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This Luda-class guided missile destroyer sailing into the rising sun is a fitting symbol of the new dawn for China’s navy, which includes extensive modernization and wider-ranging operations.
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fter more than three decades of slow, metU- and unobtrusive efforts to develop an effective. 'ang—“Maritime Defense” capability—-the ^
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community with China’s maritime perceptions, 1 g force structure, and probable future policy for empl°- sea power. jsing
Today, China is an old naval power with a pr°r> new future. It has the tradition, the technical capacity- ^ now the strategic concept to employ maritime P°vVC^0[1. fectively in its national interest. The PRC leadership f siders both of the maritime superpowers as potential ^ destabilizing forces operating against it in maritime ^ Nevertheless, recent events seem to have persuade
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pie’s Republic of China (PRC) leadership apparently ^ cided that the time has arrived to acquaint the internati
j. eng Xiaoping leadership group that two of the most vital (°reign policy interests of the United States in that area— . Maintain the status quo and neutralize Soviet expansion- rtl'—coincide with China’s desire to improve friendly Sional ties and support peaceful economic intercourse uiout foreign interference and intimidation.
Sino-American Naval Cooperation: Conversations with veral People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy officials 1Ve me the impression that China greatly desires informal ^operative arrangements with respect to mutual or rein- p^Clng maritime interests. One source suggested that the mnese do not believe that any formal agreements are in e best interests of the United States or China, but that y Potential opponent should be kept guessing whether or
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not it would have to deal directly with one or with both parties simultaneously. Concerning the transfer to China of defense-oriented high technology, particularly in the fields of antiair, antisurface, and antisubmarine warfare components, another official believed that one side should respond to mutually beneficial requests of the other. The failure to provide such support in times of distress creates the perception of the United States not needing China’s friendship at a later date.
PRC Defense Minister Zhang Aiping’s visit to the United States during January 1984, U. S. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s visit to China and PLA Navy facilities the following August, PLA Navy Commander Admiral Liu Huaqing’s visit to the United States in November 1985, and U. S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
Supporting the PLA Navy’s “green water” capability is a ten-division naval air arm, which includes this Xiam H-6 Badger-type bomber carrying C-601 antiship missiles.
James D. Watkins’s scheduled visit to China in early 1986 all reflect sincere efforts to develop a mutual understanding of an informal maritime cooperation between China and the United States.
The New PLA Navy Commander’s Maritime Perceptions: At the outset of this decade, a vigorous Chinese naval leader, Admiral Liu Huaqing, who had been intimately involved with a series of modern technical developments of the PRC’s naval force structure since the 1950s, took command of the Haijin—“Sea Military.”
Shortly after assuming command of the PLA Navy, Admiral Liu, the PLA’s former Deputy Chief of Staff, in addressing the country’s leadership, depicted the navy as “an important organization to handle the issue of ‘maritime rights’ in struggles of manipulation and countermanipulation, plunder and counter-plunder, which have always existed between maritime nations.”
Several months later, Admiral Liu obtained the unanimous endorsement of the Central Military Commission to establish and staff three advisory groups to govern the PRC’s efforts in improving its sea power capabilities—the Naval Academic Research, the Naval Scientific and Technological Research, and the Naval Scientific, Cultural, and Education Research Commissions.
Naval Force Structure Concepts: The beginning of the PRC’s current bid for an oceanic navy able to meet major sea power adversaries on equal terms in East Asia, and to pursue regional political interests effectively, dates from 3 May 1975, when Mao Zedong convened an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee’s Military Commission, the highest deliberating body in China. This meeting’s agenda provided for the discussion of and decisions for the most effective means of developing and modernizing the PLA Navy further.
As a result of this meeting, three decades of development, and coastal warfare experience, the PLA Navy became the first in the world in numbers of operational missile-, gun-, torpedo-equipped fast-attack craft, second in numerical size of sea infantry forces, and third in submarine strength. The core of this almost 2,000-unit strong, three-region battle fleet is more than 50 classes of warships and combat craft that range from nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, missile destroyers, and frigates to small semi-hydrofoil torpedo boats, and amphibious ships.
Supporting this “green water” capability is a ten-division naval air arm consisting of medium-range strategic bomber, attack, fighter/interceptor, and helicopter elements. (The term “green water” is used to express a naval capability somewhere between a “brown water”—coastal
COURTESY JANES DEFENCE WEEN-
defense or coast guard force—and a “blue water”—fu^ international open-ocean fleet.)
The Haijin Bubing—“Marine Corps”—is rapidly developing into a combat force capable of invading or destroying invasion forces which might land on the East Asian mainland and offshore islands. Currently, the author believes this force capable of deploying under combat conditions against a well-defended objective within 3 300-nautical mile range of the embarkation point. Maximum operational distances for such deployments would be determined by the combat radius of assigned air supp°rt- Since China has no coast guard, the PLA Navy—-along with its designated authority to defend the coastal approaches and insular territories—has been given the responsibility of intercepting foreign vessels illegally °per' ating within China’s exclusive economic zones and along its offshore archipelagos. Therefore, Chinese coastal defense forces continue to expand and become more mobile- Elements of this sizable organization can be found at numerous key locations on the many promontories of [be PRC’s long coastline and offshore islands.
New special economic zones at selected shipping P°rls are opening continually. This, along with the decision 10 explore offshore seabed energy and mineral resources jointly, specifically in the Eastern Sea and South China Sea regions, further expands the PLA Navy’s offsh0j'e maritime responsibilities. Therefore, particularly since tn early 1980s, considerable numbers of coastal and insula base-support installations have been established to supp°r directly coastal security activities for surface and subsur face warfare elements. Some of these have been eon structed underground, with direct access to the sea. This ur rangement provides for reduced combatant concentration- operational flexibility, security from air attack or obser^a tion, simplified logistic support, and high crew m°raL, China has placed special emphasis on developing 1 South Sea Fleet’s air, surface, and subsurface warfare ca pabilities. Chinese sources advise that almost all °f1 . combat elements of their Haijin Bubing, along with muc of the amphibious assault lift shipping, have been L ployed into the Hainan Defense Sector. The PRC na^. force assigned to the South China Sea region apparel has the most ships, and is the best trained and D - equipped of their three naval fleets. n
Also at various positions along the coastline, located ^ high promontories, are jointly manned PLA Navy and ^ Force “filter centers,” equipped with long-range dc, tion and communications facilities, and fully integra with coastal defense and land-oriented security f(,rL
—1980—
18-ship naval task force, including six guided-missile estroyers, was deployed 5,650 kilometers into the south- ','/est Pacific Ocean to monitor land-based carrier rocket |yghts and recover reentry capsules.
Past Sea Fleet forces participated in a large-scale “live- lre ’ antiair warfare and regimental-size amphibious assault scenario involving air cushion vehicles, and medium and heavy tank units.
-1981-
Past Sea Fleet forces conducted another major fleet evolu- bon involving a regimental size amphibious assault, antisubmarine, and antiair warfare exercises.
A marine battalion and engineer company, using specially configured submarines, conducted underwater reconnaissance against sea and ground targets, seabed demolitions, and removed beach obstacles and land mines.
—1982—
^hips of the Vietnamese and Chinese navies clashed in the Culf 0f Tonkin with indeterminate casualties when Vietnam refused to concede control over water boundaries West of 107.3° east longitude.
Past Sea and South Sea fleet elements, using bad weather c°nditions, concurrently conducted joint “live fire” land- ln§ and counter-landing exercises to test doctrine for the simultaneous employment of reinforced regimental- strength assault forces equipped with air cushioned vehi- c,es, heavy and medium tanks, mechanized artillery, armored personnel carriers, communications, and chemical defense troops.
Separately, four East Sea Fleet “landing ships” con- Ucted 26 night landings in 20 days, covering movements °f more than 1,000 nautical miles.
V —1983—
ietnamese and Chinese ships clashed again, this time bear the Xisha Dao (Paracel Islands) claimed by Vietnam as its sovereign territory, but fully occupied by the PRC. ubmarines were used to transport “sea frog” detachments on sea patrol surveillance and underwater demoli- '°n missions in Vietnamese waters.
— 1984—
^ double-pronged “show-of-force” was conducted ar°und Nansha Dao (Spratly Islands), shortly after the First oviet-Vietnam amphibious exercise along the northern mtnam Coast. This action, in support of PRC-claimed
sovereignty, consisted of maneuvering a sizable air and logistically supported surface action group to conduct a series of air, surface, and subsurface exercises there, followed immediately by the circumnavigation of these islands by a 2,000-man, combat-loaded amphibious force with escort and gunfire support elements, to demonstrate China’s capability to assault and occupy any or all of the islands in the archipelago.
Commencement of an expedition involving naval auxiliaries loaded with supplies and equipment in support of the Chinese Academy of Science project to establish the PRC’s first Antarctic scientific and experimental station on King George Island at 62-13° south: 58° west.
—1985—
Successful completion of a 142-day, 48,955-kilometer Antarctic expedition involving two helicopter-equipped naval auxiliaries which also conducted ship visits to Ushuaia, Argentina, and Punta Arenas, Chile.
Naval “good will” visits by East Sea Fleet Commander, Nie Kuiju, a destroyer, and a logistic support ship to Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan.
,. numerous offshore islands and rugged coastal terrain 'stort or reflect electromagnetic transmissions, making uunter-detection measures by foreign forces operating in e PRC’s coastal approaches difficult.
Because of the sea environment and the forward posi- °ning of logistic support sites among the numerous archi- (lagos, long-range endurance is not considered a key fac- r m naval deployments at this time. Thus, small [. mbatant craft, capable of rapid response, may provide e necessary short-term deterrence of foreign power projection needed to maintain stability in the area, especially in view of the Soviet Union’s support for Vietnam’s current attempt to take over the entire Indochina Peninsula.
Operational Experience: The PRC warships’ lack of sophistication is often criticized. The PLA naval leadership, while realizing the need for sophisticated long-range communication, detection, and fire control equipment, also recognizes the need, under combat conditions, for simple, reliable, battle-survivable combatant weapon sys-
The following comments by Admiral Liu, published in the August 1984 Liaowang, pages 89, best reflect the maritime perceptions and future goals of the Deng Xiaoping leadership:
According to geologists’ estimates, China’s offshore deposits may amount to about 8 billion tons, forming one of the world’s largest oil deposits. The deepwater basin in the South China Sea has rich concentrations of manganese nodules, and there are over 1,500 varieties of fish in Chinese waters of which 200 are viable major commercial varieties. In the future, in the wake of deep sea exploitation and other biological resources, more and more of the protein needed by the Chinese people’s daily life will be obtained from the sea. In addition, China has a potential tidal electric power generation of 110 million kilowatts, and is capable of generating 87 billion kilowatt hours a year. However, for the moment only 3/1000 of this is being exploited and used.
The new technological revolution will bring mankind into a stage of large-scale exploitation of the sea, the military value of the sea will be still further enhanced, and superpower rivalry at sea will become still more intense. Therefore, the position and role of the Navy will be prominent each day. Speeding up the building of a powerful, modem Navy sufficient to guard against any marine in-
from the sea and have appl'e electronic, laser, optic fiber, ge' netic engineering, and other ne'v technologies to the large-scale re' search, exploitation, and utihz3' tion of marine resources.
At present, China’s annual output value from marine resources|S more than 6 billion yuan, compared to $50 billion for the Unite States in 1980.
The emergence of new techno ogies, including the new achieve
cursion and safeguarding the country’s maritime interests has become urgent, and a major strategic task in China’s national defense construction.
Since ancient time the ocean has been an important place for man’s production activities and the most economical transport route. As land resources are excessively exhausted today, people have focused their attention on the exploitation of new resources
terns. Such war craft are much more economical to produce, require minimum training levels for their crews and reduced logistic support, and can generally perform well in a coastal environment.
Although limited numbers of new warship and aircraft production programs are ongoing, economic constrictions require upgrading and retrofitting existing naval combatants and aircraft with more advanced strike and defensive weapon systems to improve the PLA Navy’s ability to project near-term sea power.
Naval personnel of the Republic of China on Taiwan and former Soviet naval advisors to China can attest to the originality, capacity for innovation, and adaptability of Chinese command personnel in employing older, less- capable weapon systems to confront a new, more sophisti
cated threat until a better weapon system can be deve oped. For example, recognizing the immediate need f°r fleet-wide improved antisubmarine warfare capability,111 PLA Navy adapted missile boats and other fast-attack era to operate in conjunction with other air and surface umts fitted with modem submarine detection equipment. These boats' ability to maneuver at high rates of speed, some times under adverse weather conditions, make it diff'cU for a modem submarine with a high underwater speed 11 escape destruction, once detected. ~
During the first three decades of its existence, the P*V Haijin acquired considerable experience in ocean surve lance, monitoring foreign flag shipping and fishing act'vl ties in coastal waters, boat-against-ship warfare, c0lT\ mando-style amphibious assaults against light and hea '
118
Proceedings / March '
^ents in oceanic science and tech- n°l°gy, and their rapid and wide ^Pplications for navy building will bring about profound changes in lhe military equipment, opera- rional methods, training, and organization of the Navy establish- nient. The Navy already has enhanced its capability to utilize toe sea. The scope of sea warfare operations has extended from the •united space of air, the surface, toe water, and coasts, to all space r°m under the sea to outer space and from the sea inland. The conCePt of naval battle has been extended from the traditional deci- s,ve warship engagement and the tectical offensive of shallow c°astline targets to the launching °f strategic nuclear attacks against mternal targets on an opposite shore.
With the perfecting of recon- baissance technology and means, and the greater accuracy and destructive power of ballistic misses, the security of the coastal aunching silo and other important acilities will be seriously threatened, whereas security below the tea and in deep water will be further guaranteed.
According to analysis of releVant data, in the face of a large scale nuclear attack, less than of the coastal launching silos "tol survive, whereas submarines armed with ballistic missiles can Use the surface of the sea to protect and cover themselves, preserve the nuclear offensive force, and play a deterrent and containment role. Thus it can be seen that from a series of changes in the new world technological revolution which have taken place in the maritime field, it is absolutely necessary to enhance the understanding of the position and role of the Navy, and the trend of the times is to speed the building of a powerful modem Navy.
The Chinese Navy, after 30 years of effort, developed into a comprehensive branch of the Armed Forces, with submarines, surface vessels, flying units, coastal defense units, marines and so on. Moreover, it has initially formed a modern arms and equipment system and has the capability to fight on the surface, underwater, and in the air. It thus effectively defends the mother land’s seas and upholds China’s maritime interests.
China is a large maritime country with a coastline of over 18,000 kilometers, more than 6,000 islands, with a vast expanse of ocean spanning some 3.5 million square kilometers. The Navy required by the state must be a powerful force sufficient to guard against seaborne incursion by any enemy. In light of this demand and the momentum of large-scale exploitation and utilization of the seas, our Navy needs to be greatly strengthened both in size and in degree of modernization.
There are three guidelines for the modernization of China’s maritime power:
- Combine naval building with marine undertakings,
- Link state defensive forces with economic construction, and
- Step up education and training of talented people.
A 26 September 1985 Zhong- gou Xinwhen She article, “Liu Huaqing Speaks on China’s Naval Submarine Force,” discusses the Chinese submarine force:
In order to safeguard China’s coast, resist possible foreign invasion, and defend our maritime rights and interests, it is only right and proper that China should attach great importance to developing its own Navy, including the “emphatic” development of its submarine force.
Over the past 31 years growing out of nothing and developing from small to large, the Chinese submarine force has gradually been built into an important and sizeable underwater strike force with considerable fighting capability. China’s success in launching a carrier rocket from an underwater submarine in October 1982 shows that China’s naval equipment and technology have achieved new advances, a requirement in the construction of the four modernizations.
The building of this submarine force has entered a new historical period of development, namely a period of advancing toward overall modernizations.
eachhead resistance, and combat logistics operations.
During the years from 1980 to 1985, this navy methodically developed a significant “green water” capability. Analysis of PLA Navy deployments over the past five •tears depicts a gradual but deliberate movement of its operations further seaward.
The list of naval operation highlights partly substantiates PRC pronouncements that China intends to use its toaritime forces to promote friendly regional ties and sup- P°ri peaceful economic intercourse, as well as protect its toterests against foreign intimidation or interference.
As part of a plan to obtain more open-ocean experience, PLA Navy periodically deployed special naval task §r°ups of various sizes, supported by underway replenishment elements, into Antarctic waters, the Indian Ocean,
the Western Pacific, Gulf of Tonkin, the Philippines, and the Eastern Sea and South China Sea regions.
Maritime Defense Policy: During several recent conversations with knowledgeable PLA military and civilian authorities, I obtained the impression that the current commander of the PLA Navy, Admiral Liu Huaqing, might well come to be considered China’s Sergei Gorshkov.
Since the tumultuous 1950s and especially following his return from naval tactical studies abroad, Liu has engaged in various naval and national defense construction activities, including a number of sophisticated research and development programs involving nuclear propulsion and submarine-launched strategic weaponry.
From Admiral Liu’s recent public remarks and inter-
views, it is obvious that China is serious about developing a more powerful maritime force to protect its claims to seabed resources in the South China Sea, as well as asserting itself elsewhere as a major maritime power in Asia.
There appear to be three specific circumstances that have caused the Deng Xiaoping leadership to direct a sig-
An improved antisubmarine rocket, being launched from a Luda-class guided missile destroyer operating in coastal waters, shows how the PLA Navy has met the immediate need for an improved fleet-wide antisubmarine warfare capability.
nificant expansion of China’s sea power capability at this time.
- The Soviet Union’s continuing increase of its maritime power projection capability in both East and West Asia
- The Soviet Union’s expanding support for Vietnam’s conquest of Indochina and the establishment of bases there
- Conflicting national sovereignty claims to seabed mineral and energy resources contiguous to the various archipelagos in the Eastern Sea and South China Sea regions
These problems will continue to stimulate the Chinese leadership’s quest for a major maritime deterrence posture in East Asia. The situation will also provide the requisite backdrop for increased Chinese Communist Party support for developing a full-fledged modem “green-water” sea power. As the PRC leaders look to the future, the fleet’s numerical growth will be modest, but force modernization is expected to be extensive. There also appears to be a firm
determination not to allow history to repeat itself and permit invasion and subjugation by a major sea power to again thwart Chinese interests.
Because of the current direction and dimension of various maritime issues, sea power will probably play a vital role in any future Chinese regional endeavor. The further expansion of offshore energy resource recovery capabilities and merchant and fishing fleet activities, to let China obtain the necessary foreign currency reserves for its modernization plan, will undoubtedly increase the requirement for more warships to protect those interests.
Consequently, the younger leaders of China, in implementing strategic national defense concepts, have launched a maritime development program structured to make the PLA Navy the dominant seagoing force in the offshore approaches to the East Asian mainland by the end of the century.
Because they are concerned that Vietnam, with or without direct Soviet support, might soon decide to confront China over boundaries of declared exclusive economic zones or the sovereignty of certain offshore islands, naval planners are calling for further expansion of naval forces assigned to the South China Sea region. The rationale is reportedly the Deng Xiaoping leadership’s decision to employ the appropriate level of sea, land, and air power to intimidate and deter any such attempt on the part of the Vietnamese Government. The current leadership has apparently decided on this policy because it believes it is highly unlikely, even though Sino-Vietnam discussions on Southeast Asian security issues have been under way f°r some time, that any compromise will ever be reached regarding sovereignty of offshore islands and ownership of seabed energy and mineral resources located in their areas of maritime interest in the South China Sea.
Official recognition of the ongoing and expanding Soviet seaborne threat to China’s coastal areas increases the necessity to project Chinese sea power further seaward-
Even for the present, the PLA Navy could be a formidable opponent in anything less than a full-scale sea war in East Asia. Because of its preponderant force of fast-attack craft deployed over a vast area of China’s coastal waters, the PRC is quite capable of successfully conducting guef' rilla warfare at sea tactics against more powerful adversaries who may attempt to interdict China’s coastline or seize offshore islands.
Sources:
- Bradley Hahn, “PRC Seapower,” U. S. Naval Academy, Political Scienc
Department Guest Lecture, 24 October 1985, 22 pages. ,
- Bradley Hahn, “The Chinese Marine Corps,” U. S. Naval Institute Procee
ings, March 1984, pp. 121-127. t
- Robert L. Rau, “Present and Future Maritime Security Issues in the Southe
Asian and South China Seas,” XIII World Congress of Political Science, Par,‘ 15-20 July 1985, p. 24. .
- A series of informal conversations with several knowledgeable PRC mil* and civilian officials during 1984 and 1985.
Commander Hahn is a retired naval intelligence officer, a technical arj^ lyst, and a recognized specialist in the fields of maritime history a
naval weapon systems developments. He is a graduate of the U. S.
International, a maritime information research service. His writings have been published widely in Asian publications.
Amphibious Warfare School and is the Director of Hahn Associate
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Proceedings / March ^