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Some claim Soviet Pacific Naval Aviation’s burgeoning fleet of Backfire, Badger, Bear, and, soon, Blackjack bombers is the most powerful conventional war-fighting component in the Pacific—Placing the U. S. Pacific Fleet at great risk.
■"breedings / February 1989
I
Table 1 SNA Strike Aircraft by Fleet Area Year Pacific Northern Baltic Black Sea
1978 | 85 | 90 | 105 | 100 |
1979 | 85 | 85 | 110 | 105 |
1980 | 105 | 80 | 120 | 110 |
1981 | 120 | 90 | 130 | 110 |
1982 | 130 | 85 | 120 | 110 |
1983 | 130 | 90 | 120 | 125 |
1984 | 140 | 95 | 115 | 120 |
1985 | 160 | 100 | 115 | 115 |
1986 | 165 | 95 | 115 | 120 |
Increase | 94% | 6% | 9% | 20% |
Note: SNA strike aircraft included in the table are as follows: Tu-26 Back- fire-B/C, Tu-16 Badger-A/C/G, and Tu-22 Blinder-A. The table does not include the Su-17 Fitter and Yak-38 Forger close-support aircraft, which have negligible value for surface strike operations.
Source: A reconciliation of data from several sources, including successive Jane’s Fighting Ships (1979-87); successive I1SS, The Military Balance (1978-87); and Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security 1987-88 (Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1987), p. 61.
“There is increasing evidence that the Soviet bomber and cruise missile force may be overtaking their submarine force as a threat to our fleet. . . . They can concentrate aircraft, coordinate attacks with air, surface, or submarine launched missiles, and use new technology to find our fleet units, jam our defences and screen their approach.”
U. S. Defense Department, 19781
“Naval Aviation represents a formidable force and, along with submarines and surface ships, is one of the primary components of the Navy. It is distinguished by universality, maneuverability, and mobility. The strike force of units and subunits is growing.”
Morskoy sbornik, 19782
These statements about the evolving capabilities of Aviatsiya Voenno-Morskogo Flota (Soviet Naval Aviation [SNA]) are even more accurate now, a decade later. The Pacific area component of SNA has made the largest contribution to SNA’s development as “one of the basic naval arms intended for the destruction of enemy combat forces.” Such importance attached to Soviet Pacific Naval Aviation (SPNA) contrasts markedly with SNA’s operational priorities in the 1970s, when the Pacific placed fourth behind the Baltic, Black Sea, and the Atlantic in operational priority. (See Table 1.)
Since 1978, four major developments have contributed to the SPNA’s enhanced strike capabilities:
► Introduction to the Pacific theater of the highly capable Tu-26 Backfire bomber
► Numerical expansion and reequipping of the existing force of Tu-16 Badger bombers
► Strengthened operational coordination in support of theater-wide maritime strike operations between naval aviation units on one hand, and Frontal and Long Range Aviation and Air Defense units on the other ► The SPNA’s use of new flight corridors and extension of operational reach, owing to the acquisition of overflight and basing rights in North Korea and Vietnam
These four developments have turned the SPNA into a potent force tailored to inflict destruction upon the surface-group formations of the U. S. Pacific Fleet. According to some, the SPNA “is the most powerful component . . . for fighting a conventional war in the Pacific.” Considering the potential number of air regiments available for maritime strike operations and the quality of aircraft an their main antiship armament, this observation has much credibility.
In the late 1970s, SPNA’s strike component was comprised of two main-force regiments of Tu-16 Badger-A, -C, and -G bombers (70 aircraft) and a single, squadronsized formation of Tu-22 Blinder-As (15 aircraft). The Badger-G was considered the most capable weapon pint- form for attacking surface ships, its primary armament being two antiship missiles, principally the AS-5 Kelt, with a maximum range of more than 100 nautical miles- The Badger-C, armed with two first-generation AS-2 Kipper missiles, was considered the second-line aviation threat to U. S. aircraft carriers in the Pacific. The rest of SPNA’s strike component was largely devoid of the threat-potential consonant with modem fleet warfare. The Badger-A and Blinder-A bombers were specifically configured to perform level-bombing only, which denuded both of any operational significance against combat ships- Thus, in the late 1970s, SPNA’s overall maritime strike capabilities, though substantial, were patterned on a technologically inert force, the effectiveness of which was being severely challenged by constant improvements m the naval potential of major adversaries.
Introduction of Bactfire: In 1980 (the watershed year for SPNA), variable-geometry Tu-26 Backfire-B bombers commenced deployment to the Far Eastern naval aviation base Alekseyevka. Conforming to the Soviet Navy’s general practice of fleet assignment, Backfires deployed to the Pacific theater only after units had begun operating with the naval air arms of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets five to six years earlier. SPNA’s Backfire force achieved full regimental strength (45 aircraft) by 1987, including newer Backfire-C versions.
The Backfire has been described as “the most formidable offensive aircraft in the service of any country.”4 This is partly explained by the fact that there is simply no Western equivalent to this medium-range bomber.5 With a low- altitude, high-subsonic penetration capability at a maximum unrefueled combat radius of more than 2,000 nautical miles (3,000 nautical miles at a high-altitude, supersonic dash speed) and armed with two AS-4 Kitchen antiship missiles, the Backfire is without a doubt the Soviet Navy’s principal threat to Western surface forces.
The Backfire’s main antiship armament is one of the most technologically sophisticated in the Soviet tactical- missile arsenal. In fact, reports suggest that during the
early 1980s the Soviets expended considerable effort to enhance the lethality of the AS-4 Kitchen.7 This missile as an optimum standoff range of 180 nautical miles, a Passive anti-radar capability for air-defense suppression, ar>d an active radar homing capability for terminal guidance (in a high-altitude dive) at Mach 4.6.8 In short, once aunched, the AS-4 would be extremely difficult to c°unter even with the most advanced air-defense screen, ^uch as the U. S. Navy’s Aegis area-defense system.9
ccording to U. S. Navy Captain Linton F. Brooks, “Improved antiship capabilities inherently favor the Soviets, ecause our surface fleet is crucial to our strategy, while eirs is not.”10 This, indeed, is precisely the point. Is the length of a navy determined by the number of impres- 8lve-looking aircraft-carrier formations that it can muster °r action, or by the most effective, economical, and stealthy capability that it can use to defeat an opposing ttaval force? The latter, axiomatic answer completely un- erpins the significance of SNA, whose role in the naval ■dance of the late 20th century has been greatly understated by Western powers. The West has been mesmerized y the growth of the Soviet surface fleet—the most visible symbol of Soviet military power, and yet, ironically, the east significant offensive threat.
Precisely because it has been developed as a predomi- jtantly land-based force, SNA has furnished the Soviet n'°n with a particularly efficient means of denying enormous areas of its oceanic flanks to Western surface forces and limiting the amount of collateral damage that might be Incurred by Soviet forces. SNA’s surface strike arm can c°ncentrate a great weight of attack with great swiftness>” and is specifically tailored to counter the principal adversarial element of sea control—the U. S. carrier battle troup.11 SPNA has been at the forefront of efforts to ex- 'bit this trenchant capability. During 30 September-1 otober 1982, flights of Backfire-Bs from Alekseyevka c°nducted mock attacks against two U. S. battle groups, deluding the carriers Enterprise (CVN-65) and Midway p V'41), in the North Pacific. According to then- °rnmander-in-Chief Pacific (CinCPac) Admiral Robert • J. Long, U. S. Navy, this was the first incident “of ackfire bombers operating against U. S. naval forces anywhere in the world.”12 Press reports said that the indent may have exposed a deficiency in U. S. naval forces’ ab'lity to deal with the new bomber threat:
“Eight of the long-range bombers practiced their anti-carrier attacks during American fleet exercises near the Aleutian Islands.
“In waves of mock launchings, the Backfires flew within about 120 sea miles of their targets—well within striking range of their air-to-surface ‘Kitchen’ AS-4 missiles.
“A navy spokesman said it was the first time the Soviet super-bombers had ‘operated in close proximity to the carriers.’
“But the navy would not comment on the adequacy of the fleet’s response to the mock attacks. A spokesman said: ‘Any discussion of carrier detection or aircraft intercept capabilities would be inappropriate.’ ”13
The U. S. Navy had no qualms about disclosing its defensive capabilities in 1986, when the opposition was not the supersonic Backfire, but the turboprop Tu-95 Bear of Soviet Long Range Aviation. The latter incident occurred during a U. S. amphibious exercise at Adak, Aleutian Islands, when then-CinCPac Admiral James Lyons ordered two Soviet Bear bombers intercepted when they approached the exercise area.14 In a subsequent interview, Admiral Lyons said:
“ . . .we have a message to send. If I intercept that Soviet strike-bomber or submarine 200 or 300 miles before he ever gets to a weapon-launch position, which we do, he has got to know he’s not ever going to get there. And if he takes that message back then we have raised the deterrence equation without firing a shot. That’s what we’re all about.”15
Admiral Lyons’s confidence in U. S. naval air-defense capabilities does not appear to be fully shared by other U. S. Navy officers. In 1983, Commander Paul Hanley, a Pacific Fleet intelligence officer, spoke of the Backfire threat: “If we had to go up there and support Japan against a threat from a big country somewhere to the north, the threat of an aircraft that comes in at Mach 2 on the deck just complicates our problem immeasurably.”16 Former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral James Watkins was more explicit about the SNA threat. At various times, he spoke of the need for U. S. forces to “move rapidly into an attack on Alekseyevka ... at the very front end of conflict,” and “to counter the Soviets’ missile launching
b
platforms, to shoot the archer before he releases his arrows,” for “the main threat to our fleet... are the Backfires and other missile-carrying aircraft of Soviet Naval Aviation.”17
In retrospect, it may have been unwise for a serving CNO to publicly air the brush strokes of the U. S. Navy’s contingency plans. It appears that the Soviets have taken note and have devised two appropriate countermeasures:
► Stepping up simulated alerts to demonstrate the effectiveness of Backfire dispersal capabilities out of Alek- seyevka to auxiliary airfields at the Primorski Krai, Sakhalin Island, and the Kamchatka Peninsula
► Forward basing several flights of Backfires to the Arctic air base of Mys Schmidta and to two of the four air and naval air bases located near the Petropavlovsk- Kamchatskiy salient18
Apart from complicating any U. S. surprise-attack option, these measures have also had other deleterious effects. One is to turn the Backfires into quick-reaction strike units demonstrating a relatively high peacetime operational tempo and, ipso facto, elevating the overall combat readiness of SPNA. Another is the forward basing of a proportion of SPNA Backfires to the Kamchatka Peninsula, thereby affording the Soviets an ideal jumping-off point for a major naval air campaign over much of the North Pacific. From the direction of Petropavlovsk, Backfires would be able to range out and strike U. S. surface units operating as far away as Guam, Midway, and the Philippines without in-flight refueling.19 According to naval analyst Floyd Kennedy, such a strike reach also allows SPNA to fully exploit the detection ranges and targeting data provided by space-based oceanic surveillance systems (the highly survivable RORSAT and EORSAT network).
Badger Modernization Program: Though the Backfire is clearly a formidable weapon system, in terms of overall aircraft numbers it accounts for only about one-quarter of SPNA’s maritime-strike inventory. The rest is made up entirely of Tu-16 Badger bombers. Since the late 1970s, the number of Badgers has grown from about 70 to about 120 aircraft, organized into four nominal air regiments. More important, however, these regiments have been modernized significantly. All the Badger-As, like the Tu-22 Blinder-As, have been phased out of SPNA’s operational order of battle (probably reassigned to the Command of Soviet Long Range Aviation and to Asian front [China] contingencies). In place of these assets, additional Badger-G bombers and the newer modified Badger-G version have deployed to the Pacific theater in force.
The overall Badger modernization effort has included assigning to SPNA strike elements more suitably configured for antishipping operations and armed with more effective antiship missiles. First-line AS-6 Kingfish missiles have replaced AS-2 Kipper missiles on most Badger-C bombers and have been introduced into the larger force of Badger-Gs, apparently serving alongside the AS-5 Kelt.20
The significance of this modernization is that the Soviets have mitigated the deficiencies inherent in a subsonic bomber by rearming it with a highly sophisticated missile
capable of a maximum range of 300 nautical miles. Of equal significance is the fact that the Soviets recognize the utility of having a variety of long-range, air-launched, antiship missiles—the Backfire’s AS-4 and the Badger s AS-2, AS-5, and AS-6. The rationale for this appears to be that on simultaneous employment the different flight profiles of each missile would serve to dilute the antimissile defenses of an enemy task group.21 Indeed, the Soviets themselves have stated:
“The growing defensive capabilities of fleets and the improvement of the combat reliability of ships and forces stipulate the necessity for even greater massing of forces and weapons in battle. For example, to overcome antimissile defense and achieve the required number of hits it is necessary to increase the number of missiles in a strike at a single target, meanwhile an important condition for the success of the strike [is] the simultaneous arrival of the weapons on the target.”"
Tactical Air Support (Aviatsionnaya PodDerzhka): Another significant enhancement of SPNA penetration capabilities has been demonstrated during theater exercises since late 1986—naval aviation Badgers flying in company with advanced fighter aircraft. These escorts have been furnished by Soviet Air Defense (PVO strany) and Frontal Aviation (Frontovaya aviatsiya) P The principal factor spurring this nascent cooperative effort (it completely endorses the Soviet military’s “combined arms’
[obschevoyskovaya] doctrine) has been the tandem buildup and modernization of Moscow’s air forces east of the Urals. “Reinforcement of the Soviet Air Force in the Far
East [has] accompanied the expansion of the Pacific Eleet’s bases. Soviet military writings emphasize the importance of adequate fighter forces to cover the emergence °f the fleet into the Pacific.”24
As an integral fleet component, SPNA has benefited enormously from this approach. Since the late 1970s, the newest Soviet fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft have deployed in considerable numbers to the Far Eastern theater. These deployments have for the first time been effected at a rate nearly equaling that in the more crucial Western theater. The great bulk of the newly deployed aircraft are concentrated within the Far Eastern Military district, operating from bases that are either close to those used by SPNA regiments or are joint facilities largely sub- °rdinated to the requirements of the theater fleet command. The latter are constituted in the principal bases of: Alekseyevka; Dolinsk, on Sakhalin Island; Petropavlovsk; Komanovka, in the Vladivostok area; and Sovetskaya E*avan. From this geographic spread, it would appear that ne new Air Defense and Frontal Aviation forces are predominantly slated for contingencies against Japanese °rces and (especially) forward-deployed U. S. forces in ue vast North Pacific/Northeast Asian region, and not along the Chinese frontier.
About 600 fighter aircraft belonging to Air Defense and rental Aviation are deployed in the Far Eastern Military fmstrict. According to the U. S. Pacific Command in Hawaii, about 90% of these aircraft are at least third- generation versions, i.e., MiG-23/25/27/29/31 and Su-27. *ae heavy deployment of such “all-weather” air-superiority fighters as the MiG-31 Foxhound (since 1983), MiG- 9 Fulcrum, and Su-27 Flanker (both since 1984) has considerably upgraded the Soviet defense posture in the Far East.-5 These three fighter-aircraft types have provided ne wherewithal for the development of close operational c°°rdination between SPNA and the two Soviet tactical- air arms. The true lookdown-shootdown capability of the bree aircraft and their sophisticated avionics suites— roadly comparable to U. S. carrier-borne F/A-18 Hornet and F-14 Tomcat fighters—is one element encouraging ,beir employment in a “protective escort” role. The most 'mportant element, however, is their extended combat rams vis-a-vis aircraft of an earlier generation. In the Far East, through staging-out of bases sited on Kamchatka and akhalin, these tactical forces escorting SPNA maritime- str,ke Badgers have a twin axis of approach to the open ®cean. The radial extremities of these two main approach mes afford nearly blanket coverage of the strategically Critical quadrant of the Northwest Pacific. U. S. carriers must enter this oceanic quadrant if they are to launch aircraft with full bomb loads for tactical missions against Moscow’s vast military infrastructure in the Far East.
. Acting as a significant force multiplier for SPNA, Soviet fighter aircraft can support maritime-related opera- bons in other ways. Forming an initial and massive attack ^ave to directly engage carrier-borne fighters, thus paving he way for successive waves of closely following missile- aden bombers, Soviet Air Defense and Frontal Aviation aircraft might decisively contribute to a major fleet action. Whittling down an opposing fleet’s organic air arm through direct air combat, thereby enhancing the penetration prospects of strike aviation, is a viable Soviet option that cannot be ignored.26 (This threat cannot be degraded merely because the concept has not yet been reflected in Soviet theater air exercises.)
Even if Soviet fighters fail to inflict the desired level of attrition on a task group’s tactical air arm, they would have nonetheless succeeded in their mission by simply inducing enemy carrier air wings to a large-scale engagement. Because carrier-borne fighters must return to carriers for refueling after extended air combat, a task group is not likely to have sufficient fighters airborne in time to intercept the subsequent waves of missile-launching bombers. U. S. forces have no counter for this potent threat. In geostrategic terms, this is particularly true of the Northwest Pacific, where the Soviets have placed a huge concentration of aircraft poised to counter conventional U. S. naval power without having to be diverted to other contingencies.
The Maritime Role of Long Range Aviation: In recent years, the Soviet command has attempted to blur the lines that distinguish naval strike aviation operations from those of Long Range Aviation (LRA). This policy has had a signal effect within the maritime environment of the Asia- Pacific region: the increasing dedication of Soviet LRA to operations against at-sea targets. As with the Soviet tactical air arms, the primary impetus for reconstituting the
combat role from single mission to multimission appears to be the modernization of Soviet LRA within the Far Eastern theater.
The principal LRA elements that appear closely integrated into the SPNA mission structure are the Backfire- B/C (45 aircraft), the Bear-G (30), and the Bear-H (25) bombers. All of these LRA assets have deployed to the Far Eastern theater since 1978; the Bear-H bombers commenced deployment in 1984.
Like those operating with naval aviation, LRA Backfires are armed with the AS-4 Kitchen missile, which can attack both land and sea targets. This sort of standardization in the principal weapon-delivery system provides flexibility and the potential for theater or strategic strike roles for the Backfires. In fact, the AS-4 Kitchens also arm the Bear-G bombers, three-quarters of which are de-
Since 1979, the Soviets gradually have turned the former U. S. facility at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, into a forward base of operations providing SPNA aircraft, such as the Bears and Badgers shown here, with a 2,200-nautical-mile threat coverage in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Java, South China, and Philippine seas.
ployed in the Soviet Far East.27 The AS-4 is also a secondary weapon load for the Bear-H bomber, which has been specifically configured to carry eight AS-15 Kent cruise missiles. With a maximum range of 1,500 nautical miles, the AS-15 is intended for intercontinental nuclear strikes.
At the operational level, Far Eastern LRA assets in effect represent an additional echelon of about 100 aircraft that, if wartime contingencies demand, can easily be placed under the operational control of fleet command at Vladivostok (nominally subordinated to the theater high command headquarters at Chita). Relatively recent Soviet Pacific naval air exercises are replete with evidence underscoring the nominal integration of LRA into the maritime command. In 1986, CinCPac Admiral Ronald Hays disclosed that Bear-G and Bear-H aircraft “now fly simulated strike and maritime attack missions against U. S. targets as a matter of routine.”28 In the same year, it was reported that elements of Soviet LRA and SNA “more regularly operate together in simulated anti-shipping exercises than five years ago.”29 These exercises demonstrate that the Soviets are capable of mobilizing more than 250 missile-equipped, fixed-wing aircraft (including as many as 90 Backfire bombers) for maritime operations in the Pacific theater. By any standard, this is a large contingent of strike aviation. Should this force be mobilized for action, it would support the classic Soviet military concept of the massive and redundant employment of combat assets for rapid operations over a broad front.
Extended Strike Coverage: Facilitating the projection of such air power across the considerable over-water distances of the Pacific has been a relatively recent development. During 1983-84, the Soviets deployed a formation of 16 SPNA Badgers, including ten Badger-G missile- configured versions to Vietnam. A related development was Moscow’s acquisition in 1985 of rights for its combat aircraft to overfly North Korea. These developments enhanced SPNA’s strategic reach and alleviated some logistical encumbrances.
From its principal Vietnamese naval-air station of Cam Ranh Bay, SPNA is afforded a 2,200-nautical-mile forward base-of-operations, extending its threat coverage to include: the eastern Indian Ocean; the Java, South China, and Philippine seas; and all the international straits that traverse maritime Southeast Asia. Though the current size of the SPNA strike formation based at Cam Ranh appears modest, it can be rapidly reinforced for contingencies- Moreover, trends appear to point in the direction of a further, incremental buildup of force strength. The development of Cam Ranh since 1979 has deliberately proceeded at a gradual pace, in part owing to a Soviet desire not to alarm regional states, many of whom perceive the Soviet Union as a bete noire. To a greater extent, however, this gradual buildup appears predicated on Soviet military doctrine’s resolution that strict priorities be established among objectives.30 This doctrinal tenet has necessarily ensured that Soviet force requirements in the more important Northeast Asian-Northwest Pacific region are satisfied before those in the secondary sector of Southeast Asia.
Another factor that has mitigated the immediate necessity of basing a large SPNA force at Cam Ranh has been the establishment by the Soviets of a new air bridge connecting their distant Vietnamese outpost with Vladivostok. Using North Korean airspace, this air bridge is the
C°l- Gen.
niost direct route for Soviet aircraft departing Vladivostok or Cam Ranh Bay. The advantage of this route is not merely the ease with which Soviet aviation strength at Cam Ranh can be built up at a moment’s notice. In war- tlme> the United States, Japan, and South Korea are likely to attempt coordinated operations aimed at achieving supremacy of the airspace over the Tsushima Strait and the surrounding area to deny egress to Soviet aircraft attempt- lng to range south out of bases along the Primorski Krai.
The strategic value of a Soviet forward enclave in ^southeast Asia and a new air corridor across the length of North Korea has already been elaborated upon in Soviet naval air exercises. Since early 1986, Soviet Badgers stag- lng out of Cam Ranh have on occasion assumed mock ahack profiles against U. S. surface forces patrolling in me South China Sea and against the U. S. Seventh Fleet use at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Simulated missile stnkes have been conducted against Chinese naval forces jmd facilities in the Yellow Sea as Soviet bombers overfly North Korea on a southerly bearing toward Vietnam. All hose practice bombing runs are clear evidence of SPNA’s enhanced operational capabilities farther afield from its haditional areas of concern—the North Pacific and the oa of Japan. They also indicate that the proficiency of PNA personnel in strike operations has increased in tan- em with the accelerated peacetime operational tempo in he relatively newer geographical areas of interest. That Proficiency is likely to increase as SPNA consolidates the jj'gnificant operational gains it has acquired over the past few years.
Today, Soviet Pacific Naval Aviation is clearly representative of what the Soviets have termed “one of the asm naval arms intended for the destruction of enemy uombat forces.” The evolution of this force since the late J'0s has reflected a Soviet desire to attain a judicious mance between qualitative and quantitative inputs in ^eapon development and procurement. This approach to he buildup of a credible war-fighting capability is not restricted to the production and deployment of combat air- '*■ extends across the weapon spectrum that equips he five services of the Soviet armed forces. In the naval Ration sphere, this approach has meant marrying techno- 10gically sophisticated avionics and missilery to huge numbers of fielded aircraft. In addition, SPNA has a(fopted suitable operational concepts and improved its overall reach thorough cooperation with client states, hese developments have helped turn SPNA into a potent orce configured for deep-strike operations in the Pacific heater. It is little wonder that SPNA remains the only aviation arm among the four Soviet fleets that emphasizes SUch operations. The impending deployment of the long- range Blackjack bomber with SPNA will further enhance hs ability to wield strike forces theater-wide. The United tates can ignore these developments only at its own peril.
Annual Report of the Department of Defense FY79, quoted in W. R. Taylor ed., loo6 5 ^ World’s Aircraft 1985-86 (London: Jane’s Publishing Co., Ltd., P- 260.
of Aviation A. Mironenko, “Wings of the Fleet,” Morskoy sbornik,
No. 2, 1978, p. 45; selected translations prepared by the U. S. Naval Intelligence Support center.
3G. Jacobs, “Soviet Pacific-based strike forces,” Asian Defence Journal, No. 1,
1986, p. 12.
4Bill Gunston, An Illustrated Guide to the Modern Soviet Air Force (New York: Arco, 1982), p. 131.
5Michael Taylor, Naval Air Power (London: Hamlyn Publishing, 1986), p. 84. 6Norman Polmar, “Soviet naval aviation,” Air Force Magazine, March 1978, p. 70.
7See, for example, Doug Richardson, “World missile directory,” Flight International, 2 February 1986, p. 42.
8RonaldT. Pretty, edJane’s Weapon Systems, 1986-87 (London: Jane’s Publishing Co., Ltd., 1986), p. 181.
9On Aegis and ship defense against missile attack, see, for instance, “Aegis: shield of the fleet,” Defence Update, No. 65, pp. 7-11; Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., “Sea Services: Anti-ship missile defense,” National Defense, May-June 1983, pp. 1115; Ronald O’Rourke, “Defending against the cruise missile,” Military Technology, No. 9, 1986, pp. 64-74; and Col. Norman L. Dodd, “Defence of ships against airborne attack,” Asian Defence Journal, No. 6, 1984, pp. 12-19. ,0Capt. Linton F. Brooks, USN, “The Nuclear Maritime Strategy,” Proceedings, April, 1987, p. 36.
"William D. O’Neil, “Naval antiwar warfare,” National Defense, February 1981,
p. 26.
,2“Adm. Robert L. J. Long discusses U. S. forces in the Pacific, the Soviet threat, and U. S. alliances in the region, Sea Power, July 1983, p. 23.
,3Peter Day, “Mock raids show Soviet muscle,” The Australian, 10 November
1982, p. 5.
,4Tom Burgess, “Icy island of Adak seen as Navy’s key North Pacific outpost,” San Diego Union, 8 February 1987, p. 8.
,5“A conversation with Adm. James Lyons,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 22 January
1987, p. 28; see also Glenn F. Bunting, “Navy warms up to idea of presence in cold Bering Sea,” Los Angeles Times, 31 August 1986, p. 3.
,6Quoted in David Watts, “Russia doubles its Far East naval presence,” Weekend Australian, 19-20 February 1983, p. 16.
"Armed Services Committee, U. S. Senate, FY 1985, p. 3887; Adm. James D. Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy,” supplement to Proceedings, January 1986, p. 12.
,8William M. Arkin, “Arsenals move north,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1984, p. 6; Neil Munro, “Keeping watch on the Amur and the Sea of Okhotsk,” Pacific Defence Reporter, October 1985, p. 19; and Maj. Tom Linn, USMC, “On Soya Strait and Soviet Pacific Deployment,” Defense & Foreign Affairs, December 1983, p. 9.
"Paul Dibb, “The Soviet Union as a Pacific military power,” Pacific Defence Reporter, November 1984, p. 46.
20See, for instance, W. R. Taylor, ed., Jane’s All the World's Aircraft 1986-87, p. 264; Georges Tan Eng Bok, The USSR in East Asia (Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1986), p. 47.
2,H. K. Ullman, “Anti-ship missiles,” Naval Forces, No. 11, 1985, p. 73. 22Capt. 1st Rank V. Mamchits, “The main features of modem naval combat,” Morskoy sbornik. No. 4, 1977, p. 24.
2iPVO strany is the abbreviated Russian term for Protivovozdushnaya oborona strany, or “Air Defense of the Nation,” the third priority within the five-service Soviet Armed Forces. Frontovaya aviatsiya is a component of Voenno-vozdushnyye sily (Soviet Air Force), which is also comprised of Dal’nyaya aviatsiya (Long Range Aviation) and Voenno-transportnaya aviatsiya (Military Transport Aviation).
24Drew Middleton, “Strategic Soviet region,” The New York Times, 2 September
1983, p. 1.
25See Peter Samuel, “Soviet Union upgrading forces in Pacific: US,” The Australian, 28 November 1984, p. 7; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1986-1987, op. cit., pp. 247-48; and Lt. Col. David Eshel, “Superpower confrontation—The Pacific,” Defence Updated!, p. 16.
26Taylor, Naval Air Power, op. cit., p. 100.
27Adm. Ronald Hays, “Build-up betrays true intent,” The Australian, 19 November 1986, p. 10.
28Adm. Ronald J. Hays, “Soviet Pacific-based strike forces,” Signal, December 1986, p. 39.
29“Tu-95 Bear-G in detail,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 29 November 1986, p. 1305. ^Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 163.
Mr. da Cunha, a Singaporean, has a B.A. degree from the University of Hull and an M.Phil. degree in international relations from Queens’ College, Cambridge University. In 1985, he was appointed a Research Associate (Strategic Studies) at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. He is concurrently a Research Scholar at the Department of International Relations, Australian National University, where he is writing a book on Soviet naval power in the Pacific.