The Marine Corps Is Special Ops
By Major Thomas C. Linn, U. S. Marine Corps
From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Grenada, the Marine Corps provided a versatile, all-purpose force for crises short of war. While all the hoopla and money rain on other services' elite units, the Corps continues to field the most experienced, best-suited force for special ops.
The U. S. Marine Corps has been this nation's all-purpose expeditionary force in war and in crises short of war. Avoiding specialization for the sake of versatility, the Corps has performed a wide variety of operations—from disaster relief in the Philippines to "small wars" in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. As Lieutenant General V. H. Krulak, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired), put it, "The Marines don't have a role except to be malleable enough to do what comes on the horizon."1 But demonstrated capability—not historical precedents—has prompted such calls on the Corps. Over the years, the versatility of the Marines provided the taxpayer with the most useful and cost-effective force possible. Yet, some defense-related circles continue to campaign for the use of other forces, especially in the context of low-intensity conflict (LIC). This narrow interpretation of the LIC concept is reminiscent of the rationale that led to the increased involvement in Vietnam during the early 1960s, and has the potential for similar mistakes. Should such thinking prevail in military circles, we could lose more than the use of the nation's most versatile fighting force. We could also lose flexibility in foreign policy, which rests upon credible military power.
The Marine Corps has been used at least 231 times since its inception, usually in support of foreign policy short of major war. It is no surprise that the use of Marine Corps forces has been directly proportional to U. S. involvement in international affairs. Marines were used to protect U. S. interests in such places as the Falklands Islands in 1832 and Lima, Peru, in 1836, but the Corps came into its own as the United States expanded its interests after the Mexican War. Between 1852 and 1855, Marines were used to intervene in Buenos Aires, Argentina; Canton, China, Nicaragua; Okinawa; and Fiji. By 1934, Marines had been used 134 times in 37 nations and were often referred to as "State Department Troops." The famous Blechman and Kaplan report, Force Short of War, which is not all-inclusive, cites 77 uses of Marine Corps forces during the most active period of U. S. foreign policy, 1945-1975.2 With this minor conflict experience, the Corps developed this nation's first real doctrine on the subject, the 1940 Small Wars Manual, which has attracted renewed interest.
The Marine Corps's service with the Navy has made it an element of power projection. Maritime nations faced with uncertain threats to their interests have found that it is easier and more cost-effective, in most cases, to use ship-based rather than land-based forces. The fleet's inherent logistic support capability eliminates the need for extensive basing and reception facilities, and provides more sustainability. Also, the presence of naval warships near an enemy's coast has a strong psychological impact. These ships can loiter off the coast in international waters almost indefinitely and, if necessary, can move from stations over the horizon to conduct an amphibious assault. In addition, amphibious ships can withdraw Marines from shore, reducing the likelihood of a prolonged conflict. The value of amphibious power projection may be even more apparent in the future, when fiscal and political environments may not grant us the luxury of basing our forces overseas.
The Marines' mission does not end with the assault. It is the extension of force beyond the shoreline that has en abled the National Command Authorities to influence situations around the world. The ability to transition rapidly from ship to shore for a variety of missions is what makes the Marine Corps unique.
In his study "Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and the U. S. Marine Corps," Marine Lieutenant Colonel Andrew N. Pratt cites several missions associated with the LIC concept that are traditional Marine Corps capabilities—as history attests.3
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO): The United States is one of the few nations that will use armed force, if necessary, to extract its citizens from hostile situations overseas. In the more extreme situations, the Marine Corps has evacuated citizens of other nations, as well as Americans.
Political Reinforcement and Counterintervention Operations: Before World War II, Marines conducted numerous reinforcement and counterintervention operations to prevent coups or to remove governments that were unfavorable to the United States. These two operations differ only in that the former is initiated at the request of a host government and the latter is not. Two recent operations are good examples of reinforcement/counterintervention: the 1965 Dominican Republic and 1983 Grenada operations. Key to the success of these operations are rapid introduction of forces into the strategic center of a nation and achieving attack momentum against opposing forces. The fleet and its Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) have such capabilities.
Protection of U. S. Property: This mission has been performed more often by Marines than any other servicemen. Even before Marine security guards were formally established, Marines guarded U. S. embassies, consulates, or legations in such places as Korea (1904-5), Paris (1914), and Istanbul (1919). Incidents in Morocco (1956), Guantanamo Bay (1962), the Dominican Republic (1956), and Beirut in the early 1980s demonstrated a continuing need for such a capability. Today, forward-deployed MAGTFs are capable of bypassing airports and landing reinforcements by helicopter within the embassy compound.
Peacekeeping: Despite the perceptions that have emerged from the 1983 Beirut tragedy, Marine forces remain capable of peacekeeping operations. This mission is usually conducted in the most fluid of situations, requiring a flexible and adaptable force. In the later stages of counterintervention/reinforcement, the imposing force usually transitions to a peacekeeping mission as was the case in the Dominican Republic. This mission also assumes that the other parties involved will accept or submit to a peacekeeping force. If one of these parties changes its position, the peacekeeping force may be required to transition to a peace-enforcing role or to withdraw.
Show of Force: This indirect application of military force has been used increasingly in recent years to demonstrate a U. S. resolve to intervene, if necessary. Most often, the use of Marines in this mission has been for the political purpose of deterring an action by another nation, such as in the 1962 Laotian Crisis: 5,000 Marines were moved into Thailand to deter the Soviet Union and China from providing further support to Pathet Lao guerrillas, across the Mekong River. However, Marines have been used in this mission to compel another nation to take action. Later in 1962, Marines in amphibious shipping were staged off Cuba to increase pressure on the Soviet Union to remove offensive missiles from the island. Blechman and Kaplan determined in their sample analysis of incidents in which Marines were used in a show of force that 81% of the incidents had favorable outcomes in the short term and 52% of the same incidents worked out favorably in the long term.4
Humanitarian Assistance: This operation is generally associated with a demonstration of good will between the United States and another nation with a portion of its population in distress. Humanitarian assistance can have a profound impact on the will of people; and public will is an essential target of low-intensity conflict. The MAGTF has a variety of assets required for these operations. The ability to conduct such humanitarian assistance further demonstrates the versatility of Marine Corps forces. Since World War II, Marines have participated in eight humanitarian assistance operations, ranging from disaster relief in the Greek Ionian Islands after the 1953 earthquake, to the evacuation of snowbound Lebanese in the Chouf Mountains in 1983.
Counterinsurgency: It often comes as a surprise that the Marine Corps has provided the nation with its most effective counterinsurgency force. The Combined Action Program in Vietnam was a model counterinsurgency operation, but its roots lie in previous Marine experiences in the first half of the century. Before the Panama Canal was completed, Marines were used in Panama to check insurgents. Later they were used for the same purpose in the Philippines, Nicaragua, and Haiti. During World War II, Marines trained the Somoan Fita Fita Guards to fight the Japanese, incorporating earlier techniques.
The use of Marines in a counterinsurgency role has even greater applicability for the future. A sea-based counterinsurgency force has tactical and strategic mobility, and is capable of outmaneuvering its opponents. More important, the sea-based force does not require costly, extensive in-country support, which often invites attack and leads to increased involvement. The United States is unlikely to tolerate a prolonged involvement like that in Vietnam. The ease with which sea-based counterinsurgency forces can be introduced and withdrawn provides viable options for National Command authorities, particularly considering the problems in Central America and the Philippines.
These diverse operations cannot be neatly categorized. Some operations may include aspects of others. For example, a counterintervention force might conduct noncombatant evacuations and humanitarian assistance operations simultaneously. One operation may transition to another—counterintervention to peacekeeping, for instance. More important, these operations may be conducted against a background of all-out war.
Such diversity requires a flexible force. In Grenada, the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) required no artillery sup port ashore, so the artilleryman formed an additional maneuver element. The MAU did use its tanks and helicopters, some of which later supported the U. S. Army brigade that lacked similar assets. The MAGTF organization provides a number of options for diverse situations. Accordingly, the Corps remains the best force for limited operations in support of foreign policy.
Nonetheless, the Marine Corps's all-purpose expeditionary force capability has weathered some storms. Within the Corps, these operations were often taken for granted and, until recently, their study was neglected. Essentially, during the 1970s, Marines were forced by the Defense Department to downplay their intervention capability and focus more carefully on "heavying up" for a high-intensity war in Europe.
But the 1982-83 experience in Beirut brought low-intensity operations to the forefront again. The MAU special operations-capable (SOC) program, with associated training, has recently been implemented to improve the capabilities of deployed forces.
The increasing number of terrorist incidents in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Iranian hostage situation, and communist takeovers in a number of nations produced a highly charged environment in which political leaders struggled for solutions. Because these incidents were increasing, many believed that status quo forces were inadequate. To some degree, this was true. The nation needed a special counterterrorist force capable of hostage rescue.
However, the effects of Beirut cannot be ignored. Many claimed that special operations forces should be used in counterterrorist operations, and many other operations as well. They lumped many traditional Navy-Marine Corps operations under the term "low-intensity conflict," and declared LIC to be the province of special operations forces. For example, Edward Luttwak argued that the MAGTF's structure was too unwieldy for the flexibility needed for situations such as Beirut.5
Dr. Roger Beaumont of Texas A&M University wrote that nations experiencing foreign policy humiliation and frustration have often resorted to special or elite units.6 Such units become a visible symbol of response; that alone is seen as a victory. President John F. Kennedy promoted elite units in the early 1960s in response to the growing phenomena of "peoples' wars" and Third World insurgency movements. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill relied heavily on elites during World War II.
This is not to argue that special operations forces do not have a role in those operations associated with low-intensity conflict. Their mission is very specialized and specific, and they could be used in conjunction with Marine Corps forces. But they are not a substitute for Marine Corps forces. They lack the flexibility to adapt to a situation that may rapidly change from peacekeeping to peace-enforcing, or even to conventional war. Eliot A. Cohen of Harvard wrote in Commandos and Politicians: "When elite units are used for purposes that are not really defensible in military terms, a number of effects harmful to military efficiency occur."7 Cohen states that beyond their specific roles, elite units have rarely proven effective.
Beaumont and Cohen noted the eagerness of politicians to use these forces outside their specified roles. In April 1961, President Kennedy sent 1,200 U. S. Army Special Forces personnel to Vietnam despite the possibility that his commitment might be regarded as a precedent for the introduction of combat troops. A similar possibility exists today. A number of elite and alternative forces are being advertised for overly ambitious roles, with little regard for our ability to extract them from deteriorating situations. The result may be another Vietnam—or Beirut.
The term "low-intensity conflict" has taken on undue military significance. Retired U. S. Army Colonel Harry Summers attacked the use of "low-intensity conflict" in terms of military fundamentals.8 Unless the concept is carefully interpreted, military power could be misapplied in support of foreign policy.
The operations that have come to be associated with the low-intensity conflict concept are not new. The Marine Corps has traditionally been capable of these missions. More important, the security of this nation requires an all-purpose force that is readily capable of any mission the president may direct. We cannot afford a variety of overspecialized forces that have been further constrained by bureaucratic definition and flawed military concepts. Successful foreign policy requires a versatile military force. Versatility provides foreign policy options—and is the hallmark of the U. S. Marine Corps.
1 R. J. Moskin, The U. S. Marine Corps Story (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), p. 920.
2 B. M. Blechman and S. S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 45.
3 LtCol. (then Maj.) A. N. Pratt, USMC, "Low Intensity Conflict and the United States Marine Corps," Low Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology, LtCol. D. J. Dean, ed. (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1986).
4 Blechman and Kaplan, p. 103.
5 Letter to the editor of Armed Forces Journal, May 1987.
6 R. A. Beaumont, "Military Elite Forces: Surrogate War, Terrorism, and the New Battlefield," Parameters, March 1979, p. 20.
7 E. A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1978), p. 102.
8 Col. H. G. Summers, USA (Ret.), seminar on low intensity conflict at Georgetown University, November 1986.
Author of the November 1986 Proceedings article "Military Power Short of War," Major Linn serves in the service plans division at Headquarters Marine Corps. He served as a platoon commander during the evacuation of Saigon and Phnom Penh, as a Recon company commander, and as an operations officer with the 9th MAB. He is a graduate of the U. S. Army Airborne and Ranger schools, and the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, where he also served as an instructor in terrorism counteraction and counterinsurgency. He has written articles for the Marine Corps Gazette, Defense and Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces Journal, and Amphibious Warfare Review.