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Pacific nations is greater than U. S. trade with Western Europe.)
However, these considerations must be examined in the context of overall Soviet naval strategic concepts and missions in the Pacific area. Today, the Pacific Fleet boasts about 30% of the Soviet submarine force, major surface warships (frigates and larger), and Soviet Naval Aviation’s aircraft. Some 33% of the navy’s manpower is assigned to the Pacific Fleet. And the Soviet Pacific Fleet has a naval infantry (marine) division, while the three European fleets—Northern (Arctic), Baltic, and Black Sea—have smaller, brigade-size units.
The responsibilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet are considerable. It must be prepared to conduct operations against the People’s Republic of China as well as
Norman Polmar, Editor, Guide to the Soviet
The news media have joined Western ? m*rals and defense officials in report- lng the Soviet naval buildup in the Pa- tl*lc- In fact, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is fe Iargest of the four Soviet fleets and cently has received impressive new warships.
In many respects, the most important sPect of the Soviet naval buildup is that ^ occurs in a period of:
Increased development and industriali- >on of Asian nations, which has made 0se nations highly dependent upon the of the seas
ncreasing U. S. dependence on Japa- Se high-tech components for commer- ^lal and military equipment An overall increase in U. S. trade in Le Pacific region (The volume of trade
the United States and its allies— presumably, some combination of Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and possibly other nations, depending upon the scenario. Also, the Soviet Pacific Fleet’s area of operations includes the entire Pacific region, from the Arctic to the Antarctic, and from the coasts of North and South America to the shores of Asia. In addition, the Pacific Fleet provides most of the ships for the now- continuous naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Ironically, the recently expanded U. S.-built harbor facilities at Cam Ranh Bay are now the Soviet Navy’s home-away-from-home in the Pacific.
The buildup of the Soviet Pacific Fleet was to be expected. Under the aegis of Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, Commander- in-Chief of the Soviet Navy from 1956 to 1985, there had been a massive buildup of Soviet naval capabilities. Initially, the Soviet Union’s three European fleets had priority for advanced surface ships, aircraft, and submarines. Only after these weapons were introduced to European waters were they assigned to the Pacific.
During the 1970s, the Soviet Pacific Fleet began receiving the current generation of first-line units. The highlight of this trend was the transfer of the Minsk, the second of the Kiev-class vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft carriers, to the Pacific in June 1979. The carrier was accompanied by the Ivan Rogov, the Soviet Navy’s largest amphibious ship. Four guided missile cruisers (one Kresta I, one Kresta II, and two Karas) and several lesser surface warships and submarines also joined the Pacific Fleet from 1978 to 1980.
A second Kiev-class carrier, the Novorossiysk, transited to the Pacific Fleet in 1984, followed in 1985 by the nuclear-propelled battle cruiser Frunze, the second ship of the Kirov class. The third of the new Slava-class antiship missile cruisers recently arrived in the Far East.
The principal mission of the Pacific Fleet is to defend the Soviet Far East (Siberian) coast, which is second in length of Soviet maritime borders only to the Arctic coast. The Soviets perceive threats to their Pacific maritime borders from the United States, Japan, and China.
The most serious naval threat to the Soviet Union is the U. S. strategic missile submarine force. In fact, the U. S. Navy’s first eight operational Trident submarines are assigned to the Pacific. Thus, a large portion of the Soviet Pacific Fleet is oriented toward strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW), i.e., operations against the U. S. missile submarines. However, tactical ASW is also important to counter U. S. hunter-killer attack submarines that could similarly threaten Soviet ballistic missile submarines.
The second most important mission of the Soviet Pacific Fleet is to operate strategic missile submarines that can threaten nuclear strikes against the United States, China, and Japan. Of the Soviet Navy’s 62 modem strategic missile submarines, the Pacific Fleet is reported to operate 25: seven Delta Ills, nine Delta Is, and nine Yankee Is. Western intelligence has not revealed the presence of the Delta IV or giant Typhoon nuclear-powered ballistic missile subs in the Pacific Fleet, both types believed to be configured for
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under-ice operations in the Arctic. The Delta classes’ SS-N-18 missiles can strike a large portion of the continental United States while the submarines are in Far East coastal waters.
In addition to these nuclear-propelled Delta and Yankee classes, the Pacific Fleet has seven Golf-class diesel-electric submarines, which can carry the shorter- range SS-N-5 ballistic missiles. Although the total missile load for these seven submarines is 21, the Golfs present a direct nuclear threat to China and Japan.
There are several tertiary missions for the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The navy will undoubtedly be required to provide support to Soviet ground operations, especially should the decision be made to attempt to occupy part of the Japanese home island of Hokkaido, to ensure control of La Perouse (Soya) Strait. Some Western defense planners and analysts freely speak and write of the need for closing the other straits into the Sea of Japan, by mines or other means, to prevent Soviet naval units from entering the Pacific. Such closure, however, would probably not be acceptable to South Korea and Japan, which have extensive merchant shipping and fishing activities in the Sea of Japan. Indeed, while the Soviets wish to egress through the various straits, they may partially mine them and conduct other operations to prevent U. S. (and possibly Japanese) submarines from entering the Sea of Japan.
In wartime, Soviet forces—ground and naval as well as air—could provide assistance to North Korean operations against South Korea and general operations against China. The latter could be from the north or south axis; forces based in Vietnam could move from the south. (In addition to Soviet operations across the long Sino-Soviet border, Soviet military aircraft are now allowed to overfly North Korea on flights between Vladivostok and Vietnam.)
The Soviet Far East coast has several ports vital to Soviet coastal trade and shipping to the European portion of the Soviet Union, through the Arctic route and the Indian Ocean route (either through the Suez Canal or around the southern coast of Africa). Maritime shipping reduces the burden on the severely limited Trans-Siberian Railway. Further, maritime shipping facilitates the economically and politically important Soviet trade with Third World nations of the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean areas. During periods of crisis or limited war, the Soviet Pacific Fleet probably will be required to provide some level of escort for high-priority merchant shipping, both to Soviet ports and key allies.
There is, however, a new series of threats from the Soviet Pacific Fleet to Asian sea lines of communications
(SLOCs). First, Soviet access to the naval and air base complex at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam provides Soviet Naval Aviation with the means for intensive attacks against maritime shipping in the region. In the late 1970s, Soviet naval and air units began using the extensive U. S.-built air and harbor facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. It is now the center of the largest concentration of Soviet naval forces outside of the Soviet Union. There are ship support facilities, a communications center, intelligence collection facility, and a major air base at Cam Ranh Bay.
Naval strike, reconnaissance, and ASW planes now fly from the base, which also has a squadron of protective fighter aircraft. The base puts Tu-l6 Badger and Tu-22M Backfire aircraft within unrefueled striking range of the important Indonesian straits as well as all of Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the southern coast of China.
Reportedly, the Soviets have also begun improvements to naval and air facilities at Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) in Kampuchea (Cambodia), which could further extend their strike capabilities.
Second, Soviet attack submarines could inflict considerable casualties on merchant shipping, especially in the restricted coastal waters of the South China Sea, the Indonesian archipelago, and the other Far East island groups. Shallow, island-populated waters reduce the effectiveness of the long-range, passive sonars of U. S. and Japanese warships, which perform optimally in deep water.
Though the first-line Soviet attack submarines armed with torpedoes and possibly antiship missiles will be employed in the primary missions of the Pacific Fleet, the older units will be available and valuable for antishipping attacks. The large number of diesel-electric submarines in the Pacific will be particularly suitable for this role.
Third, Soviet air, surface, and submarine forces can damage considerably the economies of all Asian nations by means of mining operations.
The Soviet Pacific Fleet will continue to increase in size and improve its capa bility as newer ships and aircraft are added to support the growing Soviet p° litical-economic interests in the Paciii Ocean and Indian Ocean. These weapons will have a war-fighting capability 1 needed, but on a day-to-day basis will e employed for political presence and 10 fluence, as the U. S. Navy has been use for the past 40 years.
Proceedings / July l9ft7