi-mission surface combatants will remain a vitally important factor in the ability of the United States to support its national security and military strategies in the future.
Modem, sophisticated surface combatants are the bottom line for ensuring the Navy’s ability to carry out its missions successfully. The 27 Ticonderoga cruisers, the Arleigh Burke destroyers, and future Aegis battle force combatants will help provide the global presence, crisis- response, and surge capabilities needed to protect American principles, political and economic interests, and citizens, whatever the challenges in the decades to come.
'National Security of the United States (Washington, DC: 1990), p. 17.
2Gcn. A.M. Gray, “Defense Policy for the 1990s,” Marine Corps Gazette, May 1990, p. 20.
3RAdm Thomas Brooks, Statement before the Scapowcr, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 14 March 1990, mimeo, p. 4.
JRAdm Brooks, Statement, op.cit., March 1990, p. 47.
5DoD Press Release, 380-90, 13 August 1990, p. 1.
'’National Academy of Sciences, Implications of Advancing Technology for Naval Operations in the Twenty-first Century (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988), p. 44.
7For other perspectives on the Arleigh Burke program see: “The ARLEIGH BURKE (DDG 51) AEGIS Destroyer: Preserving Maritime Superiority,” AEGIS Shipbuilding Program (PMS-400), April 1989; and Scott C. Truvcr, “Today's 'Revolution at Sea,’ the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) Aegis Destroyer,” International Defense Review, Number 3, 1989, pp. 335-338. Following the Major Warship Review of the spring and summer 1990, Secretary of Defense Cheney decided on a reduced acquisition program of four DDG-5ls per year (a reduction of one ship per year) but ordered significant improvements in the ships’ overall warfighting capabilities. In his 13 August 1990 letter to Representative Les Aspin, Secretary Cheney stated that he had “. . .decided to embark on an aggressive program to improve the warfighting capability of the DDG-51. A block II change is planned in FY 1992 to improve the electronics suite of the ship and a block III change is planned for incorporation in FY 1995 to improve the . . . (ASW) capability of the DDG-51. The block III change will include a redesign of the ship to incorporate the full LAMPS [ASW helicopter] capability.”
“VAdm Joseph Metcalf, III, USN (Ret), “Revolution at Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1988, pp. 34-39; also, Scott C. Truver, “Wither the Revolution at Sea?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1988, pp. 68-74. ’internal Navy Study Finds Service Requires 15 Aircraft Carriers,” Defense News, 15 October 1990. In that article, a Navy source commented: “If we go to 12 carriers, what section of the world should we not cover? Don’t tell us to meet 1990 commitments in 1996 with only 12 carriers.”
“Personnel tempo,” is built around three specific goals: (1) maximum deployment length of six months (180 days), port-to-port; (2) minimum Tum-Around-Ratio (TAR) between deployments of 2:1; and (3) minimum of 50 percent of time in homeport for a unit during a five-year cycle.
10A research paper prepared for the AEGIS Shipbuilding Program in 1982 discussed the likelihood that a 15-CVBG force level could not be sustained and expressed the benefits of “AEGIS Strike Groups." See Scott C. Truver, el alia, Implications of Policy and Future Naval Environment for AEGIS Shipbuilding Programs, Santa Fe Corporation, AEGIS Program Technical Paper 197-02, 22 January 1982.
"ACNO Surface Warfare, Surface Warfare Plan, 1989 (Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, 1989), pp. 4-8.
Dr. Truver is Director of National Security Studies, Information Spectrum, Inc., Arlington, Virginia. Commander Hazlett is a member of the Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603) in the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06). The views expressed in this manuscript are those of the authors alone, and do not represent official positions of the Navy or the Department of Defense.
-------------------------------------------------------------- To Be A Marine in Greece_________________________
One of the contemporary short stories read in my modern Greek class at a local university dealt with how war and a military campaign affects the common soldier. After an animated discussion of the story by the class, the students wanted to learn the Greek terms for military personnel. One of the students wanted to know the word for a Marine.
The instructor, an erudite and distinguished European gentleman, explained that the term for a Marine is a compound word in Greek. The first part has its roots in the term related to the “foot” which relates to the fact that a marine is basically a foot soldier or infantryman. The second part of the word has its roots in the words “ocean” or “water” showing connections to the sea service.
Afterward, there was a brief moment of silence as the students assimilated the rather eloquent explanation. Then, unexpectedly, from the back of the classroom, a student expressed his understanding of the term in a rather sardonic tone of voice—“Yeah, I see, a Marine is a guy who walks on water.”
T. Hatzeson