The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) will soon begin their fourth year. Although grounds for skepticism about reaching any agreement in the near future still exist, there are three points to keep in mind.
First, it has taken an average of five to six years to negotiate past arms control agreements. The first strategic arms limitation talks—SALT I—took about four years. SALT II went off and on for about seven years. And START has been ongoing less than four years, including the year-long walkout by the Soviets.
Second, many top administration officials, including the President, have predicted progress in 1986. As the National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane made that prediction on network television, and President Ronald Reagan has expressed hopes for progress resulting from the “fireside summit” in Geneva. With two more summits already scheduled—one for this summer or fall—there will be tremendous pressure for an arms control agreement in the next year or so.
Third, and perhaps more important in the long run, both sides have come close together on basic principles. The United States originally proposed a “deep cut” to 5,000 warheads, about a 50% reduction. For a long time, the Soviet position called for a cut to 1,800 launchers. If many missiles having multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) remained, that could still leave a lot of nuclear weapons. But in last year’s propaganda war before the Geneva summit, the Soviets also proposed a 50% cut in warheads to around 6,000. President Reagan then countered with a further cut to 4,500 warheads. Finally, at the summit, both sides agreed to the 50% reduction guideline.
It thus appears that the basic, general principle of deep cuts for START has been established and that the cuts will involve warheads, not launchers. Just what are the implications of these deep cuts? More than first imagined, they might deeply affect the Navy and the whole strategic nuclear arsenal of the United States. To appreciate these implications fully, however, we must first look at the historical background of nuclear strategy and then move on to examine the lessons, rules, and principles from SALT I and SALT II.
Nuclear Weapon Strategy: From Utility to MAD: For the first 15 years after World War II, during the “Cold War,” the general nuclear strategy of the United States could best be summed up by the word “utility.” In other words, the United States was prepared to use nuclear weapons to defend its own and its allies’ interests. This was the implicit policy of the Truman administration and the explicit policy of the Eisenhower administration, through its well-known “massive retaliation” statements. Most scholars now agree that the Eisenhower threat to use nuclear weapons in Korea finally brought the North Koreans and the Chinese around to serious negotiations, and that a similar threat during the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis cooled that situation. Threatening words also flew during the 1956 Suez Crisis. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had opposed the British and French move into Suez, but after they were threatened by Nikita Khrushchev’s “rocket forces,” the President backed his allies with his own nuclear threat.
During these early years, the United States had a clear preponderance of nuclear weapons. Despite the “bomber scare” of the mid-1950s and the “missile gap” of 1960, defense experts knew who had the strategic advantage. This started to change during the 1960s. The Soviet Union began to catch up. The balance shifted—from preponderance in the early 1960s; to equivalency in the late 1960s; to (by many standards) inferiority by the early 1970s. Consequently, the strategy changed—from utility to deterrence. The Cuban Missile Crisis was probably the last major incident in which the United States had the definite preponderance of forces.
In the mid-1960s, the United States stopped building nuclear weapons. We felt we had “sufficiency”—in the jargon of the day—and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made the very clear statement that we would allow the Soviet Union to catch up and obtain equivalency. By Western logic, the Soviets then would also stop building nuclear weapons. Of course, they did not. As the strategy evolved from one of utility to deterrence, McNamara argued that letting the Soviet Union catch up would give “mutual” assurance. This notion became better known under the acronym MAD, for mutual assured destruction. The policy became one of having enough second-strike capability to deter the Soviet Union from making a first strike.
Many have questioned this equivalency or MAD policy, which has been in effect for nearly 20 years. In 1974, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger developed a counterforce concept of limited strikes against military targets, but that was quietly dropped. The goal of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is to go beyond deterrence, but attaining that is very far in the future. The policy is still one of deterrence. For example, President Reagan often says, “Nuclear wars can never be won, so they must never be fought.”
This deterrence policy has been extremely important for the Navy, for two reasons:
► First, the Navy nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), from the early Polaris to the new Trident, have always been considered the least vulnerable leg of the triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range bombers, and ballistic missile submarines. As the least vulnerable, the SSBNs would be the weapon systems that would survive the first strike and prevail for a second one.
► Second, the SSBNs had the majority of the warheads. Of the 7,000–8,000 odd ballistic warheads, about 6,000 have been the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warheads of the SSBNs. As this author once stated, the “Navy is MAD and MIRV.”[1]
These basic beliefs—which still prevail today—were taken into all the SALT negotiations: First, that overall sufficiency/equivalency had been reached; second, that deterrence was now the real goal; and third, from a Navy viewpoint, the invulnerable MIRVed SLBMs were the ultimate deterrence force of the United States.
SALT I: From Equivalency To Equality: The formal SALT I negotiations took two and a half years, from November 1969 to May 1972. But the preliminary talks can be traced back to the Glassboro, New Jersey, meeting in March 1967, when President Lyndon B. Johnson and Premier Aleksey N. Kosygin first announced a willingness to begin discussions. In July 1968, President Johnson announced that agreement had been reached to begin talks, but the subsequent Soviet suppression of Czechoslovakia disrupted the process.
The SALT I Interim Agreement (never a treaty[2]) was essentially a “freeze” of existing missile systems. At the date of signing, the United States had 1,054 operational land-based ICBMs (54 Titans, 450 single-warhead MM-IIs, and 550 three-warhead MM-IIIs), while the Soviet Union had an estimated 1,618 missiles—both operational and under construction (of varying size, but almost all single warheads). The United States had 41 strategic missile submarines with 656 SLBM launchers, while the Soviet Union had about 62 strategic submarines with 740 SLBMs. According to SALT I, the United States could reach a ceiling of 710 SLBM launchers on 44 submarines by replacing 54 older ICBM launchers, while the Soviet Union could increase to 950 SLBM launchers at the expense of the older systems. Table 1 summarizes SALT I accords.
At first glance, the SALT I Interim Agreement looks very “unequal.” Supporters pointed out, however, that looking at “warheads,” the balance was really not that bad. At that time, the Soviet Union did not have MIRV missiles[3], while the United States had the three-warhead MIRV Minuteman-III, and, more important, the ten-warhead Poseidon C-3 missile. Thus, the warhead count was about 7,500 to 2,450—in favor of the United States. Despite the MIRV warhead advantage, Congress, especially the U. S. Senate, was critical of the SALT I Interim Agreement because of the apparent imbalance. Indeed, most observers believed that had this been a treaty, requiring a two-thirds majority, it would never have passed. But, as an agreement, it only needed a simple majority. Nevertheless, in passing SALT I, Congress added the so-called Jackson Amendment (after the late senator from Washington) that future agreements had to be equal.
Table 1 SALT I Force Limitations
Delivery System | United States | Soviet Union |
---|---|---|
ICBM | 1,054 | 1,618 |
| [1,000] | [1,408] |
SLBM | 656 | 740 |
| [710] | 950 |
Submarines | 41 | 62 |
| [44] |
|
Note: Bracketed numbers represent allowable limits.
Without the MIRVs—and in essence that meant the Navy’s MIRV Poseidon missiles—SALT I would never have passed. The Navy missiles preserved, at least for the majority of Congress, that basic principle of deterrence. We still had the capacity to respond to a first strike with our own second strike. But another concept was changed slightly. No longer was the “sufficiency” or “equivalency” vagueness tolerated. Congress wanted a more straightforward “equal” system, and this became the new concept taken into SALT II, along with the deterrence principles.
SALT II: Opening the “Window of Vulnerability”: Following a provision of SALT I that committed both sides to continue negotiations on strategic arms limitations, SALT II began in November 1972. These talks continued on-and-off for almost seven years, culminating in a June 1979 agreement. A major milestone was the so-called Vladivostok meeting in November 1974 between President Gerald Ford and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. At this meeting, both sides endorsed the general framework of this agreement:
► 2,400 equal aggregate limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles on both sides (i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers)
► 1,320 equal aggregate limit on MIRV systems
► Ban on construction of new land-based ICBM launchers
► Limit on deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms
But this never reached final form. After the new Carter administration came into office—in March 1977—instead of building on the Vladivostok agreement, the new administration proposed deeper cuts to 1,800–2,000 launchers. The Soviets dismissed these cuts out-of-hand as inconsistent with the Vladivostok Accords. This delayed a final agreement for two more years. This agreement provided for the following:
► 2,400 equal aggregate limit on all delivery systems (includes ICBM, SLBM, and bombers)
► 2,250 final aggregate limit on all delivery systems (within three years)
► 1,320 equal aggregate limit on MIRV missiles and heavy bombers with cruise missiles
► 1,200 sublimit on MIRV ballistic missiles (120 implied limit on heavy bombers with cruise missiles)
► 820 sublimit on MIRVed ICBMs
Supporters pointed out that—unlike SALT I—SALT II was based on equality. It allowed some freedom for mixture—for example, trading MIRVed systems—while maintaining equal aggregate limits overall. They also pointed out that the United States still had the advantage in warheads, since the Soviets were just starting to MIRV their systems. Opponents, on the other hand, pointed out that the Soviet Union still had a distinct advantage in throw weight, with its huge SS-18 and SS-19 missiles. Further, with its 300-odd SS-18s alone, the Soviet Union would have a first-strike capability to take out all U. S. land-based ICBMs—and probably bombers, as well—leaving the United States vulnerable. Thus opened “the window of vulnerability.”
From SALT II came some more important bargaining principles, which have major implications for START. First, the principle of counting launchers shifted to one of counting, or at least accounting for, warheads. Multi-warhead missiles—the MIRVs—became a new category. Observers pointed out that the warhead kills, not the launchers. Launchers were still the basic counting tool in SALT II, but launchers of MIRVed missiles were now considered separately—in a substrategy.
Another principle concerned verification of the number of MIRVed warheads. It is virtually impossible by looking at a missile to tell whether it is a MIRV or not, and even harder to determine how many warheads it has. The United States decided that once a missile had been tested with “X” number of warheads, that would remain the count, even if it deployed with less. As one analyst put it, “Once MIRVed, all MIRVed.”[4] A third and final principle with implications for START was that long-range intercontinental bombers with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) were equated to “MIRVs.” By implication then, an ALCM became a warhead.
One thing that SALT II did not change was the importance of the Navy strategic systems. For the United States, the launcher and warhead count did not really change, since we had deployed no new systems. And the SLBM warheads on the Poseidon submarines still provided a second-strike, deterrent capability. But changing the concept from launchers to warheads began, for the first time, to make warheads vulnerable to cuts.
START: Closing the Window?: Thus, the Reagan administration came in with a mixture of old, evolved, and completely new concepts. The old notion of deterrence still prevailed, despite some opposition to the concept. Those who talked about fighting and surviving nuclear wars were soon silenced. Not to be misunderstood, the administration was well-prepared to fight a nuclear war if deterrence failed—that is what the modernization of the strategic triad was all about—but the basic notions were still those of deterrence or MAD. The evolved concepts were those of true equality and that warheads—not launchers—were important. Finally, the new concept was that the Reagan administration wanted “real” cuts. In fact, this is the reason for changing SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) to START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). And the Reagan administration not only wanted real cuts; it wanted deep cuts.
Many—mostly critics—thought at first that the deep cut strategy was simply a ploy to torpedo arms control talks. After all, President Jimmy Carter’s try for a deeper cut during the Vladivostok episode in 1977 did in fact torpedo those talks and delayed the agreement for more than two years. The Soviets did not at first embrace the deep cuts in warheads, but they did agree to some fairly significant cuts in launchers, from around 2,250 to 1,800 (the Carter administration’s old number). And for the Geneva summit, the Soviets accepted the principle of deep cuts in warheads with their proposal to cut their inventory in half, to roughly 6,000 warheads. What are the implications of these deep cuts? What are the implications of cutting warheads? And what are the implications of using warheads with the “once MIRVed, all MIRVed’’ principle established at SALT II verification, and on counting bombers with ALCMs as MIRVed?
Near-Term Implications: Table 2 shows the approximate current inventory of U. S. nuclear weapon systems and warheads. This is constantly changing. There are still a few old, single-warhead Titans, but they are being dismantled and should be out of the inventory by fiscal year 1987. Some B-52s are in the process of getting air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). As of this writing, there are now about 100. The 120 shown in Table 2 is the current allowable total under SALT II guidelines. And, of course, another Trident submarine should join the fleet this year which will require some other MIRV system to be dismantled to keep within the guidelines. The figures are approximate but, for considering the implications of START, greater precision in counting matters little. The thing to remember is this: If we go from approximately 9,500 warheads to our current position of 5,000 (or even the Soviet position of 6,000) the implications are clear that something has to give and major reductions are coming. Furthermore, since more than 60–70% of the warheads (depending on what counts) are in the SSBNs, it stands to reason that the Navy, with the most invulnerable leg of the strategic triad, may wind up taking the major cuts.
Table 2 Current Inventory
(Approximately Spring 1986)
System | Launcher | Number of Warheads | Total Warheads |
---|---|---|---|
ICBM |
|
|
|
Titan | 17 | 1 | 17 |
MM-II | 450 | 1 | 450 |
MM-III | 550 | 3 | 1,650 |
Subtotal ICBM | (1,017) |
| (2,117) |
SLBM |
|
|
|
SLBM Trident submarines (7 × 24)* | 168 | 8 | 1,344 |
SLBM Poseidon with Trident (12 × 16)* | 192 | 8 | 1,536 |
SLBM Poseidon (18 × 16)* | 288 | 10 | 2,880 |
Subtotal SLBM | (648) |
| (5,760) |
Subtotal ballistic missiles | 1,665 |
| 7,877 |
Bomber |
|
|
|
Bomber with ALCM | 120 | 12 | 1,440 |
Bomber without ALCM | 137 | 1 | 137 |
Total | 1,922 |
| 9,454 |
*First number represents number of submarines; second number is the number of missile tubes per submarine.
Table 3 New Systems
| Launchers | Number warheads | Total warheads | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Early 1990s | Late 1990s | Early 1990s | Late 1990s | Early 1990s | Late 1990s |
ICBM |
|
|
|
|
|
|
MX | 50 | 50 | 10 | 10 | 500 | 500 |
Midgetman | 0 | 500 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 500 |
SLBM |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Trident Tubes | 240 | 480 | 8 | 8 | 1,920 | 3,840 |
Bombers |
|
|
|
|
|
|
B-1 | 100 | 100 | 1 | 10* | 100 | 1,000 |
ATB | 0 | 130 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 130 |
Total |
|
|
|
| 2,520 | 5,970 |
*An “average” assuming a B-52 type decision on having about half with ALCM.
The National Command Authorities will be faced with some immediate decisions. Some calls that might look easy at first also have implications. For example, the Minuteman-II missiles are getting old, but now that the five to ten megaton Titan has been retired, the only “large” warhead missile is the MM-II with a yield listed at one to two megatons. Retiring the MM-III that carries only three warheads might be considered, but many have just been modernized with the Mk-12 warhead, and are now considered very accurate. The real problem is that retiring the Minuteman force does not “buy” you much in the warhead count. This is why, when the USS Alaska (SSBN-732) was commissioned earlier this year, it was “easier” to retire an SSBN than so many Minuteman missiles. Scrapping all the Minuteman missiles would still leave the United States with about 6,000 warheads on the SLBMs and would, of course, make the triad, a dyad.
Another complicating factor is the ALCMs on the B-52s. If they are counted as “warheads,” then another 1,440 cuts must be made. But again, even scrapping all the ALCM-equipped B-52s does not buy you that much.
This actually raises another dilemma for the United States. Even sticking with the SALT II guidelines, which it appears the administration will do, will require the United States to dismantle between 1,320 and 2,240 MIRVed ballistic missiles, according to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.[5] And, it appears that—once more—the Navy system will be cut. According to newspaper reports, when the Nevada (SSBN-733) starts sea trials this spring, two Poseidons will be retired.[6]
In short, it looks like it will be the SSBN force that will take the major cuts. Details await a final agreement, but it appears that anywhere from one-third to two-thirds of all current SSBNs would be scrapped under any START agreement.
Future Implications: No one expects an agreement in the very near future, and we can anticipate some phase-in time (as there was for SALT II), but it is prudent to look at the early- and then late-1990s time frame. Looking at those periods (and assuming that the strategic modernization of all three legs of the triad continues) raises some more dilemmas. Table 3 summarizes the strategic modernization systems that should, or could, be available. It assumes the MX capped at 50, the Midgetman built with the total often mentioned being 500,[7] Trident proceeding at about one per year, the B-1 also capped at 100, and the Advanced Tactical Bomber—ATB (Stealth)—at 130, which is also an often-quoted number.[8]
New ballistic missile systems/warheads for the early 1990s period could amount to the 50 MXs and five more Tridents—another 1,460 warheads (50 MXs [10 warheads] + 5 Tridents [ × 24 launchers × 8 warheads each]). If the B-1 is counted, that could add another 100. Thus, in the early 1990s another 1,500-odd warheads are to be deployed, yet all the current systems could still be potentially operational—at least from an obsolescence viewpoint. The Minuteman would still be available as would all the Poseidon submarines. Again, what might at first look like an easy choice, is not. Retiring all the old MM-IIs (450) and a few MM-IIIs would get the warhead count equivalent to the 50 MXs, but the launcher count would be reduced drastically, making the remaining ICBMs more vulnerable to first-strike attacks.
Ironically, by the late 1990s, the situation may not be so bad. By then, the Poseidon submarines will be reaching the end of their 30-year service lives and the Minuteman missiles will also be aging. Assuming about 20 Trident submarines, 50 MXs, and 500 Midgetmen, the count is about 4,800 warheads, very close to the U. S. figure of 4,500 and well below the Soviet recommendation of 6,000. (But, by the mid-1990s, there will probably be a START II, meaning further cuts.) The dilemma will arise in the immediate and near term, but the long term has other complicating factors, which will be discussed.
Discussion: There are obviously a lot of variables and questions that go into the implications of START. First, will all the new systems be built? For some, the answer is definitely yes. The MX will be built but probably capped at 50. A buy of 100 B-1s has already been approved and there is a fight under way to increase this. The Tridents are being approved at the rate of about one a year, with at least 20 planned. The real question for new systems, therefore, concerns Midgetman and ATB, with the prospects for the former running at 50/50 and the latter much higher.
Supported by both conservatives and liberals (although with different motives), the small mobile, so-called Midgetman missile may never be developed for several reasons: technical, economic, and political. According to some reports, there are problems making this a true minimissile, and the technical problems of building a transporter are far from being resolved. (Remember the “mobile” MX!) Economic difficulties are accelerating rapidly, especially in developing the mobile carrier. Finally, in a political sense, there are two problems: one international and one domestic. There is currently some doubt whether a START agreement should include or exclude mobile missiles, which present an extremely difficult verification problem. This leads into the domestic problem. Where do you put this in the United States? (Again, remember the MX!) Of course, the vast Soviet Union does not have this problem. But, whether or not you build the Midgetman is almost beside the point, when you consider START guidelines. Since it has a single warhead, just three Trident submarines would have more warheads than the 500 Midgetmen. In other words, Midgetman counts little for staying under any warhead limit.
While the chances for building the Stealth ATB seem better, the same logic applies to it as long as it does not carry ALCMs. As of this writing, Congress seems adamant about capping the B-1 buy at 100, to force the Air Force to build the ATB. Since ATB will be a penetrator, it probably will not have ALCMs, and would thus count as one warhead. Once again, this does not buy you much in trying to keep under any limits.
A real problem arises in counting the ALCMs. Under SALT II guidelines, a long-range bomber with ALCMs was equated to a MIRV system. If, then, each ALCM is considered as a warhead, the numbers can go up quickly, especially if B-52 and B-1 capabilities are fully exploited. The B-52 can carry eight internal and 12 external ALCMs, for a total of 20. Up to 120 can be equipped and for verification purposes, these carry special markings. A B-1 can carry eight internal and 14 external ALCMs for a total of 22. But since the B-1 is now designated as a penetrator, it will not be equipped with the internal rotor or external pods, at least for the immediate future. When the B-52 reaches obsolescence in the 1990s and/or the ATB takes over the penetrator role, that might be a different matter. If all 100 B-1s are fully ALCM-equipped, there could be 2,200 warheads on the B-1s alone.
The ALCM dilemma is not the only warhead dilemma. Under the U. S. principle of “once MIRVed, all MIRVed,” there are other problems. For example, the Minuteman III has been tested or listed with seven reentry vehicles (RVs), the Poseidon C-3 with 14,[9] and the Trident II with 12.[10] Using those figures—especially 12 for the Trident II D-5 missiles—can run up the number very quickly. The reasons for our insistence on this principle stems from concern over the potential warheads the Soviets could place on their huge SS-18 and SS-19 missiles. Estimates have varied from 14 to even 20, although the number listed is usually ten for the SS-18 and six for the SS-19. But, since “breakout”—especially under a deep-cut proposal—might be even a worse problem, those worst-case scenarios must be assumed, which leads into the most basic principle—and problem—of all.
What does this do to deterrence? Deterrence has been the principle that has prevented a war between the two superpowers for more than 40 years. Not knowing the final outcome of any START agreement, not knowing what systems the Soviet Union will choose to keep, not knowing what verification procedures will finally emerge (and verification is even more important, of course, with fewer systems), about all that can be said is that it will be “different.” It appears that the number of land-based ICBMs could decrease by at least half and possibly by 95% if the Midgetman is not built—from 1,000 Minutemen to 50 MXs. The number of bombers will stay about the same assuming all 130 ATBs are built as well as the 100 B-1s, for a total of 230. Therefore, as a percentage, the bomber force will be about the same. And, the SSBN force will decrease by about 50%, from the 41 SSBNs of the SALT I and II era to about 20 for a START agreement.
However, from a deterrence viewpoint, the bomber force is usually considered the least important since it is a slow flyer when compared to a ballistic missile which is a fast flyer. When people spoke of the window of vulnerability, what they really feared was the “third strike.” That is, with just their 300-odd SS-18s, the Soviet Union could wipe out almost all of the U. S. ICBMs, plus most of the bomber force and the SSBNs in port. Although the United States would still have the at-sea Poseidon-Trident force for a second strike, the Soviet Union would still have more than 1,000 ICBMs and all their SSBN and bomber forces for a third strike, thus inhibiting the U. S. response. That is why we need fast flyers as a deterrent—for an immediate retaliation capacity, not a retaliation that might take hours.
It is true that warheads—not launchers—kill, but from a vulnerability viewpoint, launchers are more important. It appears that the number of launchers will decrease drastically for the United States, especially if the Midgetman is not built. Thus, even though the Soviets’ inventory would also be reduced, will the reduction of our ICBM force by 95% and SSBN force by 50%—and with only the slow-flyer bombers kept at current numbers—really close the window on our vulnerability? Besides the bombers—which, of course, are also vulnerable to a first strike and would still have to get through the Soviet layered defense system—there are still some SSBNs, but their numbers will have been decreased drastically, leading to another “difference” problem.
Those who advocate moving all ballistic systems to sea usually point out two advantages. First is the well-known advantage of invulnerability. No one expects an antisubmarine warfare breakthrough in the near- or long-term, so the Navy’s SSBNs are virtually invulnerable, especially with the longer-range Trident missiles. A second advantage is that sea-based systems remove the incentive for the enemy to launch missiles at the United States, since there are no military targets to hit. To put it another way, if the enemy does launch nuclear missiles at the United States, he presents a rather unambiguous threat, making a retaliatory decision very easy. In other words, the deterrence effect is enhanced. A new balance in the 1990s could have none of the advantages of moving to sea yet a lot of the disadvantages, from a deterrence viewpoint. There will still be many land targets yet fewer sea ones.
Conclusions: There are still many problems to be resolved before any START I agreement can be signed. The throw-weight question is still a very difficult problem only peripherally addressed here, but a limit on warheads could, indirectly, help solve that. The big Soviet missiles, if they did carry many warheads, could be penalized. There are still many problems concerning SDI, although—according to newspaper reports—both sides do now agree that research and development cannot be verified and will be permitted at some level. There are still many questions on what actually does constitute a “warhead” or nuclear weapon. In that warhead total of 6,000, the Soviets want to include bombs and forward-based systems and, most importantly, ALCMs. The United States, presumably, does not. The list could go on and on. But looking back to the differences of 1982, the view has narrowed considerably—to the point where an agreement is a distinct possibility.
Now is the time to begin publicly examining the implications of a possible START agreement. After virtually no debate on strategic implications—especially on deterrence—three SSBNs are now scheduled to be taken out of the force. And that is just for SALT compliance. What happens when at least one half of the SSBNs are retired, for START compliance? One thing does seem certain: the START deep cuts will have very deep implications for nuclear strategy, for deterrence, for the U. S. strategic force, and especially for the Navy.
Because of START, the “invulnerable” leg of the strategic triad has now become quite vulnerable.
Lieutenant George was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1961. Following his retirement for medical reasons, he earned an M.A. and Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Maryland. After graduation, he was awarded a public affairs fellowship from the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace where he spent one year in the office of Senator Bill Brock. He later served as a professional staff member in Congress and is a former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmanent Agency. Dr. George is the editor of The U. S. Navy—The View from the Mid-1980s (Westview Press, 1985) and the forthcoming The Soviet and Other Communist Navies to be published by the Naval Institute Press. He is currently Director of Special Projects at the Center for Naval Analyses. The views expressed are his own. Lieutenant George was the winner of the 1978 General Prize Essay Contest and first runner up in the 1979 and 1981 contests.
[1] James L. George, “Salt and the Navy,” Proceedings, June 1979, p.37.
[2] The ABM Treaty, which was signed at the same time, was a treaty.
[3] Some SS-11s were deployed with three multiple reentry vehicles.
[4] Mark M. Lowenthal, “The START Proposal: Verification Issues,” Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1982, p. 4.
[5] “Text of Weinberger’s Letter,” The Washington Post, 17 November 1985, p. A30. (This is the famous leaked but unclassified letter, but it is very easy to figure out anyway.)
[6] Walter Pincus, “Navy Picks Two Missile Subs for Possible ’86 Dismantling,” The Washington Post, 27 November 1985, p. A2.
[7] Aviation Week and Space Technology, 16 September 1985, p. 24.
[8] “Bomber Brouha,” Defense Week, 28 October 1985, p. 1.
[9] Lowenthal, p. 5.
[10] Arms Control Today, September 1985, p. 9.