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ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Train Smart: Interactive Partnerships Closing the Gun Gap Supporting Land Warfare
Needed: Submarine Design Competition Reactive Hull Armor
Flagships for Fleet Commanders?
Oh, For a Ship That Can Keep the Sea! The Morning of the Empty Trenches The Road to Eighth and Eye The Public Affairs Front
The Death of the Coast Guard
Contents:
Safeguarding the Hospital Ships
Hospital Ships: The Right of Limited Self Defense
Keep Pilots in the Navy Bulldog
Buying Time for the Merchant Marine
:
“Safeguarding the Hospital Ships”
(See A. M. Smith, pp. 56-65, November 1988 Proceedings)
“Hospital Ships: The Right of Limited Self Defense”
(See S. L. Oreck, pp. 62-65, November 1988
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander David Scott, Medical Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve— The intent of the various Geneva regulations regarding hospital ships is twofold:
► To provide for identification of hospital ships to avoid accidental attack.
► To offer immunity from attack in return for assurances that hospital ships cannot support combat operations.
The use of beacons and radar transponders is beneficial only if one believes one’s adversaries intend to recognize the neutral status of hospital ships and avoid attacking them. For the foreseeable future, unfortunately, the Navy very likely will confront terrorist organizations and revolutionary governments as opponents. These entities repeatedly have demonstrated a willingness to violate international agreements whenever it suits their purposes. The Iranian seizure of the U. S. embassy and Iraqi use of chemical weapons are two vivid examples.
Given this reality, the Navy is justified, some might say obligated, to assess potential threats to its hospital ships in any area of operation and to take whatever actions are necessary to assure the safety of ship and crew. Decreased visibility may be one response to threats, chaff and close-in weapon systems may be another, and armed Marines to prevent attack and boarding from small craft still another. None of these purely defensive measures threatens an opponent in any way, and we should not expose these valuable assets to attack because someone criticizes the presence of a chaff dispenser.
Hospital ships are not warships, but they are intended to operate in combat zones and they do enhance our combat capability. The safety of these vessels, their crews, and their patients should rest upon something more reliable than the integrity of Colonel Moammar Gadhafi or the Ayatollah Khomeini.
“Keep Pilots in the Navy”
(See N. L. Golightly, pp. 32-36, December
1988 Proceedings)
Lieutenant James P. Unger, U.S.Navy If given sincere effort and a chance, Lieutenant Golightly’s proposal might succeed in producing officers with a liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor—officers who would be the souls of tact, patience, justice, firmness, and charity as per John Paul Jones’ qualifications of a naval officer. However, the Navy could not develop such officers because, just as Lieutenant Golightly alludes, the chain of command would treat such an effort as just another bureaucratic chore—another block to be checked.
But, why wouldn’t the proposal work? Why are pilots leaving the Navy? Lieutenant Golightly has accurately addressed major reasons for this dilemma. However, the true answers lie in lack of leadership and character, not in “nugget’ officers, but in general. The main tenets of leadership, honor, and personal character have become watered down and misdefmed.
Leaders inspire men to want to do the extraordinary under extraordinary circumstances. Leadership is not bound by time and has not changed since John Paul Jones’ day. Imagine yourself as a junior officer on board a U. S. ship at the time of our Revolutionary War. Battling rats and scurvy, maintaining drinking water and food stores, and fighting with outgunned and outnumbered ships, all without guidance from superiors for weeks at a time, compounded the problems of carrying out one’s mission. Today, instead of leadership, guidance is no more than a radio call or satellite away; in essence, this closeness nullifies independent thinking, judgment, and command. Junior officers have not been instructed, but have learned and adopted the thinking that, in order to maintain the viability of one’s career, the norm is to ask one’s superior exactly how he wants his order
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carried out, rather than doing what is ordered.
Another problem is today’s misdefini- tion of loyalty. It seems loyalty means to one’s direct superior or whoever is writing the fitness report or evaluation, a compromise of moral values or personal ethics, almost to the point of ingratiation. In actuality, a loyal person has true, willing, and unfailing devotion—devotion to shipmates, to the Navy, and, above all, to the country. Loyalty implies patriotism of the highest sense. One’s loyalty is never to be questioned, but rather assumed. Young airdales have seen that to question or express an opinion not in line with “corporate thinking” is highly deleterious to one’s career. To some it is tantamount to treason against a superior, a unit, or even the Navy itself. Even the Soviets, with the introduction of glas- nost, have realized that if people are not allowed to question, all that is left is a stymied, stifled, subdued populace lacking any creativity and imagination.
Hand in hand with loyalty is honor, the most important part of a naval officer’s character. Honor is a quality that renders a person unable to speak anything less than absolute truth in any situation, regardless of the outcome, and it leaves him incapable of any action that would bring reproach upon his integrity. What is a young junior officer to think when, in the process of his squadron’s submission for the Isbell Trophy for antisubmarine warfare excellence, he asks his operations officer, “How can we say we have all that contact time when 95% of it was on that surfaced transiting Foxtrot submarine—the one that we blanketed by no less than three or four of our aircraft simultaneously for four days straight?” And the reply comes, “Well, they never said whether it had to be submerged to be counted [did they?].” ASW excellence? Personal integrity? What is the junior officer to think? How does this type of revelation affect his future thinking? Where is the honor?
What does being an officer or selection for command mean? Lieutenant Golightly suggests required reading, such as The Caine Mutiny by Herman Wouk (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1951). Anyone reading this story quickly learns that an officer has been trusted by the nation with preserving its future and that command means competence. Today, does selection for command or promotion merely mean clique approval or favoritism? It was ironic that a former Secretary of the Navy was compelled, according to Navy Times, to send a letter to an admiral selection board to remind its members about the gravity of their decisions to the nation’s livelihood and freedoms, and to specifically instruct them to discount totally personal relationships and acquaintances.
Lieutenant Golightly’s suggestions concerning mandatory tactical lessons and how to administer and measure uncompromised tests should have been implemented long ago. But they will find only limited acceptance unless the seriousness of an officer’s duty to become a manager of violence and to learn the art of war is reaffirmed as preeminent. Even so, officers always have had access to tactical material. Interest in and knowledge of tactics are directly proportional to an officer’s professionalism and are a true measure of his love of the profession- The true professional makes room in his day to study tactics; he knows the trust ot the nation mandates this as his foremost responsibility. The basis of the problem concerning tactical emphasis in naval aviation is not with the current program or the lack of an effective program- Rather, the problem is with the degree of personal professionalism that exists today and the lack of serious commitment to emphasizing and enforcing an officer s duty to learn his primary vocation.
Why is pilot retention floundering- Perhaps it can best be illustrated by the following true story. Even when an officer assumes command, feeling that he can now do things his way instead ot keeping things to himself, and emerges as a leader, he seems shunned by his less dynamic contemporaries. The other squadron’s new commanding officer, the one who calls his men “his boys,” starts achieving remarkable turn-around results. In some minds his young turks are perceived as quickly becoming genuine, viable threats in the battle “E” competition. Sayings, bordering on pettiness, begin to arise from senior officers and filter down to be used by department heads- Soon the other squadron is known as “Brand X.” More trite references follow, freely given at wing functions. Suddenly, the up-and-coming squadron suffers a tragic fatal Class “A” mishap- Imagine the average person’s awe when, in another squadron, on the mishap message, placed at the forefront of the message board for that day, scribbled in red ink, are the odious words, “VS-38 has been snakebit—what great luck!” Some pilots are leaving the Navy because they cannot stomach the question, “A naval career, at what price?”
Lieutenant Golightly says to educate young officers about leadership so they may better assume responsibility, but this is not the answer. We can educate and reeducate, but will this bring forth a fu-
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ture generation of competent officers and solve the pilot retention problem? What makes a leader is not knowing more leadership, but practicing leadership. Lieutenant Golightly attacks the problem by trying to improve junior officers, but misses the cause of the effect. Even if his first generation of junior officers were taught, certified, and put out on the street, they would not survive. They would be terminated by a system that would find such fine young leaders at odds with its self-serving concepts of loyalty, personal character, professionalism, and leadership.
Lieutenant Golightly needs to look at basics. John Paul Jones doesn’t seem to fit today. Some cynical officers would even say that the formula for success and promotion in today’s Navy is to agree always with superiors and shunt responsibilities, but seek credit and titles, lie or falsify when expedient to do so, and, most important, know somebody. Honor, personal integrity, and loyalty are fundamental characteristics essential to every naval officer. Pilots, naval flight officers, and enlisted personnel are leaving the Navy because these basic values are no longer uniformly paramount or correctly applied in their squadron’s daily routine.
The reason pilots are leaving, when finally reduced to its lowest denominator, is that they are tired of being forced to ask themselves some fundamental questions to which they have not received satisfactory answers: Where are the honor, maturity, integrity, leadership, and my chance to lead without having to worry about offending someone who is higher up?
Perhaps it is time to ask someone else these questions. Pilots are not naive in pursuing civilian careers as Lieutenant Golightly suggests. Rather, in the majority of cases, they are young leaders that the Navy cannot do without because they understand the essence of the naval saying, “He who will not risk, cannot win.”
William T. Brockman—Lieutenant Golightly’s article on pilot retention raised heavy airline recruitment as a factor in the problem. The reason for the heavy airline recruitment relates to the large number of airline pilots reaching age 60, the age of mandatory retirement from piloting large commercial aircraft. This Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rule dates back to I960 and recently has been challenged by a group of 28 pilots whose requests for exemptions were rejected. The Air Line Pilots Association has changed its position, and now favors the “age 60” rule, based on a desire to let younger pilots move up into the vacated positions. Of course, many of these younger pilots are replaced by military pilots.
A clear public policy problem exists, however, when the services cannot maintain adequate pilot strength at a time when the airlines are retiring 60-year-old experienced pilots arbitrarily and replacing them with taxpayer-trained military pilots. I suggest that the Defense Department consult with the FAA on this matter, and encourage a system of rigorous physical and psycho-motor screening for airline pilots approaching age 60, with each pilot treated individually. Each qualified airline pilot older than age 60 on the job equals one less fighter or transport pilot lured from the Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force.
“Bulldog”
(See G. K. Holcomb, pp. 115-118, and M. E.
Edwards, pp. 116-117, November 1988
Proceedings)
Major Paul F. Donohue, U. S. Marine Corps—As 1 read Captain Holcomb s article, I wondered when exactly it was that the U. S. Naval Academy (USNA) went out of the leadership business. His comment that “the Naval Academy does not develop the leadership style of midshipmen as well as the [Officer Candidate School] OCS system does” either means that some USNA company officers should start looking for new jobs, or Captain Holcomb should start spending more time in Bancroft Hall. Whatever the case, a problem exists that is not going to be solved with only a six-week OCS course.
Realizing that the last real plebe yea1 was some 20 years ago (gee, that’s when I was a plebe), I was concerned when 1 read that “Bulldog will replace Plebe Summer as the definition of discipline. The one attribute I credit most to my time as a plebe is a strong sense of self-discipline. That, along with two concepts that were mentioned often at the Naval Academy—accountability and responsibility—add up to the basis of a rather fair leadership style. I would hope that these same concepts are being stressed today at USNA.
One indication that all is not well lies in the Naval Academy’s decision that midshipmen have to prepare for Bulldog- If it takes the average midshipman three afternoons and two nights each week for five months to get ready for a six-week OCS course, something is really wrong. I always thought being in good shape was a given for a midshipman, especially one who is interested in the Marine Corps.
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I’m confused by the statement that “USNA midshipmen had five months of Marine Corps-related training—short compared to the nearly three years NROTC midshipmen receive.” I wasn’t aware that NROTC midshipmen choose the Marine Corps option the first day of their freshman year, nor was I aware that the first two and a half years of training at USNA are mutually exclusive to the development of only naval officers. I rather think it is the intention of Naval Academy officials to give their midshipmen whatever edge they can over their NROTC and MECEP (Marine Corps enlisted commissioning education program) counterparts. Yet the fact that their OCS performance is “indistinguishable” is certainly not something to be “proud” of. What became of the days when the USNA graduate, armed only with a Marine Corps Institute course in squad tactics, could routinely go to Quantico and tear up the program at the Marine Corps Basic School (TBS)?
My biggest concern with the current USNA/Bulldog system is that the midshipman considering a Marine Corps career is now forced to select his service about a year sooner than the rest of his class. If he is absolutely sure that is what he wants to do, no problem. But is it fair to force someone into that very important decision before he even goes on first- class cruise? In my case, it was my first- class cruise that convinced me that the Marine Corps was what I really wanted.
The declining performance of small numbers of USNA graduates at TBS and their lack of competitiveness in the field should be a concern to all. Attending Bulldog is only part of the solution. Maybe it is time to get back to some of the basics during plebe year in order to get the Marine USNA graduate back in his rightful position at the top of the pack.
“Buying Time for the Merchant Marine”
(See E. C. Williams, pp. 110-113, December 1988 Proceedings)
“The Death of the Coast Guard”
(See C. Walter, pp. 29-33, June 1988; R. E. Korroch, p. 89, August 1988; K. A. Meaney, p. 79, September 1988; J. R. Kelley, pp. 28-31, November 1988; B. Penney, p. 20, December 1988; A. E. Mayer, p. 87, January 1989 Proceedings)
Commander David H. Grover, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), chief mate— Two proposals in the December Proceedings to expand the role of the Coast
Guard are disturbing to a number of us who have to deal with that agency about our merchant marine licenses.
Mr. Penney proposes giving the Coast Guard more autonomy—and presumably power and money—so that it won’t have to give up any of its present functions to do more. To those who would like to see the Coast Guard get out of the licensing of maritime personnel, this proposal would be a giant step in the wrong direction. Airplane pilots are not licensed by the Air Force or any other military service. Why should maritime personnel be licensed by the Coast Guard, which increasingly stresses its military orientation? Let’s restore maritime licensure to civilians who at least hold the credentials they are authorized to issue.
Commander Williams proposes giving the Coast Guard legal responsibility for the master planning of maritime manpower. In recent years, when the agency on its own initiative has ventured into this area, it has shown no understanding of the issues and has been unable to provide useful data about its own licensees. Recent changes in licensure regulations may do more to accelerate the impending shortage of maritime manpower than anything the Coast Guard has done in the past. For years, maintaining a license after leaving the sea—and becoming pad of a trained manpower reserve—was easy for mates and engineers because only minimum sea service was required for license renewal. Now, renewal requires one year’s sea time (virtually impossible to get in today’s miniscule merchant fleet), plus continuing education at the applicant’s own expense—something that a part-time mariner is unlikely to accomplish, even if he could. Thus, the already small shoreside pool of trained officer manpower will quickly become smaller as officers decide that maintaining a license isn’t worth the hassle.
Let’s stop canonizing the Coast Guard.
It has its share of flaws, and merchant t marine licensing is one of them. 1
“Flagships for Fleet Commanders?”
(See K. W. Estes, p. 113, November 1988 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Ray Peet, U. S. Navy (Re- * tired), former Commander First Fleet and Commander Amphibious Group Two—I coauthored the article entitled “Fleet Commanders: Afloat or Ashore?” with Michael E. Melich in the June 1976 Proceedings. I didn’t support fleet commanders using amphibious ships as flagships then, and I still don’t. I agree with
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fte thoughts expressed by Lieutenant Colonel Estes in his commentary.
Captain James K. Pernini, U. S. Navy— j?s a blue member of the blue-green avy-Marine Corps gator team, I feel obligated to join Lieutenant Colonel bstes in questioning the use of amphibious command ships (LCCs) as fleet flagships. I join the fray with little enthusiasm and a sense of hopelessness, having already come out on the losing end of this argument numerous times with numbered ,et commander staff officers. However, 11 ^oes not seem fair or appropriate for the ®reen side of the gator team to carry the uagship banner alone.
„ ^s Colonel Estes wisely points out, No Marine tells a sailor how to handle strictly naval matters.” Unfortunately, he 'gnores his own sage advice and boldly Presumes to advise fleet commanders on °w they should fight their fleets. By so °'ng, he inadvertently weakens his own ease for returning amphibious command ships to the gators. By asserting that fleet commanders do not need to be afloat, he ntfers up a red herring to critics, who can eflect his valid question away from the arena in which it rightfully must be discussed. The question is not whether fleet commanders need to be afloat, nor even 'vhere they may break their flags. Rather, me question is when the LCCs and other amphibious command ships will return to Sator duties. If they are not going to be teturned to the amphibious forces, when VV|fl we stop advertising an operational capability that we do not intend to use?
Senior defense officials frequently refer to our capability to conduct a Ma- J?ne Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) amphibious assault operation. We appear to take pride in our power projection capability. However, without the LCC our amphibious forces cannot execute an MEF-level assault. It is doubtful whether be gator team can adequately conduct an MEB-level assault without the LCC. Unly the LCC has the requisite command and control capacity required to conduct a complex, large-scale amphibious assault, •ears of hard combat experience were Japped in designing and building the *~CC. No other ship or group of ships can replace the LCC’s capabilities.
Unfortunately, as fleet commanders ost their own dedicated flagships, they temporarily” moved on board LCCs and ”co-located” with navy amphibious group commanders and Marine Corps commanders. The growing fleet staffs Quickly learned to appreciate the LCCs’ communication and staff support capabil- fltes. Sadly, since the fleet staffs embarked, they steadily have encroached upon the amphibious staffs’ spaces and essentially forced the Navy amphibious staffs to give up valued capabilities. Ostensibly, Marine spaces have been protected from the encroachment, but without access to their blue counterparts, the Marines have not been able to use the LCC as she was designed to be used. As a result, LCC spaces and equipment rarely are used to support amphibious operations; when they are so used, fleet staffs begrudgingly allow only minimal time for “their” flagship to be involved in the less-glamorous world of amphibious warfare. This usurpation of the LCC mission has eroded our amphibious capability.
As Colonel Estes points out, the LCC is only the first echelon of encroachment, as the Navy also has usurped flag-configured amphibious transport docks to serve as Navy command and control ships in nonamphibious roles. The question remains: when will the amphibious-configured command and control ships be returned to their intended use? We cannot continue to advertise an amphibious warfare capability when amphibious forces are not able to conduct training exercises with their own specifically designed command and control platforms.
It is time (past time) for the Navy to face the difficult flagship issue and come forward with an alternative that does not emasculate our amphibious power projection capability.
“Oh, For a Ship That Can Keep the Sea!”
(See L. G. Halloran, pp. 66-67, December 1988 Proceedings)
Walter Hass—Lieutenant Commander Halloran’s piece was outstanding. That fellow has a way with words that is being wasted on board ships. He should be on the Proceedings' staff. He used humor successfully to make his point: “Why, when weaving an erratic course across a pitching mess deck, am I constantly assailed with the sight of gallant sailors, defenders of the nation and the Free World, hunched over mess tray, cup, and utensils, grimly determined to protect their hard-earned meal—not from some scavenger but from the laws of physics?” He didn’t miss a thing.
(Continued on page 82)
Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 23)
“The Morning of the Empty
Trenches”
(See C. A. H. Trost, pp. 13-16, August 1988;
D. L. Clarke, p. 86, January 1989 Proceedings)
Engineman First Class Michael D. Stay- ton, U. S. Naval Reserve—Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s December speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York proposed a reduction in the number of Soviet troops and equipment in Western Europe, as predicted by the press. People I have talked to since about the speech seem to be optimistic, and I must admit that I am hopeful that something can be negotiated.
Something stuck in the back of my mind, however. Deja vu. I searched through my copies of Proceedings and found Admiral Trost’s article in the August issue. I only hope that Admiral Trost’s reasoning will be placed before the Congress and the citizens of the United States, as well as the rest of the world. Maybe “60 Minutes” or “Nightline” will allow him to share his views on this matter with their viewers.
I am convinced that most people perceive General Secretary Gorbachev’s proposed unilateral and equal troop reduction much as my wife did, with great expectation. She, like many, was unaware of the numerical superiority in troops that the Soviets command in the field. I pointed out that this is a major factor for our nuclear policy.
There must be some way our populace can be informed about the complexity of this proposal so these proposals won’t be accepted at face value.
Is it a coincidence that this speech was delivered on 7 December? Two other historical events occurred on this date: in 1787, Delaware became the first state to ratify the Constitution; and in 1941, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. It will be interesting to see to what end Gorbachev’s speech will lead.
“The Road to Eighth and Eye”
(See M. L. Bartlett, pp. 73-80, November 1988 Proceedings)
Colonel Andrew 1. Lyman, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Lieutenant Colonel
Bartlett’s otherwise excellent article on the selection of the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) was clouded by one statement that may well be apocryphal. Even if it is literally true, it nevertheless unfairly impugns General Charles H. Lyman’s motives. Bartlett says, “Lyman—believing that he would be the 17th CMC—insisted on a rearrangement of seating to be prominently situated next to [Major General John H.] Russell.”
I must point out that, at that Marine Corps birthday ball at Quantico, Lyman was the commanding general. As such he was the host. Russell was the guest of honor. If Lyman insisted on a seating rearrangement it was because someone less perceptive had initially failed to seat the host and guest of honor in proximity, where they belonged.
“The Public Affairs Front”
(See B. Baker, pp. 114-117, September 1988
Proceedings)
Ed Ojfley, military affairs reporter, Seattle Post-Intelligencer—Captain Baker’s title accurately depicts the Navy’s point of view on the current state of military- media relations: a conflict, a stalemate, and a direction of attack. Let me further the dialogue with a civilian journalist’s perspective on covering the Navy.
To most Navy people, reporters are many things—an unruly sideshow, the horde in the last carrier on-board delivery flight to the carrier on the final day of a fleet exercise; a nuisance, the baying crowd at the base gate when an aircraft has gone down; a frequent source of humor, bellowing questions of dubious content at the admiral during his press conference; a loose cannon, prowling the Pentagon corridors for inside dope of the latest intra-Navy faction fight; and, in times of crisis or combat, a threat to operational security.
The most common complaints 1 hear about the press from the Navy are our woeful ignorance about basic technology, organization, strategy, and tactics and our uncanny ability to miss the larger story. We have a fixation, they say, with what went wrong, rather than with successes of a fleet. In short, the Navy complains about how bad a job we do.
I gladly will enter a guilty plea to that charge if the Navy will sign up as codefendant. For the Navy itself must bear an equal share of the blame for the uneven news coverage on the military beat.
► Bremerton, Washington: The taxicab slows in the predawn darkness at the gate of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Sitting in the backseat, the passenger is nervous. He drapes his jacket over a small satchel lying on the floor of the cab between his feet.
The USS Nimitz (CVN-68) is leaving on a six-month Western Pacific and Indian Ocean deployment this morning, a story that in Norfolk or San Diego would scarcely make the news. But because the Nimitz is the first carrier to be homeported in Puget Sound since 1942, her initial deployment sailing is a legitimate local news story. But the story was not important to the Navy or, more specifically, the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and its parent organization, the Naval Sea Systems Command (Nav- SeaSysCom). When the aircraft carrier backed away from the pier, only two reporters were on hand to obtain the basic interviews and photographs necessary f°r the story.
And they were present only because they were able to overcome an illogical, unfounded barrier to coverage erected by the shipyard. My tactic was to smuggle myself on base in a taxicab to a rendezvous with the Nimitz’s public affairs officer. A television reporter for KIRO Channel 7 in Seattle was grudgingly admitted to the pier only after spending literally half the previous night on the phone to Washington, D.C., seeking an admiral who could nullify NavSea’s ridiculous nonmedia coverage policy.
And this was for a story that makes the Navy look good!
► Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, Washington: The admiral’s staff officer is apologetic on this early Friday morning- For the second time in three weeks, an A-6E Intruder has crashed on a low-level training route in Washington State and investigators are scrambling to organize a search for the wreckage. The reporter is calling to request a background interview, but the base is closed to all press.
about
security to have established a rigor-
, --------------- . . _________________________________ \
fe
We just can’t spare anyone,” the commander says. “It’s impossible.” A long Pause. “Can you wait until Monday?” This is an inadvertent but unavoidable clash of roles. I fully understand that base officials are preoccupied with search- and-rescue activities, establishing the udge Advocate General probe and Mis- uap Investigation Board, preparing for 0n-scene debris recovery, and notifying relatives.
Conceding that few facts are available, and that even much of this data are privi- eged, it is nevertheless a major, breaking news story. I can no more “wait until Monday” than the Navy investigative teams can put off their business for the Weekend.
Having failed to obtain the minimal assistance through the Navy’s public af- airs office (PAO) channels, I go where the story is—to the crash site. Within two ours of that unhappy telephone call, a Photographer and I are flying south in a chartered helicopter to document the £rash search.
Bangor, Washington: The Navy news advisory to editors is enticing: A major Physical-security exercise will be held s°on at Navy bases throughout Puget °und, including the Bangor Submarine ase, Navy Base Seattle, and Whidbey sland Naval Air Station. The Navy cau- >°ns that “radio transmissions monitored y news media may appear as though ter- mnst/antiterrorist actions are actually aking place.”
Physical security is a thorny subject, since the vast bulk of details are properly . assified. Still, a reporter’s mission is to mform his readers about newsworthy top- jcs and, in the case of antiterrorism (or— et s be candid—anti-Spetsnaz) exer- ClSes> there are ample components that are pressing, newsworthy, and valid of
comment.
First, the Navy is concerned enough °ns exercise with the “Red Cell” cadre ° SEAL (sea-air-land) commandos that ravels around testing security and raising he consciousness of its personnel. Second. that particular Navy organization ad earlier attracted considerable adverse Publicity, resulting in a change of leadership and at least one lawsuit. Third, the media can address the perceived value of triock scenarios in general terms.
The Navy flatly refuses to entertain a Slngle question about the physical secu- r"y drill . In the absence of official help, a reporter will turn to his sources for an Un°Hicial account of security issues, inc tiding the tale of the civilian Cessna Phot who mistook the nuclear-weapons c°mpound at Bangor’s Strategic Weapon
Facility Group Pacific facility for the Bremerton airport.
► Seattle, Washington: Following a two- year tour as commander of Navy Base Seattle, the admiral is about to depart for blue water as a cruiser-destroyer group commander. While it has been a rough period for the Navy in Washington State (lawsuits delaying the Everett carrier base, protesters at the gates of Bangor), the service, all in all, has enjoyed a lot of good news coverage too. The Nimitz’s arrival was a public celebration as well as a homecoming for the crew in a new port; other major ships, such as the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and the USS Missouri (BB-63) have visited Seattle and attracted record crowds of visitors; and the Blue Angels appear annually to rave reviews. Fleet officials say that Seattle is one of the most popular liberty ports in the Pacific area.
In journalism, the “exit interview” is a time-honored practice by which a departing official can reflect on the issues and trends he has faced, publicly praise (or castigate) the people and institutions with which he has worked, and say anything else that’s on his mind. It is one of the few instances where journalists tend to back off and let the source speak for himself.
But the admiral flatly refuses to hold a press conference or give any interviews. His red-faced public affairs officer lamely assures reporters that this is not meant as a personal affront. The admiral leaves Seattle for his new job, but don’t ask me to prove it.
Now, these Navy-press encounters have several elements in common. First, they were local, time-sensitive, and newsworthy topics. Second, all four involved objective events: a ship’s departure on deployment, an aircraft crash, a military exercise in part visible to the public, and a scheduled change of command. Third, classified information and open information intermingled in varying degrees, but were easily separated. Fourth, news reporters went through channels, contacting appropriate Navy PAOs to seek assistance and guidance. And in all cases, the press hit a brick wall thrown up by senior Navy officials. Finally, the lack of Navy cooperation in large part did not prevent coverage of the issue.
Several weeks after that unhappy string of events had occurred, I sat down over coffee with a senior civilian defense analyst who deals with the Navy and the press on regular occasions. The string of bad encounters came up in conversation, and he smiled at my frustration.
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“What you have to understand,” the analyst said, “is that to the Navy there are only two types of reporters: enemies and doormats.”
His words stung. I reject membership in either category, but I sometimes find that the Navy’s conduct toward reporters props up the analyst’s cynical theory. (It would also seem obvious that a quick way to create an enemy is to treat someone like a doormat.)
So let me offer a concession and a challenge. The Navy is not well covered by the civilian press, especially by newspapers and TV reporters in Navy communities outside the Washington, D.C., area. To begin with, there are too few reporters outside the Capitol Beltway specializing in military affairs. But I sometimes think the Navy (and other services) secretly prefer it that way, on grounds that an ignorant press is easier to control than an aggressive, informed press.
But the paucity of military reporters in the civilian press is not the Navy’s fault. It is the direct responsibility of publishers, station managers, and the corporate executives who control the civilian press.
Last 20 July, more than 13,000 U. S. reporters, television cameramen, editors, cartoonists, and pundits flew east to Atlanta, Georgia, for the Democratic National Convention. That same day, I flew west to Hawaii, where the Third Fleet had assembled 55 warships and more than 50,000 sailors from four nations for the biennial RIMPAC (Pacific Rim) fleet exercise. Upon my arrival at the fleet command information bureau at Pearl Harbor, I learned that I was the only U. S. reporter on the check-in list.
This was not an exception. Three civilian reporters from the Puget Sound news media flew to Korea last March to cover the multiservice Team Spirit exercise (which featured a large Army-Air Force contingent from Washington State). During one break in the two-week maneuvers, I turned on a television set in my hotel room and watched the National Collegiate Athletic Association championship basketball game, with more than 350 reporters in attendance at the edge of the court. Politics and college sports certainly are legitimate news beats. But so is the military. By unofficial estimate, there are fewer than 50 full-time military reporters outside the Washington, D.C., area, to cover a military establishment that spans the globe.
Working for the daily morning newspaper in Seattle, 1 report on 23 major military facilities encompassing five major Army commands, two Air Force wings, the West Coast headquarters for North
American Aerospace Defense Command, two National Guard organizations, and five major Navy facilities. By the Pentagon’s own count, there are 70,848 Defense Department employees in the state of Washington alone, of which 27,645 work for the Navy and the Marine Corps. Of the other four Puget Sound daily newspapers, only the small Bremerton Sun has a full-time military reporter like me, while the other three large daily newspapers (the Everett and Tacoma papers and The Seattle Times) cover the beat either on a part-time basis or not at all.
Our small numbers may explain why so many senior-level Navy officials have trouble maintaining a commonsense attitude toward reporters. They see few of us and the ones they do see are not too impressive. It explains the goggle-eyed looks I get when I correctly identify a radar on the mast, demonstrate a basic awareness of naval organization, or understand the difference between TACAMO (take charge and move out) and Tacoma.
The basic friction, however, stems from our clash of roles in a free society.
At heart, military people are responsive to a command hierarchy in which information is codified and classified and held closely as a matter of policy. Journalists, at heart, are burrowers after and seekers of that same data. We want to know what happened. Even if a reporter will ultimately refrain from publishing a sensitive national security story, he must first have the facts in hand to make that hard decision.
Here is the first point of collision: Information is power.
But even military people get caught up in the dilemma of what is genuinely secret and what is merely concealed. While attending a military-media seminar at the Naval War College in 1986, I was accosted by a young Marine captain who indignantly demanded to know by what right I or any other reporter could decide whether or not to print classified data- (We hear this a lot.)
I got sore.
“Would you have been interested, as a Marine officer, to have known that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff bitterly opposed prolonging the deployment of Marines to the Beirut airport in September 1983 before the terrorist bombing that killed 241 Marines in their barracks?” I asked.
The officer paused. “Yes,” he said- “I would have wanted to know that-
“Help me out of the dilemma, then,’ I replied. “The minutes of the National Security Council are classified Top Secret.” He could not help me out.
Here is our second collision point: The Defense Department and the Navy plaY the information game just as aggressively as the press. Any Navy or Marine officer who reads the front pages each day must know that. Yet senior officers seem to expend man-years of effort denying that any such thing happens. There seems to be a need among senior military officers to deny that their organization—like any organization—fights for its survival, especially in the corridors of Washington- And military leaders are as selective as politicians in the choice of information they elect to release or leak to the press- Pentagon spokesmen respected newspaper and television deadlines last year when they quickly released photographs of two Soviet Navy ships bumping into the USS Yorktown (CG-48) and the USS Caron (DD-970) while the two U. S-
ships conducted a “freedom of naviga- hon” exercise near Sevastopol in the Slack Sea.
I guess the Navy and Pentagon wanted 'hat story out.
Why, then, do the Pentagon and Navy °day still refuse to comment on or clarify a similar incident that occurred on 17 ^ay 1987, off the Soviet Pacific port of etropavlovsk, when the USS Arkansas (CGN-41) reportedly (unofficially) found , erself surrounded by Soviet Navy ships ar>d aircraft? The most authoritative ac- c°unt of that incident can be found in a recent Proceedings issue—by a Soviet wnter who provides the Soviet viewpoint nf that incident (see Captain William "•anthorpe, U. S. Navy (Retired), “The nviets on the Soviets,” p. 231, May 988 Proceedings). One is left to con- c ude that for strategic or political rea- s°ns, the Navy simply does not want its aggressive maneuvering in the northwest acific to receive coverage.
These are a few of the dilemmas that I exPerience daily reporting on the Navy and other services in the Pacific Northwest.
hJy daily hunt for news and feature Rories does not stop at the tree-mile ■nut. Issues pertinent to Washington naval commands, overseas deployment Puget Sound ships, and the command structure of the Navy guarantee my interna' in and coverage of events far from uget Sound.
These commands, their activities, and e budgets and policies governing the are legitimate news that the civilian community has an interest in and a right to now about. In the past 18 months, I ave been able to cover the following
n Vents:
Disclosure that Soviet nuclear attack Submarines have on occasion slipped into • b. and Canadian territorial waters in ne Strait of Juan de Fuca on reconnaissance missions
A major fleet exercise conducted in the ^orthern Pacific by the U. S. Third Fleet " Adak, Alaska, testing Arctic warfare conditions and interoperability between be Navy and Alaskan Air Command. (A x®y assumption behind the development T Everett is the strategic importance of be northern Pacific, Bering Sea, and Alaskan littoral.)
Carrier operations in the Sea of Japan Uring Team Spirit 88 /Both the Army aud the Navy in Washington State have established combat and combat-support 'oles in the defense of South Korea, and be Nimitz was one of two carriers subsequently assigned to patrol there during be Seoul Olympics.)
A year-long chronicle of the prepara-
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tion of the Nimitz for a six-month deployment to the north Arabian Sea, which culminated in an on-scene visit to the ship during RIMPAC 88
► An in-depth assessment of the safety and survivability issues pertaining to the A-6E Intruder following several training- flight crashes
Other distant stories of direct local significance that I was able to cover through local interviews or telephone work included:
► The dispatch of U. S. Navy minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in late 1987 (including three of the six ships based in Puget Sound)
► Operation Praying Mantis in the Persian Gulf on 18 April 1988, in which two Whidbey Island squadrons (Medium Attack Squadron 95 and Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 135) were involved in retaliatory attacks against Iranian naval units
► Disclosure that Trident submarines are receiving crew changeover and provisioning at Guam in a test of extended forward deployment
► Plans for the Navy to use dolphins as underwater perimeter security guards at Bangor
► Initial work on a $253 million expansion at Bangor to build the physical infrastructure for the Trident II (D-5) missile
► A major physical-security exercise testing the ability of various Puget Sound Navy facilities to withstand terrorist or Spetsnaz attack
► The prolonged legal fight between environmental groups and the Navy over the dredging plan for Everett’s Port Gardner Bay to accommodate the Nimitz
► The Navy’s ongoing project to dispose of decommissioned nuclear submarine reactor compartments by land burial at the Department of Energy’s Hanford Nuclear Reservation
Then there is the day-to-day stuff: Changes of command, port visits, tussels between local congressmen and the Navy over budget cuts, a submarine grounding, development of new wings for A-6Es by Boeing, and the like.
I know what you are thinking: “How can you complain about Navy-press relations, given that string of stories?” I’m not. In fact, I think this is the best news beat in Washington State. But the overriding issue remains whether those kinds of stories should be written through a relationship based on mutual respect, or one based on hostility.
Let me cite one long-term success story. I mentioned a Whidbey Island Intruder crash as one example of a media- military breakdown. It is accurate, but unfair, to lambaste Whidbey Island,
Commander Naval Air Force Pacific, an the naval aviation community for that one breakdown in communications during a crisis. In the long haul, military-media relations between that particular military command and this particular member o the media have been excellent.
Why? Because they were willing to meet the media halfway.
When I first approached the naval aviation community for possible story ideas,
I was invited to train and qualify f°r a jet-passenger card. (My experiences m the Whidbey Island training tank are too lurid and confessional for this publication.) The wing commander, squadron commanders, and wing staff officers were willing to sit down on a not-for- publication basis and explain their mission, training, and combat doctrine. The admiral consented to interviews when appropriate. And when the crunch came, we were not strangers meeting one another for the first time in a strained atmosphere.
Several days after no one at Whidbey Island could help me on the A-6E eras story, I was talking to Mariana Graham, the base PAO, and I noted that there was rife speculation in the civilian community that the aircraft was inherently unsafe and that there was something wrong m 11 training that had led to two crashes ten miles apart on the same low-level training route. I told her, as a journalist, that this was approaching the point where a story on the public perceptions of military aviation safety was needed.
“If you want to help me with that story, fine,” I said. “But I’ll have to do the story whether you will help or not.
Ten minutes after I hung up, the phone rang.
“The admiral would like you to fly a low-level training flight on IRR-344, she said, referring to the low-level training route where the two crashes had occurred.
I gulped. Then I accepted. Then I fleW on the IRR-344.
The facts presented themselves in a straightforward way. The Navy’s contention that it had nothing to hide was underscored by this exercise in candor. And 4 made for a hell of a good story.
Five years after the military-media collision at Grenada, much can still be done to improve the professional relationship between the working press and the milk tary. The most important step is to lower the arbitrary barriers that make even routine coverage difficult, and to make it easier for reporters assigned to the military beat to learn the basics of what they are covering. Some corrective measures include:
► A conscious, dedicated effort by senior j
yeaned away from their Ernest J. King ^rell-them-nothing” approach to the
On the civilian side of the communica- 10ns gap, senior editors and publishers must be encouraged to allocate manpower and resources to fielding a cadre of rePorters literate in military topics and CaPable of addressing the full spectrum of ISSUes- This effort must be as deliberate ?nd conscious as the military’s. Major Journalistic organizations (the American pOciety of Newspaper Editors, American r®ss Institute, and major journalism Schools) could foster a better climate by Passing the Navy to coorganize a for- lrial, ongoing program for reporters as- Slgned to the military beat. This program oould include one-day seminars, engthier programs held annually, or per. aPs even a form of fellowship in which a Journalist could receive a directed, inuse education on basic military issues.
approaches could be topic seminars
As a full-time military reporter, I be- leve that it is possible for the military and press to enj0y a tough, fair, balanced relationship. It takes a lot of hard work, ruutual effort, patience, and thick skin to uecornplish, but the results are worth it.
Navy officials to deal forthrightly with .Press and a formal reiteration of this Policy throughout the chain of command hat Department of Defense policy should n°t prevent reporters from covering stor- les just because they are unpleasant or ernbarrassing. (If you think this is a point recognized by senior Navy leaders, you aven’t been covering the Navy lately. p Military PAOs are only as effective as 'heir operational seniors will allow them he; thus any attitudinal change in the hjavy must come from the top. I trust that he Chief of Naval Operations is aware of 'he current abysmal state of military- ,Tledia relations, especially in the segments of the nuclear Navy dominated so orig by tbe iate Admiral Rickover.
Chief of Navy Information must be "IVCn full authority for establishing and Carrying out Navy PAO policies in every c°mrnand and bureau. Specifically, independent fiefdoms such as the Naval Re- ac'°rs Branch and NavSea should be
Other °n subjects such as the maritime strategy 0r the Aegis system; regional topics, such us the role of the Navy in the Pacific or A‘0; or even a broader overview perspective, such as the Navy’s role in the '990s.
^ On a more down-to-earth level, fleet c°rnmanders should invite the press to 'J'ajor naval exercises earlier than the last ay of the event. A beginning and middle are needed to form a good story—not just a Punchline.
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“Needed: Submarine Design Competition”
{See S. R. Menno, pp. 115-116, October 1988 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Paul E. Sullivan, U. S. Navy, associate professor of naval architecture, Massachusetts Institute of Technology—Mr. Menno identifies fundamental shortcomings in the submarine design community, but blunts the impact of his comments with an inaccurate description of the current design process.
Could the process be more competitive? Certainly, but things are not as bad as he implies. The United States has designed only one submarine in the 1980s from the keel up, the Seawolf (SSN-21). This design was competitive from the start. During the preliminary design stage, both Electric Boat and the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company submitted design studies. These were blended with a Naval Sea Systems Command (NavSea) study to produce a first cut at the ship. The final preliminary design was accomplished by a collocated team of engineers from Electric Boat, Newport News, NavSea, the Naval Underwater Systems Center, and the David Taylor Research Center. It was a consensus design of the nation’s best experts (both government and industry), which incorporated the best features of the competitive shipbuilder studies.
In most shipbuilding programs, the design essentially would have been frozen at this point. But in the case of Seawolf, the preliminary design was turned over to the shipbuilders for another competitive round in contract design. The Navy took a “hands off” approach during much of this phase. The strategy was designed to get the best efforts of both shipbuilders, and to keep both groups of national assets (the design engineers at both civilian submarine yards) working on an ongoing “hot” design as long as possible. Admittedly, single-hull versus double-hull was not debated in this later stage of design, but the builders’ designs were very different.
The net effect of this approach was to produce a high-quality submarine design. The shipbuilders’ participation had a positive effect on the content of that design. Their contribution was far more extensive than “fleshing out the details for the same submarine” as Mr. Menno states.
Recent design practice aside, Mr. Menno is to be applauded for the rest of his article. There should be more wide- ranging studies of all aspects of submarine missions, with competitive concepts vying for priority. There should be a constant dialogue between the operators and the designers, with fresh ideas injected into the process. This is done already on a limited basis, but could be expanded.
There are several fundamental reasons to keep perturbing the design process. First, the only way to investigate the impact of new technology is to assess its benefit in a design study. As Mr. Menno states, this is the best way to stay up with the state of technology. Second, the execution of numerous designs with varying requirements serves as the only way to hone the skills of the current generation of designers. Finally, if the community pushes the frontier of submarine concepts, it can help set realistic requirements. By being familiar with the range of technically feasible solutions to numerous design requirements, the designers can help the operators decide where to take the risks and where to be conservative in future submarine missions.
Taking Mr. Menno’s line of thinking one step further, the United States should be continuously designing a submarine for production, in addition to the concept designs. The lead shipbuilder perhaps should be alternated between the two remaining submarine yards. Each yard could be on a ten-year design-and-build cycle, with a five-year overlap. This way the builder would have a manageable production problem, and the Navy would benefit from a new class of submarine every five years. Follow-on ships ot competing classes could be put out for bids for production at either yard.
The program outlined above would assure a steady workload of lead ship design and construction at each builder. I[ also would be a mechanism for producing more frequent classes of ships with fewer ships in a class, and would allow compe" tition for follow-on ship construction. I1 would not be without its challenges> however. First, the design and construction cycles would have to be cut to less than ten years. Then, the builders and the Navy would have to employ innovative and flexible manufacturing strategies to build fewer ships per class. This system would not be cost-effective unless avoided many of the mind-boggling startup problems experienced during the introduction of recent submarines. Finally, it would be difficult to keep design and development costs under control in what is sure to be an austere procurement environment.
There is a tangible benefit in producing more frequent, competing classes of submarines. Consider the accelerated development cycle experienced by the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The large number of classes turned out during this period evolved into the Sturgeon (SSN-637) class, still one of the best platforms around. Then, the Soviet Union conducted a similar exercise in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the subject of much discussion in Proceedings. Thus, the continued evolution of submarines in steel is the proven method of assuring technological superiority. We, as a nation, must be prepared to pay the price because we can’t afford not to.
“Reactive Hull Armor”
(See F. Kugelmann, p. 146, October 1988 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel John M. Manguso, U. S. Army Reserve—Mr. Kugelmann points us toward a possible means of increasing the survivability of ships, but as a green suiter, I would like to add a couple of caveats.
First, the explosive in the armor must have adequate support. In tanks, the explosive is supported by the hull or turret armor, usually several inches thick. This is necessary to prevent the explosion of the reactive armor from spalling off chunks of armor on the inner surface of the tank. On a ship, the reactive armor would likewise have to be adequately supported on armor plates of sufficient thickness. The reactive armor cannot be appliqued onto the superstructure.
Second, on a tank, the explosion of the reactive armor is vented into the air around the tank. This may cause damage to exposed personnel or sensitive equipment such as antennae or optics. The same would be true on a ship.
Third, by the time a tank fire is large or hot enough to ignite the explosive element in the reactive armor, the tank is already a total loss and the crew is out of action. A ship may still be in fighting shape when that point is reached.
Fourth, the application of reactive armor to a tank adds weight and reduces maneuverability. On a ship, it may create stability problems.
Reactive armor has drawbacks, but it still might be worthwhile considering for shipboard use.
“Train Smart: Interactive Partnerships”
(See R. L. Beckman and T. K. Plofchan, pp. 158-160, October 1988 Proceedings)
Captain Colin E. O'Neill, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve—The article on interactive videodisc (IVD) was right on the mark. As an aviation training consultant, I see a plethora of possible IVD applications daily. Extensive research conducted during the past decade on computer- based training reveals IVD as one of the most promising methods of instruction for the military and civilian sectors. Although currently a somewhat expensive training medium, the cost of IVD is expected to decline as its application grows.
IVD is not designed to replace all traditional training methods, but when integrated into a training system using the instructional systems development process, it can reduce overall costs, increase comprehension, and decrease time to train. IVD works, and the Navy should embrace this training concept as it moves into the next century.
“Closing the Gun Gap”
(See F. Herrmann, pp. 104-107, November
1988 Proceedings)
Arthur W. Sear—So here we are, more than 20 years after Marine Colonel Robert Heinl’s article (“The Gun Gap and How to Close It,” September 1965 Proceedings) and more than a decade and a half after my own modest proposal (“Some Heretical Thoughts on a Sea Control Weapons System,” August 1973 Proceedings), and we’ve still got a gun
gapGetting the Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships out of the mothballs hasn’t eliminated the fire-support gun gap. Now that the battleships are once more on active service, they are the centerpieces of surface action task forces, of course; they were, after all, designed to fight other ships, not for shore bombardment.
The 5-in./54-cal. gun never was intended primarily for shore bombardment, and the lightly armored high-tech hulls that mount most of them have no business messing around where shore-based mobile 6- and 8-inch guns can easily deprive the fleet of vital antiair warfare (AAW) or antisubmarine warfare (ASW) services for months, or even forever. The same criticism applies to 8-in./55-cal. Mk-71 guns if you mount them on those same lightly armored ships.
“Navalizing” the Army’s excellent multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) involves a good deal more than changing the name to assault ballistic rocket system; it also ignores a great deal of excellent weapon technology that is already thoroughly navalized, since it was developed for the U. S. Navy. Instead of the MLRS, start with the Mk-41 vertical launch system (VLS), and take a look at the technology available from the weapons designed to fly out of VLS cells:
► For propulsion, there are booster and sustainer motors for the medium-range and extended-range Standard missile, as well as the motors being developed for the new Sea Lance ASW weapon. These motors already are designed to operate in the VLS environment, there already 1S launch and midcourse guidance hardware designed to work with the VLS and wit the Standard and Sea Lance motors, an there are operational fire control systems that interface with those weapon systems.
► For longer-range fire missions, there exists another VLS-compatible weapon, the AGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missile- Instead of adapting or modifying Standard and Sea Lance hardware, perhaps it would be worthwhile to look at simplifying Tomahawk hardware and reducing its cost (for example, replacing the Tomahawk’s gas turbine engine with a dua - thrust solid rocket motor, and accepting a reduction in range commensurate wit the shore bombardment mission).
► There are several payloads designe for Tomahawk and Harpoon, including multipurpose and cluster munitions, m* ther, work already is under way to develop payloads employing smart antiarmor submunitions for Tomahawk.
However, all this available technology will also be “inappropriate” if the Navy intends to install it on escort hulls- Rather, the Navy needs a rugged, l°w- cost, low-tech platform for a VLS-base shore-bombardment weapon system.
I suggest that the designers start with a
sea-going barge built of ferroconcrete. Make it highly compartmented, with lots of foam-plastic-filled spaces. The main purpose of the barge will be to hold four or five 61-cell Mk-41 launchers and their cabling. The barge will have an auxiliary power generation system and fuel stores for the tug which propels it.
The tug pushing the barge will be compact, highly automated, and heavily protected by composite armor. It will be equipped with a fire control system optimized for the shore bombardment mission and with powerful gas turbine engines. The crew will be few in numbers so that the spaces from which the crew will fight the system can be compact and very well protected. The tug’s defensive weapons suite will consist of a pair ot close-in weapon systems (Phalanx or Rolling Airframe Missile), plus an active countermeasures system.
During operations, the tug and barge will go inshore and carry out fire support missions as needed. When the vertical launchers on the barge are empty, the tug crew will drop the barge’s anchor by remote control and reloading will take place after the battle; the tug will then disengage from the barge and go seaward
'yzed
in the same way. Minor powers and
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to pick up a replacement barge from a waiting raft of loaded barges.
Supporting Land Warfare”
R. M. Jaroch, pp. 50-55, November 1988 Proceedings)
William R. Hawki is, policy analyst,
■ Business and Industrial Council— °*onel Jaroch mentioned sea control as Pne °f the three basic naval functions, but e concentrated mostly on the other two: P°wer projection and sealift. He only disCussed sea control in regard to choke Points around the European perimeter uriug a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, owever, sea control can provide a deci- SlVe advantage in the theater of war if Used fully, particularly in limited wars outside Europe. Not enough attention has ■een Paid to sea power’s value in a limed War, even though limited wars are m°re probable than a European war.
A classic example of sea control in 'tnited war is given by Sir Julian Corbett ^ his history of the Seven Years War.
c British had a limited objective, con- tolling North America rather than des toying France. However, within the g onial theater, all the arts of war were 0 he employed. Sea control was to iso- _*f North America from Europe, cutting ‘French garrisons from reinforcement hile allowing Great Britain to deploy a uperior force that could strike at will.
• oday’s limited wars should be ana-
rj, ouiuv w ay . ivi
bird World states have a less self-suffi- c*cnt war-making capacity than the old .Monies. Their advanced weapons and, !n most cases, petroleum supplies must e imported to sustain combat. Cut these °Ws by sea and air, and the ability of JUinor states to resist U. S. power projec- ^°n forces or to launch attacks against ■ S. allies will be greatly diminished. The single greatest blunder of the Vietnam War was the U. S. failure to apply ul,y its sea power to isolate North Viet- jjam. “Neutral” ships, including those of he communist bloc, were allowed to sail unmolested past the most powerful navy •n the world to deliver war materials to °rth Vietnam. Despite its undisputed strength, the U. S. Navy actually did not control the seas. The enemy still was able 0 use the sea lanes at will to sustain its m'litary operations on land.
°nly after the supplies were landed uud dispersed were U. S. pilots allowed 0 attack them, at great cost in aircraft ®nd crews. As Corbett stated, a fleet that ls not permitted to intercept enemy commerce at sea is forced to such “expedients as the bombardment of seaport towns and destructive raids upon the hostile coast.” When the U. S. Navy finally mined North Vietnam’s ports in 1972, the flow of supplies was reduced below what was required to sustain offensive operations. But by then the war already had been lost on the American homefront.
Sea control cannot win limited or regional wars alone. British General James Wolfe still had to defeat Field Marshal Montcalm de Saint-Veran outside Quebec to seal the fate of Canada. But without the exercise of sea control, power projec
tion and sealift may not be able to win either. Sea control can tip the balance of power in theaters located far from the centers of industrial and military strength that the major powers possess. Sea control is not just a defensive doctrine that allows the Navy to project power ashore and sealift forces. It is an offensive doctrine that denies the use of the sea lanes to adversaries. And naval air power and missiles also can deny access to air space. Though this seems to be a fundamental maxim, it has been absent from recent planning, discussion, and operations.
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