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Interdiction of drugs involves more than the nation’s boundaries— it cuts across jurisdictional boundaries as well. Customs and the Coast Guard currently share the maritime air interdiction mission, but a strong case can be made for putting the Coast Guard in charge. This drug-runner avoided the jurisdictional issue by landing short of the U. S. coast.
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able to fly dedicated drug interdiction support missio and to provide material, training, and logistical supp0^ many non-DoD agencies for the purpose of supporting
Our country is awash with drugs. Increases in cocaine use, the relatively recent introduction of a potent new form of cocaine known as “crack,” and a marked increase in cocaine-related deaths clearly indicate the serious threat drug use poses to the United States. It is estimated that more than 100 metric tons of cocaine and 11,000 metric tons of marijuana may be smuggled into this country each year.1 Opiates and other dangerous illicit substances are also crossing our borders in ever-increasing quantities.
In April 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive designating international drug trafficking as a “national security threat to the United States.”2 Congress and the President committed more than a billion dollars to the war on drugs with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. The act has also strengthened federal enforcement statutes to combat both the supply and demand. A primary element of the war on drugs is interdiction of the drug supply— specifically maritime sea and air interdiction.
Interdiction: Interdiction of drugs before they cross our borders is the key to drug law enforcement. To date, the nation’s interdiction efforts have had only limited success. (Informal government estimates reflect that less than 10% of all illicit drugs destined for the United States are interdicted. Reliable data cannot, of course, be compiled. Observers believe the 10% figure is optimistic.)
Vast resources have been expended in the war on drugs, including the lives of many dedicated professionals, but the invasion continues. How then can the interdiction capability be improved? Are more resources the answer? Or are there other problems with the national drug interdiction strategy that are limiting optimum employment of current resources?
Interdiction operations cross many jurisdictional and geographic boundaries. To date, the coordination of available federal interdiction resources has been ineffective and inefficient because no single authority has been in charge, and many governmental agencies involved have displayed dismaying parochialism. The acquisition of additional resources may not be as important now as more effective coordination of current resources.
The administration’s most recent attempt to address the coordination issue was announced by Attorney General Edwin Meese III on 30 May 1987. The National Drug Enforcement Policy Board (NDEPB) which Meese chairs, has designated Customs as the overall lead agency for drug interdiction, with the Coast Guard as principal deputy. However, by explicit agreement this overall lead agency level has no command and control authority. Further, Customs is to be the lead agency for land interdiction, the Coast Guard the lead agency for maritime interdiction, while both are to “share responsibility for air interdiction activities.” This action is a step in the right direction, but it falls far short of what is needed to solve the coordination problem.3
Efforts to Date: In 1981, President Reagan announced the establishment of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) in the Office of the Vice Pr^s dent. Although NNBIS has no statutory authority, a ag succeeded in bringing the prestige of the Office o Vice President to bear on the problem of coordinate numerous interagency enforcement efforts. The Dep' ment of Defense (DoD) has been responsive to NN and has played a much larger role since Congress F proved the 1981 Defense Authorization Act, w ^ opened the way for expanded use of DoD assets and sonnel in support of civilian law enforcement. DoD is
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enforcement. For example, the Navy currently supp Coast Guard tactical law enforcement detachments, reg larly embarked on board Navy ships in areas where expect to encounter drug smugglers. p
There is a growing feeling in the Congress that should be even more involved in the interdiction etto ■ September 1986, the House of Representatives voted ^ to 177 to approve the Hunter Amendment to the Anti- r Abuse Bill, then under consideration. This amendmc^
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and directed the President to deploy sufficient rrn ^ force, within 30 days of the law’s effective date, t0 the unlawful penetration of United States borders by & craft and vessels carrying narcotics.” However, ^ amendment was later dropped in favor of a Senate am ^ ment that imposes a requirement on the Secretary o fense to provide a detailed plan of all forms of assis a^ to drug enforcement agencies within 90 days. The act signed on 27 October 1986. e
The Defense Authorization Act of 1986, which beca law on 14 November 1986 and therefore represents ^ most recent anti-drug legislation, included an amendn introduced by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) intende change the anti-drug effort in several important ways- amendment required: . e
- The President to submit to Congress a comprehends'^ drug interdiction program (This provision was the spec impetus for Mr. Meese’s 30 May 1987 announcemcn^
- The President to designate lead agencies in each ot
separate areas: marine and air interdiction beyond U- borders; border interdiction efforts; and domestic and eign law enforcement efforts , j
- The plan to provide that lead agencies be consu prior to actions by other agencies in respective ar®ai.£(j responsibility and that any resulting objections be rele
to the NDEPB for resolution f(j
- The President to submit a plan to enhance Coast
interdiction efforts as well as a plan to maximize, extent readiness is not impaired, DoD assistance m interdiction efforts *s
Serious question remains as to whether Mr. Me announcements—even as to the lead agency—are co ent with the letter or intent of this law, especially ^ applies to coordination within each lead agency s areae responsibility and “shared” responsibility for man air interdiction. .
The President’s April 1986 National Security Decis
P nf°rce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable si K,era *aws on ar,d under the high seas and waters ject to the jurisdiction of the United States; shall
lat^^t*Ve anc^ continued efforts by Congress to legis- c e increased DoD involvement in drug interdiction indi- suh h ^row*n§ consensus that the military may be best it 6 t0 Provide the coordination and operational capabil-
DrnhfCeSSar^ t0 ^ave a rea* 'mPact on ^e drug smuggling nec, e,IT1' The NDEPB has yet to adequately address the lish °r 3n *nten^cti°n strategy that includes the estab- nient of an effective military command-and-control e ,aniZat'on’ capable of efficiently directing scarce fed- manpower and equipment assets.
proe C°ast Guard—A Not-So-New Approach: Many vie ^>0nent.s _°f increased involvement by the armed forces marH mar't'rne sur^ace and air drug interdiction as de- lj ln& a command, control, communications, and intel- tance ^ system under the authority of a single mili- my. agency. Ideally, this agency should have broad and'lme °Perational and law enforcement experience, g^l^H^edonal authority to coordinate and focus all fed- The ruS interdiction assets, both military and civilian. enfo °aSt ^uarc^ fits the bill. It is a single federal law C'j rcement agency that has the infrastructure for such a the Systcm’ has the broad maritime experience, and has Requisite jurisdictional authority, the RC (~0ast Guard was born more than 197 years ago, as comhCVenue Gutter Service, for the specific purpose of tj0attlng smuggling. Today, the service has many addi- thorh resF>ons*h>ilities. The Coast Guard has statutory au-
minister laws and promulgate and enforce regula- e°nj* for the promotion of safety . . . shall develop, a hsh, maintain and operate, with due regard to the ^mrements of national defense, aids to maritime navigation, icebreaking facilities, and rescue facilities . . . n shall maintain a state of readiness to function as a Pecialized service in the Navy in time of war.”4
ana r ^roac* charter, which has evolved over many years >ractical reasons, is significant in that it indicates
that the task of coordinating all maritime surface and air interdiction for the federal government for purposes of the war on drug smuggling clearly falls within the Coast Guard’s purview.
Coast Guard in Command—Boarding and Inspection: In response to the Coast Guard’s unique responsibilities, the federal courts have consistently upheld a relaxed application of the Constitution’s 4th Amendment search-and- seizure rule as it applies to this service. This judicially approved authority is extremely relevant in the establishment of command-and-control relationships among law enforcement agencies concerned with drug smuggling. Of all the federal agencies involved, only the Coast Guard has the statutory authority—for purposes of documents and safety inspections—to conduct boardings and inspections of U. S.-flag vessels in any waters, and boardings and inspections of any foreign vessel in U. S. territorial waters, without any suspicion of criminal activity.5
All law enforcement personnel other than Coast Guardsmen are subject to the more stringent probable cause standard under the 4th Amendment. For example, while all Coast Guard officers by statute are “officers of the Customs” in addition to their unique boarding and inspection authority, the reverse is not true. U. S. Customs officers, therefore, operate with much less jurisdictional authority than do Coast Guard officers.
Moreover, Coast Guard personnel can, without abrogating their special boarding and inspection authority, use information from any source as long as they are not acting merely as the agent of another U. S. governmental agency.6 In contrast, courts have ruled that boardings and searches directed by all other federal agencies, including Customs and the Drug Enforcement Administration, and even Coast Guard searches if conducted solely at the behest of another agency, are subject to more stringent constitutional scrutiny.7
In United States v. Guillen-Linares, for example, the Coast Guard boarded and searched a shrimp boat while she was anchored in Tampa Bay. For some period prior to the boarding, Customs had observed the vessel, and concluded that she was involved in drug smuggling. Customs then requested that the Coast Guard maintain surveillance and advise it of any unusual observations. After an uneventful period of observation by the Coast Guard, Customs asked the Coast Guard to board the vessel. The boarding resulted in the discovery of marijuana on board, which led to the conviction of the crew.
This conviction was appealed and overturned by a higher court. During the trial, it became clear that Customs had never informed the Coast Guard of any of the facts underlying its suspicions and that Coast Guard surveillance itself had revealed nothing suspicious. The court
The Coast Guard’s role in maritime drug interdiction has always been clear. It has constitutional authority to back up boarding parties, leading to successful arrests like this one in Florida.
found, therefore, that although the Coast Guard had boarded the vessel, “the individuals in the boarding party acted under the direction of the Customs Service and, in the circumstances of the case, were acting in the capacity of Customs agents rather than Coast Guardsmen.”8 The board and search operation was held to be “unreasonable” under the 4th Amendment, because the boarding party had not observed any activity giving rise to an articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
As this case illustrates, the question of who is in charge of boardings and inspections can be crucial to a successful prosecution. To preclude situations in which the Coast Guard might compromise its broad boarding and inspection authority, it must be in control of all maritime surface drug interdiction operations.
An 11 May memoranda of understanding (MOU) between Coast Guard and Customs, the basis for the recent lead agency announcements, defines the maritime area under the Coast Guard as being “from the shoreline seaward.” The MOU charges the Coast Guard to “coordinate” interdiction activities within the maritime area, but specifically states that lead agency designation “does not connote exclusive responsibility nor command and control of the resources of any other agency.” Thus, the question of who is in charge may again become a significant issue for the courts.
Maritime air interdiction command-and-control requirements are likewise more effectively met by a consolidated command structure. While illegal penetration of U. S. airspace is in itself an extremely difficult and distinct tactical problem, the commonly used maneuver of air-dropping contraband to surface vessels calls for closely coordinated combined air-surface interdiction operations directed by one commander. The E-2C Hawkeye radar platform, now in the inventories of both Customs and the Coast Guard and designed for simultaneous surface and air target tracking at ranges in excess of 200 nautical miles, is fully capable of supporting and coordinating both surface and air command-and-control requirements. It is correct, therefore, that the Coast Guard should be in charge of all maritime law enforcement surveillance operations, especially when the principal surveillance platform is the surface and air search capable E-2C.
The actual situation in the area of maritime air interdiction coordination remains confused. NDEPB stated that lead agency status for air interdiction is to be “shared” by the Coast Guard and Customs. However, the 11 May Customs-Coast Guard MOU designates the Coast Guard as having primary responsibility for “air interdiction detection resources” in the maritime area. Nevertheless, on 3 June 1987, Customs announced a $19.7 million contract with Lockheed-Califomia Corporation for an airborne early warning variant of a P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft. The contract is for the integration of a single APS- 125 (E-2C radar), with delivery in 1988 and options for three more aircraft pending additional funding. According to Customs, the P-3 is preferred because of its ability to conduct drug interdiction patrols deep into the Caribbean. It is clear that Customs perceives a continuing and substantial role in the determination and operation of maritime detection assets, MOUs, and NDEPB decisions to the contrary. Lead agency status may mean less than appears.
The Statutory Case: Another major reason for the C°aS Guard to coordinate maritime surface and air drug inter diction operations is its statutory authority to use and ^ rect, with proper agreement, the personnel and assets other agencies to accomplish its mission. Under t “made to order” authority, the President can direct ^ agencies concerned to implement appropriate support1®? interagency MOUs with the Coast Guard designated as t primary nationwide coordinator. To be effective, MU must define specific operational responsibilities and pr°t0 col for interagency cooperation in rapidly evolving tactic situations. The current MOU between Coast Guard an Customs puts neither agency clearly in charge of air mter diction and provides no mechanism for ensuring °Pera tional cooperation. Instead, it relies on such clauses >
“They will actively support each other, consistent resource and jurisdictional limitations.”
Two Centuries of Experience: Over the years, the C°a Guard has gained significant aviation anti-smuggling e* perience germane to today’s drug interdiction problem- 1934, in order to stop the smuggling of alcohol over U- borders, Secretary of the Treasury consolidated dep^ mental air operations by transferring all of the Custom- Service aircraft to the Coast Guard, and made the Coa Guard responsible for airborne U. S. border surveillance’
Today, a similar consolidation of Customs aircraft.t0 gether with a consolidation of Customs watercraft (aP proximately 165) under the Coast Guard would be in 1 national interest. A recent Treasury study of the Custom^ marine program found that these forces were not used j their potential and that important manning and mom problems were affecting their capability for sustained °P erations. Since Customs Service officers operate their "'a tercraft with much more limited jurisdictional author1; than do Coast Guard officers, there is no inherent adva® tage in supporting the maintenance of a separate surf®c maritime law enforcement capability in Customs.
More Bang for the Buck: There are two additional argu ments for emphasizing the Coast Guard as the logical c°
e[^ator °f the maritime air and surface drug interdiction y Th
Corne statutory transformation of the Coast Guard into a the p')ne^1 Navy in time of war and as directed by
rese^C *“0ast Guard's capacity to train and use part-time addy6 Personnel whenever needed, and at virtually no 1 lonal cost to the government qu,° understand fully the significance of the Coast brieflvSt,reluti0nship t0 DoD’ it is necessary to review Q0ry^ the history of the nation’s coastal defense efforts, as CUrrent defense efforts, and how these efforts offer most8matiC’ cost"effective solution to drug interdiction’s vexing problem: a nationwide C3I system. thro°aftal defense in the United States has evolved Airet* many phases, responding to the nature of the t03 ’ the types of weapons available, the funds available Pop fj)V'de the defense, and the level of concern of the U ace and of the nation’s military and civilian leaders, air C.°ncern shifted from sea invasion or bombardment to rad3 taC^ and tben to missile attack, our defense shifted to C()3r. Warn'n8 networks and fighter intercept aircraft. Wer^ dtdense systems installed during World War II (jej C slowly dismantled or neglected in the 1950s. Coastal on fnSC atroPhied as the Navy placed increasing emphasis orward defense and power projection.
In the early 1980s, the recognition of the weaknesses in our littoral defenses led to a decision to involve the Coast Guard directly. In 1984, the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) concept was born. The Atlantic and Pacific MDZs are commanded by the Coast Guard Atlantic and Pacific Area commanders respectively, and manned by both Coast Guard and Navy personnel. In war, each MDZ commander reports to the appropriate Navy fleet commander- in-chief (CinC). In peacetime, the MDZ commanders report to the Commandant of the Coast Guard and, for planning and exercise purposes, to the fleet CinCs.
Although Coast Guard Area commanders are currently discharging their MDZ planning and exercise responsibilities with existing C3 assets, upgrades of these assets are required to integrate the MDZ C3I systems into the more sophisticated Navy Command Center System. As planned, and if adequately funded, the MDZ command centers will have:
- On-line access to military operational and intelligence information
- The capacity to control and coordinate air and surface operations involving multiple assets assigned from military commands and civilian law enforcement agencies
- The capability to coordinate air and surface drug interdiction efforts with the appropriate federal and local civilian law enforcement agencies
The upgraded C3I capabilities of the Atlantic and Pacific MDZs would be ideally suited to support the nationwide coordination requirements of surface and air drug interdiction efforts. Operating under DoD security procedures, the MDZ Command Center system will have instant access to national intelligence resources, thereby providing the full spectrum of appropriate drug interdic-
tion intelligence support to all law enforcement agencies represented at the MDZ command centers. Co-location of representatives of appropriate law enforcement agencies as liaisons at each MDZ command center could enhance coordinated operations.
The combination of MDZ command center facilities with the Coast Guard’s statutory authority to implement interagency MOUs provides strong pragmatic support for designating the Coast Guard as the primary coordinator for maritime air and surface drug interdiction. Such a designation would permit the federal government to concentrate
drug interdiction C3I funding efforts on MDZ command centers and supporting facilities. The resulting multimission-capable MDZ command centers would be immediately available for the national defense in time of war or crisis.
The reserve issue is another factor in the Coast Guard’s favor. With drug interdiction operations being seasonal in nature, the availability of trained reserve forces enables the Coast Guard cost-effectively to carry out major, time- sensitive, concentrated operations, while maintaining concerted sustained pressure in other areas over longer periods of time.
Moreover, Coast Guard personnel can be and are frequently required to work longer hours than the “9-to-5” workdays characteristic of civilian government agencies. But Customs Service aviation is still essentially a 40-hour- per-week activity. Although Customs’ aviation force manning level was scheduled to approach 400 full-time employees by the end of 1986, Civil Service manning requirements would mandate a force level of 1,500-1,600 personnel in order to maintain an around-the-clock operation, seven days a week. (This calculation is based on Civil Service manning factors which require six people for every position to be filled on a 24-hour, seven-day basis.)
The Coast Guard Reserve’s program stems from a report of the Appropriations Committee of the House Representatives, which stated:
‘ ‘This committee strongly believes a peacetime m^s10^ must be found for the Coast Guard Reserve. . ■ ■ “in the Coast Guard’s numbers are equally applicab e ^ peace and war, Reserve training should be directe support the Coast Guard programs [namely search a rescue, merchant marine and boating safety, aid navigation, icebreaking, port safety, and law ento ment] and thus supplement the regular Coast Gua^ during national emergencies or national disasters.
The training value of interdiction operations to the serves is obvious—an effective interdiction capability vital to coastal and port security in time of crisis an ability to use trained reservists is totally foreign to & civilian government agency. Although the size o Coast Guard Reserve, currently only 12,500 strong, ^ need to increase, the cost is relatively small compare the other alternatives.
How Not to Implement a Unified Approach: The 1°§^ of designating the Coast Guard as the lead agency f°r c ordinating maritime drug interdiction and C3I planning difficult to refute. Nonetheless, political considerably frequently override logic. A case in point concerns recently passed Anti-Drug Abuse Act. During final de erations on the bill, extraordinary efforts were made^ fence funding for air interdiction C3I functions for the e elusive use of Customs, anticipated NDEPB recommey tions to the contrary notwithstanding. This effort was s cessful, and $118.5 million was allocated to the CusdJ Service to establish C3I centers (a minimum of $25 nb is available for air interdiction C3I centers) and to proC aircraft and communications enhancements. ^
Customs Service Air Interdiction Command Centers currently being planned for Miami, Florida, and R1 side, California. At least five additional air interdict1 command centers are reportedly contemplated. The and Los Angeles metropolitan areas already possess M facilities that could well use a portion of that $118-5 ny lion to upgrade interdiction support capabilities. One being considered for the Custom Service’s National C° mand Center is Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; this site s oy distinction is that it is in the home district of one of toms’ principal congressional advocates. . ,g
The ultimate cost of completing the Customs Service air interdiction command-and-control center plan is e, mated to be at least $75,000,000, including the cost ^ construction. The planned system’s capabilities will dup cate many of those available in the upgraded MDZ co mand centers and currently available at the Air Forces tor Operations Control Centers (SOCCs) at Panama Ci y Florida, and Riverside, California. But Customs’s co mand centers will function in isolation, supporting 0 the air drug interdiction mission, incapable of be merged with or used by the military MDZ command ce ter system or SOCCs during peace or war. . .
Like C3I, the interdiction assets have also been subjet
lQu,e va8anes of politics. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of for 1 Pr°Vided nearly $371 million to the Customs Service the *nterdiction enhancements and only $5 million to Cm t °aSt ^uar^ (overall the bill provided $1.1 billion to civil°mS 3nd million to the Coast Guard).10 While tise l3n a2enc'es clearly have responsibilities and exper- ind'ln ^artlcu^ar areas °f drug enforcement, experience ^jljcates that interdiction aircraft and seagoing patrol craft
ttiai ,reCe'Ve °Ptlmum use when one agency operates, ate n 31nS’ and contr°ls those assets; they should not oper- j3s many independent forces. largUSt Us ,tbesc assets should be assigned to support the (jefer national interest as the situation warrants (national sign'd6’ SCarC^ and rescue, etc.), they also should be as- dpu 6 , to tbe agency that can operate them wherever the South feat aX'S ma^ be *ocated in the future (southeast or the MntSt ^order, over land or water). It is not too late for EPB to carefully consider the Coast Guard’s broad otherl° °Perate aircraft in cooperation and support of exagencies as a serious alternative to the creation of toms)SlVe .specialty iaw enforcement forces (e.g., Cus- uJ’,which are dedicated to a single purpose and are 31 ab'e to serve the larger national interest.
*986 “S°"; f>resident should fully implement the agenefense Authorization Act’s definition of lead fCrcn ^ authority and mechanism for resolving agency dif- ^oast'c Although the President’s designation of the interd' UUrd as tbe iead agency for maritime surface drug °ut10tlon is correct, it does not go far enough in spelling of r„n assi8ning command authority in the maritime area
Responsibility.
the p6 Presic*ent should modify current directives to put diction^' *^Uard stluarcly in charge of maritime air interne se t>ecause °f the combined air and surface nature of ajr in^^d thrczit. The continued shared responsibility for tion t rdlctl0J1 in the maritime area is a Solomonlike solu- The P^3- essentially a political problem.
CUstPresident should direct an immediate review of addit'111^ a*r lnterd*ction command center plans before any dttcte'dh3' m°ney *s °hhgated. This review should be con- that the Coast Guard, Customs, and DoD to ensure ar|d a' C ,Concems °f both agencies and DoD’s maritime husil 'r dePense interests are fully considered. Customs is pt0 p ,rnPlementing an air interdiction C3I system without D0[) fvr?0rdination with either Coast Guard (MDZ) or t° tJCCs) command and control systems. According c0tT/. orce testimony before the Senate Permanent Subbed lttee on investigations, these command centers are missf Constructe<J in the wrong locations, have ill-defined S0cc°nfs’ ,anci may be twice the size of the Air Force tion h- aCd’des' hi° formal requirement study or justifica- thougup6^ heen made for the Customs C3I plan. Al- mand f ustoms an£i the Coast Guard will alternate com- everv f° tbe Southeast Air Interdiction Command Center has hr ,° yearS be8innin8 in June 1989, the Coast Guard allv „ a most no say in shaping the center it will eventu- y command.
in the^n nady’tbe President should submit—as called for Defense Authorization Act of 1986—“A comprehensive plan to enhance the capabilities, manpower and equipment of the United States Coast Guard by the end of fiscal year 1989 in order to substantially increase the role of the Coast Guard in drug interdiction and enforcement efforts. Such [a] plan shall specify requirements for command and control between Coast Guard and [DoD] and civilian drug law enforcement agencies.”
As Senator Nunn recently pointed out, “Unlike any other agency, the Coast Guard is the only government body that is both a law enforcement agency in peacetime and an active member of our military team in time of war. Thus, every dollar given to the Coast Guard for drug interdiction or interception doubles as another expenditure for our nation’s defense in time of war. We should consider further increasing the Coast Guard’s [drug interdiction] role in order to guarantee the American people get the biggest bang for the taxpayer’s buck.”11 'National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, National and International Drug Law Enforcement Strategy—Report to Congress, 20 January 1987. (Statistics reflect data evaluated as of 1985.)
2Ibid., p. 21.
The NDEPB was created by the National Narcotics Act of 1984 to improve policy development and coordination among federal agencies. Members include the Attorney General, Directors of CIA and OMB; Secretaries of Defense, HHS. State. Transportation, and Treasury; the Deputy Assistant to the President for Drug Abuse Policy; and the Vice President's Chief of Staff.
4!4 U. S. C. §2.
5United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979).
6United States v. Iglesias-Uranga, 721 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1984) cert, denied 104 S. Ct. 1915 (1984).
7United States v. Guillen-Linares, 643 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1981).
"Ibid., p. 1056.
9Capt. Frank Ault, USN (Ret.), “Closing the Borders to Drugs: Customs or Coast Guard Mission?’’ Armed Forces Journal International, November 1986, p. 50 quoted by RAdm. Alan Breed, USCG, “Sea and Space Missions Multiply,” The Officer, Vol. LX1II, No. 2 (February 1984), p. 98.
"’Capt. Frank Ault, USN (Ret.), “Drug Interdiction—Performance or Politics?,” Armed Forces Journal International, January 1987, p. 42.
"Press Release, Senator Sam Nunn, 30 May 1987.
Admiral Young, a graduate of the University of Michigan (BA 1953, JD 1960), served on active duty from 1953 to 1957; he has been in the Naval Reserve since his release from active duty. A practicing lawyer in Denver, Colorado, since 1960, Admiral Young currently serves in his mobilization billet as Assistant Chief of Staff for Readiness and Tactics, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, as well as Readiness Commander for Naval Reserve Readiness Command Region Eighteen.
Commander Griffes is a graduate of Michigan State University. His active service included tours as a LAMPS pilot with HSL-36 at Mayport, Florida, and as an Assistant Navy Department Duty Captain and Head CNO Operations Briefer in the Navy Command Center at the Pentagon. In the Naval Reserve, Commander Griffes is currently a pilot with Helicopter Attack Squadron (Light) Four at NAS Norfolk, Virginia. In private industry, he is involved in defense procurement and policy issues.
Commander Tomaselli is a 1976 graduate of the University of Rochester, and received his law degree from the College of William and Mary in 1984. He served on board the USS Richard E. Byrd (DDG-23) as the Main Propulsion Assistant from 1976 to 1980, and was then assigned as an Operations Briefing Officer for the CNO and Secretary of the Navy, and Assistant Navy Department Duty Captain in the Navy Command Center (Op-64) from 1980 through 1981. After leaving active duty in 1981, he served in Naval Reserve Navy Command Center 106, and now is assigned as the Selected Reserve Weapons Officer on board the Naval Reserve Force frigate USS Blakely (FF-1072). In his civilian capacity, he is an admiralty lawyer with the firm of Hill, Betts & Nash in New York.