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an Polmar, Editor, The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet
S ^ have the 600-ship Navy,” said recre‘ary of the Navy John F. Lehman rentTl^ was expJain*ng how the cur- Und ^ ^Cet P*us lh°se ships already Drr.er, cons,ructi°n or authorized would Co1 ® *he 600-ship fleet that has be- i„t f. lhe hallmark of the Reagan Admin- g '°n’s defense buildup, abo T Scr'ous Ouestions are being raised heel* nat'on s ability to maintain a sataat size. (By comparison, using the gan AH°Unt*ng mcthods, when the Rea- had ,^ni'n'stration took office, the Navy fore Me S^'PS—*ess than at any time be- t,e e °rld War II.) The factors that can (l)eexPected to reduce Navy spending in the nCUr *uture include: the enactment of |e i ‘^''Called Gramm-Rudman-Hollings tionaf1'00’ 'ntenc*eci to reduce the na- the "i- t*e^'c'ti the general concern over jyear8e deficit; the possibility of the Nov °Crats taking control of the Senate in nee .eniber—°nly a gain of four seats is other comPetition for dollars from Stra,r tc*ense programs (especially the in« e®lc Defense Initiative); the increas- and *Tredibility of some defense critics; bg lc c°st-cutting environment that can den?X?ected t0 precede the 1988 presid'd election.
pro 6 *'sca* year 1987 defense budget as total ^ 'he Reagan Administration the S • ® billion—up $34 billion from Passed V'°US year' The House and Senate °f $7cr>d comPromise budget in late June cut' ubillion for defense—almost a 9% pro '0 l le Reagan proposal. Several Navy cwfCts are Prime candidates should such tilt. °CCUr’. especially the MV-22 Osprey aircraft and advanced procure- or the SSN-21 attack submarine. Corr)n ortunately, the 600-ship goal is a tvhafr°m*Se • between requirements and lip ,ls considered obtainable from a po- » '.economic viewpoint. Another f]e P lcat'ng factor is the need to build a as f °r Peacetime commitments as well bec°r Wur*'8hting. In peacetime, mainly ause of crew considerations, the Navy
Proceedings / August 1986
keeps ships deployed in forward areas on a one-in-three cycle. Adding transit times and other exercises and training, ships are at sea in peacetime about one-half of the time.
Thus, the Navy’s war plan requirements—considering the minimum numbers of ships necessary to provide success over the Soviets at sea—are generally divided in three for the peacetime deployments. The following are thumb-nail overviews of how the current goals are derived.
Aircraft Carriers: In wartime, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean would require three or four carriers to meet NATO commitments (along with one battleship group); Second Fleet operations in the Atlantic would require four or five carriers (and one battleship); Third Fleet operations in the Pacific would need two carriers; and the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific would employ five carriers (and two battleships), with two of those carriers probably operating in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region.
In aggregate, these war plans call for 14-16 carriers, hence, the current force goal of 15 carriers with a normal "peacetime” deployment of five ships in forward areas. The Navy now has in service seven conventional carriers (CVs) and four nuclear-powered carriers (CVNs) of postwar construction, plus two older, Midway (CV-41)-class ships. One other CV is in the long-term service life extension program (SLEP).
Three nuclear-propelled Nimitz (CVN- 68)-class ships are under construction. When the last is completed in 1992, the Navy should have 14 first-line carriers in service, plus one ship in SLEP. By that time, the two Midways (completed in 1945 and 1947) would be relegated to training duties or retired. But the number of carriers could well be smaller: for ex-
Threatening the goal to maintain a 600-ship Navy are the decommissionings in the 1990s of Knox-class frigates and Permit-c\ass subs.
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ample, there is some question of whether the Enterprise (CVN-68), completed in 1961, can be extended beyond some 30 years of service life because of the cost of rehabilitating her eight outdated A2W reactors. More significant are the threatened budget reductions, which some observers believe could cut the size of the carrier force to only seven or eight fully operational ships.
A larger question looming on the horizon is the need to begin replacing the carriers completed from 1955 onward, initially at the rate of one per year. Decisions on the replacement of these ships must be made in the early 1990s, if not before.
Battleships: Navy planning provides for the four Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships to form the core of four surface action groups. These were the last of the ten U. S. battleships built during World War II; the six others, all mothballed after the war, have since been scrapped, as were two unfinished /own-class hulls.
Three of the Iowas have been modernized and recommissioned, and the fourth is now being modernized.
Cruisers and Destroyers: The Navy’s cruiser-destroyer force goal is based on the escort requirements for the carriers (90 ships), battleships (16), amphibious forces (14), military convoys (seven), and underway replenishment groups (ten)—for a total of 137 cruisers and destroyers.
Currently, the Navy has only 99 cruisers and destroyers (of which nine are nu- clear-propelled) with another 12 Aegis Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers under construction. The Navy plans to construct 29 of the new Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers by the mid- 1990s. These ships are being criticized because of their limited antisubmarine warfare capability and relatively high cost. Even if all 29 Arleigh Burke destroyers and the planned 27 Aegis cruisers are built, by the mid-1990s, three of the older nuclear cruisers will probably have been retired as well as at least ten overage destroyers. If more ships reaching 30 years of service are retired, there could be a severe shortfall of cruisers and destroyers.
Also, the availability of vertical-launch systems (VLSs) and the Tomahawk land- attack cruise missile in cruisers and destroyers should lead to a reevaluation of requirements for these ships.
Frigates: Frigate goals are also based on escort requirements. A total of 101 are needed under current plans. When the construction of Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class ships is completed in 1988, the Navy will have 114 first-line
frigates. While this number exceeds the goals, in part because of political decisions to continue production at certain shipyards, there will be a precipitous drop beginning in the mid-1990s because of the large numbers of these ships built in the 1960s. Preliminary design efforts for a new frigate were halted by the Navy in May 1986 because design options up to 9,200 tons were being put forward— larger than the Arleigh Burkes.
Mine Warfare Ships: The Navy has two mine warfare ship programs under way—17 minesweeper/hunters of the Cardinal (MSH-1) class and 14 mine countermeasures ships of the Avenger (MCM-1) class are planned. The first units of both classes are under construction and are encountering massive technical problems. At this time, it seems unlikely that either program will—or should—be completed as planned.
Rather, the Navy will be forced to continue to rely on minesweeping helicopters, outdated-ocean minesweepers of the Korean War era, and the small Naval Reserve craft of opportunity program (COOP). In the opinion of analysts in and out of the Navy, these forces will be unable to cope with a major Soviet mine warfare campaign. But it is still too early to propose alternatives.
Other Surface Ships: Far less controversial are the Navy’s amphibious and auxiliary ship programs. In the amphibious category, the LHD, LSD, and planned LPD programs will probably be continued, in part because of strong congressional support for the Marine Corps, the principal user of these ships.
Some auxiliary ships are being cut from the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan. Auxiliaries are often delayed for budgetary reasons; still, they are important and more must be built to support the Navy’s long-range operations.
Strategic Missile Ships: The Navy’s 600-ship program includes tentative planning for 20 Ohio (SSBN-726)-class Trident submarines plus four tenders and two missile cargo ships. There are now 36 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in service, of which seven are Ohio-class boats.
Of the remaining 29 submarines, which were built in the 1960s, 17 have Poseidon missiles and will undoubtedly be retired by the mid-1990s. The 12 that have been rearmed with Trident C-4 missiles most likely will also be decommissioned, but their fate will depend on arms control agreements and the attitude of the national leadership. Twenty or fewer Trident SSBNs could be in service in the late 1990s. While they would carry 480 missiles and several times that number of
warheads, the force would present a ve0' small “target array” to Soviet antisu marine forces. _.
The construction of more than one o dent SSBN per year seems unlikely at t 1S time. .
Attack Submarines: The Navy’s attacK submarine (SSN) force is being increase from the 1970s goal of 90 boats to boats. Construction of the Los Angce (SSN-688) class continues with the lar§e Seawolf (project SSN-21) in design an development. The 90-boat goal wa never attained in the 1970s and the ^
boat level is in serious question becans of probable future building rates an relatively high costs predicted for SSN-21. f
The Navy now has 97 SSNs, but those, one is a research craft, two transports for SEALs (sea, air, a forces) and other special forces, and ni others (built before 1961) have very 1 . ited capabilities. This leaves the Na with 85 first-line attack submarine While four Los Angeles SSNs are n being built per year, it is unlikely that rate can be continued into the 1" ’
when the SSN-21 is in production, that time, a number of first-line su m fines will reach the end of their expec ^ 30-year service lives. (There are also diesel attack submarines in serV1 , ’ which will also be retired in the ea 1990s; the Navy’s submarine leaders ^ has opposed a follow-on class of t e highly effective craft.) ^
Accordingly, a hard look mus taken at both the strategic missile an ^ tack submarine categories in view o potential decline in force levels at a • when both types of undersea craft are creasing in importance. , r.
Under the astute and outspoken lea ^ ship of Secretary Lehman, the •
Navy has put forth a comprehensive rn^ itime strategy and a related goal 0 ^ first-line ships. While some would ar^ with specific components of both strategy and the ships that Lehman see it is a coherent and long-term plan ’ ' j one that Congress has long deman from the Navy and the other services, for numerous reasons, the future o 600-ship Navy is in doubt; this situa occurs in the wake of events in se^e areas of the world—Grenada, the Ac 1 Lauro hijacking, the Libyan strikes, other operations—which have dem _ strated clearly that the Navy is vita U. S. political and military policies “peacetime” as well as in war.
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Proceedings / August
1986