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The pace of recent fundamental trans- •ormations in the world brings to mind the concept of “future shock,” which Alvin Toffler described as “a time phenomenon, a product of the greatly accelerated rate of change in society. It arises r°m the superimposition of a new culture °n an old one. . . . The result is mass disorientation, future shock on a grand scale.”1 Simply put, sweeping change is Occurring far too rapidly for a reasoned ®nd timely reaction. President George “ush recognized the situation when he reviewed the dramatic pace of world affairs: “Well, I think these things are being discussed. I think changes are Soing on so fast that it’s hard to keep up 'vjth them all. ... There are a lot of things that happened more quickly than Certainly I would have thought.”2 Judg- lng from criticisms of much of the Bush ^hite House’s foreign and defense poli- Cles, the administration clearly is experiencing “future shock” as it works to figUre out its way ahead and create a vision for the future.
So it also may be for the U.S. Navy. In Edition to the external threat, domestic Political and fiscal constraints will affect ihe service. Competition with the other anued services and civilian agencies for scarce resources is already intensifying. Within the Navy, moreover, the competi- hon among the various unions—air, surface, and submarine (now undersea) warfare—for resources and internal political ascendancy is implacable but usually Veiled to the public by a facade of “One Navy” comity. Within this environment the Navy will develop and execute its Plans for tomorrow’s fleet.
Strategy for the Future U.S. Fleet
Uncertainties are growing about the feed for existing force structures and the foies and missions of the Navy and the Marines. Already, eloquent liberal spokesmen in the United States have •Uentified a vast “peace dividend” to be garnered for solving critical domestic Problems. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee’s Projection Forces and Regional Defense Subcommittee, has specified such a peace dividend of some $169 billion to be cut from the Department of Defense (DoD) budgets during the next four years.3
There is no lack of programs queuing
On board the Forrestal (CV-59), President George Bush reacts to a sonic boom created by an unannounced F-14 overhead. His administration also must deal with a shock wave—the “future shock” of accelerating international change—as it shapes tomorrow’s fleet.
up for funding: The announced $150 billion bailout of the savings-and-loan industry is thought by some to be no more than an initial down-payment on the actual bill of some $300-$500 billion, while the drug war will require increasingly more attention and funds. Moreover, many newly democratized foreign governments—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Nicaragua, Panama—now look to Washington for foreign aid and credits to bolster their anemic domestic economies. U.S. leaders, in turn, look to DoD’s coffers in search of funds to send overseas.4
The sword of the Gramm-Rudman- Hollings deficit-reduction law—the
threat of sequestration, in which 50% of needed savings would come from defense accounts if deficit-reduction targets are not met—hangs over all the services.5 President Bush no doubt shares his predecessor’s interest in maintaining a strong defense, but all services confront severe challenges to once-sacrosanct national security imperatives and claims on the nation’s treasury. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s decision in April 1989 to cancel outright the Navy’s F-14D advanced Tomcat fighter and the Marine Corps’s Osprey MV-22 aircraft program illustrates the difficult choices that must be made.
Although the critics have been vocal, clearly the U.S. government is reviewing Soviet capabilities and its own national security strategy and policies. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William H. Webster in early March 1990 stated that, while the Soviet Union clearly was continuing to upgrade and modernize its strategic nuclear and conventional weapons and forces, the
“Soviet leaders will be preoccupied with domestic problems for years to come. Poor economic performance, the Communist Party’s diminishing power, and the escalating demands of non-Russian nationalities will remain serious issues. ... We can probably expect a continued diminution—but not elimination—of Soviet threats to U.S. interests. Gorbachev—and any successors—will have an even more pressing need than in the past few years to reduce the burden of defense spending and to transfer resources to civilian production.”6
The Secretary of Defense found himself greatly at odds with the CIA’s assessment, and many naval officers also remain unconvinced, noting that political intentions are ephemeral—we must continue to focus on military capabilities, and in this regard, the Soviet Union remains a global superpower.
In the area of arms control, numerous Soviet officials, including Gorbachev, have called for naval disarmament discussions to parallel the ongoing negotia-
tions seeking to reduce U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons and conventional forces in Europe. Naval forces, especially those able to launch tactical nuclear land-attack cruise missiles, can attack sites once targeted by Pershing II and ground-launched Tomahawk missiles, which are now banned by the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. This is why Soviet arms control negotiators regard these forces as critical to any future conventional arms-control regime. At the February 1990 Moscow Ministerial between Secretary of State James A. Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviets apparently agreed, albeit reluctantly, to decouple the issue of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) from the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations. The Soviets, however, continue to note their grave concern about the threat these weapons pose to the Soviet Union.
U.S. Navy officials acknowledge— but resist—the arms-control threat to Navy force levels and mixes.7 They argue that U.S. naval forces are not directly relevant to the Central Front conventional arms balances and that Gorbachev’s promises of far-reaching perestroika and dramatic arms reductions have yet to be fulfilled. Even if they are, the officials claim, the Soviet Union will emerge a much stronger and more capable military force.
Many other developments essentially out of U.S. control, including increasingly strident demands in many countries for the United States to remove its military bases, will present novel challenges to the Navy. The potential is great for the roles, missions, and force structures of the Navy and the Marines to undergo drastic revisions as these issues are resolved. Resolutions to these difficult questions within the U.S. defense community, however, have been slow in coming.
For example, President Bush’s dramatic proposal in May 1989 for major force reductions in Europe apparently threw out the steady-as-she-goes policy recommendations of his National Security Council’s review of U.S. national security policies, and all but signaled the end to the Cold War. Bush’s announcement stimulated a very spirited round of Soviet-U.S. “top-that!” force-reduction public announcements, culminating in his call in the 1990 State of the Union message for a ceiling of no more than 195,000 troops each for the United States and the Soviet Union stationed in Central Europe. Yet there now appears to have been very little detailed analysis regarding how U.S. forces would be structured
and deployed in the future proposed by the President.
Following Bush's May announcement, Secretary Cheney was noted in the press as questioning whether in this changed environment it makes more sense to build ships rather than transport aircraft, and to rely on lighter forces that can be more easily deployed and offer much more tactical flexibility than the Army’s heavy divisions.8 Cheney also warned in midAugust 1989 that, unless Congress allows the defense budget to increase 1% in real terms in fiscal 1991 and 1992, and 2% in fiscal 1993, as outlined in the fiscal 1990-94 five-year plan, he would have no other choice than to reduce further the size of the active-duty forces, light or otherwise: I d rather have capable
forces, even if they’re smaller, than I would preserve the fiction of a larger force.”5
It is clear that the fiction has not been preserved; future DoD budgets are coming down and far-reaching force-level reductions are almost certain to continue as Congress seeks to reap the peace dividend. As Gordon Adams and Stephen Cain of the Defense Budget Project argued a year earlier,
The Navy’s goal of 600 deployed combatant ships will be unobtainable for fiscal reasons. It is time to reexamine the justification for such a large fleet and the missions to which it is committed. The plan to increase the number of carrier battle groups to 15 should be reconsidered given its link to the unachievable ‘Maritime Strategy,’ which even the Navy has begun to reconsider. Early retirement of older carriers or termination of plans to build additional new carriers in the 1990s could save considerable sums, given the costs of both the carriers themselves and their support ships and aircraft.”10
A Thousand Points of Light' ?
Although skeptics remain unconvinced, the Navy does contemplate the future seriously. At any time many futures studies, technology assessments, alternative ship concepts studies, and long-range/strategic planning efforts are under way, under the aegis of numerous offices, laboratories, and agencies, efforts that will, in one way or another, affect tomorrow’s fleet. Just in the last three or four years, for example, several major and many minor analyses have labored to forecast the broad outlines of the future—e.g., the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO’s) Navy-21 Study, conducted by the Naval Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences; Surface Warfare’s internal Revolution at Sea studies, comprising the Ship Operational Characteristics Study and the Surface Combatant Force Requirements Study; the Carrier of Large Objects and Carrier Dock Multimission feasibility design studies, and Alternative Naval Battle Force Architecture analysis carried out by David Taylor Research Center; Air Warfare’s Carrier Air Wing Study 2010 and Future Aircraft Carrier Design Study; and the Director of Naval Warfare’s Future Carrier Battle Group Study and Department of Navy Lift Study. To these, one could add perhaps 50 futures studies that have been carried out or are in progress in 1990 throughout the Navy establishment- The studies, however, have not reached consensus. Many have narrow sponsorship bases in specific warfare or technical communities, rely on contradictory official and unofficial threat assessments, are for different times, start with different strategy and policy assumptions, and focus on a particular operational problem or technology issue almost in a vacuum, with little or no reference to other parts of the Navy. Not surprisingly> the results of such efforts are, at times, contradictory, fragmented, and poorly coordinated in terms of the policy or program direction they seek to provide. Worse, they may ultimately waste the Navy’s important intellectual, not to mention fiscal, resources.
In short, the Navy’s long-range planning efforts and futures studies, using President Bush’s 1988 campaign metaphor, are a “thousand points of light” offering little coherent illumination of the most appropriate path to the future.
One aspect of the problem in 1990 of divining “tomorrow’s fleet” is the apparent lack of strong civilian guidance, which has complicated the uniformed Navy’s long- and short-range programming efforts. The fiscal 1992-97 Defense Guidance, for example, is more of a philosophical exercise, according to several officers who have studied it, offering little of substance on which to hang explicit force structure requirements and mixes and weapon and sensor systems requirements.11 The lack of specificity in the Defense Guidance will invite interservice sniping and guerrilla tactics in the battle for dwindling resources, which had already started in late 1989. Without a strong central strategic construct for U.S. defense and national security strategy and policy, almost imposed on the services from above, the danger is great that the services will define their own strategic environments to justify their own parochial perspectives, requirements, forces, ar>d programs, and the nation’s defense requirements will suffer.
. The Navy has also continued to refine lts maritime strategy in the hope of mainlining its relevance, even in the absence strong policy and strategy direction from the civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Navy Secretariat. The classified maritime strategy document itself has been continually updated, and a new unclassified version has oeen prepared, the first time since the Naval Institute published the initial unclassified version in 1986, and published in the Naval Institute’s May 1990 Naval Review Issue (pp. 92-100). Neverthe- *ess, vocal critics of the Navy’s maritime strategy and the force levels and mixes that spring from it remain, no matter how np-to-date it may be and whatever introspective long-range plans might have been carried out. William S. Lind, for instance, wrote about the late 1980s and likely future dimensions of U.S. national security strategy: “It is a strategy of memory, nostalgia, and, increasingly, of fantasy. The world that generated it and in which it was appropriate has vanished. It hangs by tattered threads, unsupported by anything approaching real power, a yawning chasm separating commitments and actual capabilities.... The U.S. Navy mirrors U.S. strategy; it is also an historical artifact, reflecting the world of 40- plus years ago. It is built around a small number of aircraft carrier ‘battle groups,’ which means that it is admirably suited to defeating the navy of Imperial Japan.”12
Fiscal Year 1991 and the Future
The Navy publication, “Highlights of the Fiscal Year 1991 Budget,” laconically describes the fiscal year 1991 Navy and Marine Corps budget request of $100.3 billion, out of a total DoD request of $306.9 billion (including Energy Department nuclear weapons accounts), as “a first year of transition to the new realities.” The shipbuilding account remains optimistic, with 15 new ships requested at a total cost of $11.2 billion. Table 1 shows the Navy’s fiscal year 1990-94 shipbuilding program; the out-years of the program—fiscal years 1992-94—are unofficial, since they have not been approved by the Secretary of Defense.
The new realities for the Navy’s future fleet amount to a smaller number of active forces that will, in many senior Navy officers’ opinions, be stretched nearly to the breaking point to maintain U.S. global commitments. If all goes according to what must now be regarded as optimistic plans, the Navy will comprise 546 battle- force-capable ships by September 1991. The Navy has announced that it will retire 54 ships in fiscal years 1990 and 1991, two of them the Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships that were a key aspect of former Navy Secretary John Lehman’s fleet revitalization efforts in the 1980s. Other ship retirements include 22 destroyers of the Adams (DDG-2) and FarragutICoontz (DDG-37) classes; 14 attack submarines of the Skipjack (SSN-585), Permit (SSN- 594) and Sturgeon (SSN-637) classes; the
Requested | Table 1 FY 1990- Reagan 1/89 | -94 Shipbuilding and Conversion (SCN) Programs Bush Bush Budget 4/89 Actual January 1990 |
| ||||
| 1990 | 1990 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 |
SSBN-726 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
SSN-688 | 2 | 1 | 1 | — | ____ | ____ | ____ |
SSN-21 | — | — | — | 2 | — | 6 | ____ |
DDG-51 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 10 | ____ | 10 |
LHD-1 | — | — | — | 1 | ____ | 1 | ____ |
LSD-41 (CV) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
MCM-1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | ____ | ____ | ____ | ___ |
MHC-51 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | ____ |
TAGOS | — | — | 1 | — | 2 | 3 | ____ |
AE | — | 1 | — | ____ | ____ | 1 | 2 |
AOE-6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ____ | 3 | ____ |
AR | — | — | — | ____ | ____ | ____ | 1 |
ARS | — | — | — | ____ | ____ | ____ | 1 |
AGOS | — | — | — | — | 1 | ____ | 2 |
AGOR/TAGS | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
LCAC | (9) | (9) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) | (12) |
SOF Craft | — | GO) | (9) | — | — | — | ____ |
Icebreaker* | — | — | 1 | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ |
Patrol Boats* | — | — | 12 | — | — | — | __ |
New Construction | 19 | 17 | 31 | 15 | 21 | 22 | 20 |
CV SLEP | 1 | 1 | 1 | __ | ____ | 1 | ____ |
CVN-65 RF/COH | — | — | 1 | __ | ____ | ____ | ____ |
AO (Jumbo) | 1 | 1 | 1 | — | — | — | — |
Moored Training Ship | 0) | 0) | 0) | — | 0) | — | — |
Conversions | 2 | 2 | 3 | — | — | 1 | — |
*U.S. Coast Guard vessels, funded through SCN at congressional direction. Icebreaker “deferred” by OSD in FY 1991 program; expected to be reinstated. Source: U.S. Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy Budget, FYs 1990/91, 1991. Private communications. |
one-of-a-kind Glennarci P. Lipscomb (SSN-685); and, in fiscal 1992 and 1994, the nuclear cruisers Bainbridge (CGN- 25) and Truxtun (CGN-35).
Even greater naval force reductions are likely to result from intense scrutiny by Secretary Cheney and the Congress. The internal DoD-Navy discussions about the fiscal year 1992 budget, for example, contain indications that the 46 Knox (FF- 1052)-class frigates and some carrier battle groups (CVBGs) are on the block; Secretary Cheney in late April admitted that at least two carrier battle groups will be cut from the fleet. The Marine Corps may lose one active-force division and air wing by the time the budget-cutting is through.
Unfortunately, affordability—not a review of U.S. global responsibilities, political commitments, and national security and military strategies—is driving this force-restructuring. The many internal Navy analytical efforts and the new Defense Guidance that seek to reassess the fundamental requirements for U.S. naval forces may be too little, too late. Former Navy Secretary Lehman called on the Navy to stand down from its 1980s “wartime footing” and bring the fleet home for lighter duty, shorter deployments, and greater reliance on the Naval Reserve Force.13
The 600-ship Navy is dead. Today, many worry that diminishing U.S. defense resources, ambiguous policy guidance, and wishful thinking that global peace is at hand will return the Navy and Marines to the post-Vietnam War doldrums—a hollow force of ships that did not leave port, aircraft that did not fly, near-empty spares bins and weapon magazines, and disillusioned and disheartened sailors and Marines who left in droves for civilian jobs. The U.S. Navy is on the verge of losing its strategic advantage for the future.
Aircraft Carriers
Although the naval aviation community agrees upon a minimum essential force level of 15 deployable CVBGs, one of Cheney’s first decisions was to reduce the force-level objective to 14 CVBGs for fiscal year 1991. Cheney also directed the Navy to retire early the World War II-era USS Coral Sea (CV-43), in fiscal year
- and the USS Midway (CV-41), in fiscal year 1992. (The USS Independence |CV-62] is slated to replace the Midway in Yokosuka, Japan, in the summer
- ) Cheney has, however, admitted to Congress that he has a personal bias in favor of aircraft carriers.
Many studies and analyses within and outside DoD in the past year—all of which have been resisted by the Navy— have called for further reducing the carrier force level. Figures of 12, 10, even 6 CVBGs have been bandied about. Because of fiscal constraints, the carrier force level will be set at no more than 12 deployable ships; 12 carriers were the accepted force requirement before the Reagan administration’s program to rebuild the Navy was put in place in the early 1980s. Navy leaders have strongly cautioned against “reducing the Navy’s force levels much below the minimum essential force of 15 CVBGs.”14 If the force level is set at 12, however, look for the immediate retirement of the USS For- restal (CV-59) from the active force, allowing her to relieve the venerable USS Lexington (AVT-16) as the Navy’s training carrier. The Navy’s fifth Nimitz (CVN-68)-class carrier, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), was commissioned in November 1989, and Newport News Shipbuilding is constructing three other large-deck carriers, the George Washington (CVN-73), John C. Stennis (CVN-74), and United States (CVN-75). The Navy included long-lead funding in the fiscal year 1994 program for the CVN-76, which the Navy plans to request in fiscal year 1996, although she may eventually be moved back if force levels are reduced. After heated debate, Congress approved the Navy’s program for the refueling and complex overhaul of its first nuclear carrier, the Enterprise (CVN-65), in the fiscal year 1990 program. The total cost of this two-phase program is estimated at less than $2 billion (a new nuclear carrier was estimated to cost no less than $3.7 billion, in comparison). The Enterprise will enter the yard in 1991 and rejoin the fleet in 1995, ready for another 20 years of service.
The ongoing service life extension program (CV-SLEP), a comprehensive overhaul and modernization effort that will add 15 years to each carrier in the plan, may also help the Navy maintain a force of modern aircraft carriers. The USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) is at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard undergoing her SLEP, and is scheduled to complete in February 1991. The next carrier slated for a SLEP availability is the USS Constellation (CV-64), which will enter Philadelphia in 1990 for the 28-month program. Another two ships (the USS John F. Kennedy [CV-67] and the USS America [CV-66J) will follow, if the funds are made available. But if the carrier force is set at 12, for example, the America's and perhaps even the Kennedy's SLEP probably will be canceled. The future role of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard as the SLEP yard is also problematic (and politically charged), since the facility is listed, along with Long Beach Naval Shipyard, in the President’s budget to be closed in fiscal 1991. Should that happen, the remaining SLEPs would have to be carried out elsewhere. Newport News Shipbuilding was the only other yard that competed for the SLEP contracts in the late 1970s and, especially if new-construction carriers are delayed, the last SLEP ships could be diverted to Newport News.
The Senate and House Armed Services Committees in 1989 agreed on the perceived need for the Navy to be prodded into developing a future technology plan for carriers. Enamored of the surface warfare community’s Revolution at Sea studies and related analyses, Congress in the Fiscal Year 1990 Defense Authorization Conference Report directed the Navy to commission an independent study to investigate all technologies that could be applied to future sea bases—a concept that could include large “mobile islands” capable of handling land-based aircraft, as well as smaller air-capable ships. An integrated technology plan for the evolution of aircraft carriers in the first half of the 21st century should be produced by late summer 1991. A “justification paper on building aircraft carriers in the near term” was explicitly not requested. In early 1990, the Navy selected the Naval Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences to do this study.
The director of the Carrier Programs Division is conducting an internal study to define design options and tentative conceptual baselines for future aviation ship platforms, beginning with the CVN- 76, which will be requested in the mid- 1990s, and those carriers that might be acquired after 2020. Navy Vice Admiral Richard M. Dunleavy, Assistant CNO for Air Warfare, intends to investigate all practical alternatives for the future, although he admitted he was skeptical of both small and very large (e.g., 150,000- ton) designs. In 1990 the official Navy is showing no enthusiasm for looking at the promise of vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft—except for Marine Corps roles. There is an ongoing advanced STOVL (short takeoff, vertical landing) program, run by NASA with participation by the U.S. Navy and Air Force and the Royal Navy. But that program has experienced funding perturbations in recent years, making the promise of V/STOL more a myth, at least as some senior naval aviators see it. And without a high-performance V/STOL or an advanced STOVL aircraft, many officers believe that debating the operational costs and benefits of small carriers or air-
capable ships is silly. Nevertheless, in Private, they also acknowledge that with- °ut enough research and development funds allocated to V/STOL or ASTOVL Programs, no worthwhile aircraft will be developed. Given the tight fiscal constraints facing naval aviation, the funds simply will not be available.
Surface Combatants
The Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Aegis destroyers are the foundation for the future surface fleet. The lead ship was funded in the fiscal-year 1985 program und launched in mid-September 1989, and another 12 have been approved through fiscal year 1990. The launching °f the Arleigh Burke was marred, however, by a congressional inquiry announced by Representative John D. Din- gell (D-MI), Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee. On the eve °f the ship’s launching, Dingell charged that she had been a “procurement nightmare”—she was 18 months late, there had been more than 760 change orders, 'he Navy was bailing out Bath Iron Works, the expense in making the 8,300- ton ship stealthy was ludicrous, and the Aegis weapon system could not defeat even relatively simple antiradiation missiles.15 The Navy categorically rejected Eingell’s charges.
Most interesting about the whole affair, perhaps, was the reason why Representative DingelTs investigative staff focused on the Arleigh Burke in the first place. He and his staff have no apparent oversight function over the Navy’s shipbuilding programs, although the jurisdiction over energy and commerce issues could conceivably be sufficiently broad to encompass shipbuilding. But this alone did not seem to justify the vehemence of the attacks against the Arleigh Burke, Aegis, and Bath Iron Works. It is well- known on the Hill, however, that Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D- ME) has strongly advocated strengthening the provisions of the Clean Air Act, especially those dealing with automobile and industrial emissions thought to cause acid rain. Maine, like other northeastern states, suffers great damage from acid rain. These legislative enhancements, however, would have sounded a death- knell for the auto industry, which Dingell supports.16 Dingell, moreover, reportedly had lobbied intensely behind the scenes to get those draft provisions watered-down, but Mitchell stood firm, only later agreeing to a White House-sponsored compromise measure. In the opinion of several observers in Congress, the only way Dingell could retaliate against Mitchell was to take on Bath Iron Works and the Navy’s Aegis program.
The Navy’s current program for the Aegis destroyers is based on building an average of five or six Arleigh Burke-class ships per year—perhaps more than 50 in all—until the Navy begins to acquire the
The Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) was commissioned last Veterans’ Day at Newport News, where three other large-deck carriers are under construction. Getting Congress to authorize CVN-76 several years from now seems to be a non-starter at the moment, however.
futuristic battle force combatant (BFC) in the first decade of the next century.17 The ambitious Arleigh Burke building program is essential, say senior surface warriors, because the Navy is now meeting only about 50% of its battle-force antiair warfare (AAW) requirements, a problem exacerbated by the potential early retirements of more AAW combatants in fiscal year 1992 and beyond. Later flights of the Arleigh Burke with significant warfighting upgrades are planned, including the provision of helicopter hangars and maintenance facilities and more vertical- launch system (VLS) cells (122 missiles instead of 90 in earlier ships of the class). Yet that future building program is in doubt, fiscally, if the overall Navy force level is reduced to only 12 deployable CVBGs. In early April, Cheney ordered a major warship review to reassess the real requirements for the Arleigh Burke and for the Seawolf (SSN-21).
For now, intense interest on the apparently dead NATO Frigate Replacement (NFR-90) program focuses on a putative U.S. Navy requirement for future ships, even as replacements for the Arleigh Burke destroyers. The 1989 Surface Warfare Plan, which outlines Navy surface needs through 2020, has no place for a new-design frigate in the future U.S. surface fleet.18 However, there remains strong official U.S. Navy interest in the projected combat systems for NFR-90, especially the NATO AAW System (NAAWS) proposals.19 NAAWS (which in April 1990 still had Canadian, Dutch, Spanish, and U.S. participation, although Spain was beginning to look uncertain) is a high-priority surface program that could complement Aegis combatants in the battle force. NAAWS may eventually serve as a replacement for the NATO Sea Sparrow/Mk-91 weapon-control system to counter the extremely high-speed, very low-altitude cruise missiles, such as the Soviet SS-N-22. U.S. Navy candidates for NAAWS the Spruance (DD-963)- class destroyers, Wasp (LHD-l)-cIass amphibious assault ships, and other future amphibious warfare and non-battle force warships.
The future BFC is the logical development of the Aegis combatants, which began when the lead ship of the 27 Ticon- deroga (CG-47)-class cruisers was ap-
proved in fiscal year 1978. It also will be the product of intense internal studies of the future requirements and direction of the Navy’s surface warfare community. Begun in 1986 under then-Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare, Vice Admiral Joe Metcalf, the first iteration of the “Revolution at Sea” studies comprised the Ship Operational Characteristics Study and the Surface Combatant Force Requirements Study.20 The former outlined 12 areas of operational characteristics that must be included in future surface combatants’ designs. High on the list, as Vice Admiral John Nyquist, Assistant CNO for Surface Warfare explained, is to increase the incorporation of stealth technologies: “Stealth expands the Navy’s battle space while collapsing the enemy’s battle space. There’s immense tactical value to stealth on surface combatants, but it’s a difficult concept to grasp,” he admitted. “No one has ever said stealth would make a surface combatant ‘invisible’.”
These initial studies have been continued and expanded under Admiral Nyquist, and include the follow-on “Revolution at Sea 2020” analysis, which is developing a research-and-development roadmap for the future BFC (initial operating capability of circa 2010-20), and the far-reaching studies being conducted at the David Taylor Research Center for a family of surface combatants—the so- called generic carrier of large objects— fashioned around common hulls and propulsion systems. The Revolution at Sea 2020 effort is to provide a research and development blueprint for the BFC and is focusing on identifying the ship platform, weapon, and sensor programs and the funding that must be in place in the 1990s to ensure that the BFC will meet all the operational requirements established for it. The issue of integrated electric drive, for example, has been central to the development of the BFC since the CNO in 1988 gave it his highest priority for development of surface warfare technology.
It will, in the words of its proponents, “break the tyranny of the drive train.” Although the later Flight 3 Arleigh Burkes may have some components of an integrated electric drive plant, it will certainly be a fundamental building block for the BFC.
David Taylor’s efforts complement the Revolution at Sea 2020 study, but are
Will the improved Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class sub—here, the Scranton (SSN-756) is readied to enter the fleet—be enough, or is the Sea Wolf (SSN-21) the only answer for the future? Stay tuned.
independent. They examine a new operational paradigm for naval forces in the post-2020 period.21 This study is developing an alternative battle force architecture called “distribute, disperse, disguise and sustain,” which should enhance mobility and sustainability, lower observability, and increase tactical flexibility and mission survivability of future naval forces. Several notional ship concepts of approximately 30,000 long tons (full load) have been developed under the rubric of the carrier of large objects and carrier dock multimission platforms, including an amphibious carrier dock, carrier dock logistics, carrier dock aviation, and guided missile carrier dock. These ships could begin to enter the fleet in the 2020-30 period, and in fact may represent the mission-essential unit concept that the earlier Surface Combatant Force Requirements study examined as a follow-on to the battleships. Some concepts David Taylor has explored, moreover, look suspiciously like smaller aircraft carriers from which (mythical) ASTOVL aircraft would operate.
Submarines
The Navy will likely experience the greatest political controversies in the area of undersea and submarine warfare. The Seawolf (SSN-21) submarine program is key to the Navy’s ability to defeat the future submarine threat but is also a key target for congressional meddling and budget cutting. Consistent with his naming antisubmarine warfare as his “number-one warfighting priority,” the former CNO, Admiral Carlisle Trost, continued to maintain that the Seawolf is the Navy’s highest-priority answer to the growing Soviet submarine threat. The
high cost of these ships, however—Navy spokesmen have cited $1.9 billion for the lead unit (funded in fiscal year 1989) and a total of $3.5 billion for the next two ships (requested in fiscal year 1991)— and the fact that the cost of the program is already growing beyond what was expected, has caused Congress to look carefully at the submarine.22
The Navy had repeatedly stated that in any one fiscal year, Seawolf acquisition requests would account for no more than 20% of the Navy’s ship-construction budget. But because the total defense budget is now coming down, while the Seawolf s unit cost is increasing, some observers have predicted that in future years Seawolf requests could account for 40% or more of the budget. If so, then other needed naval ship construction and conversion programs would go begging' Furthermore, the high cost of the individual ships may force the Navy to stretch out the program, thus increasing unit costs even more. If, as expected, the Navy continues to retire more older attack submarines early, by the end of the decade the Navy’s submarine force level could be no greater than 70 SSNs, against the stated Navy requirement of 100.23
Moreover, critics claim that the Seawolf does not deliver large enough increases in performance for the large price tag, and that the new combat system, BSY-2, is fraught with problems, cost increases, and delays.24 It would be much better, say the skeptics, for the Navy to continue building the improved Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarines—at only about $750 million per copy—and continue to research and develop the Navy’s next-generation SSN- In such proposals, the Seawolf (SSN-21) could be used as a technology demonstra-
I
tion platform, while the new Los Angeles-class submarines, which the Navy has acknowledged are superior to any listing Soviet submarine, including the much-vaunted Akula, could be bought in greater numbers to help meet force-level goals. Not surprisingly, the undersea Warfare community rejects these criticisms and initiatives as without founda- bon, ill-conceived, insufficient to meet future requirements, and ultimately more expensive.
In the strategic arena, the Navy in fiscal year 1991 identified a force objective of 24 Ohio (SSBN-726)-class submarines, which, when fitted with the Trident II D5 missile, would carry as many as 4,608 warheads.25 (The eight-warhead Trident II missile, after a few disappoint- lng failures in the 1989 test program, engineering design changes, and several encounters with protesters from Greenpeace, was approved for service use and reached initial operating capability in late March 1990, going to sea in the USS Tennessee [SSBN-734].)
In the START negotiations, the U.S. and Soviet delegations have tentatively agreed on a ceiling of 6,000 nuclear warheads for each side, of which 4,900 reentry vehicles would be reserved for land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. The fiscal year 1991 budget requests the 18th Trident SSBN; when that submarine reaches the fleet in 1997, the total U.S. SSBN force would account for 70% of the proposed START warhead ceilings. And, a 24-ship Ohio SSBN force in the early years of the next century would account for 94% of the missile warheads allowable under the START framework. Members of Congress and, not surprisingly, the U.S. Air Force, have roundly criticized this ratio.
But the Navy has strongly defended the Program, noting that the Ohio Trident system is the most survivable leg of the strategic Triad and should therefore carry the bulk of the U.S. warheads permitted under a future strategic-arms regime. Furthermore, the Navy states that the Ohio class is the ultimate stealth vehicle, rnuch more so than the Air Force’s B-2 bomber and land-based missiles, and that there are no foreseen ASW breakthroughs that will turn the oceans transparent and threaten the SSBN’s ability to stay hidden. Moreover, two problems that had created doubt about the overall effectiveness of the SSBN force—secure communications and missile accuracy—have been solved in the Ohio D5 team. The U5’s accuracy is 70% better than the target the Navy established for it when embarking on the program, rivaling the accuracy of the best land-based weapons.
Finally, the Navy has argued that the Ohio Trident system is more economical than the other legs.
The Navy’s arguments notwithstanding, there is strong pressure within Congress for slowing down and stretching out the Navy’s Ohio-class building program. The President’s Report on U.S. Strategic Force Postures under a Potential START Treaty, delivered to the Congress in July 1989, presented a range of possible force structures, including a Trident SSBN force of between 18 and 22 submarines. Thus, the Trident program could slow to one SSBN every other year, keeping the shipyard workforce reasonably stable and not creating too much consternation in the Air Force, but limiting the total buy to less than 24 submarines. The Navy’s plan, however, calls for a one-per-year building program for the next seven years until 24 Tridents are bought. Rather than cut back Trident SSBN acquisition, the Navy hopes to have the three SSBNs that at any given time would be undergoing overhauls considered nondeploy able, resulting in only a 21-Trident sub deployable fleet that would be counted against future warhead ceilings.
Mine Warfare Ships
Congress approved the final three ships of the 14-unit Avenger (MCM-l)-class ocean minehunters in the fiscal 1990 program and the Navy awarded contracts in December 1989. Two ships of the Osprey (MHC-51 (-class coastal minehunters were also authorized in fiscal year 1990; three ships were already under construction or on order, leaving another 12 to be requested in the future, according to the original program goal.
The last CNO executive board briefings on mine warfare came nearly a decade earlier, in 1979 and 1980, when the programs just reaching the fleet in the late 1980s were born. In August 1989 a follow-up mine warfare briefing (specifically focused on mine countermeasures) took into account the key experiences of the intervening years, such as the 1984 Gulf of Suez/Red Sea “Mines of August’’ and 1987-89 Persian Gulf mine crises. Admiral Nyquist noted that the mine countermeasures briefing identified a revised requirement for an additional eight dual-mission ocean minehunters for a total of 22 ships. This was the original 1979 program objective for what became the MCM-1 class. It also called for eight more coastal minehunters for a total of 25 MHCs. The three MCMs bought in fiscal 1990 are likely to be the last wooden mine-warfare ships built by the Navy; fiberglass and resin hulls are being inves-
Congress approved three wooden-hull ships of the Avenger (MCM-1) class in 1990, bringing the total to 14. The Navy commissioned the Sentry (MCM-3) on 2 September 1989.
tigated for the additional eight MCMs identified in 1989. The Navy in 1990 is also investigating the possibility of a variant of the MHC-51 design to enable it to deploy beyond coastal regions.
For the future; the Surface Warfare Plan 1989 identifies the need for a follow-on MCM ship to meet mine-clearing timelines and respond to contingencies worldwide. The Navy will investigate a common-hull design to satisfy the requirement for both an overseas de- ployer and for U.S. coastal operations. In addition, the Navy has identified a critical shortfall in both rapid mine surveillance and mine countermeasures and clearance in the amphibious objective area. An air-cushion landing craft (LCAC) has proved that it can rapidly and safely clear mines near landings, considerably faster and better than helicopter mine countermeasures. As the Marine Corps refines over-the-horizon assaults, particularly in the absence of the now-canceled MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, it will pursue the use of LCACs and other high-speed platforms and systems for mine countermeasures operations.
Amphibious Warfare Ships
At the commissioning ceremony of the
USS Wasp (LHD-1) amphibious assault ship in July 1989, a speaker noted that she had a dual mission, of sorts, as a sea- control ship. Indeed, in the early 1980s the LHDs were sold to Congress, in a package deal with the two Nimitz (CVN- 68)-class carriers requested in fiscal 1983, as having such a secondary role. That, however, had been (perhaps conveniently) forgotten for the LHDs, but future amphibious assault ships will clearly be intended to carry out sea-control operations. The Surface Warfare Plan 1989, for example, identifies an LVX to replace, beginning in the 2010-15 period, the Tarawa (LHA-1) class. The LVX will evolve from the Wasp to support future vertical-lift aircraft. The LVX also will have a VLS capability for better AAW self-defense and ASW weapons.
Other elements of the planned future amphibious fleet, according to surface warfare analysts, include an LX as a functional replacement for the 38 ships of the Austin (LPD-4), Raleigh (LPD-1), Anchorage (LSD-36), and Newport (LST-1179) classes, which reach the ends
The Wasp (LHD-1 )-c!ass amphibious assault ships, lineal descendants of the Tarawa (LHA-1) class, will undergo their own evolutionary change with gas-turbine propulsion, starting with LHD-5.
of their service lives beginning in the 1990s. The LX should be able to support two helicopters and carry two LCACs. The Surface Warfare Plan 1989 sets a requirement for about 27 LXs, which, in conjunction with 17 LSD-41/LSD- 49(CV) and 15 LHD/LHAs, will meet the amphibious lift goals established for a Marine expeditionary force and brigade in the Navy’s Lift Study of 1989.
Well beyond the LX and LXV concepts, however, are the carrier of large objects carrier dock amphibious ships conceived by David Taylor. In general, these will be large, about 30,000 tons full load, have a STOVL aircraft deck forward, a hangar superstructure above a well deck aft, integrated electric drive, and the NAAWS for two layers of AAW protection.
Fleet Auxiliaries
Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics, commented that the Navy should soon begin considering how to operate its ships
like the airlines—“replace old carts with new carts”—developing a modular logistics systems for spares, consumables, weapons, and ammunition.26 The Supply (AOE-6)-class fast combat supply ship program (three under construction or on order in 1990) is the largest and most important for the near future, but Admiral Arthur also noted that a new stores ship design is needed. Moreover, he stated
that the Navy must continue to address battle damage repair, looking at the USS Stark (FFG-31) and the USS Samuel B- Roberts (FFG-58) incidents as models for the future. The goal should be to repair in forward areas only to the degree neces- ( sary to get the ship safely home to a repair facility. In short, do not operate repair ships in forward areas.
In Admiral Arthur’s opinion, the most daunting problem confronting the Navy afloat logistics system is the environment. The Navy will have to meet increasingly stringent demands placed on it to protect the marine environment and atmosphere. The admiral stated that “the Navy has already set a goal of a ‘pollution-free’ ship for the 21st century and zero discharges from shore facilities, which will present a host of technical and logistics challenges.”
The Surface Warfare Plan 1989 also addressed the Navy’s future requirements for combat logistics and fleet support force ships. The ongoing acquisition of the Henry J. Kaiser (T-AO-187) class will eventually give the fleet 18 ships. Looking at both station ship and shuttle ship operations, the Plan notes that the most effective future course of action is to acquire large, common-hull, multi- i product ships based on the Supply-class design. The Navy is working on concepts to replace the older and slower classes of replenishment oilers, and 16 units of a fast combat support ship (AOEfVJ) vari- , ant may replace the 26 aging ammunition and stores ships of the Suribachi (AE- 21), Kilauea (AE-26), and the Mars (AFS-1) classes. The 1989 Plan outlines a series production of AOE-type ships that would alternate every other year between the Supply class (one is requested in fiscal 1991 and another three in fiscal 1994) and the AOE(V), so that 15 AOEs would be acquired by the year 2013 and 16 AOE(V)s by the year 2021. In addition to these roles, an AOE(V) fitted principally for petroleum products would begin to be phased in after 2020 to replace ships in the Cimarron (AO-177) class, which would be reaching the ends of their service lives. Future AOEs may also be fitted with vertical launchers so that they can launch reserve missiles in cooperative engagements with Aegis combatants.
The 1989 Surface Warfare Plans treatment of the fleet support force also shows the need to begin consolidating functions into multimission, common- hull ships. It identified three multimission ship types for the future fleet. First, the AR(X)—the lead unit to be requested in fiscal 1994—will satisfy the requirements for battle damage and fleet repair
ships. These large (20.000-30,000-ton) and expensive ($600-$800 million) ships will replace the three remaining Dixie (AD-15)-class ships and two Vulcan (AR-5).c]ass ships. In addition, the same hull and machinery plant of the AR(X) will be used in the planned AS(X), to replace the two remaining Fulton (ASH) submarine tenders. Second, the conceptual ATR(X) should perform emergency towing and rescue operations, and Providing battle damage repair services to surface ships and submarines while operating with or near the battle group. This S|ngle class is intended to replace the ■hree Edenton (ATS-1)- and six Preserver (ARS-8) and Bolster (ARS-38)-class ships. Third, the future ocean-surveillance ships, survey ships, and oceanographic research ships will be constructed ln both conventional monohull and small Waterplane-area twin-hull (SWATH) configurations. Several of these are already under construction; the SWATH(P) is being built as the four Victorious (T- AGOS-19/22) ships, and the first unit of (he six-ship larger SWATH(A) class was approved in fiscal 1990 (T-AGOS-23). The SWATH(A) hull will also be used for and AGOS-class ship to be requested in fiscal 1992 and the T-AGOS Ocean class, slated for an initial request in fiscal 1993. The Navy has stated an ultimate requirement for 28 ocean-surveillance, '0 survey, and 12 oceanographic- research ships.
Strategic Sealift
The question of how much sealift is really necessary and sufficient became critical in 1989. The shipbuilding industry allied itself with sympathetic individuals and committees in Congress, push- tug through a multi-hundred-million dollar package for acquiring new- eonstruction and existing sealift ships. The opening salvo in what became a heated debate about U.S. strategic sealift capability and resources came in a 22 March 1989 letter to Congress from thenSecretary of the Navy William Ball, in which he stated, “In the current constrained fiscal environment, [the Navy] cannot support a new program to build or acquire fast sealift at the expense of more critical programs.”27 The House and Senate Armed Services Committees in Rie fiscal 1989 Authorization Conference report directed the Navy to estimate the requirements for fast sealift, particularly with respect to three alternatives:
^ SL-7/T-AKR-type fast sealift ship/ monohull
^ A semiplaning hull ^ Surface Effect Ship
The Navy’s subsequent internal analysis rejected alternatives two and three outright, but the Navy Secretary was only lukewarm in his support for a new-build T-AKR, believing that other areas of strategic mobility could be better addressed. Then-Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Transportation Command, Air Force General Duane Cassidy, and Marine Corps Commandant General A. M. Gray reportedly disagreed with the Secretary of the Navy.
The House Appropriations Committee, aware of the shipyards’ desires for increased new-construction orders, perhaps to tide them over until a renaissance of commercial ship building materialized in the mid-1990s, recommended a $ 1 billion program to pursue fast sealift initiatives, which it never explicitly defined. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees supported this move, in varying degrees. The House authorizers had recommended a program of 10-12 ships, based on a prototype fast-sealift ship expected to resemble the current Algol-class (SL-7/T-AKRs), which could serve commercial markets in peacetime and revert to military uses in war. Senate supporters, however, envisioned a multimission (sealift and amphibious assault), fast (greater than 30 knots) ship based on the hull design of the Supply (AOE-6) class. The $1 billion proposed by the House appropriators was eventually whittled down to $600 million; senior Navy commentators noted that the money, if executed by the Naval Sea Systems Command as a strictly Navy program, would have funded only two or at most four ships. In the end, however, the DoD in its fiscal 1991 budget noted that it had deferred the $600 million, which would be reprogrammed for “more critical requirements.”
Navy Vice Admiral Paul Butcher, until early March 1990 Commander Military Sealift Command, discussed the question of sealift in the new world of the 1990s and beyond.:s He argued that if the United States does withdraw numerous forces from Europe and other parts of the world, there will be a greater, not lesser, requirement for strategic lift. (Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn underscored this perception in February, when he argued that even with greater warning times of impending attacks the United States will need more lighter forces to be brought to overseas trouble areas much more rapidly than before.29) Even so, Butcher noted that the requirements for fast sealift were not apparent. The correct course for the United States is not to buy new-construction fast sealift ships but to revitalize the U.S.
Merchant Marine so that there will be enough U.S.-Hag ships to meet wartime and peacetime-crisis requirements.
U.S. Coast Guard
The Coast Guard celebrates its 200th birthday in 1990 and looks to a future of increased responsibilities, but not, as does the Navy, to significant uncertainties about whether all of the funds necessary to do the job will be available. Former Commandant Admiral Paul A. Yost, Jr., in early March acknowledged the intense pressures on the defense budget for reductions, but the Coast Guard itself is not experiencing similar pressures for similar cuts.30 There is, surprisingly, some pressure to increase funding as the service gains more responsibilities. Yost contended also that the Coast Guard will likely benefit from the current mood about defense spending in that the Congress and the public realize that the Coast Guard actually constitutes a naval force in being that has extensive military capabilities. And as the DoD budget declines and forces are reduced, the Coast Guard will become something of a force of choice that is more valuable to the defense requirements of the country. “Remember,” Admiral Yost enthusiastically pointed out, “the U.S. Coast Guard is the 12th largest navy in the world and has the 7th largest naval air force ... we are an excellent defense asset for the United States!”
Indeed, the Coast Guard in 1989 bene- fitted from the pro-defense arguments, as Congress funded one of the much-desired new icebreakers (WAGBs) in the fiscal 1990 Navy shipbuilding program. Unlike last year before the Congress, Admiral Yost no longer talked about the wartime operations plans’ requirements for about four icebreakers; he and his successors will work with whatever Congress provides. Although the DoD put the icebreaker funded in fiscal 1990 on the “deferred” list, Yost was convinced that the ship will eventually be built.
Similarly, Congress funded 12 Island- class patrol boats in the Navy’s fiscal 1990 program. The requirements for modern patrol boats continue to be strong to replace the aging fleet Coast Guard patrol boats. In Admiral Yost’s opinion, the Island class is the best patrol boat design in the world. He noted also that the Curtis Bay shipyard in Maryland is now building the Heritage-class prototype; “We will test that design in a head-to- head competition with the Island class. If it looks like the new design will be cheaper to operate, provide a longer life, and have better operational characteristics, then we’ll go forward with the new class.” Until then, the 49 patrol boats delivered or on order will satisfy “about half the Coast Guard’s requirement” for patrol boats.
The Coast Guard is continuing with a SLEP for high- and medium-endurance cutters and other platforms it is not replacing. The service’s acquisition and construction budgets are adequate to meet approved programs, but Admiral Yost recognized that they cannot accommodate every new platform that may be needed, hence the SLEP for existing assets. The Coast Guard, however, will soon need to address a new-acquisition program for buoy tenders; the current ships are now 40-50 years old. The Coast Guard previously had come up with a new design for a buoy tender, but after the catastrophic Exxon Valdez oil spill in March 1989, for which the United States had to ask the Soviet Union for assistance in providing high-seas oil skimmers, Admiral Yost ordered the new buoy tender design to be modified to provide for a high-seas oil-skimming capability. .
Indeed, the environmental and drug- interdiction missions will continue to occupy the service. For the future, the Coast Guard will need to address fleet requirements. To do this, among other tasks, Yost put in place what he described as the best long-range planning organization of the military services. The Commandant’s Strategic Planning Council comprises five or six of the brightest Coast Guard officers, hand picked for the job. They meet once or twice a month with him to review programs, analyses, and concepts. Yost commented that they provide a valuable service in looking to future responsibilities, roles and missions, and changes in the domestic and international environments that may affect the Coast Guard, and identifying means for the Coast Guard to accommodate and respond to those changes.
Summary
These interesting times of the early 1990s will be critical for the future U.S. Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. Challenged by domestic pressures for massive reallocations of increasingly scarce federal resources, the Navy and the Marines are also confronted with a U.S. Army and Air Force in search of new roles and missions in the ambiguous international conflict environment. Yet in all the discussions of how all elements of the U.S. armed services should remain relevant to future combat requirements, no one publicly has forcefully questioned the marginal costs involved in the various initiatives. That is, from the nation’s perspective, why spend billions of dollars necessary to replicate in the Army and Air Force the extensive capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps in contingency and limited-objective warfare?
For the Navy, the issues of future ship designs, force levels, and force mixes may ultimately be decided within an atmosphere not unlike that of the roles and missions controversy of the late 1940s. This eventually degenerated to an “admirals’ revolt” and an intensely bitter interservice rivalry that, in the end, wrought havoc with the Navy’s initial postwar strategic concept and greatly influenced the subsequent composition and tasks of the fleet of the 1950s and 1960s.31 Without close attention, careful planning, and forceful articulation of the real requirements and capabilities today, the same fate could await tomorrow’s fleet.
’’See, for example, “Cheney Orders Reassessment of DoD Strategy, Weapon Systems,” Defense News, 8 January 1990, pp. 1, 36; and “U.S. Finds Persian Gulf Threat Ebbs,” The Washington Post, 7 February 1990, pp. Al, A19.
12W.S. Lind, “Strategy and a Future U.S. Navy,” (paper presented at the U.S. Naval Institute conference, “The Future of U.S. Naval Power, San Diego, 27-29 July 1988), pp. 5-6, mimeo. For another critical view, see Lt. N.L. Golightly, USN, “Correcting Three Strategic Mistakes,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1990, pp. 32ff.
13“Navy Urged to Bring Ships Home to Cut Costs,” The Washington Post, 28 March 1990, p. A6. ’“Personal interview with VAdm. R.M. Dunleavy, ACNO Air Warfare, 12 February 1990. l5See, for example: “$1 Billion Navy Destroyer’s Cost is Making Waves,” The Washington Post, 15 September 1989, p. A15; and “Aegis Ability to Defeat ARMs is Questioned,” Defense News, 26 February 1990, pp. 4, 48.
l6One assessment of Representative Dingell’s relationship with the auto industry describes him as the “industry’s greatest asset. . . . Dingell frequently intervenes to delay or scuttle regulations aimed at car makers, and he kept clean air legislation out of his committee during the 1980s.” “Auto Pollution Debate Has Ring of the Past,” The Washington Post, 26 March 1990, Al, A8.
l7For an overview of the DDG-51 program, see S.C. Truver, “Today’s Revolution at Sea: The Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) Destroyer,” International Defense Review, January 1989, pp. 335-338.
18ACNO for Surface Warfare, Surface Warfare Plan
- Fall 1989, pp. 4-8.
1 “Personal interview with VAdm. J.W. Nyquist, ACNO Surface Warfare, 20 February 1990. See also, “Spain Sinks NFR-90 Hopes,” Defense News, 8 January 1990, pp. 1, 37.
20S.C. Truver, “Wither the Revolution at Sea?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1988, pp. 68-74.
21LCdr. M. Bosworth, “Carrier of Large Objects (CLO) as an Element of an Alternative Naval Battle Force Architecture,” March 1990, mimeo.
"~R. O’Rourke, Seawolf or SSN-21 Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief (IB90051), Library of Congress, 21 February 1990.
23See the comments of N. Polmar and VAdm. D. Cooper, USN, ACNO Undersea Warfare (OP-02), in the transcripts of the Naval Institute’s seminar, “ASW: The Navy's Top Warfighting Priority?”; and “Navy’s 100-Sub Fleet Unrealistic, Admiral Says,” Defense News, 12 March 1990, pp. 1, 44.
““‘‘Navy Says Gap in Seawolf, Combat System Schedules OK,” Defense News, 31 July 1989, p. 13; “Delays in New Sub Battle Management System Prompt Call for Audit,” Defense News, 26 February
- p. 42.
“[1][2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]See S.C. Truver, “The Trident II Missile: Continuing a Tradition of Deterrence,” Naval Forces, No. V/1989, Vol. X, pp. 46-51.
“Personal interview with VAdm. S.R. Arthur, USN, DCNO Logistics, 15 February 1990.
27Inside the Navy, 10 April 1989, pp. 1, 8. “Personal Interview with VAdm. P.D. Butcher, USN, Commander Military Sealift Command, 20 February 1990.
“’“Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Backs Sealift,” American Maritime Congress Washington Letter, 5 March 1990.
“Personal interview with Adm. P.A. Yost, Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, 2 March 1990. ’’Michael A. Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1988), p. xix.
Dr. Truver is director of National Security Studies at Information Spectrum.
'A. Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), pp. 11-12.
[2]The Washington Post, 15 February 1990, p. A49.
’“Statement of Sen. E.M. Kennedy proposing a $169 Billion Peace Dividend over the Next Five Years, 1 February 1990. However, in an interview, Kennedy’s defense aide, W. Lynn, noted that “not much analysis had gone into the determination of the $169 billion figure; it merely represented the result of increasing the after-inflation reduction of defense accounts but no allocation of those increased cuts among the Services. Personal interview with W. Lynn, 13 February 1990.
[4]For example, Rep. B. Bradley (D-NJ) wrote that “We can t afford not to help East Europe, and we could do it for one percent of the defense budget.” The Washington Post, 28 March 1990, p. A23.
[5]The Bush administration and the Congress implicitly agreed to let some $16.1 billion in across-the-board spending cuts for fiscal year 1990, imposed in October 1989 under the deficit-reduction law, remain in effect. “Bush Willing to Let Cuts Be Permanent,” The Washington Post, 2 November 1989, pp. Al, A16. After agreeing to a $14.3 billion deficit-reduction measure, however, the government allowed some $1.75 billion in cuts to remain permanent. “Sequester Takes More than $600 Million from Pentagon Procurement," Aerospace Daily, 20 December 1989, p. 451.
Statement of the Director of the CIA before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 23 January 1990, pp. 3,4. Emphasis in the original.
[7]Then-Vice Admiral Charles Larson, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations stated before the House Armed Services Sea- power Committee in April 1989, "It is unacceptable to place limits on conventional sea-launched cruise missiles, and it is unacceptable to designate particular classes of warships as carriers of nuclear-armed SLCMs.” “Pentagon Continues to Oppose Naval Arms Control Talks with Soviets,” Defense News, 1 May 1989, p. 8.
"“Cheney Foresees Lighter U.S. Forces Under Bush Arms Proposals,” The Washington Post, 2 June 1989, p. A21.
[9]"Cheney Warns Defense Bill Risks a Veto,” The Washington Post, 13 August 1989, p. A20.
[10]G. Adams and S.A. Cain, “Defense Dilemmas in the 1990s,” International Security, Vol. 13 No. 5 (Spring 1989), p. 13.