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The backbone of the riverine warfare component consists of several “patrol oats,” six “river landing craft” and auxiliaries, and seven new 78-ton, Hestin-class minesweepers, plus a few auxiliary ships and craft.
Yugoslavia’s naval aviation (Mor- nar,cka Avijacija) consists almost en- '■re|y of helicopters: 15 Ka-25 Hormone- J/ antisubmarine/search and rescue helicopters, 18 transport/utility/liaison elicopters (ten Soko/Aerospatiale SA 4IH Gazelles and eight Mi-8 Hips), and °ur Canadair CL-215 search and rescue amphibians acquired 1980-81. There are Unconfirmed reports that the Yugoslav avy is contemplating the acquisition of a naval version of the Soviet Mi-24 Hind ehcopter armed with antiship missiles.
The 2,300-man coastal defense con- justs of a number of missile and artillery atteries. Initially armed with SSC-2b amlet missiles, these batteries were re- anned with longer-range, truck-mounted ^C-3s in 1984-85. Approximately 25 coastal artillery batteries are armed with a2-mm., 130-mm., and 85-mm. guns, he Yugoslavs claim that several new coastal gun models were introduced in e Past two or three years. Some of the oer, but very effective, ex-German 88-mm. Flak-36 guns are probably kept in storage.
Under the terms of a new law adopted in July 1985, all conscripts in the military will serve 12 months in active service. Navy draftees’ service was thus reduced from 15 to 12 months. A law adopted in February 1985 provided, for the first time, that soldiers who have completed their tour of active service can be enlisted for three years under contract as career military professionals. When their contracts expire they can become permanent “junior officers” or officers.
Albania: The Albanian Navy is the smallest and probably least effective of all East European navies. Its low combat readiness results from serious deficiencies in training and problems with technical maintenance and spare parts. Almost all ships and craft were acquired long ago from the Soviet Union and China.
The navy operates about 50 warships (almost all small combatants) and 12 service craft, and has 3,200 personnel. The largest combatants are two or three ex-Soviet Whiskey-class submarines. These boats are, however, barely operable owing to the lack of spare parts. An additional Whiskey serves as a battery charging station (some sources say as a harbor training boat). Six Shanghai-II- class gunboats and 32 45-ton, Huchuan- class hydrofoil torpedo boats provide the navy’s offensive strength.
Two aged ex-Soviet, 330-ton, Kronshtadt-class submarine chasers provide antisubmarine capability. The mine warfare force consists of two ex-Soviet, T-43-class ocean minesweepers and six T-301-class inshore minesweepers, all kept in reserve. Reportedly, only two T-301s have been (marginally) operated since 1979. The auxiliary force includes an ex-Soviet Khobi-dass coastal tanker and a Toplivo-dass yard tanker. There is neither naval aviation nor a coastal defense capability. However, the Albanian Army reportedly has three artillery battalions guarding the approaches of naval bases and some commercial ports.
A graduate of the Yugoslav Naval Academy, Dr. Vego served 12 years in the Yugoslav Navy and attained the rank of lieutenant commander. He served for three-and-one-half years as a deck officer in the West German Merchant Marine before coming to the United States. He is currently a Research Fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses and has been published widely in the Western press on naval matters.
deal of 1982—are being completed without apparent successors. There is talk of an indigenous Indian aircraft carrier, frigates assembled in Pakistan, and submarines built in Israel. But cash is short; OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) is dying; the Iran-Iraq war is sputtering; and Arab-Israeli combat is in remission. The urgencies that drove the buying sprees of the last decade
have lost force.
The issue now is how much naval expansion these countries can digest. Here the second trend, programmatic incoherence, emerges. The region’s powerful and ambitious nations have received, or are about to receive, scores of modern combatants. Only in some of the lesser states has prudence and planning prevailed. The fleets of the larger, more
Two currents connect the navies of the cnagerie of states straddling the Tropic ( dancer. The first is the onset of en- °Py in naval procurement and pro- j arns- The energies of naval expansion ^ this area of the Third World, fueled amboyantly by oil revenues, are begin- 'ng to play out. The big programs of the ,ftly 1980s—the Iraqi armada, the Saudi awari” program, and the Indo-Soviet
status-sensitive states are in chaos.
India may be the most presumptuous nation, believing that it could leap into the fabrication of the most complex combatants—submarines, for example— without experience. Libya is surely the most promiscuous, buying whatever bright jewel of a missile boat that catches Colonel Muammar Qadaffi’s fancy, and from nearly every major Western and, of course, Soviet shipbuilder. Saudi Arabia is the most profligate: not for spending the most, but for buying show ships it does not need, especially in light of the flagrant spending of the former Shah of Iran. Iraq’s experience has been the least profitable—a balanced armada with nowhere to go; a fleet without a secure base; and without a wartime mission even in war. Only Morocco, Oman, and some of the Persian Gulf states have sought and bought navies within their means, abilities, and national goals.
The Barbary Coast
Morocco: The sultanate has sustained a rational combatant acquisition program. To cover its long coastline, Morocco acquired a dual-purpose fleet of small combatants, predominantly missile boats and patrol craft. It was reported in 1984 that the fleet might begin a high-profile frigate program. Apparently rejecting such fluff in 1985, Morocco’s agenda has stabilized within its means. More importantly, Morocco’s program reflects realistic national objectives. Morocco is seeking not a status fleet, but a usable fleet. The highest naval priority for a Third World nation with a long coastline is patrol, which is effected best with purpose-built offshore patrol vessels.
An order for an Osprey-type patrol vessel from Denmark’s Frederikshavn Vaerft was announced in June 1985. This vessel is ideal for exclusive economic zone and coast guard duties. Also announced were six 22-knot, 58-meter patrol boats to be built by Spain’s Bazan. Essentially, these will be down-rated follow-ons of the four Lazaga-class missile boats delivered in 1981-82. (Three were actually ordered on 2 October 1985, with an option for three more.) Also ordered in June were 18 14-ton customs service craft from Arcor, of La Teste,
Unlike other Islamic states, Tunisia has followed a modest but sensible naval procurement program. Instead of showier frigates, it commissioned three Exocet-armed, Combattante- IH-cIass missile patrol boats in 1985 (the second, La Galite, is shown), to provide a daunting coastal defense.
France, and six wooden-hulled, 32-meter patrol boats for the customs service from CMN, Cherbourg.
Algeria: Algeria’s naval surface strength was augmented late in October 1984 with the arrival of the third Soviet Koni-class frigate. Algerian naval missions focus, like Morocco’s, on maritime patrol. Flexible patrol craft are especially needed, perhaps later to be backed up by more capable combatants. Four follow- on, 250-ton fast patrol boats were completed for the coast guard at Mers-el- Kebir after an initial British Brooke Marine buy. More could follow, as a licensing agreement has been signed with Brooke Marine. To follow on the success of local combatant assembly, Algeria is attempting to build a full-fledged, 500- ton, 54-meter missile corvette of Bulgarian design, ordered in 1983. The first unit was reportedly fitting out in late 1984.
But Algeria pines for more naval credibility, i.e., submarines. The Soviet- loaned Romeos must be returned soon, and credible, modem boats would hone the cutting edge of its maritime diplomacy. Recently, Scott-Lithgow, formerly builders of Oberon-class attack submarines for the Royal Navy, put out Oberon feelers to the export market. These boats are very desirable for basically nonmercantile Third World navies: They are supremely quiet, commodious, and not so state-of-the-art as to intimidate personnel a generation behind the technologies of the West. Given the recent success of British combatant sales to Algeria, Oberons could appear in Algeria by 1990.
Tunisia: It is remarkable that Tunisia completed its first major modem combatant acquisition program. The La Galite entered service on 27 February 1985, the Tunis on 28 March, and the Carthage on 29 April. These Combattante-III-class missile boats are powerful and fully capable of defending Tunisian sovereignty" that there are merely three should not depreciate the Tunisian effort. At last the Tunisian Navy has some means of defending Tunisia’s Mediterranean coast. It the Tunisians are sensible, they will es" chew “window dressing” combatants for ships with more modest utility. For example, procuring more Combattante-Ws would be more useful than frigates.
Libya: Libya is an exemplar among Islamic societies: It appears to have plenty of cash for weapons even when petroleum prices have collapsed, though there are grumbles of payments m arrears in some European boardrooms, m light of Libya’s elastic geo-cultural ambitions in the Mahgreb, the commission o surplus revenues to expansion is understandable. The observer of Libyan nava procurement, however, is endlessly amazed at the waste, frivolity, and absurdity of expenditure for a navy with a mission which is, at best, marginal- Reportedly, Libya had more than 4 combatants longer than 30 meters in 1985, comprised of ships from Turkey> France, Italy, Britain, and the Soviet Union. In June 1985, four 525-tom P400-class missile corvettes capable o 34 knots were reported on order ft0111 Yugoslavia’s Kraljevica. The P400s are splendid little ship killers, packing a frig ate punch in 525-ton hulls. Libyan Pr0' curement resembles that of a distracte holiday shopper or a compulsive buyer new cars: If it is new this year, buy ll' Spanking new ships are delivered prime and tuned; they are then allowed to me chanically decompose at their moorings- Such is the sorry saga of the Dat As sawari. The pride of the Libyan Navy >1 was packed off to Italy for “repairs 1[J 1979 after only three years of occasion3 service. The 1,650-ton frigate spent l°u
COMBAT FLEETS OF THE WORLD ^
years in the dockyard, then another 20 m°nths in Italy before Libya could re- c^ive it in June 1985. Once back in Trip- 0,1 > strange things transpired. Appar- ent'y, its gas turbines were “blown” °nce again and, sure enough, it was back ln the hands of an Italian “Mr. Good- drench” by the end of 1985.
, News of new combatant deliveries dur- *ng 1985 is murky. The Soviet Konis jtave not arrived, but six of 12 SAR-33s uilding at Tashkizak, Turkey, apparently Were delivered. There are rumors nat a 100-ton midget submarine, perhaps r°m Yugoslavia, joined Libya’s six So- v,et Foxtrot attack subs.
Libyan ambitions are worn like heavyweight links from Qadaffi’s sleeve. Fully 0 landing craft are building or have been elivered from Turkey. Based on the ritish, World War II-vintage LCT.IV . esign, they have a large carrying capacity, but are open to the sea and weakened y its stresses. What does Qadaffi want ern for? A corps-level invasion of Tuni- s,a from the sea?
Two diplomatic-military agreements Underscore the vitality of Libyan Medi- ®rranean meddling. One signed with reece on 6 February 1985 is for $500 nttllion in arms, including Hellenic Ship- ynrds production. An agreement with Yugoslavia was clinched on 20 February, and promised a “closer cooperation on Security matters.” Does “cooperation” ntean more missile corvettes or 100-ton Submarines?
The Levant
. Lgypt: Plagued by poverty, the Egyp- lan Navy adopted a bifurcated combatant Procurement strategy. At face value, it k as a smart move: go for Western contents for specialized roles where supe- p0r high-tech was required; go to cheap astern sources for patrol combatants. It as not worked. Of the Chinese “cheap” Patrol combatants, Romeo-class subma- , nes> and Jianghu frigates purchased, Ur Romeos and two Jianghus (the sec- « 'n April 1985) were delivered and 0 more submarines are anticipated. It k as thought that the Jianghus might later e Properly outfitted with modem weapons and sensors in West Germany. This PParently was too expensive. As com- eted, the Jianghus would have served todUt*Iy m l^e ®att'e °f tbe Atlantic; ruay they are the equivalent of museum Phcas. Modernization would be as ex- nsive as their original procurement, g erhaps in recognition of its plight, Tgypt is making noises to the West. Two Partite minesweepers were ordered ^°m Van der Giessen de Noord on Nlarch 1985. The Red Sea mining might have forced this decision. Three patrol boats were reportedly ordered in October from South Korea’s Hyundai, where new ships are cheap but not antediluvian. Longing looks have been made at a follow-on class to the successful Ramadan large missile boats built by Vosper Thomycroft. Naturally, Vosper would like to deliver the litter. Apparently, a Bazan design and Tacoma’s 61-meter PSSM-200 are also in the running. If Egypt has the funding for such a deal, the Egyptians are not saying.
Egypt’s best move in 1985 was the acquisition of two E-2C Hawkeye aircraft for $25 million, to be delivered in 1986. They will enlarge Egypt’s strategic surveillance envelope more than any ship.
Israel: Israel also has money problems. For some time, its most cherished dreams have centered on a clutch of corvettes—big 75-meter units with all the trimmings—and on larger submarines, able to patrol the hostile waters of the farthest Arab state. The corvette design, bruited for the past two years, was officially announced as complete in 1985 by the Israeli navy commander, Rear Admiral Abraham Ben-Shushan. Four are planned. But from whence the cash?
The submarines’ story is truly convoluted. When U. S. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman visited Israel in 1985, he stated that the United States was prepared to co-produce diesel submarines at Haifa with Koor Industries, investing up to $300 million. Before this announcement, there had been baseless rumors that used nuclear-powered submarines might be made available by the United States. If a non-nuclear boat is built at an Israeli shipbuilding plant without submarine experience, what design and materials would be used? The gossip is that West Germany would be the source, offering its IKL Type-209-2000.
Limited funds dealt the Israeli Navy a major setback in 1985: The new landing craft program was abruptly cancelled. One of the major tactical-operational lessons of the war in Lebanon was the utility
After an attempt to maintain a balanced East/West military procurement program, Egypt seems to be looking for arms like the E-2C Hawkeyes it will receive this year.
of amphibious flanking. To enhance this capability, Israel planned to acquire 384 by 56 by 7-foot landing ships in 1985, capable of carrying 12 tanks, 14 armored personnel carriers, 250 troops, and two helicopters. Because of the cancellation, 600 of 800 jobs at the Haifa shipyard are apparently at risk.
The joint Israeli-U. S. hydrofoil gunboat program is also stalled. The third unit of the class, the Snapirit, was completed in June, but what was to have been a class of 12 will now await a more cost- effective design. However, some 14 U. S. Phalanx weapon systems have been ordered and are being deployed in Reshev-, Aliy ah-, and Romat-class ships. The Israeli Gabriel surface-to-surface missile appeared in a fourth version and is reported to have a range of 108 nautical miles. A program to succeed the Gabriel was announced in April.
Syria: Syria confines its naval acquisitions to those from its only “friend,” the Soviet Union. In 1985, Syria took delivery of two more Osa-IIs, bringing its missile boat squadron to 12 units, three more Zhuk patrol craft, joining the six delivered in 1984, and its first submarines— two ex-Soviet Romeos.
Lebanon: Two French ED1C 640-ton utility landing craft were delivered in late 1984 and early 1985, and a loaned sister returned to France.
The Arabian Gulf
Iraq: The Iraqi armada is still building in Italy. Of the four frigates, the Hitt in essentially was completed in March 1985, the Al Yarmouk launched in April, the Al Qadisiya launched in June, and the Tmi Qar in December. Why rush to complete them? Where will they go? Iraqi naval bases are all in the war zone, in-
55
0cc«lings / March 1986
eluding Umm Qasr, crimping the style of the Iraqi fleet. Because these ships will not be able to reach their bases, it will be difficult for them to live up to their namesakes—decisive battles at the inception of Islam. Delivery of six missile corvettes and an oiler from Italy is also stalemated.
The complexion of the long war with Iran has changed, but the “tanker war” is far from over. Although Iraq returned its five borrowed Super Entendards to France in September, newly arrived Mirages can also carry Exocet missiles as well as other French-supplied air-to- surface weapons. With the land war impossibly stalemated, speculation is fair on the disposition of the armada now in Italy. Jordanian support for Iraq has been unwavering. Could harbor space be made available at Aqaba?
Iran: The Imam’s zealots will embrace any assistance that helps prolong the struggle. Iran even approached Argentina in an effort to pick up its British-built Type-42 guided missile destroyers. The deal might have been made, but U. S. pressure scotched it. Weeks later, Britain
Iran, they were immediately declared combatants. The British-built, 33,000- ton underway replenishment oiler Kharg also became operational in Iran early in 1985.
Iran’s has been a cunning and successful strategy. European builders need cash; they can live with insults. Another example: A Netherlands shipbuilder delivered two more large landing craft to Iran in 1985. Each displacing more than 1,000 tons and 65 meters long, they followed two others provided in 1984.
Saudi Arabia: The Saudi “instant” navy, criticized in 1984, is closer to completion. The frigates Al Madinah and Hufouf were delivered in January and November, respectively. The Abha was undergoing trials in August, to be delivered in March 1986, and the Taif will follow in the summer of 1986. These ships may actually be survivable if the Saudi Government properly incorporates the Tornado fighter planes ordered from Britain. This giant S.4,000 million deal, signed in September, will give Saudi Arabia a credible maritime strike capacity ters and longer, all have been built by Vosper Thomycroft or Brooke Marine, are diesel-powered, and are armed with Exocet missiles and either OTO-Melara or Breda/Bofors guns. Amphibious needs are met by landing ships and craft supplied by British-associated builders. The fleet is modest, capable, and within the means of Oman.
Major deliveries in 1985 were the 2,200-ton landing ship Nasr Al Bahr (h1 service 13 February) and the return of the training ship Al Mabrukah (formerly the royal yacht Al Said) from refit in Britain.
Bahrain: Following Oman’s example, Bahrain is shaping a naval force tailored to its operational needs and financial limitations. The core of the Bahraini fleet consists of a quartet of Liirssen-built fast combatants, all finished since 1982. To this squadron will be added a larger pair of 63-meter corvettes ordered late in 1984, and a second pair of 45-meter missile boats. The corvettes will each have a helicopter deck atop a small hangar with an elevator to raise or lower aircraft to flight position. In addition, a 40-meter
Iran’s navy has reaped the spoils of the successful campaign waged by Islamic cash over Western politics. Britain’s semantic manuever warfare helped supply Iran with ships like the oiler Kharg despite U. S. protests.
agreed to free up tonnage lying in British yards since the Shah’s demise. That deal did go through. The landing ship tank Lavan was completed in February 1985 and arrived in Iran in April; her sister ship, the Tonb, arrived on 18 July. Britain attempted to gloss over U. S. protests (less effective here than against Argentina) by calling the ships non-combatants—medical support ships or the like. When they arrived—already armed—in by 1990. The 48 bomber-version Tornados can easily cover the Persian Gulf; the F-15s and 24 Tornado air defense versions can provide air cover. For hostile shipping, a sizeable Sea Eagle antiship missile arsenal is included in the package. It is a major package, and even Saudi Arabia cannot afford to pay cash. Times have changed.
Oman: This sultanate has pursued one of the most sensible naval programs of any in the Arab world, perhaps owing to cash-poor coffers, or because of a long association with Britain, which has nearly limited Oman to a single source. Given its modest size and resources, the offensive arm has been confined to fast combatants. Of 12 patrol craft of 25 me-
utility landing craft entered service in November, and the coast guard, a sepa rate service, took delivery of a 30-meter yacht-cwm-patrol boat from England- Kuwait: Under the shadow of an Iran-Iraq war spillover, Kuwait took d livery of two Loadmaster 33-meter util**; landing craft from Cheverton in Octob 1984, and two more early in 1985. T^ 18-meter patrol craft were delivered / Agimut Italia in June. . ,
United Arab Emirates: The Uniw^ Arab Emirates announced plans late 1984 to build a naval facility to prot® offshore oil installations, located on island of Taweelah, 45 nautical m1 , northeast of Abu Dhabi. Design vV°r^ will begin next year. No new naval cr
Will
^hich a letter of intent was signed for tee “broad-beamed” Type-21s? Or Pakistan choose Blohm & Voss’s m®ndy MEKO design? The question is uther Pakistan has the cash for either. Ij '’Ulaller units—Osa-class missile
Q,ats’ for example—may still be in the lr|ese pipeline, while a license agree, C|U with South Korea may permit the p **uing of Swallow-class patrol craft in ■dstan’s capable facilities. There are that perhaps six “formerly ^ ned” Royal Australian Air Force P-3B •pi^dime patrol aircraft may be acquired.
it be Vosper Thomycroft, with
dit' a,a: *n<^'a *s on'y heir to the trait, l?na* Western blue water fleet concept 'he wUt^wcst Asia. It alone has a carrier, \y V‘krant, which was laid down during War II but not completed until - • She can soldier on for some time,
have arrived since 1981, but the coast §uard received a small patrol craft from Ua|y late in 1985.
^he Indian Ocean
Pakistan: Pakistan seeks equality with ne'ghboring India. With destroyers and submarines, it strives for a balanced °cean-going fleet, although it will almost 'Hevirably be second hand.
The strong suit of the Pakistani Navy is submarine force: two Agostas and four aPhnes. The weak link is its ocean es- curt force. An ex-Royal Navy County- ^ ass destroyer, the Barber (e\-London), ®nds status and visibility to the navy as a l ely traveling training ship and re- vLaces an ex-Royal Navy cruiser of °rld War II vintage. For real antisubmarine warfare escort, however, Pakistan '1 relies on six antique ex-U. S. Navy -jSarin8 (DD-710)-class destroyers.
ere has been endless speculation about Possible European frigate replacements.
to P>Se are modest and necessary additions akistan’s maritime capability.
. ttuia: India is; thp nnlv Vipir tn tl
W 6 t*le most visionary °f nationalist p 'ans dream of an indigenous, sj ^hay-built ship. Apparently, a “de- ®n group” was set up in 1985, and rub of ships of up to 40,000 tons have P*ed through the defense press. Admiral K. K. Narayan himself stated that a new ship will appear in the “late 1990s.” Will it happen? A look at India’s other naval construction projects is instructive. Cruisers—the Soviet Union will be building them: Kresta IIs may be under construction there now. Destroyers—the Soviet Union will produce at least three more Kashins for Indian export. There have been reports of an indigenous destroyer design in the 5,000-ton range. “Project 15” is to be drawn up with the aid of the Netherlands’ Nevesbu design bureau. Frigates—apart from the last of three stretched Leanders, the Ganga, the Indian Navy is pursing an indigenous class of corvettes. Four 1,200-ton units were ordered in 1983. The large Vikram- class coast guard corvettes are rumored to have been intended as a class of at least 11; in fact, there will be only three. The Veera was completed in January and the Vijaya in April. These ships have trouble with slamming, lacking the sea-keeping needed by offshore patrol ships. It has been hinted that a proven design is desired, such as the superbly sea-keeping Castle-class offshore patrol vessels from Hall Russell. After the six Soviet-supplied Nanuchkas, reportedly five Tarantul- class missile corvettes will join the fleet.
In 1984, there was much talk about German diesel-electric submarines to be built at Mazagon Dockyard in Bombay.
Britain and France continue to exert significant influence in the Middle East. In Saudi Arabia, France replaced the United States as Saudi Arabia’s prime naval supplier, delivering two Al Madinah-c\ass frigates in 1985 (Al Madinah, left). In Oman, Britain continues to advise the Omani Navy and supply it with ships like the 2,200-ton landing ship Nasr Al Bahr (below).
The first two have been launched by Howaldtswerke. The first Indian unit was started at Mazagon in April 1984, but all work had ceased by July 1985, with very little progress. Not one pressure hull weld passed inspection. The program managers fled out of frustration. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is reported to be delivering at least three Kilo-class submarines of nearly twice the displacement of the German SSK-1500s.
An indigenous tank landing ship, the Magar, is fitting out at Garden Reach, and the fourth Vasco da Gama-class utility landing craft was commissioned in late July. Yet even with this type of combatant, India relies on foreign suppliers, especially the Soviet Union. A Polnocny- C was delivered from Poland in February (iChetta) and a second followed later in the year; two more can be expected by the end of 1986.
Only in naval aviation has the Indian Navy improved its maritime capability. An agreement to produce Donier Do- 2285 in India includes the acquisition of 24 maritime search radars and 100 antishipping missiles for 24 maritime patrol variants. Eight more Sea King helicopters were ordered in July from Britain, extending a 1983 order for 14. Eleven more V/STOL Sea Harriers (ten fighters, one trainer) were ordered in 1985 to complement the eight aircraft of the “White
Tiger” squadron, while a total of 30 aircraft is programmed. Also, six to eight Tu-142 Bear-F maritime reconnaissance aircraft reportedly have been ordered from the Soviet Union.
India can build basic ships and modem aircraft, but it must still order more complex combatants from the West. India should not rush its accession to symbolic equality with the West.
Sri Lanka: Faced with a massive internal security problem which has attracted India’s sympathy, Sri Lanka continues to strengthen its hitherto minimal maritime patrol capabilities to stem the influx of Tamil support from India. Six former small container ships were acquired as transports for small patrol craft, of which a variety have been ordered from China, Britain, and Israel. Meanwhile, the nation’s small but capable naval dockyard continues to build patrol craft. Two landing craft were also purchased during 1985. Nonetheless, much more needs to be done—within very limited finances—to secure the seas around the troubled island.
Dr. Vlahos is Co-Director of Security Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies, and Staf Consultant to the Johns Hopkins University Appl*e Physics Laboratory.
African Navies South of the Sahara
By Colonel Norman L. Dodd, British Army (Retired)
Economic recession, famine, and internal problems continue to plague almost all sub-Saharan African countries. Only Nigeria has significantly improved its navy, intensifying training and increasing the efficiency of its naval schools and facilities. South Africa’s internal security problems and the consequent fall in the value of the rand have inhibited the government from placing orders for corvette- type ships or submarine replacements.
A significant trend in southern Africa, except South Africa, has been the steady but quiet increase in French influence. The French scored points with these countries for their early and strong condemnation of the South African Government and by their much-heralded economic and military sanctions. Examined carefully, the sanctions proved merely rhetorical—most of the measures (for example, arms sanctions) were already in effect. French influence in Africa dates back more than 100 years; French is still spoken in many countries there, and France has either full defense treaties or technical military assistance agreements with 24 African nations. The French appear to have avoided East-West confrontations in Africa, while retaining a useful military presence to assist their friends and for their own strategic purposes. Examples of this presence include a Foreign Legion-guarded base at Djibouti on the Red Sea, facilities at Reunion Island in the Indian Ocean and the Comoro Islands near the Mozambique Strait, as well as agreements with Mauritius and the Seychelles.
The average strength of the French Indian Ocean Fleet, operating fr°m Djibouti and Saint-Denis in Reunion, >s five frigates, two Patra (Trident)-c\^ss patrol boats, one amphibious assault ship for logistics support, one tank and infantry landing craft, two oilers, and one naval repair ship. Extra submarines, destroyers, mine countermeasures vessels, and support ships are attached for exercises and emergencies.
On Africa’s west coast, the French have a good relationship with Senega* and can use the harbor at Dakar. They have air base facilities in Gabon, at Bouaf in the Central African Republic, Tog0’ and the Ivory Coast. Without much Pu^ licity or adverse comment, the Frenc have also developed a matrix of agr®e'
ments that links the French-speaking
countries with France and with eac other. Recently, the French Governnien established working relations with 1,1 Portuguese-speaking countries Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands* Spanish-speaking Guinea, and are in’ proving relations with Mozambique.
Relations among Britain, the Unite States, and the black African countries are bedeviled by the problems of aPar heid in South Africa. The strategic portance of South Africa is obvious; ■* vital that South African ports, dockyard^ and airfields remain in the hands government both friendly to the West an economically stable. Britain and * United States have considerable eC° nomic interests and assets in South A rica; many of its raw materials are vita British and U. S. defense efforts. ln’Pl^c ing full economic sanctions would popular with some black African sta ^ but could ultimately damage British 8 U. S. economies. If sanctions proved fective and a serious economic crisis