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numerically superior and geographically advantaged ventional forces on the Eurasian continent. The doctrine make the nuclear threat credible underwent a number refinements over the years (“massive retaliation.’ ^ tual deterrence,” “limited nuclear options,” and “countervailing strategy”), but the goal remained esS dally the same. Blurring the threshold between conv tional and nuclear war would deter the Soviet Union ‘rt all forms of armed conflict in Europe. ^
Times have changed and the coastal defense and Pl security missions have become indispensable to a str -
If the Coast Guard is to ensure that U. S. naval and logistics forces are not destroyed in their home waters before they can deploy, it must get the respect—i.e., resources—deserving of a fourth leg of the strategic deterrent.
Are Western defense establishments keeping pace with the dramatic arms control initiatives that appear to be transforming the international security environment? Are the NATO conventional warfare strategies equal to the task of deterring the Eastern bloc in an increasingly denuclearized Europe? The continued neglect of the U. S. coastal defense and port security missions suggests that the answer to both questions is “no!” There are two reasons why Western security planners have been willing to accept NATO defense strategies that pay no attention to the need to protect America’s vital harbors and waterways. First, until recently there was no threat: the Soviet Union did not dedicate the resources to interrupt maritime traffic along the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific coasts. Second, and more important, ^ Westerners believed that any confrontation between two superpowers in Europe would automatically esca‘ 0 the conflict across the nuclear threshold. Such a seen3 meant that war would be both destructive and short-l>ve Coastal defense and port security measures would the fore have no measurable effect on the outcome. ^ This second reason originates in the way in wh'c pu. United States has guaranteed the security of Western rope. The Eisenhower administration argued that deteirt \ = Soviet aggression could be made more affordable by r 'e ing on nuclear weapons. Nuclear forces meant that ^ United States would not have to match the Soviet Uni°n
plan
antic
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and Gulf coastline—is exposed.
Hailllshment’s response to the coastal warfare threat re- PnK|S a" t0° tudolcut and haphazard. Untended, this
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dettlese commitments with deterrence, this loss of confi- could threaten Western security.
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arance missions. They are charged with coordinating
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Q - security planners is whether or not the U. S. )rsd Guard is up to the MDZ tasking. A serious question ae Coast Guard leadership is whether the service will
able
v credible deterrent. In the wake of the Intermediate p0]C ear ^orces (INF) treaty, there is almost irresistible w1Ica* pressure to make massive reductions in nuclear (STi°nS' ProsPect °f Strategic Arms Reduction Talks an<l ^ and ^hort-rangc Nuclear Forces (SNF) treaties _ seemingly insurmountable problems associated fj . 'Modernizing the Lance missile threaten to remove the ■□dity from the “flexible response” doctrine, jailer nuclear arsenals will make it increasingly diffi- jji to ground deterrence in limited nuclear options. The let k °od tactical nuclear weapons will become obso- Or f.because °f a lack of political will to modernize them, a[aat short-range nuclear forces will simply be negoti- Cr a^ay, means the nuclear threshold will become in- jtSlngly inviolate. This trend would be reinforced if lim- I °n cruise missiles—sea launched (SLCMs) and ground Iheh^ ^GLCMs)—are written into the START treaty. Js °Urden °f deterrence will shift to credible plans that c !e t*le Warsaw Pact that the West can conduct a suc- pl U1 large-scale conventional war in Europe. Those I as will not be credible if NATO’s rear—the U. S. At-
gQv'et military doctrine and force structure have under- tl, e aoteworthy changes in the 1980s. Both indicate that Nat °>V'et Union can and would take advantage of tj0 ® s exposed rear area during a superpower confronta- eS(.l !n, sP*te of these developments, the U. S. defense
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|etTi may lead the NATO allies to lose confidence in Jnited States’s ability to satisfy its conventional de- of: commitments. Given the growing interrelationship coastal defense player is the nation’s Sj armed service. A memorandum of agreement thfed 'n March 1984 by the Department of the Navy and UePartment of Transportation created the maritime zone (MDZ) system and tasked the U. S. Coast bilijHd with overseeing its implementation. This responsi- \Cc ^.'ndudes: mine countermeasures, port breakout, port C|cUr>ty/safety, protection of coastal shipping, and harbor
,i y. Coast Guard, and other resources that will be as- /\,l ed to the coastal defense missions. The Coast Guard heant'c and Pacific area commanders were placed at the K .L°f their respective MDZs, under the Atlantic and ne of the questions that should be on the minds of
w to hold its own, once exposed to the mounting \y lrty of this increasingly important link in the chain of 3 ern security. Both questions should be answered with le^lified “yes.” The Coast Guard can meet the chal- &)n 6 S° *onS as tde White House, Congress, the Penta- tw ’ t*le Fleet commanders in chief, and the Chief of tare Gperations are willing to recognize the critical na- the coastal and port security mission. More important, they must be willing to provide the Coast Guard with the resources needed to cope with the current and projected threats posed by mine warfare, sabotage and terrorism, and coastal submarine warfare.
The coastal mine warfare threat is especially serious. Little abstract thinking is required to appreciate the disruption that modem sea mines can cause to oceanic trade, the strategic and commercial impact of the few unsophisticated mines used in the August 1984 Red Sea mining incident and more recently in the Persian Gulf. Mine production does not require advanced technology; mines are readily available in the world’s arms market; mines can be laid in anonymity; and countermeasures require specialized knowledge and resources. The strategic value of mines is derived not from their ability to actually destroy seagoing assets, but from their ability to deny an adversary access to uncleared waterways. Modem ships and the armaments that they would carry are expensive. They require long lead times to build. They carry larger cargoes than World War Il-era ships, and as a result, cannot be readily replaced if lost at sea. No naval commander can even consider the possibility of risking maritime assets by permitting them to transit an uncleared minefield. Among other things, this cruel fact poses a serious threat to the U. S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy.
Two of the Maritime Strategy’s main tenets are seizing the initiative and carrying the battle to the enemy. To accomplish this, the Navy must immediately mobilize its combatants and surge them from home ports at the first sign of deepening tension between the superpowers. A delay caused by the unexpected appearance of mines in U. S. waterways—inland and offshore—would permit Soviet naval assets to reach open water, where they would be far more difficult to locate and neutralize. As a result, their chances for damaging NATO maritime assets would be dramatically improved.
In World War II, 338 mines laid by the Germans temporarily closed all the ports on the East Coast. The vital naval port of Charleston, South Carolina, remained closed for 13 days. Current Soviet mines are far superior to those German mines. In fact, the Soviet Union is reported to have the largest and most diverse stock of mines in the world—estimates run as high as 400,000 mines of all types. Their massive postwar expansion in naval ships and aircraft, the availability of East European-flag commerce vessels and surrogates in the Caribbean Basin, and the Soviets’ connection with international terrorist organizations provide them with an unparalleled ability to deliver those mines to U. S. coastal waters. This is particularly true during the critical war transition stage.
At present, U. S. mine countermeasures (MCM) assets are not even marginally capable of responding to the threat. These include two Avenger (MCM-l)-class ships, 20 1950s-vintage oceangoing minesweepers (MSOs), seven equally aged minesweeping boats (MSBs), 30 minesweeping helicopters, and slow-moving vessels in the craft of opportunity program (COOP). Only 12 of the MSOs are assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. Three are in the active force and the remainder are in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF). These resources must support U. S. naval
and
amphibious operations, keep at least a dozen major ports open at all times, sweep the approaches to the Panama Canal and Florida Straits, and provide mine-free channels along the coastal shipping lanes.1
What contribution might the Coast Guard make in response to this demanding mission? There appear to be several cost-effective options. One is to outfit all Coast Guard vessels larger than the 41-foot utility boats with a portable side-scan sonar and a state-of-the-art LORAN C receiver. The quality of the LORAN signals in most U. S. coastal waters is such that the navigational accuracy required for effective MCM operations can be easily satisfied with this relatively low-cost piece of electronics. The availability of a side-scan sonar would allow Coast Guard units to update bottom charts of important navigati°na routes regularly under peacetime conditions so that sus pected mines could be more readily identified in wartime-
When mines are located, qualified Coast Guard div deployed on board cutters could be used to defuse them- instead of the Navy’s explosive ordnance detachmea • Recent MDZ exercises in New London, Charleston. & Jacksonville have shown that with training and a investment in electronics, Coast Guardsmen can per*0 this vital mission.
The MDZ assets must also respond to sabotage and rorism. The port systems of the United States link ^ national industrial and defense infrastructure to the sea.
vital outlets for the flow of supplies, reinforcements,
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naval assets, these systems make excellent targets-
The varied threat to U. S. ports and coastal waters—from submarines to Spetsnaz saboteurs—demands a variety of Coast Guard capabilities, from LAMPS ASW helicopters like the one temporarily operating from the USCGC Escanaba (WMEC-907), above, to increased harbor patrols, opposite.
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fragile nature of their increasingly technical and conc ^ trated infrastructure makes them especially vulnerabl terrorists. j
Trends in modern commercial shipping have en.*ian].j|y the attractiveness of port sabotage. The most mild^.^ useful ships are relatively small, able to transit ea . through shallow and restricted waters and to carry a vt ety of cargoes. Ideally, they are self-sustaining s0 loading and offloading of cargo can be done without SP cialized shore facilities. But today’s merchant ma
fends cific
toward large, deep-draft ships designed to carry spe- cargoes and dependent upon port facilities for effi- *0aciing and offloading. Therefore, commercial ves- *re operating out of fewer ports and only out of those In sophisticated dockside facilities. If the loading cranes tQ(j 'tS. major seaports are ever damaged or destroyed, . aV s commercial containership fleet would be virtually
CaPacitated.
tureSt ^0W *mPortant a smoothly running port infrastruc- jsls to the success of NATO conventional war strategies ^Pparent from an examination of the logistical demands ^ conducting a war along the NATO Central Front.
11 ree-fourths of U. S. ground combat power,—including *tive and seven reserve Army divisions and two active l °ne reserve Marine expeditionary forces,—would jae to be transported to combat theaters. According to lhe6S ^arkin, approximately 34% of the troops, 52% of vehicles and equipment, 77% of the dry cargo and rien les’ an<^ 90% of the petroleum products will be car- jScla the assault follow-on echelon (AFOE). The AFOE H^toprised of the elements needed to support and sustain atophibious operation that will be embarked in mer-
Ch
n S^‘PP'n8- “Some of these elements may be required 0 + _.ha^ ancj the remainder should arrive no later than
t^Pon conducting a conventional war, the Soviets would disUnlikely to overlook the benefits to be derived from dir^PP'ng American ports by sabotage. Their history of lenect ties to international terrorist organizations, the exis- Ce °f their own highly trained special forces known as
etsnaz, and a doctrine that speaks of the vital imports ^ con(Juct'ng operations in the enemy’s rear all indi-
^ce,
0 _r--------------------------- ^
«tieney have not made such an oversight. For instance,
naj rn'Ss'on of the Spetsnaz is to conduct “special recon, 'sance which calls for the infiltrations of enemy terri-
a,? before the outbreak of war to destroy or put out of L°n’ to
^able enemy.”3
major economic and military installations of the
jHether .
sPo^ ^ Spetsnaz forces or, more probably, by Soviet- parn^0red terrorist/, the United States is inadequately prePort t0 C0Pe (bis serious threat. Since World War I, q security has been the responsibility of the Coast % rto Its ability to conduct this mission has always been Q^totoed dramatically by augmentation from the Coast Reserve. But the Selected Coast Guard Reserve ^ti^glb is less than half of that necessary to meet mobili- 3Ct.°n manpower requirements. Fiscal year 1988 budget ^ actually led to a decline in reserve personnel, retraining programs, and operational exercises. Fiscal Port ^?9 and 1990 budgets are more substantial, but sup-
the infrastructure of vital U. S. ports is dis-
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; COASTGUARD;
:
U. S. COAST GUARD
^ar
tj00n,y a no-growth program in spite of a more ambi-
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P v-oast Guard proposal. This is unacceptable. 0^ecent MDZ exercises have shown that the Coast e(ydrt* Can in fact protect vital harbor facilities from a vari- ofV^ sabotage attempts. But it can not do this as a matter
°toine if its ranks continue to be restrained and training totunities are cut back.
Sp0ne third major threat that MDZ commanders must re- nc* to, and the one for which they are most poorly pre-
pared to combat, is coastal submarine warfare. Until recently, the prospect of Soviet submarines targeting allied shipping off U. S. coastal waters was considered relatively remote. But two developments indicate that this assessment must be revised. The first is the sustained Soviet commitment to build a large number of submarines; by the mid-1990s, the Soviet submarine force could number 240 nuclear and diesel boats.4 The second development is associated with strategic arms control. Soviet doctrine calls for most of its submarines to remain close to Soviet waters to protect its ballistic missile submarine force. However, a negotiated decline in the number of submarine-based nuclear missiles would mean that more Soviet submarines would be free to attack military and merchant convoys.
The speed of modern submarines, the precision with which they can navigate and locate maritime assets, and the destructiveness of their antiship weaponry could mean that a few boats operating in the rear of a forward- deployed U. S. naval force could do enormous damage to an already small allied merchant marine fleet. The greatest prospects for success would come from targeting the shipping lanes adjacent to coastal waters. During the war transition phase, when vital NATO troops, ammunition, and supplies are en route to West European ports, coastal submarine warfare could do irreparable damage to the NATO war effort.
The United States has few assets available to respond to the submarine threat along its coasts. Further, the problem of coastal antisubmarine warfare is complicated by the technical problems inherent in conducting ASW in shallow water. The Navy’s limited assets will be deployed to support carrier battle groups and amphibious task groups preparing to operate overseas. In most scenarios, coastal defense and escorts for sealift forces would be assigned after these forward defense requirements are fulfilled.
The Coast Guard could help contain the coastal submarine threat in two ways. The first is to make its platforms available to research efforts aimed at developing a shallow-water ASW capability. The second is to outfit Coast Guard high- and medium-endurance cutters with the latest ASW weaponry, including LAMPS helicopters. Coast Guard helicopters, especially those engaged in law enforcement, are essentially operating as eyes and ears. Accordingly, outfitting them to carry sonobuoys and light-
I
I
weight torpedoes with conventional warheads should not substantially affect the normal peacetime missions of these aircraft.
Investing in the MDZ mission takes into account a likely axiom for defense planning in the 1990s—Western strategic planners will have to think smarter, not richer. Recent budgetary constraints have left high and dry many who recognize the growing importance of conventional forces for defending the West. With justification, these critics feel that U. S. forces are spread too thin and subject to far greater attrition than is officially acknowledged. Generally their solution has included demands for building more naval ships and submarines, rebuilding of the U. S. merchant marine, and restoring the U. S. shipbuilding industry.
But as attractive as these proposals are, they are unrealistic. In a future of increased austerity, funds will not be found on either side of the Atlantic to improve NATO's warship, merchant marine, and shipyard inventories.
If U. S. port systems and coastal routes are left unprotected, this nation could find its forces bottled up in their home ports when they are desperately needed overseas. Worse, many of these forces, once clear of port, could be destroyed long before they reach their destination.
It is therefore imperative that the United States develop and maintain a peacetime coastal defense posture. With the likely prospect that arms control initiatives will reduce limited nuclear options and raise the nuclear threshold, there will be a greater demand on conventional warfare plans to provide a basis for a credible deterrent. The MDZ
mission must thus be a vital link in deterrence.
Policy makers can ill afford to keep the Coast Guard 0 the sidelines of national defense planning. Changing c,r cumstances have made it a player with an important con tribution to make in the preservation of the Western secn^ rity system. A small investment in resources that alio the Coast Guard to protect vital U. S. waterways will he P to ensure that the billions of dollars spent on defense c
do what it must do: deter war in Europe, or failing
that.
be
prosecute a large-scale conventional war so that it can
terminated on terms favorable to the West. It is an in
vest'
ment that would work to smooth the potential rough ^ ters left in the wake of INF.
'J. L. Couhat, B. Prezelin, A. D. Baker 111. Combat Fleets of theWorld l^ (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988). _ coMe'
2Stud\ Guide For Strategic Mobility, (Newport. RI: U. S. Naval War 1 1985), p. 17. .
'David R. Kohler, "Spctsnaz,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Augus
p. 47.
“Karl Lautenschlager, “The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001. tional Security, Winter 1986-87, p. 121.
Inter"0'
Lieutenant Flynn is a doctoral candidate in the International Sece 3[1 Studies Program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, an ' Jfj instructor in the Department of Humanities at the U. S. Coast Academy. He is a 1982 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy- - served in the USCGC Spar (WLB-403) and served as commanding , cer of the USCGC Point Arena (WPB-82346), in which he particiP in the first three MDZ exercises to be held in Hampton Roads.
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