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Comment and Discussion
Captain Smith also fails to spe ^di' on the organization of 0f th
ane and the possible relation*'1 ^ 0otli
Line anu me pussiuiu . nc6* u
organization to a loss of ®°n^,.trUcturin-
Navy medicine ran itself- ^^cal h*ef
archy, and only senior phys*cia^e(jjCjitf' stood the complexities of Navy ^ k
Th*. r*nlv e'hQnaf.Q since 19 ~ 0C*
Contents:
April Supplement
Time to Put the Cats Out
1986 Naval and Maritime Prize Photography
Are We Losing Confidence in Navy Medicine?
West European and NATO Navies The Coast Guard’s Trident Sailor Talk
The Maritime Strategy
Soviet Subs in Scandinavia: 1930 to 1945
The Hidden Career
Why Don’t Aviators Write?
Telling It Like It Isn’t January Ad START & the Navy Sealab: Unfinished Legacy Rebuilding Canada’s Navy Turn On the Lights
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
April Supplement
(See Supplement April 1986; W. A. Moffett, p. 90, June 1986 Proceedings)
“Time to Put the Cats Out”
(See J. P. Antal, pp. 90-91, April 1986 Proceedings Supplement)
1986 Naval and Maritime Prize Photography
(,See pp. 57-69, April 1986 Proceedings)
M. D. Kirschbaum—I applaud your inclusion of an excellent article by an enlisted man.
As an enlisted aircrew veteran who has made a civilian living by the pen, I can appreciate the fact that the bulk of the Navy’s journalistic talent is composed of commissioned officers. But when an exception to the rule can shine as brightly as Petty Officer Jeffrey P. Antal, he should be given a chance to do so.
Also, the winning photo contest entries were among the best I’ve ever seen.
“Are We Losing Confidence in
Navy Medicine?”
(See A. M. Smith, pp. 120-131, May 1986
Proceedings)
Lieutenant John P. Brown, Jr., Medical Service Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve— Captain Smith’s article displays symptoms of the pervasive illness that is eroding confidence in Navy medicine: awareness of serious problems without corrective action, commitment, leadership, or accountability. The article avoids some of the controversial issues facing Navy medicine, while expounding only on the managerial complexity of the other issues. Captain Smith accurately summarizes many of these issues, but does not make any noteworthy constructive suggestions for change. No mention is made of what will happen if confidence is not restored, and Captain Smith does not convince me that things eventually will get better.
Captain Smith does not thoroughly question the overall role of physicians in the Navy. Noticeably absent is the question of whether physicians should dominate the leadership structure of Navy medicine. Is declining confidence caused tions without requisite leaders ^ .(^ ties or managerial skills? Or’ c0. -strator that for every physician-a bje to there is one less physician av ^p(ajn provide needed medical care • a(jjuSt-
Smith gives little consideration ^an.
ing physician roles to supportcon- sion, rather than the curtailmen >
tributions by non-physician reasing
providers in the Navy. Wou 1 , sUper- the number of properly trained a praC- vised physician’s assistants or n ^ aVajl- outpatient health care? Past con ^ entire Navy medicine was earned Y of ^atd health care team—from the ie -aijst^ corpsman up to the physician SPC ^j|j re- and rebuilding that confide**® ^ ^ al- quire that all members of the .^on5- lowed to maximize their can j mud1 time before and after the 1982 r^t|jcal pr°" fessionals answered to the m®d _ undef nave uuui a ouiiuuj “— . i rom1-' I
sonnel to the Naval Medica _raptiica (NavMedCom) and the & (jVe commands, increased adm***1 . c0nt*0
perwork demands, and t'-'lt'jieSpons*'l| by the medical bureaucracy- ness to the needs of local l'ne0lnfli'ltlf ers and the rest of the military ^v0f o
has, if anything, decreased * greater NavMedCom contro • vv<*u Confidence in Navy rne 10t *1 be boosted more quickly d 11 pat*el\ medical professionals tnlateeaC|i o*^-’ instead of shuffling papers for ® vVt»re d and if far more medical lea e ^ajn 1 rectly accountable to the Na c°c, command at the local level fidence is won or lost. countability to line comm " cetv also generate greater c°n j for c°njiy medical assets are as prepare ^ ^ th - gencies as the operating f°rC support. B1 1
Without naming Conl,mfLulty °Lei Captain Smith notes the di LirlqliabI plaining how an apparently
. < / jh?
Proceed'11®
J
of*ne_diiSd
The only changes since have been a serious drain
I
s
’ ln Conducting anti-competition ma- Caretir^,.:1yecteh at non-physician health
eXclusivV*der^’ an<^ in fostering an almost
Pair,
sub h many hospitals; the increas- - . Ord'nation of physician prefer-
es to
^^ds- Or8anizational and community ^r°uudsvyC^aS*n® accountability; and a tjun, Wb j interest in health promoSs D1 e health maintenance organiza- Sld satel! -erate and civilian hospitals health nr *te chnics and actively market h’ayy ^ ^atotion services, the leaders of Paralle, 'c'ne appear intent on avoiding In ^ changes.
h'^vy , active-duty experience at four ^ttber ^Plta*s’ I encountered a large
SlQi
, h'lo g0„jC1Sm f°r the good doctors, e ves Sl administrators find them- j.J'he tim°Unde^ hy sycophants, n'^feritiaf !! W'h takc for the Navy to fe health between excellent and medicare providers and obtain re-
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Navy0*311 Was *lired and then protected by but ilen||'h'cine for almost two years— posjibi oes not delve very deeply into cians 6 exP*anat>°ns, such as: physi- ers n|)rotecting their peers; medical lead- theiramta'n'n8 good appearances for bureaucWrL,adVancements in the medical patiemCfacy; or increasing insensitivity to fectivj neec^s' Such issues must be ef- tJfality ^ ac^ressed if Navy medicine’s than an assurance is to be anything more PaPerw CXPer'ence> personnel-consuming quaiit 0rx exercise. Navy medicine’s ate asassurance program must not oper- dissije* SUb>terbu8c t0 identify internal screen ,S’. while providing a smoke- Practi(,„ ehind which other Billigs can Captsuhstandard medicine.
•ary ma'n ^tnith also points out that mili- deVei0p *C'ne 's strongly influenced by Navy ^nicnts 'n civilian health care. ^aviiy'f6^'0'116 has indeed borrowed Ptoniotj r°m tbe civiiian sector—e.g., in cians; i^® tbe special status of physi
"euvers rath de^n'ti°n of health care as reNaVy ^ er than prevention. Now the 't^latey 'Ca* bureaucracy would like to Cents'SC^ from current civilian devel- XUrvival ’KSUc*1 as; the intense struggle for ing ” enci 'tals inoutstanding medical profes- sPeciaitj 3 * chnical and administrative lnCQniPete’ aS Wel1 as some bumbling officers a ”fs' * encountered some superb CXarnples0 *ea<ders—and some pathetic nately j ® 'he Peter Principle. Unfortu- aut°rnatic navy medicine, bad physicians PaV, ancja y 8et the same promotions, ^s,andStatus eafned by good physi- earn (batn°n'Physician officers quickly j^d^al tk UncIUestioned loyalty to the '"Portam ,ain °h command is far more duality Se0 'heir careers than providing < fesul,VlCes to health care consumers. trvt(l are excessive work and unde-
July 1986
sponsive and cost-effective health care may cost more than the national economy can afford and take longer than the international military situation allows. Delays could result in an excessively expensive medical establishment contributing little to the health and retention of military manpower during peacetime, and which will become part of an unprecedented national disaster during wartime.
“West European and NATO Navies”
(See N. Friedman, pp. 36-48, March 1986 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral J. J. Leeflang, Royal Netherlands Navy—Mr. Friedman’s most interesting and detailed contribution correctly mentions a planned reduction of surface ships, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) for the Royal Netherlands Navy.
However, after a review of our navy’s budget, triggered partially by strong recommendations from NATO to reconsider the intended reduction, it was decided recently that the total of 22 frigates and destroyers will be maintained as originally planned—with 18 of them operational and the other four only partially manned and used for training. These four, however, will be ready for operations on a very short notice.
Conventional submarine strength is still under discussion. Two options exist: four Walrus-class submarines and two other submarines of a smaller type; or five Walrus-class submarines.
Finally, all 13 MPAs are operational and deployed often, some from a base in Iceland.
“The Coast Guard’s Trident”
(See B. B. Stubbs, pp. 50-55, June 1986 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John R. McEl- wain, U. S. Coast Guard—As a Coast Guard officer who periodically describes his service to members of the public, I find that one of the most frequently asked questions is, “Are you folks really military?” I usually bristle and launch into a diatribe on how we are the smallest armed force and how we’ve participated in almost every armed conflict in which our nation has been involved.
The standard reply is “Gee . . . then what about those armed forces commercials on TV every night?”
I got to thinking about those omnipresent commercials—“Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines . . .We’re your country
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. . . The Armed Forces!”
What about the Coast Guard? Why aren’t we included? The uniform with the sword that I’ve been wearing for the last 15 years sure looks military. Our red, white, and black ships look military. Our haircuts, boot camp, academy, salutes,
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Uniform Code of Military Justice, and rules and regulations all seem military, too!
In digging for a reasonable explanation, I found a copy of Title 14, United States Code—the law of the land. Sure enough, on 4 August 1949, Public Law No. 207 was enacted, defining the U. S. Coast Guard as a branch of the armed forces of the United States. We were part of the Treasury Department then, and I’m sure our switch to the Department of Transportation in 1967 didn’t affect our status as an armed force. Title 14 has been revised very little over the years, so I concluded that the Coast Guard was still a member of the armed forces.
Then what about those commercials? Well, the way it was explained to me was that a “board,” comprised of all the services, chipped in a certain amount of money to create the commercials and buy air time (prime time, to boot!) for them. And, as the story goes, the Coast Guard couldn’t afford to chip in its share, so it wasn’t included.
I guess that’s fair. Everyone knows that if you can’t afford to cough up the ante, you can’t sit in the game.
Occasionally, you can see a Coast Guard public service announcement after a late movie and right before the test pattern at the end of a programming day. Or, if there is a programming manager whose brother happens to be in the Coast Guard, such an ad may air during prime time. But for the most part, the television medium is devoid of messages relating the good things that the Coast Guard does.
I can’t help being irked, though, by the demonstrable impact of the incorrect message broadcast to the public by the commercials that say “Armed Forces” without including the Coast Guard. It is an affront to the 39,000 men and women who comprise the Coast Guard and could potentially find (or have already found) themselves standing in harm’s way because they are an armed force.
I guess I have to accept the stark reality: The Coast Guard has always been a poor relation to the other services. And, after all, we’re not really hurting in the area of recruiting.
The impact is felt, however, when it comes to public perception of the Coast Guard, which in turn impacts on our support lobbies throughout the country and on Capitol Hill. In many circles, we are largely unknown. If we are known by name, what we do is not clearly understood. The commercials imply that we no longer have a role in our nation’s defense, and the public believes this.
The television ads in question here are not the cause of all our problems. The
r0mpieX
problems exist because we are organization; we are not easi y c0„. But the ads have added to an a re fused public perception that need. Why make matters worseads ing the Department of Defense; ( d a„
to continue their damage? Why error easily fixed remain ul"ix^ffending
Couldn’t the DoD drop the ° „ jn
references to the “Armed ^ ° say, their commercials? Couldn t ^at a “The Department of Defense, ^u()try great place to start,” or ,, 0a„yotbef needs you for its defense, or accurate slogan?
The Coast Guard role as a ytfe force is a tradition it proudly U_P v0jved i® are now even more deeply m. atj0n in defense issues through P3^10 Les ^ Maritime Defense Zone aCtleanW^ constant readiness training by r jcno"' reserve forces. The public nee the facts. ur irriage
Somehow, we must renew the
as a military service. Dnforta0„ big image-renewal business func 1 joesh1
bucks, which the Coast Gu q^o
have. But everybody in the re)ati°n* can do his or her bit for Pu^' t orn0t by rejecting attempts (inadve statufe
to diminish our national tfni tradi'ion'
and erode almost 200 years
Sailor Talk
Lieutenant Commander hli * ^ year5
U. S. Coast Guard—A coup jq. Leh', ago, Secretary of the Navy J° ^ jaCk 0
man decided that there wa r»aucratese] “sailor talk” in the Navy- Butra£jiti°('a. he declared, had overtaken nautical terminology, an_i;cted P,n.
he declared, had overtaken nautical terminology, aI],existed going to be an end to that. , ing Facilities” once again ” 8°.
___o____ ’ once again
“Mess Halls” or “Mess ‘Unaccompanied Officer
pers1
and
;onfle
iW
‘ ‘ Unaccompanied L/iuy~- r kn° ■
Housing’ ’ would resume its QUaderS. title, BOQ (Bachelor °fflC®e bad Mr. Lehman, I’ve got som ^ _
for you: Your decree isn t j an1 I think your plan is tern1* and b* raditionalist who enjoys us‘ ses. ^ -
ni» lr,nir_ctanrlino nalltical P
[eif
AlVApVl 1 111 HI IMlll - itttf
;trates professionalism, an n)un>^ L l,- to comn ,ef
Tand,^:
I
____ r________
tantly, it enables seamen to c°nunde
'iflr
ing long-standing nautical p er0ploy are very good reasons r°r den1® f proper nautical terminology^^ jrflP^
y, it enables seamen <. ly un , ... precise, succinct, and a<^
stood manner. There is a° n-ft •
in a
JU lllclllIlCI. 1 llvlv # , jg
the location of an item whic jgser' something else. An item tha as being “behind” sonieth‘^nding ,( is of uncertain location r fo^. whether the speaker is facl ^ aft, or athwartships. Thus
,vef’
rd.
Editor’s Note; This is the solution to the “puzzle” we published in last month s professional notes section. Figure 1 had lots of arrows, but no type to justify their presence.
/jut'1
return to the good and proper practice of seamanlike communication would encourage correct communication, show respect for the traditions of the sea, and make the Navy a more seamanlike (instead of bureaucratic) organization.
I regret to report that my observations reveal a lack of use (and apparently understanding) of “sailor talk” among sailors from the lowest enlisted ranks to the highest admirals.
I’ve watched the effects of the Lehman decree over the last two-and-a-half years while I spent time with Navy personnel, first at the Naval War College and then in a joint command headed by a Navy rear admiral. Here’s some of what I’ve seen and heard.
I heard a Navy captain refer to the space on board a vessel in which meals are prepared as a “kitchen.” I guess galleys can only be those big, multi-tiered ships of the ancients propelled by slave- powered oars. This same officer, while on board another vessel, stated that one of his acquaintances had “gone downstairs.” I took this to mean the same as if the person had gone below.
On another Navy ship, I asked the officer of the deck (a lieutenant wearing surface warfare officer insignia) what his vessel’s beam was. He gave me an inquisitive look and said, “Beam? Do you mean how wide is it?” He knew neither the beam nor the width.
I later looked at a list of ship’s characteristics on board this vessel and found the length, draft, tonnage, and. so forth
and, to my chagrin, also found a dimension listed for the “maximum width.” No wonder the deck officer didn’t know what the beam was; apparently whoever wrote the characteristic table didn’t know either.
While on board the same ship, nature called, and I asked an ensign where I might find a head. The same inquisitive look I had gotten earlier from the lieutenant I now got from the ensign who said, “Head? Oh, you mean the bathroom.” Later that same day I heard a boatswain’s mate (Yes, a boatswain’s mate; a member of a group that I thought was the last bastion of salty talk) tell a seaman to “put the loop of that rope over the post.” I guess eyes are found only in people, lines are drawn only with pencils, and bitts are found only in horses’ mouths.
I cannot claim, however, that my own service fares much better. Although the Secretary of Transportation, Elizabeth Dole, has not yet issued an edict on sailor talk, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral James S. Gracey, has, at least, encouraged it.
Consequently, the official Coast Guard publication The Commandant's Bulletin, now has its captions for front and back cover photographs listed under the headings “Up Forward” and “Back Aft.” Now, while I believe in using seaman’s language in a seaman’s environment and am, in fact, incensed by its absence, I get nearly as upset when sailoring terms are used in a non-sailoring situation. Front cover and back cover are adequate de-
scriptions; why waste good words in a description ot a ^ 0s The Commandant’s Bulletin o ^ miserably in its efforts to be sa f magazine has described sea-gomg jng more than 500 feet long and more than 20,000 tons as “boatS' geS jf read repeatedly in those *a®e PyS here a I boats “tipping over. | a jjsted lieved that boats either heele until they became inverted, point they had capsized. nmewhat So what? Why use all these so obscure terms? What do we try _s jj,at when using sailor talk? The ansvve ^ ^ seaman’s terms serve the PuJ,°ctj0ns on curately describing things an a 1 and about vessels with no am 1
I race sailboats as a pastime- ^e_ tell someone (a reasonably n fair- able sailor) that “the spinnaker gen0a lead is located directly aft ° s0n
sheet turning block,” the r what ^ knows exactly where to look wj,at • wants. Joe Landlubber has no t ^jors, said, but who cares? We, and
communicate quickly and c that is what language is all a ^ #ith So, Mr. Lehman, good luc • j [air you in your fight to restore naa rea* guage to the Navy, but yoU challenge. I hope you Preval0 spBce In the meantime I believe the mainbrace. --
The Maritime Strategy ^ Ha
(iSee Supplement January P roHin5, ^ pp. 26-28, February 1986; J- M- ,, yW o0 22, March 1986; R. N. Griffin. V- a’ gj'*9' 1986; R. S. Hibbs and W. Pendley.
June 1986 Proceedings)
“Soviet Subs in Scandinav‘a’
1930 to 1945” i986
(See R. C. Suggs, pp. 100-1°6’
Proceedings) .
Captain D. M. Ulmer, U, c0nla'n* tired)—The maritime stra!f%ubmar,n little accommodation for 1 e . ( tin'0’’' warfare capability of the b°, c)cofsUv Perhaps this is because of the man-. marine warfare as a factor i c0[)CjuCt6 U. S. naval combat operation .^tp6 over the past 40 years. The ex haVe 0 formance of naval aircraft a"ar
scured the maritime strateg* iautc. ness of the vulnerability 0 platform. The antisubmarine ^ threat to the maritime strate S°v,e
dismissed by the theory tha r 0f all Pr will not perform in the mann aI1,paiSlY vious successful submarine (0 ch
i.e., that they will not come ^ c0rnrl1 lenge control of the sea lines
,1#
Proceedin8s
present L —
'hen U c the 'C’ov'ut strategic reserve, 'eat b carr'er battle groups pose no cess t0 fuaUSe they have no tactical ac-
thei
ch r™, anu tow radiated Submarinara<itCr*St’cs op emergent threat ^hrtiaring^ 3Sses c*ear'y show that these
°c<*d
lio8s /
c,lsr *^LOCs). The maritime strategy their rheSoviets —in order to protect hind •rategic reserves—to huddle be- reachlmaS>nary lines in the northern oceans °' t^le Atlantic and Pacific
esis |1fL'r^Uest'ons fall out of this hypoth- rines ] (Thoon- ar>d Delta-class subma- rePrescm undcr the Arctic canopy
thn
CSs to tl'. } uavc no lavucui ae-
Soviet £Se tar8cls- Why, then, would SuhmarinUC*ear"h)owere^ guided missile and en,,n^S not tnove out into the oceans fore the^6 carr‘er battle groups be- lhe nr,„rV reach positions threatening to
den a 0t the land battle7 A1‘ r strea ence °n the SLOCs to support clear e®T *s quite obvious. It is not
their . Soviets would not deploy $lOcsrnarjr|e resources to interdict the this tactic*1 t'6w tbe b'stor'c success of P°sitionC f 6 PurP°se served by the dis- V^oviet, resources—as pre- readilvI toe maritime strategy—is not diving jPParent- The long range, deep n°ise sPeed, and low radiated ‘ions jn l°s are not designed for opera- !n forwar'i*116 Waters—but rather for use hdike, 3: areas. Ships of the Oscar, Masses th^f’ y*ctor III, and Charlie II ?e endurUl 1 C’rca hT74 and later) have ')rrn effC(d.nCe and striking power to per- htis ittclu i'Ve*^ *n aPtbe world’s oceans, ‘‘djacent t C? l'lc target-rich environment ev'en allic? S. coastal waters, where 'V°uld nm Pontr°l °f both surface and air . As Mr°l^ a deterrent. aave only . ° -ns Points °ut, the Soviets Maritime ,° s’rdc 15 ships to defeat the Suhrnarinerate§y- There are 130 Soviet ^'ssion aCaPable of performing that S|dering’ tu Sl|bstantial figure when con- il^0 'vorld £ subrnarinc achievements of he rnari|i.,yars' Successful enactment of Cfnceived 6 Strate8y, as it is currently n lhe und'e Wl** reclu'rc absolute control
- y °f anv r°Cean’ hardly a true capabil-
- n'ted Stat^u 31 lh’s point. Although the nd destroCS *'as tbe capability of finding
an ld indeed S°me of these shiPs’ “
■ °r even he a m'stake to believe that lyCePteri °St tbem could actually be . ^r- Su ,
tnbtllarine8f S article shows that Soviet
as ®0 vvhere°ti!lrnanders are not reluctant a|S|Jrned tu e ,argets are. It cannot be o,0r,e drovp Proximity to Mother Russia
^nient site^ eCt'°n tbe‘r Past en‘
predilection of the 6 b|0„S !1t0 Perniit a foe to strike
• The absence of an altema- K
J“ly 1986
tive provision to counter massive Soviet submarine deployment prior to hostilities is a serious deficiency in the maritime strategy.
“The Hidden Career”
(See W. Malone, p. 25, May 1986 Proceedings)
Captain John N. Brown, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—One way to get the real word on the Navy to the high schools and the local libraries is through a gift subscription of the Proceedings. I provide such subscriptions, and they are much appreciated. I also give my current issues of the Proceedings to the local boys and girls clubs, where they get a gieat deal of use.
“Why Don’t Aviators Write?”
(See R. H. Purnell, p. 130, January 1986 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Charles Timon, Jr., U. S. Navy—Where has the quality control in your editorial department gone? Who is responsible for Commander Purnell’s article finding its way into print? While his sea stories were exciting and made me long to be back on sea duty, the article missed its mark by a long shot. One thing I’ve learned during my short tenure on this earth is that if you ask the wrong questions, you get the wrong answers. A more appropriate question would be, “Why aren’t naval aviators motivated to write?”
Commander Purnell would have us believe that aviators are afraid to write for fear of being ostracized by their peers. He also tries to sell us on the idea that aviators, who rely heavily on radio communication daily in their jobs, can no longer piece together more than a few words at a time. I assume he is referring to phrases like, “Roger, out,” and “Roger, ball.” This is ludicrous. He makes aviators, who are naval officers and college graduates, sound like functional illiterates who obtained their college degrees by mailing in cereal box tops.
If an officer cannot express himself in written form, or if he doesn't feel comfortable writing, then maybe it’s an indictment of our educational system, e.g., athletes who play college sports but can neither read nor write. Scientists tell us that human beings tend to behave in ways that give them pleasure and avoid behav-
(Continued on page 78)
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Comment and Discussion
(Continued from page 27)
who obtain pleasure by wa 0 Mar' world of criticism, I enj°^ef had been coni/Rockwell ad. If that pt10s. jus1 made up of actual s*gj
the
■raphe0 ’ sev-
autog1
would have been to send an a ^ copy home: “Look, Morm ^ sjxtee'
nth
“START & the Navy” [9g6.
(See J. L. George, pp. 30-38.
R. F. Urso, p. 18, June 1986 Proce f
Lieutenant Commander ^ GeOr-C Bouchard, U. S. Navy—' cr0Cial makes a superb analysis ot anegot'a
ior that results in pain. They also say that we must be properly “motivated” to function this way.
I submit that naval aviators, and naval officers in general, don’t write because they are not properly motivated to do so. One does not just sit down, pencil in hand, and say, “Today, I think I’ll write.” Artists don’t paint and musicians don’t compose unless they are motivated to do so. I also suggest that the Navy is largely responsible for a general deterioration of officer writing ability. Naval officers are not encouraged to develop their writing skills, nor are they provided adequate opportunity to do so.
How can the Navy cultivate writing skills in its young officers? It can start by having senior officers set an example for their subordinates to follow. This does not happen often enough now because the senior officers themselves are victims of the very same system—mediocrity breeds mediocrity. Also, writing in the Navy mostly involves writing instructions, enlisted evaluations, and fitness reports. I do not consider these to be challenging writing projects. Even offering money for written work—though a potent incentive—may still not be enough to motivate officers to write. However, the continued appearance of scholarly, stimulating, thought-provoking articles by serving professionals in publications like Proceedings may prove to be the spur required to get the horse moving.
“Telling It Like It Isn’t”
(See W. V. Kennedy, pp. 44-53, April 1986;
T. M. Daly and C. D. Howell, pp. 14-20, May 1986; J. C. Ramsay and P. Braestrup, pp. 1822, June 1986 Proceedings)
Hanson W. Baldwin—In reference to Colonel Kennedy’s article:
- I had no safe in my office at the Times or elsewhere, and my—mostly unlocked—filing cabinets never contained a mass of secret documents.
- I retired from the Times in 1968 at age 65, not in 1970.
- Where Colonel Kennedy refers to “Ochs” on p. 49, I believe he means General Adler.
- I made two long visits to Vietnam in 1965 and 1967, reporting on the way, and
I wrote many articles from New York and Washington about the war, the internecine Pentagon struggles, and the relationships and differences of positions and opinions between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.
The need for specialization in the newspaper business is obvious. Every newspaperman and television reporter should be a competent general assignment reporter. But military coverage, like financial, sports, business, or art coverage, requires specialized knowledge and training.
American newsmen have dual responsibilities: one as U. S. citizens; the other to the public. Sometimes the two clash, and sometimes the conflict is irreconcilable. And in some cases, the duties of citizenship clearly supercede the right to publish.
Midshipman Pat Grandelli, U. S. Navy— The actions of the media can influence morale in military commands. For this reason, along with many others, the military needs to maintain good relations with the press.
Two highly publicized incidents at the U. S. Naval Academy illustrate the media’s influence. Some midshipmen believe the outcomes of these incidents resulted from the Navy’s fear of negative media coverage. In 1984, a midshipman who had been separated from the Navy because she refused to jump off the ten- meter board into the swimming pool (a requirement for all Naval Academy graduates) was reinstated after receiving a great deal of publicity. A more recent example is the case of the midshipman separated after his urinalysis tested positive for cocaine use. The Secretary of the Navy readmitted that midshipman. In both cases, the Brigade of Midshipmen’s morale dropped considerably because it appeared that the “Brass” had “sold out” to help the Navy maintain a positive public image despite negative reports by the press.
My point is that if the press and the military view one another with guarded hostility, many decisions will have this same sort of taint. To correct this situation, the Navy needs to actively train the reporters newly assigned to cover the
j [he tni
military. These reporters nee tand mi1'" tary training so they can un e ^ than tary capabilities and methods. . ^en- having the “fresh look 0rep0rters nedy describes. While 1 ,s jnten' may be skeptical of the mi i aan in- tions, it is still preferable to affairs formed skeptic covering na rather than an uninformed roo •
January Ad p 25'
irtoA V R NoiW’ ‘
(See p. 1, January 1986, K- K-
26, April 1986 Proceedings) -ng
Stephen H. Jacobus—Except f ^ ^ds to read the berations of those jn the think how proud the
enth guy from forward and , in from portside in the letter run a Instead of soliciting critics- unjforUlS “Trivia Contest”—How many
in the picture of HFAJ?
I’m ready with my guess-
pect of Soviet-American a tions—strategic weapons 1 -sjeadill“ but inadvertently conveys a j,jch c°u picture of the range of issues^ ^ n3v have a major impact on • forces. . ,
The recent history of S°vlcornpUc:jtcie-c arms talks is much more Strate",j than his article suggests. ^ 0peU Arms Reduction Talks (ST uctioUs J 29 June 1982 to discuss reo r i strategic arms. Seven month
this, the Intermediate-rang jn n
Forces (INF) talks had ope "etie^y sponse to a long-standing So j si for limitations on “forwar terns”—non-strategic nucle"nion. 'j' that could reach the Sovie INF talks were of greater imp
/ jut?1
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_ Ils
and' GLCMs, Soviet SS-20s),J^u)d
initially leave both sides ual INF levels
The Soviets will be unlikely to^.^ new INF and strategic weapo limit* unless one of the two agreeme air- and sea-launched nuclear c ^ygh siles (ALCMs and SLCMs)- addreSs U. S. proposals have yet 1g0ti- SLCMs, they are definitely on t0 be ating table at Geneva and are :c anti included in severe limits on s INF weapons. . ticle, the
As Dr. George shows in h jtation* impact of strategic weapons jgS and on intercontinental ballistic missileS submarine-launched balhs ^ re)a-
(SLBMs) is easy to 9uant1^ ategic Pri' tively easy to manage, once s ^ pf0b' orities have been defined. Eve lem of having too few nuc ^gpls) f°r oallistic missile submarines ^ s0lved
ble manner a portion of t*lt!.“”antlin2 in each boat, rather than “^^iv ^jth converting entire boats to limits.
,ver. to
lave well-defined SLCM °P qc$c J. S. negotiators t0 preSe!!lmativeS ind must actively explore a \0o$ laving a single weapon j attac*’ ange, antiship, conventiona ind nuclear land attack missl° irnp^c11 The NSAT talks do have deep strr
the Soviets than were the START talks because of the 1979 NATO “two track” decision. This was the decision to deploy new U. S. Pershing II and ground- launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) if an INF agreement could not be reached to limit Soviet SS-20 deployments. The Soviets would not have entered into the
80
START talks had there been no INF talks.
Neither the INF nor the START negotiations made substantial progress. On 23 November 1983, the Soviet delegation walked out of the INF talks in retaliation for the initial deployment of U. S. GLCMs in Europe. On 8 December 1983, the Soviets refused to agree on a date to reconvene the START talks when that particular session adjourned—also in retaliation for U. S. INF deployments in Europe. The START talks were held hostage for progress in the INF talks, a clear indication of Soviet priorities.
President Reagan’s announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) led to repeated Soviet calls for negotiations on a ban on space weapons. The U. S. responded to these Soviet overtures with a proposal for broad-agenda talks covering INF, strategic weapons, and space weapons. In November 1984, the Soviets accepted the U. S. proposal. The Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NSAT) opened in Geneva on 12 March 1985. Thus the United States adroitly used the Soviet interest in space weapons talks to coax the Soviets back into talks on INF and strategic weapons.
Dr. George’s discussion misses a key point—that strategic weapons have been the easiest to discuss in the NSAT talks. This is the area in which the U. S. and Soviet proposals are closest. Agreeing on specific numbers of strategic weapons is the easy part of the talks. The hard part of these talks is defining counting categories and reaching agreement on INF and space weapons.
In addition to the warhead limits Dr. George discusses, the October 1985 Soviet proposal would limit the Soviet Union to 1,250 and the United States to 1,680 “relevant delivery systems”— defined by the Soviets as any system that can reach the other side’s territory. It thus included in the U. S. total INF weapons and forward-based systems such as nuclear-capable carrier aircraft, while excluding similar weapons from the Soviet total. The November 1985 U.S. proposal clearly placed INF weapons in a separate category, and the Soviets have since ceased trying to balance U. S. INF and strategic forces against Soviet strategic forces alone. The joint statement issued at the end of the November 1985 Reagan- Gorbachev summit called for negotiation of a separate INF agreement, and subsequent U. S. and Soviet arms proposals have focused on INF weapons.
The U. S. and Soviet proposals on INF limitations are far apart. The Soviets call for an immediate ban on INF weapons, defined broadly to include U.S. forward- , British
based systems and French an eS weapons. The U * -
only on INF missiles (U. 6. ,UI
and CjLL-Ms, ooviei , ^oU
British and French weapons,resid'
sign
ballistic missile sudiikuu— - ^ s0ivu- a secure retaliatory force cou ^ verifia- by permanently dismantling t ^^5 tIf* mtuinpr r nnrtion of the afltli’1^ ^
compiy
mts. a tong'raI,ee
The impact of INF and ^QvVev cruise missile limitations, ,.^-lCult could well be complex an that J manage. The astute argume tar?1-1
widely deployed and difficu. nCes Ae' weapon such as the SLCM en ^st strike terrence by making an enemy ^ as a less profitable, while having no dabb
first-strike weapon itself ■v*’1 ^ 0ff tbl
not be enough to keep Toma a^\oS negotiating table. The ubl4al‘°. f and th' ment of the Tomahawk 5L (WeeO1 lack of observable differences variants create a nightmare 0^ aCtii’1’ gotiators, whose easiest c°urs .flo'b is to ban the weapon entirely- .(^ desires to avoid this outcom > |l’
ions for nuclear strategy and . ha"' ;gic forces. But the NSA . tj0nS *l> ven deeper and broader imp j re Navy than just numbers o j,lc ®
irtually every Navy piatf°rrneajnst 1V aunching a nuclear weapon .^jy a ioviet Union would be pojf vVeaP0ldj ected by limitations on IN ^ y0pvaf sng-range cruise missiles, a iased systems.
; whettc
d the
habitat. Ballast was scrap
-------------------------------------- , we pur-
axles and surplus anchors, ^
commitments. As an alternative, ^ ^ Robert Workman, the medical^ ^ (he
for the
pal medical investigator I 0f tns tests. He selected four mem _„„def
. Co m^‘ diving team to participate- j to
---------------------- then aSS1Lr6dt0
the
r ia tests °n
Our plans to begin the t> craSfi
id*-
Ad
U. S. Air Force planes ,jey A1
two
The commanding officer
_________ ■
recovering the bodies °f lhe c^e0„ly d>v'
21-day test might be cut short by^ t
ent weather. This did happen
the field test to 11 days whe" !faching
■dtest
iroaC
apP1
Bermuda. Even during the
0 *abl;
achieved our goals: We
wb av^mv^wvj uui nlTU^1
divers could live and work c , tb, ^
under saturated conuiin”- - pei we also measured their ability useful work.
With the completion of t^Spor Sc3
II. The success of our program
attention of others, and a ,£',J'2iergen' group known as the Deep ^ pad beC
“Sealab: Unfinished Legacy”
(See D. Chamberland, pp. 72-82, January 1986;
D. Chamberland, p. 93, April 1986
Proceedings)
Captain Lewis B. Melson, U. S. Navy (Retired), Project Director for Sealabs I and II—As the initiator of the Sealab program and as the project director for the two successful sea trials, I regret Mr. Chamberland never spoke to me when preparing his article. I would like to offer some additional background information to provide a better understanding of the events leading to the final tragic end of the program.
To begin with, Mr. Chamberland implies that the U. S. Navy conceived the Sealab program to counter the outstanding efforts of Jacques Cousteau and Ed Link. Nothing could be further from the truth. Neither the Cousteau nor the Link tests had any impact whatsoever on the origins of Sealab.
Sealab was conceived shortly after Typhoon Karen dealt the naval facilities on Guam a devastating blow on 1 November 1963. At that time, I was the commanding officer of the Naval Ship Repair Facility (SRF) Guam. The typhoon damaged 90% of our buildings and sank 11 ships and craft assigned to SRF Guam for repairs. We easily replaced the damaged buildings and were back to 100% repair capability in three days. Salvaging the sunken ships and craft required three months of the greatest salvage effort undertaken by the U. S. Navy since the end of World War II.
At my request for assistance, Commander Service Forces Pacific Fleet diverted three salvage ships to Guam. Under the supervision of the Pacific Fleet Salvage Officer, Commander W. F. Searle, Jr., and the Service Force Seventh Fleet Salvage Officer, Lieutenant Commander Thomas Blockwick, these ships and our SRF personnel completed the salvage effort. Watching the diving personnel descending day after day into the protected waters of Apra Harbor, equipped with inadequate tools, to work for periods usually less than one hour daily per diver, I cringed and became determined to develop diving techniques and underwater equipment that would provide the Navy with a capability permitting underwater work to be conducted safely, quickly, and economically.
My next assignment after completing my tour at SRF Guam permitted me to do this. I was assigned as Director, Naval Applications Group, Office of Naval Research (ONR). In this assignment I proposed to my division directors that the Office of Naval Research endeavor to provide diving techniques that would per-
82 mit divers to work lengthy periods underwater without exposing themselves to unsafe conditions and that underwater tools capable of providing the divers with equipment adequate for their work also be developed. The third portion of the concept was to provide safe working conditions to the edge of the continental shelves, or a 200-meter depth. Our first review of this proposal pointed out to us that before adequate tools could be designed, we had to know exactly what the abilities of the divers were under typical conditions and how long the divers could sustain these abilities.
We envisioned a program consisting of four major field tests. Sealab I was to be a controlled dive to a depth well beyond the then-accepted limits for nontethered divers under saturated conditions. The personnel would live in a habitat placed at the depth at which the work would be done. The second test would be Sealab II which would extend the knowledge and the complexity of the program at a depth somewhat deeper than the first test. Sealab III would continue the testing at a depth twice that of Sealab II, and the final test, Sealab IV, would be conducted at the 200-meter depth.
At that time, the Office of Naval Research had two facilities at Bermuda capable of assisting the first planned field test: the Tudor Hill Laboratory and the Argus Island offshore tower. Argus Island, an oceanographic facility, was located on Plantagenet Bank, 26 miles southeast of Bermuda. The seamount was 194 feet below the surface of the sea. Adequate power and other support facilities were also available.
The design and construction of the habitat were supervised by my assistant project director, Mr. H. A. O’Neal and Captain Richards Miller, Commanding Officer, Mine Defense Laboratory, Panama City, Florida. Additional field support and diving equipment were provided by the Supervisor of Diving and Salvage, Naval Ships System Command, Captain W. F. Searle, Jr. Other commands invited to participate, with few exceptions, expressed only slight interest in our efforts.
We requested surface fleet support from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav) and the Atlantic Fleet Command with negative results during the planning stages. The Office of Naval Research had been assigned USS Sagamore (ATA-208) and the YFNB-12, a cable-laying self-propelled barge for research connected with the Argus Island operations. We scheduled the field test of Sealab I for the first three weeks of July 1964 during a lull in cable-laying operations to permit our use of these craft.
Limited budget restrictions w**— t|ie skills of our personnel to c°nssp0ssi- Sealab I habitat as economically rf ^ ble, without sacrificing the sa e y ^ personnel. Sections of two ^orponn the sweeping floats were mated ^-|road-car
chased the best, newest qQ
proportioner and the only °aC ^ sciiba and COz monitor in existence. 1 .,abie. gear was the latest and fmes , ^teri' Whatever we might have lac pof by ally was more than compensa our outstanding, skilled Pers0nei from Our requests for diving PersQf prior
the fleet were denied becaus _ tajn „.,ve. ffof
the Experimental Diving , sUg- Washington, D.C., Navy . p Capta*n gested we request the services ^ ^gl). George Bond’s team from t e teaPi don Submarine Base. Bond an te(j div" had previously conducted sa and ing tests within a chamb pr^c available. We appointed Bon field
iander
Scott Carpenter,
NASA’s space program, ’ ” n the - participate. He would have e£pt he member of the diving team, ^ a get' was involved in an acciden the
muda highway the morning cQvered 'n beginning of the test. He re^ i time to be our first team lea Sealab II tests.
wui (.re
schedule were foiled with „erlTiu-
ti c an-r-o nlanes ott
Force Base requested Navy a*s
iwvvjyviiug uiv- — , (jit’s
the plane wreckage. We had t ap(j ers qualified to dive to 250 e ’ gates- responded, rescheduling °u^ oP top 0 Once we had placed Seala g for 3 the seamount, we knew our P jnClem ' yecut
vvet® advised a hurricane was
den<T>
under saturated conditions at nerf°rI11 we returned to begin planning ^ug|it t^
newly Subi
Systems Project (DSSP)- which
Sealab II under the were granted to DSSP.
°Wever n r. ' °----------------- ------------
SeprI. ' Robert Morse, the Assis
^ppo»U,Navy divers. Our outstanding faster ,vlv'n8 supervisor for Sealab I,
i„ Cr Diver D„l . o. . , . ’
o, —u. Scott Carpenter e°rge ft6alS as a team leader. Captain ?1 °nd Was again designated medi-
di, n- ~
•ft . UVOlgllUlVrU 1UV/U1*
)r f0r- Bond never was the program
lr,8 reri,!>ted aH his time to those demand
. The R‘Ilments-
test was excellent for a
>ranfrati,0ns are done in much tr,<l of tu murkier waters. The site at the
r"Phy r,;6 ^cripp Institution of Oceanog-
e
extenH a “‘cac cunuiuuiiN. oeaiau h ilitie^6 °Ur knowledge of diving ca-
s'gn ’. ar|d what needed to be done to 61 aden
supervisors from O’Neal
llngs /
i^lished , .
°rce W tL 10 Provide the submarine
Subrnari' ab'Iity to rescue sunken
Placed ’ demanded our project be SherX their control rationalizing UtlProve ^ sh°uld restrict its efforts to approved ,research. This demand was I'ad rp OpNav, and the funds we
(Wasted for Howlbudget
tar»t *
^eVe]olretary °1 the Navy (Research and n°l conn 6nt)’ agnizing DSSP could r<ZCtoSealab 11 on schedule, dinned nto fund the project but as- 8roup Irrational control to my ONR Ir°visn .* Was done reluctantly with the
$ea]a, n,<Jer DSSP cognizance.
^alab I Jr. Was more successfu Rifled \i dme, we had the pick of all
ers rIVer Robert Sheats, selected the for Sealab II.
rect0r f . was uic piu^iam
"'as C0[i0r either Sealab I or II tests. He ‘"'d devotpracd with the medical aspects „requirP
^ *ne t>
rirst tria,ermuda
'"re and 80-degree water tempera- :|vin,> 00-foot visibility, but normal
lef — ■
'of the
ny jft- ^uomuuui. vi vyccaiiug-
^,r°vicleder Cb°sen for the Sealab II test eXtenH U? vv'tb these conditions. Sealab
deSj
lbe diVprUeclUate tools and equipment for
0
^ledge"^^’ DSSP str'PPecl away
July 1986 downward, replacing them with excess personnel from the former Polaris staff. The neophytes became engrossed in proper paperwork, ignoring the realities of open-water diving. The tragic ending of the Sealab project stemmed from this approach.
The scheduled date for the projected Sealab III test was missed; I recommended to DSSP that all plans for the depths Sealab III was to be placed at be cancelled and plans to proceed to the Sealab IV tests be made. Industry had avidly grabbed our Sealab I and II data and had boldly placed commercial dives at depths far beyond the 350-400-foot depth we had initially planned for Sealab III. From that point onward, the ability of the Sealab team to conduct successful tests deteriorated, ending with the tragic death of Berry Cannon.
In reviewing the complex causes of the failure of the Sealab program after its reassignment to the DSSP project, no simple answer properly explains the tragedy. From my personal observations during the period leading up to the fatal accident, the primary contributing factors stand out. The first was DSSP’s refusal to retain the organization system we had employed so well for Sealab II. A second factor was DSSP’s dismissal of the skilled personnel after Sealab II. Third, DSSP assigned Captain George Bond as director of Sealab III. Bond was an amazing medical researcher and devoted all of his time to that endeavor to the detriment of the overall project.
The program was overambitious. The constant delays and setbacks took their toll on the team members. These dedicated divers knew better than to react the way they did when the habitat leaked inert gases after submergence. They overreacted, and Cannon’s death resulted
Sealab II had the pick of Navy divers including: Berry Cannon (front row, left), who would later die in a tragic accident during Sealab III; Scott Carpenter (next to Cannon), who served as a team leader; and Master Diver Robert Sheats (standing off to the right), who selected the divers and also served as a team leader.
from their zealous desire to remedy the leakage. If they had ignored this leakage, it would have corrected itself once the environmental pressure within the habitat came into equilibrium with the surrounding pressure of the ocean. Robert Barth’s team was too tired to recognize this, and the topside controller failed to order them away from the abortive attempt.
It is unfortunate that our skilled team from ONR was not permitted to complete our plans. As it is, while divers are now able to dive to depths approaching 2,000 feet safely for lengthy periods of time, little has been done to provide them with the tools and equipment they need to work safely at any depth.
As far as the Cousteau and Link work during the 1960s is concerned, neither Cousteau nor Link was directly involved in Sealab I. Later we assured everything possible to coordinate Cousteau’s Con- shelf III test at Cap Ferrat, France, and Sealab II was done. Ed Link went his own way after his 436-foot Bahama dive in July 1964, during which he had requested Navy support. Pressure on OpNav had dictated it assign a safety ship to Sealab I. USS Petrel (ASR-14) arrived, but her commanding officer directed his divers to comply strictly with the Navy’s 135-foot diving limitation then in effect. As we were at 194-feet, this failed to provide the back-up safety support we needed.
At the same time, OpNav asked us to review Link’s plans for his dive. We did and recommended OpNav divert the Petrel to Link, and the Petrel saved Link’s team from disaster.
As far as any U. S. Navy interest in diving research, none existed in 1963. We had to fight inch by inch for every concession we were granted to permit us to conduct the Sealab I field test. Without the support of Dr. Robert Morse, Captain Richards Miller, and Captain W. F. Searle, we would have had a far more difficult time completing that first test.
Mr. Chamberland is correct in saying that with the demise of the Sealab program, the Navy lost its lead in underwater research. I am confident the program can and should be resumed and that our original goals can be attained.
83
“ft . , _
uiiding Canada’s Navy”
iee J n U u J
D P w • Harbron, pp. 115-118, June 1985;
P' 171' °ctober ‘985
^enrv U
Mooj ■ ■ "ill—I concur with Mr.
ate prQS C0ITIrilcnt on the new patrol frig- °f Ma ®ram' With ‘he rapid deterioration Iays in^u16 Command’s frigates and de- Under„, *"e ProSrarn itself, it is hard to nient ‘he Canadian Govem-
frigat1 n°t look at the Dutch Kortenaer finin„ Pr°8ram in 1977 when il was demakes 6 Patro* frigate requirements. It etumgn?16 Won(ler if the Canadian Gov- ply argls Playing politics or if they sim- tirrre p0t ‘nterested in seeing that Mari- “P-to-d- 0rnmancl is equipped with conir^j^6 Warships able to carry out its
Govenc'°0re ''idicates that the Canadian try anHment's spending $100 million to ates. pQextenc* ‘he life of the aging frig- has (,er an example of how this money The 4 , Wasted, look at HMCS Nipigon. Man c,Une *985 edition of the Halifax ^ipigonu rePorte(i that the 25-year-old tracks ' hat^t0 return to port due to stress return^ ^er htill. The Nipigon had just tinderp ■ t0 Maritime Command after t>estrQ°'n® a million refit under the stressq Extension Program; the
‘to pun 'eh the navy no choice but ttUdj a , S^‘P out of exercises off BerThe c her indefinitely.”
Under program has also been
l'°'v ha 3S we" as the delays which e,“erinpVe Halifax, the lead ship,
delay 08fService in 1989 or 1990—a l-0ok' approximately five years. nava| bu^ • *3aC^‘ at Canada’s postwar °n (kg 1 dnig program sheds some light ^°rld \y,atr°* fr'Pate program. During was aWar II, Canada’ s main naval effort ‘hat en(jSU'3rnarine warfare (ASW) and to “‘Utiber ’ the navy had in service a large ‘he war’° ASW-oriented warships. At V0]dS end’ most Canadian vessels ^ repia 3nd ^acl seen strenuous service. NanadadCement Program was needed. bra'vinBn°fpeeded to establish a Naval rCce'Ved ,^'ce at Canadian Vickers and p0tps ‘‘ssistance from the Royal Naval ‘ng deSi ^ava‘ Constructors. The result- Prorn ‘heir efforts was the St. lMcS ?,ass destroyers. The lead ship, “Ove^^' Laurent, was launched in ^ctobere,rt ^9^‘ and commissioned in Hich w ^hc Restigouche class— 'kstrnv 6re improved St. Laurent-class . In jew followed.
'CS for a ’t*16 navy initiated design stud- ‘>r')graninew frigate program. This new ** CaWas to consist of eight ships, but /U'red aCeded m 1963. The navy still re- ^Ui-ent Program to replace the aging St. and Restigouche-class warships.
^m8s,. ,
July 1986
Approximately 18 months later, a new design was on the drawing boards. This design became the 280-class helicopter destroyers. The lead ship of this class, HMCS Iroquois, was commissioned in 1972 and the Algonquin, the last of the four 280-class destroyers, was commissioned in 1973.
The St. Laurent- and Restigouche-class destroyers were given mid-life modifications and refits to extend their usefulness to the navy, but replacements were again needed. The navy began design studies in 1977 for an urgently needed replacement program; the outcome of the studies and industry competition was the Canadian Patrol Frigate Program.
The Canadian Navy needs assistance on a temporary basis. Would it be possible for the Canadian Government to negotiate to borrow temporary replacement naval units from its NATO allies until the new patrol frigates enter service? In the meantime, the government has to make an urgent decision regarding the longterm replacement program for the Canadian Navy. It can build operational foreign designs like the Dutch Kortenaer in Canadian shipyards as suggested in the Proceedings or continue with the patrol frigate program which has been plagued with delays and cost overruns. With the useful life of Maritime Command’s warships in a critical state, the Canadian Government cannot “fiddle” while its navy “burns.” “Turn on the Lights”
(See R. A. Stratton, pp. 81-86, September 1985; J. R. Lunney, p. 142, November 1985;
T. A. Brooks, p. 33, December 1985 Proceedings)
Midshipman Bryn Johnson, U. S. Navy— Former POW Captain Stratton’s article is quite informative and drives home the point that there are American military men still missing in Southeast Asia.
If we don’t account for every missing man, how can a new generation of Americans serve with confidence in the armed forces of our country? Do we have the assurance that our country will ensure that all military personnel lost in action in future conflicts will be accounted for? Until the U. S. Government and President Reagan make progress on this issue, the families of the men missing in Vietnam will keep waiting and hoping, with prayers in their hearts and lights in their windows. Please continue to spread the word about these men whom most Americans have forgotten.
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• Are you looking for the Pre-Dreadnoughts, the Fleets of * \ WW I or WW II, or the present warships, ours or theirs? J r Are you also interested in the magnificent ocean liners r J (Troop Transports) of the past, and the few of the present? ) f Would you like to build harbors in that small scale, or T J equip your carriers with aircraft of the era? It’s all listed 3 F in our catalog. We also carry a large array of continental f 3 model railroads and accessories, as well as R/C equip- 3 ^ ment and accessories. ^
S We are a US owned company . . . bank in the US ... so r \ that there is no problem with payment . . . and our cus- J r tomers are also our friends, many of them for 20 years f \ now. Would you also like to become one of our custom- 3 f ers (oops, friends)? Send $2.00 for our complete Dollar ? 3 Ship Catalog and Model TVain Price Lists to:
j PRESTON HOBBY M0DELLE 0HG j
\ P. O. Box 2280—8600 Bamberg, West Germany J r Telephone: 0951-1 2222 T