This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
^ Clemen, n n.u
Sub
I- ^arin 1 °n ^ t0 dynamic antl_ 'n>itatin„„ Warfare world but also to the inadequate systems and
of
Pro,
>Cedur,
/£ZS\\>. to the^urface
ment D. Urban
npebn?arine tactical effective- thpS *S getting buried under Cftmasses of reports and
Th?rter'generated data* tu., • doesn’t need all
allhe"^keSp?ns'ble ior tacitcal training Diego I ,niar'nc Training Facility in San Mariners °Und myse*f asking how sub- CaPabilitj C°U'C* develop better tactical
'V°u|d re!fk EaCh team trainin8 session teau be|CUC l U certa'n intermediate pla- cienCy °W tBc desired level of profi- saiDe ’nnd pro8ress would stop. The °Ver and°Untl Would have to be covered a lack „f°Ver a8a'n- and certainly not for Por! CreW cff°rt.
Marine °^lcers reporting for sub- exPeriencU ^ac* s’Snificant operational The com^i ”Ut tBose days are long gone, and tech) ty of submarine missions T° ret>aj ° |’8y has increased immensely. and profjn. ost ground, officer training Io ad(jresClencT are the most critical areas cal eff(v.,S ln order to upgrade force tacti-
, cCHvenpt;o °^sareDnne aPPr°ach and attack meth- Corr>bat nmarily a Product of inadequate 0r'8‘nalivS^Stems caPabilities. Systems 'nPutting es'Sned for determining and Sc°Pe an,|'VCaP°ns presets have grown in c°ntact ta Complexity to include multi- s°nar emr®et rnot*on analysis (TMA) and Tanuj] pf °Tnient. The proliferation of ls testjjpp °tS ar|d stand-alone processors Sf*bttiarin ^ not on^ to the dynamic anti-
i0litations
v solv lrnPr°ved combat systems Hat Can , ,he Problem tomorrow, but To c„ e done about it today?
Miners ^°Un<^ basic problems, sub- ■Hrs aare a nostalgic group. A few approach ’r‘hc c°ncept of the assistant , Id Wa° ,!cer was dredged up from its noJ n °r‘8'ns- The approach offi- y 0), a 'y the commanding officer ^aneuVer^ct?’ t*le bre control party and C°ntacts itaC subrnarine in prosecuting >er tL n This particular incarnation, v lhc anneXCCUt‘ve officer (XO) would ik^ Wou,(,rh °Tficcr’s alter ego or the c CO a ..C lhc approach officer with >r a 't ln8 as a more detached ob- al'd prQ supervisor. While this is a °Sal. its success is highly de-
/ October 1987
pendent on the personalities and capabilities of the CO and XO, and it does not directly address current problems. In implementation, the XO was relegated to the role of a messenger commuting to and from the sonar shack; the second most experienced officer on board was no longer an integral part of the fire control party. Since this proposal, a more directed approach to solving sonar training and proficiency problems has been undertaken with effective results.
In some ways, we have gone full circle in the technical arena. When digital combat systems were introduced, those who had been trained on analog systems were unfamiliar with them, which led to a considerable and not necessarily healthy skepticism of their usefulness. Today, there may be too much misplaced trust and dependence on combat system and weapon capabilities. In addition, we are just now realizing that the design of the display interfaces in combat systems has a subtle yet powerful effect on overall system utility and capability.
Whatever hardware and software problems will be solved by future developments, the design specifications for the new systems have demonstrated a better understanding of the architecture and capabilities of the submarine fire control party. The hierarchy typical of previous line diagrams shows signs of giving way
to functional realities.
Consider the plot coordinator. Frequently, he has the best tactical picture of anyone in the fire control party, at least as long as he is not acting as another geographic plot evaluator. Since he does not work explicitly for the fire control coordinator, the primary assistant of the approach officer, but for the approach officer, he will be elevated and renamed the tactical evaluator.
Even more important than the realization of capabilities within the fire control party organization are the actual capabilities of the people manning the particular positions. Consider the historically underutilized CO tactical display operator. While just about everyone else in the fire control party is concentrating on the primary contact of interest, he is supposed to conduct TMA on every other contact. His theoretical capabilities have been recognized in renaming this position contact manager, but even renamed it depends on who is filling the position to make full use of the information. The difference is obvious between a qualifying engineering officer-of-the-watch and an officer-of- the-deck with experience at conducting rapid TMA on numerous contacts during hundreds of trips to periscope depth with an understanding of tactical significance. The same comparison applies to the position of sonar officer, although the inexpe-
93
The second volume in Eric Hammers historic Guadalcanal Trilogy
“Praiseworthy on a standalone basis and as part of Hammers prospective trilogy.... Here he focuses on a pair of coincident carrier engagements (the battle of the Eastern Solomons and the battle of Santa Cruz)...Hammel’s reconstruction affords a wealth of strategic and tactical campaign detail. His kaleidoscopic but unfailingly comprehensible text... Draws on the recollections of 100-odd surviving veterans from both the US and Japanese sides, plus archival sources, to provide a vivid narrative account of the pivotal actions”
—K/rkus Reviews
“Even better than his previous book... Essential’.’
—Library Journal
Illustrated with 24 pages of dramatic photographs.
GUADALCANAL:
The Carrier Battles
The Pivotal Aircraft Carrier Battles of the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz
by Eric Hammel
Over 500 pages. $24.95, now at your bookstore, or send check or money order to Crown Publishers, Inc., 225 Park Ave. South, N.Y., N.Y. 10003. Please add $1.50 postage and handling. N.Y. and N.J. residents, add sales tax. MasterCard, VISA, AmEx holders, call toll-free,
1-800-526-4264, Dept 674.
94
rienced officers filling these billets have a much more serious impact on the capabilities of the entire fire control party.
The primary TMA operator is no longer a department head as in the past, but is again an inexperienced first-tour officer. Owing to the facility of digital systems to conduct TMA, this operator’s understanding of the TMA problem has been greatly diminished.
Consider finally the data base manager. The name itself conjures up unique visions in the laser-based continuous communications environment of the future. Even now we are beginning to see a hint of the deluge of raw data that will be dumped on commands in the name of expediency. The picture of the little man being pushed around the corridors of his office building by an immense pile of paper used in a recent air express television commercial comes immediately to mind. Finally, are we really going to man the fire control party the way we do now or will the engineer be in the propulsion spaces and the XO in charge of damage control evolutions?
The Submarine Officer Advanced Course (SOAC) experience has suggested some future areas for training emphasis. The synergism in the fire control parties at SOAC is interesting to note. Every student gains experience at every position in the fire control party (FCP) during the six-month course. This same method is used in training prospective commanding officers. While the SOAC approach officer is much less experienced than any submarine CO, the FCP’s overall performance is admirable. This is not to suggest that the CO’s role in the FCP is not important, but it demonstrates what happens when every member of the FCP has roughly the same level of knowledge. For one thing, communications within the fire control party are greatly enhanced and not necessarily along the traditional line diagrams of FCP organization. This is not to imply that every member of the FCP simply needs to be better trained, but that we should emphasize a better understanding of the approach and attack process. Some junior officer training sessions have been instituted at training facilities to give these less-experienced professionals an appreciation of what the entire fire control party is doing, but this is basically an introduction.
The word “training” has taken on a negative connotation. A lot of wasted effort has led to this perception. Many man-hours have been squandered in continually reinventing the wheel in implementing common training requirements at each submarine command. This, coupled with a mind-set that training is not
60 mi-
training unless it is at least - long and properly documented an ported in the prescribed format, tn^ this negative perception more un . ents able. For years, operational require prevented the scheduling of m.an - training. At least mandated train* ^ now on the employment schedu es- ^ CO of a submarine in overhaul r
half of his fire control party
to
the tram- duct
ing facility for an entire week to c° ^ tactical training exclusively. ' e ^ week the other half came. Obvious ’ j CO had not heard that it was **%. ^ ble” to run his ship with only wardroom. This is the rare except1 not the rule. ■ • „ is e°n’
The way tactical team training fire ducted and evaluated dissects aftSl control party into its componen looking at the microscopic man’P11^ of each operator. Inevitably, cn *h e. nothing more than a laundry 1>S*0 -on is dural non-compliance. The *mP'lC „eople often that the CO should train n*s ^y, better but the critics do not stipu'J jjrect and the suggestions rarely have any application to the CO. . ^efe
Tactical Readiness Evaluating instituted to demonstrate that ^^jnes5
be as much interest in tactical
but
as in nuclear-powered proficieI* the Operational Reactor Safegua^ anamination is still the most imP° at
nual event in the ship’s schedu^ t[,e ' ’■ ac-
when
into
least one order of magnitude months of preparation are taken *’ ^t count. Exercises are a more ' factor in training than is probab y^ ^^1
are
0fkn°
rciseS
because of their reinforcement ^ edge and experience. If the exe j]| fos" not challenging, however, they ter a false sense of tactical c°na(jjness' thus reducing the benefits to re fine S along ‘h.eAl-
needed ■
Fortunately, someone realized that SOAC was though touted as a depai
fiea'
----------------------------------- .
school it is little more than a jearnea
what was supposed to have beeni ^ during the submarine qualified' taCtica* ess. The relative importance 0 ^at sir training is indicated by the *aC^ jti- months in SOAC is required sar**e
nior officers up to speed, yet j-0r officer needs six weeks to prePa old engineer’s exam. The division o cer corps into tactical and ® o subspecialties has been discusse ^ , but this is not the best appr°ave n°! number of reasons. Primarily- vycU“ known many junior officers want to do it. Most of them carin pUlsiofl do something besides study P j,# plant manuals and participate The attendant friction that su Pt0 cause has been restricted l°rce
Proceedings
/ Od0
his
Iif 1
ssr**-'
?
i
\
!
NRP
.—
MAIL-ORDER FROM GERMANY - i SHIP MODELS IN 1:1250 and 1:12400 SCALE :
Tired of the same old hobby—not satisfied with run-of- 2 the-mill interests? Would you rather see a ship model f than read about one? Sound like you, read on! ’
- We have advertised our 1:1250 and 1:2400 Ship and Air- \
- craft Models in PROCEEDINGS since 1964-over 22 }
f years! During that time we have gained a lot of experi- i J ence in “ACROSS THE OCEAN MAIL-ORDER.” } C These ads have brought us many satisfied “friends.” i J Many of them have been with us from the start. •
V Interested in becoming one of our friends? Send $2.00 for \ i our 32 page Dollar Ship Catalog. In it you will find a 2 I large selection of ship and aircraft models cast in metal or \ i resin. Freighters, liners, warships (ours and theirs), air- 2 \ craft for your flattops and 1:200 scale tank models—from \ • Columbus’ time to the present! 2
S Also available are Continental Model Railroad Supplies; S ? ask for our Train Price List when ordering the Ship r j Catalog. j
f A U. S. Company with old-world efficiency, we promise
J to satisfy you to the best of our ability.
C Leo J. Winkler and Crew at
PRESTON HOBBY MODELS
) (Your friendly Hobby Shop across the Ocean)
ASW: SUBMARINE TECHNOLOGY BATTLE
A historical look at the evolution of the submarine, and at ASW methods used to counter it. Subs, surface ships, aircraft, sensors, weapons, operations, intelligence, US and foreign. Includes interviews and stories of persons involved in WWI, WWH, and the present with future outlook.
Author: Louis Gerken 760 pages with many pictures.
ISBN 0917163-0-4
Price: $49.95 includes shipping Order from the publisher:
AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC C.ORP 3250 Holly Way, Chula Vista CA 92010 Tel: (619) 422-1754
☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆
HIST9R SC Al„,
APPLE, IBM, ATARI
GENERAL QUARTERS SOFTWARE
P.O. BOX 1429 TORRANCE, CA 90505 (213) 547-0597
☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆
98
ballistic submarine wardrooms up to now.
Consider what might happen to overall tactical effectiveness if there were more SOAC graduates on board the typical submarine. The SOAC graduate’s utility stems from significant practice and study of tactical problems and an exposure to a varied number of COs’ philosophies. Unless retention improves drastically there will never be enough second-tour officers to have a significant impact on working conditions. Perhaps first-tour officers could be sent to SOAC and returned to the same command without appreciably lengthening their first tours. If the battle of the budget slows the construction pipeline, it could increase submarine officer manning. This would facilitate providing first-tour officers with SOAC training and increase the total number of SOAC graduates on each submarine. The increased tactical knowledge of the wardroom would be enhanced by ancillary rewards to watchbill rotation, leave utilization, and engineer training. I realize that this proposal probably cannot be implemented, but the goal of this discussion is to provide suggestions to increase tactical competence and not to do so within any predetermined set of existing bureaucratic restrictions.
The CO will only make progress if he goes beyond the basics documented in the Naval Warfare Publications in training his wardroom. The approach officer’s role in submarine approach and attack has long been regarded as an art, not a science, and for good reason. The CO is not simply handling data using a decision tree but applying his aggregate experience in a complex and powerful way. Even the best computer systems cannot begin to approach this inherent knowledge. The interactions within the fire control party that the SOAC experience suggests can be applied to each CO’s individual idiosyncrasies. The CO does not need all the information, just enough. The relevance of reports to the approach officer should be judged by whether the CO uses that specific information to validate his ideas or recognize anomalies that will cue certain actions from him to search for an additional piece of information.
Unfortunately, specifics cannot be adequately addressed in an unclassified forum. A good place to start would be: Which reports accelerate the scenario in each CO’s perspective and why? This training would get the individual members of the fire control party to interact more as a team, and it would serve the CO by going beyond the skeletal information contained in tactical documentation. The problem is not with the CO but in translating his particular methodology
to the members of his fire contro P _ The resulting support from the >re Q.g trol party would further enhance t e performance. ,„„n2er
Current initiatives to have y ( submarine COs could also have a ^ 0f impact on tactical effectiveness. a ^ experience could severely hampe ^ functioning of the FCP. This c■ Pj with the first-tour officers’ lack o uS knowledge could produce very danc jor results, particularly since the rnore|<|)0ok CO has been weaned in the col^ ^ world of verbatim compliance. 0f, plies to the distinction, or lac' ^ jf
between doctrine and guidance as ^ ^ .
a CO follows doctrine and fai‘s; rr0ni , deviate11
idanee
did not show the initiative to (
be
guidance. If a CO deviates from g jne. and fails then he did not follow a|s0 Younger, inexperienced COs wo ,o0S likely be more vulnerable to the m^ ^ abrogation of command prerog ,s the squadron and type cornrnan.jcration The only remaining conSIraCtice- would be finding the time to Attack submarine wardrooms <- ^ js
themselves tactical experts since their primary reason for existence- jarger ever, the allotted time within t ^ scheme of things relegates tactl^v ciaims
ing to more of a hobby despite any to the contrary. One need only the amount of time the wardroo
coi
mPute
I has i
devote to pervasive secrei justify such a conclusion It is clear that generating ring deficiencies and
tarial minu‘ia
ofreCUur;
lists
documenti”®
crease the submarine force s
the
fulfillment of requirements ''^f”al ef"
detailed
trains
ani?a'
fectiveness. Specifically by each CO will. In addition. tional priorities should pr«vl 0fficet
creased tactical experience of t ffjgefi corps, either by sending first-tour ^ n0t to SOAC or by other methods tna re. currently exist. Common trall^ore ef' quirements can be implemente . ficiently by not overburdening in^ ^ fu-
command assets. Finally, *desl® sitiYe t0 ture combat systems must be scnnSjdera' sophisticated interface design co gr- tions. There is certainly no nee CIltatior1' ate more checklists and docum ^^gh The issue is not how good is g°° -
but instead how much better
orgi
, , AcadeiW
.... Urban graduated from the NavaNjuC|ear 1975. He received a master’s degree in served1 neering from the University of Virginia- 0ffic^’ the USS Plunger (SSN-595) as electn damage control .assistant, and rat*‘°M°ro4) as naV,' officer and in the USS Permit (S nmnletedtvV gator/operations officer. Mr. Urban ceJlt tours of duty as Tactical Training DcPa pjcg°- tor at the Submarine Training Facility- is currently a government researcher.
Mr
Proceedings
/ October