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Crippled by the politicization of ICBMs and neglect of long-range bombing capabilities, the strategic triad is now propped up by its remaining leg—Trident ballistic missile submarines. Technological and strategic flexibility has kept the Trident strong and promises to ensure its status into the future.
Recent modifications in submarines and bombers, and incremental developments in the separate legs of the triad defense concept have persuaded a great number of strategic analysts that the triad of the 1970s must undergo significant changes to remain viable. Since these developments have been evolutionary (although often significant), analysis and comment have been incomplete, scattered, and unfocused. We hope to distill the myriad analyses and offer observations on the strengths, weaknesses, and trends in the triad concept.
The triad developed in the late 1960s as most intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) were being withdrawn from Turkey and other NATO bases—an ironic action now, considering the recent furor raised by stationing similar weapons in the European theater again. Quite simply, the earlier and primitive IRBMs had become a liability with few strategic advantages and a host of political disadvantages. Land-based missiles in the United States, alternatively, featured greater security, less political fallout, and as much, if not greater, communications, accuracy, and stability. Withdrawing the IRBMs and the earlier retirement of the 280-mm. howitzer with its Mk-19 nuclear tactical projectile (although two major calibers [155 mm. and eight inch] as well as the Lance missile still remain in U. S. and European service) essentially left the United States with three strategic defense legs: long-range
decoys, or eight 300+-kiloton (up to 475 MIRVs, possibly equipped with even more Evader capabilities. Terminal fixed-source impr°v
:ed
:inents 120 to
and intelligence (C3I), and stealth characteristics for bombers, cruise missiles, and SSBNs, the new triad must feature fully flexible systems, much like a basketball team using its five best athletes rather than a center, a power forward, or other narrowly defined role-players.
The Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is one of the best examples of success in the trend toward systems flexibility. Coming out of the 1967 STRAT-X study, the Trident was conceived primarily, if not solely, as a replacement for the Polaris/Poseidon submarine force. Partly by accident and partly by design, the Trident either has fulfilled or soon will fulfill almost every desired characteristic on the matrix.6
Equipped at commissioning with the then-most advanced quieting techniques available, the Ohio (SSBN- 726), the lead Trident of eight launched so far, represents a masterpiece of lethal firepower and stealth. She is 560 feet long and is 42 feet in diameter at her widest point of beam. Powered by a single Westinghouse S8G reactor, the turbines turn a—revolutionary—single screw. The power train employs dozens of design concepts that give the boat the world’s greatest combination of speed, reliability, availability, and quietness. The Ohios have the greatest diving ability of any Western strategic submarine. They also carry more missiles than any other submarine in the world. Each of the 24 Trident I (C-4) missiles has a range of 4,000+ nautical miles and a payload of eight 100-kilo- ton Mk-4 MIRVs or a combination of decoys and fewer real warheads. Capable either of “ripple fire” (full magazine) in under six minutes, partial sets, or of individual selective firing, especially with their on-board computer capability, the Ohios have targeting options unavailable to any other submarine in the world.7
Not only is the Trident submarine herself strategically deadly, but from the viewpoint of Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW), she is a blue-water sensory phantasm. The aft section permits deployment of the tactical towed array system (TACTAS) passive sonar outside the hull at such a distance astern and with such sensitivity that the “baffles” are reassuringly “cleared.” TACTAS, in turn, allows the Trident to deploy the self-initiated antiaircraft missile, should the Navy decide to deploy it in Tridents. She also carries defensive jammers, mobile submarine simulators, Mk-48 torpedoes, and up-to-date bow and conformal sonar to enhance her defensive abilities. Even if detected, she can outrun, outdive, outwit, or “outshoot” most attack submarines.8
Traditionally, three factors have made SLBMs less useful against hard targets than ICBMs: accuracy, C3I time urgent availability, and deliverable throw-weight. But advances in the first Trident missile (the C-4) and related technology have substantially improved the missiles in these regards, while even greater advances can be confidently awaited with the second (D-5) by 1989. First, missile accuracy in SLBMs has greatly decreased circular errors probable (CEPs). Recently, however, the ability of submarines to link into the NavStar safe navigational system and radically improved shipboard optical fiber guidance systems guarantee location accuracy—in real-time terms—of ten feet or less, making the SLBM firing location almost as fixed as that of an ICBM. Nav et enables the vessel to move farther away from t e ^ and still retain highly accurate CEPs (under 300 me ^ Deployment of the Trident I missile has also inclJp an(] as available throw-weight per missile by at least 2 g much as 480 kilotons more than the Poseidon, dep® ore on whether the latter is loaded with 8 or 14 RVs,t0 jn_ the multifold increase with the forthcoming D-5- creased penetration, the Trident I can be equippe w , cafl Mk-500 Evader maneuverable reentry vehicles a^^g9 carry combinations of real warheads, aids, and ^ 0f The D-5 missile’s accuracy will improve to a £t0 roughly 120 meters or less, while its punch will inc ^ a possible combination of 14 150-kiloton MIR j^jjoto0)
ad vanc'
in the Trident II could further reduce the CEP flaUti-
± 35 meters. Range increases to greater than 6, joad,
cal miles may be standard with the 14-MIR P wjth while the 4,000+-mile range of the C-4 is pr0a£onse- the heavier RVs of the alternate loading of D- ■ ^ quently, technology currently employed in tn ^3- siles or imminently available will make the SL excePt lent or superior to the ICBM in every category communications reliability.10 >,e.charg6'
In addition to standard upgrading of the ta tj,e and-move-out (TACAMO) aircraft—not to j 35 air- prospective E-6A (a version of the Boeing 70 ^ tj,at frame), a replacement of the current EC-130s n. roVing role—a three-way research effort is aimed at 1 submarine communications. y (Ef-D
First, the two-transmitter extra low systems now being activated at Clam Lake, ^as£if and the K. I. Sawyer Strategic Air Comman 0 Michigan’s Upper Peninsula send out low-freQ seVeral cycles per second) warning “beeps” as 011 ^reCtion 10 other forms of normal communication, as a ^ ■‘bell- seek alternate forms of communication, an ^sSjgned 3 ringer” warning to SSBNs, for example- ^mine1)1 second-strike mission to dive deeper under a° jjver tl+ crucial threat condition. ELF can probab y jflinu1^ warning even under attack if there are at least eSpecinH5 of warning. Second, research with laser beams, ^ jasri blue-green lasers, is progressing to the P0113a communications with submarines could ^ cons>d in a few years. Third, more exotic research s, artls- ^ erable promise, specifically with neutrino ^ (0 tn trino particles make the earth and sea transpearth- point that the particles penetrate through t enCj to ta can be fired in code through a point in the g coV\d cO opposite side of the globe, where a submarm ^gb1 lect them in message form. A significant . pCl-hap any of these areas would put SLBMs and on a more even footing.11 cSB^s’ ^
A multiplicity of C3I systems already serv. ^ FofC,
eluding the Fleet Satellite Communications, p^ge R 0 Satellite Communication System, now enteriiTeilite Con1g a three-phase modernization; the Defense transro'ttirl“ munication System satellites; shore stations
Procel
■eding*
/ june 1
0,1 four kinH . .
9 sirnila °as frequencies; surface ships broadcasting in
'■on 5 J mode; and the Emergency Rocket Communica- ’hese 0,,Cn' °n board selected Minuteman II missiles. All *'6s 'vith%Wa^S t0 conncct National Command Authori- Wan eve ^^N deterrent forces. Finally, a provisional l° a satH]f nlcrrap 13tcs the assignment of one Ohio SLBM sSid‘a, launch mission to reestablish C3I contact ^Utiicatj e*Se fri*- While not a baker’s dozen, the com- ^Up]iCate°^12Cord to the SSBNs is engineered in more than
'ntrcv|r'neS are nehieving even greater flexibility with asrj'| La't’on °f SLCMs—also known as Tomahawks |ertjCa| |a ^M-Ns in the nuclear land-attack mode. In the e® (Ssiyf "Ch mo<fe now being deployed in the LosAnge- with their “^frefass attack submarines, cruise missiles rr*arines. ^oO-kiloton nuclear warheads turn attack sub- >doff ° quasi-strategic submarines by enhancing their f 'r leth- [Stance f°ur or five fold as well as increasing the d 'n a quantum step. The Trident will profit f^frare ^reater pressure placed on Soviet antisubmarine CrH, (3u(rces> especially by Los Angeles/SLCM deploy- At the benefit more from the cruise missile.
earliest, when the Navy reaches at least the Tri-
dent level necessary to replace the launcher level currently on board C-3 armed boats (304 tubes) or, at the latest, when the level also suffices to replace the Trident I- equipped launchers on board the SSBN-640s (192 tubes), subsequent Tridents might be outfitted with something between a low of 120-192 (by then) longer range advance “stealth” Tomahawks and a high of 240-432 (if nine are assumed deployable in rotary magazines within the space an SLBM now occupies and if a superimposed and baffled technique is employed). Tomahawk deployment on board the Trident would add immeasurably to the flexibility of the eventual Trident I-Trident II mix, especially as a more cost-effective and manpower-conserving follow-on for the battleships in the theater-reserve role, for example, where currently some 400 C-3 warheads are assigned in at least two to three Lafayette (SSBN-16)-class boats. This latter approach is feasible because cruise missiles are not restrained by the numerical limits of SALT, while compliance with the SALT I and (unratified) SALT II agreements has already resulted in the initial dismantling of the Poseidon Sam Rayburn (SSBN-635) because the Alaska (SSBN-732) recently commenced her sea trials, and will probably result in two more Poseidons being dismantled
1,ngs /
June 1986
77
when the Nevada (SSBN-733) soon commences her sea trials. Indeed, the supreme irony and paradox of scrapping admittedly older SSBNs for essentially numerical reasons under SALT II as elements of the most survivable leg should have suggested the desirability of a Navy program either contemplating converting them to the Soviet Navy’s Oscar-like cruise missile boats or leasing or selling them to NATO itself or to NATO allies not restrained by the SALT process.
While these systems are either available now or will become available within a few years, one critical factor <n maintaining the triad, as the matrix shows, is to anticipate future vulnerabilities and opportunities. Strategic warfare planning must, therefore, also anticipate the defensive and offensive implications of space-, ground-, and sea-based laser-beam, nuclear-powered X-ray beam, particle-beam weapons, and conventional terminal defenses.
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) exhibits a threefold irony: first, a substantial number of defense critics who otherwise rationalize postponement of operational deployment of a major system in favor of waiting upon the future possibilities of incomplete research and development (stealth bomber research and development will displace today’s alleged nonstealth B-1B bomber’s operational necessity, so goes the argument for example) are in this case belligerently disqualifying SDI research and development which has hardly begun. Second, SDI potential has long enjoyed firm support from broad segments of the natural scientific community in the United States, on the one hand, while developing practical knowledge has progressively forced hysterical and doctrinaire SDI critics to scale down both the SDI’s presumed vast scale of practical requirements in mirrors, beam energy, manned space vehicles, and the like, and its trillions of dollars of original cost estimates. Finally, Soviet defense policy experts have long accepted the eventual practicality of these various systems in some form or combination while simultaneously accelerating the deployment of major offensive ICBM systems like the SS-18—as U. S. national policy halved the 1979 MX missile count a second time to a 1985 total of 50 in anticipation that the Midgetman will eventually bail out the MX “bailout” to the Minuteman obsolescence problem.
Such conduct is neither in the interest of updating deterrence nor effective in enhancing the prospects of concluding an equitable arms agreement under the new label of START. SDI and the MX probably should go forward together, without the Midgetman, even after the first’s research and development phase eventually compels the repudiation of the 1972 ABM treaty under the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus if practical deployment becomes desirable. Alternatively, again without the Midgetman but with a determined commitment to SDI, an acceleration of Tri-
The Tomahawk nuclear land-attack cruise missile has burst onto the scene as another weapon for the Trident submarine. Tomahawk deployment on board the new ballistic missile submarines would add immeasurably to the flexibility of the Trident I-Trident II mix.
dent SSBN construction from its current pace of °ne^.( year to three every two years could be adopted been is within the capacity of the Electric Boat yard at r .
A corresponding expansion of D-5 missile pro “ could also be initiated to match with its canister s P 9 cally “fresh face,” so to speak, (and with its 1 ^
level of strategic and technical sophistication) eventually higher commissioning rate of the ^htoc least partly beforehand) and to supplement the M half” order and the general Minuteman problem- ^ The impact of these weapons will be varied, unp tvVo able, and significant, but strategically they will ^0$ major functions at a minimum: to knock out L reqUire- and to assist in (or entirely cover) missile defense ^ e)C. ments. Tactically, they will eventually combine ^
isting and forthcoming “look-down-shoot-down faft,
bilities to help neutralize cruise missiles an ^usU. especially at sea where the number of attackers total ally be limited and the price of suffering a hit to puture offensive force would be disproportionately hig * ' f,aSed triad operations must, therefore, allow for sate j0l)s attacks on, for example, NavStar. All commu^ capa' satellites will require hardening protection, eva bilities, or defenses of their own. aPP103^
More germane to the triad, the predictab e ^ j6ss lanes characteristic of ICBMs will render men^ateSafld useful in the future, even if, with navigational uPsurVjVe a silo-hardening programs now under way, they ^es first strike. The SLBMs’ full azimuthal attack arrwLn0ns. them somewhat less vulnerable to space-base but they will nevertheless still have to deal wj based defensive systems. Cruise missiles simi a
not havp •
terms ^ any special advantage over SLBMs, except in
at
some
termi
chaff, on
-“non m°re dec°ys’ maneuverability, hardening, sat- steaith ’redectlve casings, greater range and speed, more ' ’ and perhaps even “atmospheric alteration
boi
mbs,’
The,nilssde penetration.
PerPetSei c^anSrng requirements once again illustrate the fense 3 rcdallvc interchangeability of the concepts of of- ts tactn idefenSe’ as ciiense undertakes to maximize lty whiTal..defensive ability to preserve its dynamic lethal-
rhe Trident could be adapted to play a defensive Would, for the short term, suffer in the transition. role a„er’ nevertheless, the use of a Trident in a “picket” With the*nSt bud range of offensive missiles. Armed °Win„ taPPr°priate beam weapons, a Trident submarine,
tion
'§ to her
^erself0U^ Perbaps screen a whole battle group, while CKp0su’recause of partial submergence and small sail >n p0r(e’ staying almost completely out of danger. Even iricomi’ trident could assume a defensive role against King,s J reentry vehicles although the base (Bangor or might a 3^ ltse^ might have no protection. Some critics wue that the Ohio-class hulls could not be spared abom tv,3 Sea§°ing beam system, as our own commentary fy)tyeve AJaska-Rayburn “offset” already intimates. «cy r’ this reservation becomes a self-fulfilling proph- founci n° other modem, specially adapted hull is ever
!n§ a.
ial _ .
“ftiendl^M P°hcy overall; nor should the Navy oblige
^ y force “onmnpfitnrs” hv marctinllino q11 nf
J —11CU1IC1 15 5U UVC1W11C1111-
def 6 ^°rce advantage usually in the interest of na-
competitors” by marshalling all of , planning, engineering, and systems ■pPrive this essential idea of its general seminal
numbers, because they, too, would be picked up (]e]ic " P°'nt by ground-based systems. In fact, given the s°nic cru'se missile fan-jet motors, their sub-
envei S^eed’ anci general restriction to a contour-confined 0r ]0^fe’ they can be more easily countered by “debris” s'oikW a*l'tUC*e and low-yield defensive nuclear explo- pa bie cruise version of “fratricide.”14
ed with defensive responses of this sort, new counts rm!«fS W1^ be required. ABM-perplexing capabili- Ufati,
cruise SUcdl as cloud cover, will be needed to assure hese
lts tactic^'<de^ense’ as the offense undertakes to maximize
siyetbe defense seeks to maximize its tactical offen- fully : pabllily to enhance its survival integrity by more ty^j^Pacitating the attacker, role 6 ^°nsid,
capacious hull and available power genera- v'vabj|j.il1 tbe Trident’s hull capacity, speed, power, sur- ^et, SjJ’ submersibility, and sail beam-projector utility. about1 ar arguments with identical effect can be made ar>d ab0u6r ^^bNs, smaller SSNs, including SSN-688s, Probabiv l^e smaller, but perhaps more powerful and 'n actuai exPens‘ve (also, as compared to the Trident SSl\[-2i f „ar amounts for a lesser-tonnage submarine), °'°W~on to the Los Angeles attack submarine.15 ?*evant fS ^lr b°rce> at 79% of the fiscal year 1986 V afands> clearly has a prodigious lead over the ■ rese and the Navy at 4%, in beam-related and (lri8 a sin f„rcjt anct development, neither is so overwhelm-
its ‘u defense
Vj1. SClentific telr sto
, e how ^ter ah, otherwise, one would have to specu- kfdaden) htransPired that Tomahawk-laden (perhaps un- e Sea-CQatdeships can still become, today, a highly via- n tol and land-attack platform system. Were Po-
8s/June 1986 laris and Trident, after all, also merely two exceptions to the rule of Navy “hideboundedness”? Although sea- based beam-related weaponry is just now receiving attention, potential already exists for some such experimental form of missile defense at sea.
The point is that beam and terminal defense weapons have reached the stage of research at which they need to be taken seriously and incorporated into naval planning. The debate over whether they will work should be about over; appropriate responses in the- strategic equation must now be made in program terms. Planners must anticipate the possible and plan for the probable, not wish it were otherwise. The Trident can be adapted to a wide range of these contingencies, perhaps more than any other seagoing platform, at least within its own realm, and it may even be able to outdo the outstanding record of the bomber leg for adaptability—as the B-52 now undertakes to “stretch” its linkage from 25 to 40 years, between the B-47 and B-58 of the late 1940s and early 1950s, respectively, and the B-1B and the advanced tactical bomber (ATB) of the mid-1980s and late 1990s, respectively. “Stretch,” one more time, turns out to be “anatomically” flattering, adaptable, and cost-effective.16
As shown by these arguments and the matrix, then, the ICBMs’ disadvantages have grown in absolute and relative terms compared to the other two triad legs, while the new cruise missile category has been added as a complementary and offsetting influence upon all three legs separately and jointly. Submarines with their SLBMs have increased their advantage absolutely and relatively to ICBMs but only absolutely to bombers. Even when the full suit of B-1B bombers is fully operational in 1989, the bomber will have recaptured its position on the matrix only in relative terms. No ICBM version, including even the land-based D-5 update suggested in this article, will reestablish the ICBM’s relative position and probably will not even redress its absolute position. Virtually all of the advantages held by ICBMs at one time over bombers and SSBNs have been overtaken and, in most cases, surpassed because of the ICBM’s immobility, despite admirable and highly imaginative and successful programs of modernization to improve substantially this system’s defensive hardening protection and flight-path accuracy. The most damaging case against the ICBM, nevertheless, is its sys- temically inflexible and nonadaptable nature in evading the Soviet threat. The Trident and the B-1B not only fill current requirements, but they provide platforms that anticipate future needs, although in this respect the cruise missile may turn out to be somewhat more deficient relatively, even in its later, “advanced” version.17
These judgments do not constitute, as some might suppose, a conclusion encouraging “inevitable” submission to “iron laws” of technology or a move exclusively toward robotics or sophisticated weapons. Rather, it is a straightforward assessment of how strategic planning must proceed. We cannot, in World War I fashion, ignore the “machine gun” of the future in the interest of romantic elan. Frustratingly, ironically, but naturally, man will be all too much unavoidably involved in the future “loops” of prospective war, so the “danger” that the human ele-
79
Critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative—an early phase demonstrated in last fall’s successful antisatellite missile test—should recognize that SDI would support the strategic triad by knocking out the Soviets’ communications satellites and their first-strike missiles.
ment will be excluded is not logical or possible.
Thus, when the broadest possible strategic perspective is employed, the triad of the future will quite possibly consist of a dyad-cum-cruise missile or a reconstructed triad of unequally vital legs. Flexibility, clearly, is a major requirement, provision for which strategic planning must systematically include “space” in both offensive and defensive modes. A truly farsighted strategic policy, when viewed in light of the neutrino beam developments, for example, should even now begin to consider a high level of multidimensional defense and war-making capability, in sophistication and capability substantially beyond the triad’s conceptual restraints.18
'For discussions of the triad, see Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 1: U. S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984); the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY1986 (Washington, DC: n.p., 1985); J. David Singer, Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament: Towards a Synthesis in National Security Policy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984); Steven E. Miller, ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence: An International Security Reader (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Edgar Ulsamer, “Gains and Gaps in Strategic Forces,” Air Force Magazine, September 1985; Norman Polmar, “The Design of Deterrence: Status Report on the U. S. Submarine Forces,” Sea Power, April 1985; Stephen J. Cimbala, “The Sea-Based Strategic Deterrent,” National Defense, February 1985; J. J. Martin, “View I—Trident’s Role in National Security,” and Theodore A. Pistol, “View II—The Trident and Strategic Stability,” Oceanus, Summer 1985; “Strategic Defense, Strategic Modernization, and Arms Control” (transcript of Naval Institute Panel with Paul H. Nitze, J. E. Matlock, Sol Polansky, and Dean R. Sackett, Jr.), Proceedings, September 1985; Daniel O. Graham and Gregory A. Fassedal, “First Strike and You’re Out,” The American Spectator, July 1985; Millard Barger, Deborah G. Meyer, and Benjamin F. Schemmer, “M-X, B-1B Uncertainties Pose Question: Is SAC an Anachronism?” Armed Forces Journal International, January 1985; and Bruce van Voorst, “Tuning Up the Nuclear Triad,” Time, 23 September 1985.
2Robert Osgood, “The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine,” in Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age, ed. Laurence Martin (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press). For a discussion of ABM systems, see Vive Nerlich, “Missile Defenses: Strategic and Tactical,” Survival May/June 1985, pp. 119-27; and Werner Kaltefleiter, “Strategic Defense on the Broader Historical Stage,” Strategic Review, Summer 1985, pp. 14-21.
3Aviation Week carried a series of articles that thoroughly covered Soviet beam developments. See Aviation Week, “Soviets Push for Beam Weapon,” 2 May 1977, pp. 16-23; “Beam Weapons Effort to Grow,” 2 April 1979, pp. 12-16; “Soviets Developing Laser Antisatellite Weapon,” 16 June 1980, pp. 60-61; “Beam Weapons Race,” 2 October 1978; For an appreciation of the variable rhythms of attention that the various legs of the Soviet triad have received, consult Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1985 (Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents, 1985), especially pp. 3-59, 79-111. On the current bomber emphasis, see Soviet Military Power, pp. 33-34, 84-85, as well as “National Scene,” Aerospace America, April 1985, p. 16.
4See Aviation Week articles cited in footnote 3. Also see the authors’ Trident (Car- bondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), chap. 9 and notes, for a detailed history of these developments. In addition, see Curtis Peebles, Battle for Space (New York and Toronto: Beaufort Books, 1983); and Department of Defense, pp. 43-48 especially.
5Andrew Jampoler, “Dyad: Less Is More,” Proceedings, April 1983, pp. 65-70. On cruise missiles, see Richard K. Betts, ed., Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981); “New Missiles Deployed in Southern Belgium,” Wall Street Journal, 18 March 1985; John T. Correll, “Teeth for the Dual Track,” Air Force Magazine, December 1984; Charles A. Sorrels, U. S. Cruise Missile Programs: Development, Deployment and Implications for Arms Control (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983); “Cruise Missiles Are Operational in Belgium,” Aviation Week, 25 March 1985, p. 28; “Ground- Launched Cruise Missiles Deployed in Five Countries,” Aviation Week, August
1985. Finally, for insight into the Navy’s Tomahawk cruise , ,aaiion ’ n. gene Kozicharow, “Navy Developing Rapid Strike Planning,^ nroCeedin^s' j. July 1984; Russell S. Hibbs, “An Uncontrollable Tomahaw • pand A j
uary 1985, pp. 65-70; Linton F. Brooks, “‘New’ as in “ ^andH° y
Tomahawk,” Proceedings, April 1985, pp. 127-28; Linton • j985, PP'' al
M. Holland, in “Comment and Discussion,” Proceedings, u—//tnesl »
“» “* ~— --------------------------------------------------------- —iq«4 " Proceed^5,, ^
28; “U. S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development—ly5 Missile En£,ne April Review 1985, pp. 350-51; “USAF Plans Uprated Cruis%MAarCh and 23> AF . “USAF Proposes Upgrades for ALCM.” Aviation Week, 1 _ rmise ^lS‘
1984, respectively; Jeffrey S. Duncan
Aviation Ween, ^ rrUjse ‘ ‘The Tomahawk Nucle
for*1
Arguments For and Against,” Oceanus 28 (Summer 198 )• prident- ^ 6Most of the material for the following pages has been taken ,eish an\rrj(jcflt
review of pre-1960s naval developments, see D. Doug*las and the p.
Schweikart, “The Final Salvo: Rickover, the Navy, Electric an£j “ Submarine Program,” Weapons and Warfare Weekly, Apn .. e pevi^’ C dent Submarine in Bureaucratic Perspective,” Naval War Co ^
ary 1984. . , ^search Se p.
1Trident System Issue Brief (Washington, DC: Congression j^th ed- * §ed 1985); Norman Polmar, ed., Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. e ’ Sea' ^ olis, MD: U. S. Naval Institute, 1984); Stephen J. C‘n*al^an Poim^’ ^r. Strategic Deterrent,” National Defense, February 1985, 0 ^ j^0nnan ,, $g(j
Other Leg in the Triad,” Air Force Magazine, July 198 ’J”Jarjne Forcei\eCtriC “The Design of Deterrence: Status Report on the U. S. u -je(j from -0ps Power, April 1985. Other material is taken from Trident, co ^ Qf0ton.
Boat sources, Navy sources, personal interviews, and vislpevej0p dates. Material on the Trident missile appears in “Navy to Warhead,” Aviation Week, 17 January 1983, p. 26. a(jvantageS
8Trident, chap. 8. The Trident’s obvious cost and performanc flpg
tailed in our Trident in Chapter 10. ^maVSTAR ‘‘Sov*et
9For NavStar, see Leonard Jacobson and Michael Bittner, ^ Garn’ -
Navigator, Spring 1981, pp. 24-26. For Soviet advances, see ^ecVyity )t^id-, Superiority: A Question for National Debate,” Internation ferity* Spring 1979, pp. 1-25, and his “Exploitable Strategic Nuclear
1980, pp. 173-92. . insult “peCjy,-ird F
10For suggestive evaluation of the D-5 (Trident H) missi e’0 j5; 2\
c am
dc'
gcsuvc evaluation ui uic ij-j v **' —~ .qoa p. l-»’ "*
...fc ... Washington Roundup,” Aviation Week, 30 Ju y ^viation ^of 52
Kolcum, “Eastern Range Updating Timed for ContraCt,.<j0viet
mg
August 1984; “Lockheed Unit Gets Navy Job for $1 u lucaS< ,,/Vi 2**
Trident IIs,” Wall Street Journal, 2 November 1984; and H & g ICBM Force ‘Becoming More Vulnerable to Attack, nne pjnally>1set o' August 1985, p. 347. Also, consult the information in the Ma • a( the o be noted that the SSBN-726 tube diameter was designed origi ^ the 1970s to accommodate the D-5 missile first deploya c
Proce
DC:
airborn n<jVert*leless specialized Navy version of the Air Force Boeing NKC i5ut Wp »k:_. aser weapon svstem. Critics Dlease counter-DroDose. not oonose Argi
ative/ xr_______________ b ___________ e___
winter ,982’ pp. 9-12 and John Glenn, “Stealth: A Morrell Li*^usler'’’ Strategic Review, Winter 1982, pp. 5-7. Also see John ^89;£u’ ^re Comes the B-1B,” Air Force Magazine, August 1985, pp. ^ ^°zicharow, “Some USAF Planners Promote Extended Production
, ^nest gp Vlat‘°n Week, 25 February 1985, pp. 50-51; Gerald F. Seib and
!6. We think Tr;j Cdpon system, unties
Ar§umen, <• ndent especially fits the bill. ativenis *or D 1 • * — ~ »
“ ’ Stri
„ -..cst R Aviati°n Week,
8°>nber‘^ley- ---------------- --------
e^':As the ^treet J°urnal’ 9 October 1984; Erik Simonsen, “Special Deliv-
^ew ‘Lcp’ ^ Becomes Operational, Strategic Forces Modernization Has
>49 ' “
j. '■ Worjj’^ jj. *'juucuo
fitter 19g^ ost Effective Strategic Bomber Is Now Flying,” Military Airpower, JtnesDefe ' 48-57; Tim Wrixon, “Rejuvenation of the Manned Bomber,"
attlPaign"Sl We‘kly, 25 August 1984; and Edgar Ulsamer, “The B-1B Whisper ’ lr Force Magazine, June 1985, pp. 29-30. On the ATB stealth
R J
Military Renaissance in Submarine Communications,” parts I-V,
1980 vCtr??CS an<* C°lmtermeasures, November 1980, pp. 38-47, Decem- l98l> pp 48 5c~57’ January 1981, pp. 26-39, February 1981, pp. 29-34, April pp. 55-56, respectively; “Laser Applications of 'Usercony Week, 28 July 1980, pp. 62-63; Steven Thompson,
J®-52. e ^reen Dragon Awakens,” Air Force Magazine, July 1981, pp.
*985, pp ^vati°n: Sending a Message to the Soviets,” Sea Power, September ^°°k f0rm ~ Por a broader treatment of C3I problems and developments, in ltle ^clear’r!^11^ ®ruce *-*• Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining Bracket^ Tl ^eat (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985); Paul Univep- °mman^ and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven and London: flfp°nuna ^ ^ress’ *983); and Daniel Ford, The Button: The Pentagon’s Strate- 14 ese esti^ Qn^ ^ontr°l System (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985).
S°me of tJ^ates are drawn from Trident, chaps. 10 and 12.
J'frice of t C^C concePls are discussed in MX Missile Basing (Washington, /,teniativeChnnl08y Assessment> *981), PP- 111-43. ieeTridemu uses have already been examined by the Navy and Electric Boat. ^0rtened bufC 3p' ^' ^ur here, as well as in Trident, is for a perhaps
a . nevertheless specialized Navy version of the Air Force Boeing NKC- weapon system. Critics please counter-propose, not oppose,
f u CSp
0r the B-l appear in A. G. B. Metcalf, “The B-l: A Strategic Imper-
nmbers ’^^^ futures of Rockwell and Northrop Tied to Debate Over New s the F
P ry* 8tan(* On,” International Combat Arms, November 1985, pp.
„rec WoriH’„» *n Pr°duction: After Years of Political Debate and Bungling, the bomber, see Steven E. Daskal, "LRCA: The Importance of Long Range Combat Aircraft” [while actually on B-1B, the rationale involved applies to ATB], National Defense, March 1985, pp. 49-51; Scott Armstrong, “U. S. Military’s Quest for ’Now You See It, Now You Don’t’ Aircraft,” Christian Science Monitor, 3 September 1985; Franc Gavin, “Search for Stealth: The Invisible Bomber," International Combat Arms, November 1985, pp. 8-11, 74-81; and “U. S. Senator Confirms ATB to Be a Flying Wing,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 24 August 1985, p. 348. On space budget shares, see James W. Canan, “High Space Heats Up," Air Force Magazine, July 1985, pp. 61-67.
l7As a final insight into the current dilemmas of strategic modernization, consult Edgar Ulsamer, “Gains and Gaps in Strategic Forces,” Air Force Magazine, September 1985, pp. 126-39, especially p. 136 on Midgetman; Edgar Ulsamer, “Budgeting for a Bedrock Strategy,” Air Force Magazine, April 1985, pp. 96-104; “R & D at the Razor’s Edge,” Air Force Magazine, May 1985, pp. 51-56; and Pete Wilson, "The President’s Foundering Strategic Modernization Plan.” Strategic Review 13 (Summer 1985): pp. 9-13. Finally, on the results of upgrading the existing land-based and airborne systems, see Robert R. Ropelewski, “Long-Term Strategic Program Beginning to Show Results," Aviation Week, 29 April 1985, pp. 84-96.
l8Jampoler, “Dyad,” passim; Trident, chaps. 10 and 13.
Mr. Dalgleish teaches political science at Arizona State University. A Columbia University and University of Colorado graduate, as well as a Fulbright Scholar, he served in U. S. Army intelligence in West Germany. He has published articles on national security and the West German Government.
Mr. Schweikart teaches at the University of Wisconsin Center— Richland in Richland Center, Wisconsin, and has written many articles on business and economic history. Before receiving his PhD from the University of California, Santa Barbara, in 1984, he had two books published, the second being Trident, coauthored by Mr. Dalgleish.
Proper Attire
Assigned to his first ship, the captain, an avid etiquette buff, requested that the ship’s officers wear ties to all meals. Everyone complied except the crusty old chief engineer. Threats and blandishments had no effect.
But one morning, on arriving for breakfast, the captain was overjoyed to find the chief engineer wearing a tie. However, his joy was short-lived. After finishing his meal, the chief engineer left the table—wearing no pants!
D. Dolphin
Just Testing
Documents recently declassified by the U. S. Government revealed the following item from a Pacific Intelligence Report: “TUNNY'S MINEFIELD: At 29 North, 125 East, investigated by Seahorse which reports 95 contacts which sounded like mines but shadows very large and some had irregular shape, raising suspicion that they were rocks. Reports: ‘In desperation passed near two with no explosion.’ ComSubPac sends note to Captain Holmes: ‘We have informed Seahorse that bumping into mines is not the approved method of testing their explosive qualities. Information obtained thereby may be conclusive, but dissemination of information is very poor.’”
Commander R. G. Fisher, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
When John Warner was Secretary of the Navy, he decided to sail on board a historic Chesapeake Bay skipjack. The skipjack’s weatherbeaten old skipper looked Secretary Warner over and said, “1 understand you do something in Washington.”
“That’s right,” Warner replied. “I’m the Secretary of the Navy.”
“Well, in that case,” came the skipper’s response, “you steer.”
Harold Heifer
b,