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^•th Cuba and Nicaragua looming as threats to stability in the Caribbean Basin and with shortages of combatants to fend off such threats, advanced marine vehicles could provide lle C. S. Navy with an ideal solution. By dispatching large numbers of these smaller,
•J^re affordable craft to the area, larger, more powerful combatants could be freed for uty in other parts of the world.
Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Commander in Chief Atlantic Command and U. S. Atlantic Fleet, identified our dilemma in the Caribbean Basin:
“In assessing our margin of strength relative to the Soviet Navy in the Atlantic, I concluded that our forces continue to be stretched too thin. The Navy can only execute an Atlantic strategy based on a sequential application of limited resources. The forces which could
contingency planning regarding the status of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and the probable use of marine forces to secure key basin objectives and to reinforce and resupply friendly garrisons throughout the basin. The study’s final listing of Caribbean naval missions included:
- Escort operations for the protection of Caribbean Basin shipping
- Independent antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations within the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea to counter Soviet and Cuban submarines
be called upon to secure the Caribbean Basin are the same forces that would be deployed to control the North Atlantic or to secure the Mediterranean Sea.”1
To fulfill this need, a Naval Sea Systems Command study entitled “The Caribbean—A Military Perspective” determined that advanced marine vehicles (AMVs) would be ideally suited to meet U. S. strategic objectives given the threat in the Caribbean Basin. In addition, the scope of mission responsibilities was expanded to include U. S.
- Surveillance/interdiction/blockade surface warfare °P' erations against the Cuban and Soviet naval forces, as \v’e as against clandestine arms/troop movements from Cuba and Nicaragua to other states in the basin
- Basin-wide mine countermeasure operations
- Rapid reinforcement of key strategic points (e.g., Pan ama Canal, Netherlands Antilles, and Trinidad and 1° bago) friendly to the West, as well as relocation of f°rce
- Limited (rapid reaction) amphibious assaults to secU key points within the Caribbean Basin hostile to the W*-
reoThese missions were translated into ship performance ^utrements and combat aviation system guidelines.
*e they were applicable. (See Table 1.)
- Soviet submarines
- Cuban submarines
ASW
SWATH surveillance ship
= 2000 NM transit 30 days on station
= 10 KTS transit 3 K 1S on station
35 days
SES
escort ship
= 1500 NM
=40 KTS sprint 15 KTS drift
21 days
Soviet surface combatants
f uban surface combatants
Soviet intelligence collection ships
Cuban and Nicaraguan aircraft
Cuban and Nicaraguan ground forces
Soviet inshore/ coastal mines
III
SWATH
surveillance ship
= 1200 NM transit 10 days on station
=KTS transit 15 KTS on station
21 days
SUW
A AW
AMW
M1W
IV
III
V
VI
Hydrofoil patrol boat
SWATH
surveillance ship
SES
logistic/assault
transport
ACV heavy lift amphibious lighter
SWATH mine countermeasures ship
=400 NM attack 2Vi days on station
= 1200 NM transit 10 days on station
= 1200 NM transit
=20 NM anchorage 5 hour operations
240 NM transit 18 hours on station
=40 KTS attack 20 KTS on station
=25 KTS transit 15 KTS on station
=40 KTS transit
=20 KTS
= 15 KTS transit 6 KTS on station
7 days
21 days
15 days
N/A
5 days
"'he
t0c e study identified eight AMV combatant candidates 0neU those roles, including two surface effect ships, hull CUs*1'on vehicle, four small waterplane area twin
hva 'S^ATH) ships, two of which are identical, and a nydrofoii Th *
Coe Construction and use of AMVs would increase the n,ry s escort forces and provide a larger number of
Operational area maps 1-6 and Table 1 define the advanced marine vehicles' characteristics necessary to fulfill the requirements for endurance, speed, and provisions to counteract the threat in each warfare area.
smaller, more affordable craft to secure the basin and the Atlantic coastline to Panama. AMVs so employed would also free larger, more powerful combatants for duty in other parts of the world.
In all cases, the AMVs proposed for Caribbean Basin applications benefit from an existing, extensive, and proven technology base, which includes propulsion machinery, ship controls, skirt/seal structures, propulsors, lift fans, ride control systems, foil systems, and other equipment peculiar to the type of AMVs under consideration. Most important, they can be built without time-consuming and costly research and development.
The use of AMVs to supplement our conventional naval forces is also in keeping with their unique performance capabilities and their state-of-the-art development. Finally, the AMVs’ operational capabilities are particularly well-suited for the Caribbean area environment-^ moderate sea states, good local basing support, and lii°' ited endurance requirements.
Before discussing the AMV missions, requirements, and candidates for the Caribbean Basin, it is essential to understand the strategic importance of the Caribbean to the United States both in the past and in present NAT planning. It is important to know what the regional threa is posed by the Soviets’ presence in the basin and by the>r Caribbean surrogates, particularly Cuba and Nicaragua, irj order to define U. S. Navy missions and naval operation3 requirements appropriate to the opening phases of a Eur° pean war.
The Caribbean Basin: From east to west, the Caribbean Basin extends some 2,000 miles from Barbados to Gua^ mala’s coast, and from north to south some 1,500 rTU from the U. S. Coast to the Venezuelan and Columbia
oasts. Navigable waters within the basin, including the u of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, encompass an area 0 more than 1,340,000 square miles.
Although the Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos islands 'Which belong to the United Kingdom), El Salvador, Guana’ and Suriname do not touch the Caribbean Sea, they are also considered part of the Caribbean Basin. The Ba- amas and the Turks and Caicos islands are included because of their position relative to staging areas for convoys estmed for Europe and their large oil refining facilities.
. alvador, Guyana, and Suriname have strong trade ties hh the basin’s island countries and a strategic position stride the allied sea lines of communications (SLOCs) Passing eastbound to the Atlantic between South America j" lower portion of the Lesser Antilles Windward ancl westbound to the Pacific through the Panama
th ’ t^1C maj°rity °f Caribbean nations are friendly to e United States and trade with the Free World. In a European war, most would support the West. Cuba, however, as become the center of communist revolutionary activity n the heart of the Caribbean Basin, and the most out- Poken in opposition to U. S. policies and in defense of °viet interests. A few other Caribbean states have emceed socialist precepts. Cuba has been a strong role °del. Nicaragua, and, to a lesser extent, Suriname and uyana have also challenged the Western traditions of the , atericas and U. S. policies. Prior to the U. S.-Caribbean atervention in 1983, Grenada had begun to move in that Action also.
The Soviet Threat: During the past two decades, the Vlet Union has succeeded in exporting its political, eco- j and military systems into the Western Hemisphere, ^currently has about 2,600 combat troops, 6,000 to 8,000 oth an a^visors’ ancl 4,800 Soviet military advisors and er personnel in Cuba. These advisors provide technical v,ce on Soviet-supplied weapons, such as modern MiG ,Craft> surface-to-air missile systems, and “Foxtrot” ^marines.
th • 6 ^oviets’ intelligence facility located near Havana is jteir largest such installation outside of the Soviet Union; it's suPported by about 2,000 Soviet personnel. The facil- t.y enables the Soviets to monitor U. S. military opera
tions
s.. ln the Caribbean. The Soviet intelligence-collection sv^S ^*Is) that support the Soviet command and control thefm are rcPlen'sbecl at Cuban ports. They operate off § . ■ S. East Coast and in the Caribbean regularly, as do ship*21 typographies research and space-program support
it ^graenting the Soviets’ intelligence-gathering capabil- ajrln ^'s area are Soviet Tu-95 “Bear-D” reconnaissance sin ra'! ttQt have been operating periodically from Cuba ce 1970. These aircraft are deployed in pairs and re- So 0 m ^uta f°r several weeks at a time. They support the a* reconna‘ssance missions and naval maneuvers in ver tan tic, and observe U. S. and NATO naval maneu- obtS.and training exercises. The Soviets not only have f0a’ned landing rights at Cuban airfields, but their naval es have access to Cuban naval facilities.
Soviet naval deployments to Cuba have been numerous. Since 1969, more than 20 task groups have been deployed to the Caribbean and virtually all of them have visited Cuban ports. One of those visits included a Moskva-class helicopter cruiser, which is the largest Soviet combatant ship to have visited the island.
The Cuban Threat: The value of Soviet arms delivered to Cuba since 1962 exceeds $5 billion. Soviet arms deliveries plus Cuba s $5 billion annual Soviet economic subsidy are tied to Cuba’s ongoing support of Soviet military and political objectives abroad. As a result, Cuba has by far the most formidable forces in the Caribbean Basin. In terms of size, its forces are larger than those of any other Central American or Caribbean nation, with almost 3% of its population involved. There are more than 295,000 personnel—260,000 army, one-half of whom are capable of mobilization within two to four days; 18,500 air force and air defense; 13,500 navy; and a 3,000-man coast guard. In a contingency, they can mobilize more than
- people in their paramilitary organizations.
The Cuban Air Force is one of the largest and best- equipped in Latin America. Its inventory includes about 200 Soviet-supplied jet fighters, including three squadrons of MiG-23 “Floggers.” If the MiG-23s were to stage from Nicaragua, their combat radius could include all of Central America and the northern tier of South America. Cuba has also recently acquired An-26 short-range transports that could be used for transporting troops or supplies to Nicaragua and other basin objectives. They could be used to support commando operations, targeting vulnerable oil refining facilities.
The Cuban Navy has about 75 ships of all types, including nine 250-ton ‘Turya”-class hydrofoils, 22 missile attack boats, three 2,100-ton, diesel-powered “Foxtrot”- dass submarines, and two 2,300-ton “Koni”-class frigates. Integrated into an operational force, they will enable Cuba to conduct operations throughout the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of Mexico, and, to a limited extent, the Atlantic Ocean. The Cuban Navy’s defensive missions would be carried out by “Osa”- and “Komar”-class missile attack boats, whose ranges also extend well into the Caribbean. Armed with SS-N-2 “Styx” antishipping cruise missiles, they could readily be used to intercept allied shipping.
In addition to their forces at home, Cuban advisors are supporting revolutionary activities overseas and in the Caribbean Basin, including the Central American states. Before October 1983, they were assisting the governments of Guyana, Suriname, Nicaragua, and Grenada. By State Department estimates, about 6,000 Cuban civilians and
- Cuban military advisors are serving in Nicaragua alone.
The Nicaraguan Threat: Nicaragua currently has about
- personnel on active duty, including regular forces and mobilized militia/reserves. Rearming the nation’s ground forces has priority. Air force capabilities, however, are being developed, and Sandinista officials have announced intentions to acquire jet combat aircraft. The near-term payoff for the Soviets would center on the air bases and ports that Nicaragua might attempt to make available to Cuban and Soviet forces.
To<*edi
The Grenadan Threat: Following the 1983 military operation by forces of the United States and six Caribbean island-nations to rescue U. S. citizens and to restore order and democracy in Grenada, much was openly disclosed concerning the role that Grenada had been playing in the Caribbean for its mentors—Cuba and the Soviet Union. For example, Cuban military units had established fortifications, arms caches, and military communications facilities on the island.
Captured documents showed that the Soviet Union and North Korea, as well as Cuba, had made secret treaties with Grenada, calling for the importation of massive amounts of arms. Taken together, Soviet and Cuban plans amounted to turning the island from a tourist paradise into what President Ronald Reagan aptly called, “a Soviet- Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion to export and undermine democracy.”2
The United States had been concerned that Grenada could be used as a staging area for subversion of nearby governments, for interdiction of SLOCs, and for transit of troops and supplies from Cuba to Africa, and from Eastern Europe and Libya to Central America. Within a 575-mile radius of Grenada—the range of Cuba’s MiG-23 fighter/ bombers—are the fields, refineries, tanker ports, and sea- lanes which supply nearly 50% of the oil imported by the United States.
The U. S. Challenge: Nearly half of all our foreign trade and petroleum passes by sea through the basin, which is our lifeline to the outside world. In a future NATO/War- saw Pact war at least half of our supplies and nearly all of the fuel for NATO would use those SLOCs. Two of the SLOCs are choke points, the Straits of Florida, which separates Key West from Cuba by just 90 miles, and the Yucatan Channel, which separates Mexico from Cuba by less than 100 miles. All reinforcements and allied shipping would pass through one or both of these choke points. Victory will depend on the ability of the United States to sustain the tempo of mechanized combat by delivering massive quantities of fuel, ammunition, and other war materials to European ports. The burden of securing the basin, in the event of global hostilities, rests with U. S. forces.
The Soviet Union is presenting a greater challenge to our security in the Caribbean today than Germany did during World War II. The Soviets have access to bases and nations friendly to their interests in the region—Nazi Germany had negligible support for its military. Yet in the summer of 1942, Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, the head of the German submarine forces, boasted that, “. . . our submarines are operating close inshore along the coast of the United States of America so that bathers and sometimes entire coastal cities are witnesses to that drama of war, whose visual climaxes are constituted by the red glorioles of blazing tankers.”3
Not six months before, the first of Admiral Doenitz’s U-boats entered the Caribbean Sea and sank five tankers at Aruba in the Netherland Antilles. In addition, the U-boat surfaced and shelled the Lago oil refinery, setting fire to it. Tankers were loaded at the refinery islands of Curacao and Aruba in the Netherlands Antilles, which served the rich Venezuelan oil fields of Lake Maracaibo. In the following weeks, as additional U-boats came on the scene, losses to the shallow-draft Maracaibo tanker fleet seriously affected oil production on Aruba and Curacao. By the end of 1942, the heavy losses of tankers in the area had highlighted the strategic importance of the Caribbean Basin as the fuel depot for the Allied war effort. Yet, Germany did this without a naval base or an ally in the area; Cuba was our staunchest ally.
Four tankers each day were needed to sustain the domestic needs of Great Britain alone. During 1942, nearly 35% of the gross tonnage of shipping lost in the Atlantic area while en route to Europe went down in the Caribbean Basin.
The majority of refined petroleum products (e.g., diesel and jet fuel) required for future combat operations in a NATO war would come from the Caribbean Basin from U. S. refining facilities along the Gulf Coast and from major refining centers along the coasts of South America and the island chain encircling the Caribbean Sea. The oil refining and tanker port facilities in the region today are among the largest in the world. Not only do the ports handle regional production, but they are also transshipment points for crude oil moving into the basin from Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Far East.
Modem highly mechanized combat forces will tax our ability to sustain them. In the future, fuel needs alone will be more than 11 times greater per man for every day 10 combat than they were in World War II. We cannot tolerate the oil tanker shipping losses we sustained early n* World War II, particularly since the average oil tankers cargo deadweight (payload) is now approximately 12 times that of World War II designs. The loss of a single such ship in a future conflict could mean the loss of a year’s supply of fuel for a modem infantry division. Securing an uninterrupted flow of vital war material through the area in a European war would be absolutely essentia* for NATO.
Since World War II, our mind-set has rejected the idea of a serious threat from our neighbors to the south. Yet- modem geopolitics and warfare technology have change** those outdated perceptions. Consistent with a Caribbean state’s ability to wage war at an increased tempo is the Soviets’ desire to extend their operational bases to the Caribbean and Central and South America. These trends have grossly altered the area’s security and have brought the Soviet threat to our doorstep. This is where the AM vs enter.
AMV Response: The Naval Sea Systems Command veloped operational area maps for Caribbean Basin AM missions. Developing these maps was instrumental in at** ing in defining desirable platform endurance and spee characteristics. In addition, they related those requ*re ments to specific strategic objectives. Using these maps’ detailed platform, design, and combat/aviation syste*TlS characteristics were developed. .
All of the designs can fulfill the proposed naval missi^ requirements in the Caribbean Basin. (See Table 2.)
Hull Form
SES ASW SES
Escort Logistics/Assault Hydrofoil
SWATH Mine Countermeasures
SWATH
ASW
Design
Pull Load Displacement (LT) Military/Cargo Payload (LT) Lightship Weight (LT) hhip Fuel (LT)
Overall Length (Ft)
Overall Beam (Ft)
Navigation Draft (Ft) Off-cushion (Ft) On-cushion (Ft)
Foilbome (Ft)
Hullbome (Ft)
Oombat System
tas
FCS
ECM (ChafO IFF
Towed Array Major Caliber Gun ASMD Gun Short-range SAMs uitermediate-range SAMs ^hort-range ASMs Short-range SSMs Jutermediate-range SSMs
lamps
Torpedoes
eofcs
Eistatic Radar Hi-rate Gun ine Warfare Systems
sortass
Marine/Army Inf. Bn. e*Tormance
Orsepower, Propulsion (HP) Lnnse Speed (Kts)
^S3,* Foilbome ^S3, Hullbome ^S3, On-cushion ^S3, Off-cushion ^S3, Maximum ^S2, Cruise ^S2, Maximum U ^2, On-cushion Kange (NM)
^S3, On-cushion ^S3, Off-cushion ^S3, Hullbome ^3, At Maximum Speed
^S3, At Cruise Speed
ACV
1,500
66
1,035
256
308
66
9
16
1,800
157-484
1,089
502-150
365
79
16
9
175
10
111
47
103
35
880
50
770
70
162
56
15
2,400
120
1,750
600
226
78
20
265
89
160
16
125
65
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
8
6
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
45,000 | 45,000 | 11,794 |
|
| 40 |
| 16 | 10 |
43 | 40 |
|
20 |
|
|
960
3,518
2,089-624
5,822-1,743
1,449
2,800
1,600
8,000
10
15
11
25
M
^S3, Foilbome . S2, On-cushion
,a»>ning Officers Enlisted
946
1,200
1,700 +
5 days on station
2,000 +
30 days towing
14
103
9
19
2
10
5
45
5
37
290
Total Crew of 5
. = Idem re;° “ Command- Contr°L and Communications; TAS = Target Acquisition System; FCS = Fire Control System; ECM = Electronic Countermeasures;
M*ssile- LaS_ Fnend °r F°e; ASMD = Antiship Missile Defense; SAM = Surface-to-Air Missile; ASM = Air-to-Surface Missile; SSM = Surface-to-Surface WS - Light Airborne Multipurpose System; EOFCS = Electro-Optical Fire Control System; SURTASS = Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System
Dc
Mr. Stoiko’s 36-year engineering career is about equally divided be tween industry (General Electric and Martin Marietta) and the LI. ■ Navy. In industry (1950-69), he was technical director on a large nutn her of pioneering missile, booster, and space programs, including * ^ Hermes, Viking, Vanguard, and Titan families of missiles, the Uyn_a. Soar Manned Sub-Orbital Program, the Vanguard Earth Satellite Orb*
iments
neering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and his ma^r.^ degree in product design from Illinois Institute of Technology. Eaw^,
some cases, the designs were based directly on existing craft with minor changes in craft geometry, machinery choice, and arrangements. In others, they were based on detailed design studies that benefited from extensive model-testing data bases and well-developed structural and machinery design concepts. In a few cases, the AMV designs were the result of an amalgamation of features appropriate for the mission application, or were developed by Froude-scaling craft characteristics over a small size range. In all cases, dramatic breakthroughs in subsystem technologies were neither assumed nor anticipated.
Inasmuch as speed is tactically valuable in many Caribbean Basin military situations, choosing an AMV design which would require minimum power for given speed, range, and payload characteristics was the key criterion for the selection of candidate designs. Ride quality was also important, particularly for those applications where higher endurance was a primary concern.
The United States has been working on all of the proposed AMV candidates for the past 30 years. During this period, the advanced ship research and development budget has been austere, but significant progress has been made. Most of the AMV ship technology is developed to the point where the full-scale construction risks are either minimal or nonexistent. Yet a follow-on to scale or prototype construction has not occurred.
The U. S. Navy’s AMV technical advocate teams have all independently and jointly experienced the same fate— insufficient support to move into the final phases of their proof-of-concept cycle. As a result, our available force levels in AMVs are currently comparable to pedestrian powers worldwide. For example, of the more than 1,300 military and commercial advanced ships operating around the globe, the United States has only 2% of the total; the Soviet Union has more than 52% of the total, with more on the way. Where once we were in the lead, we must now play catch-up.
In the past, we invested heavily in AM Vs. We had assembled a respectable number of professional people, both in-house for the Navy and in industry, and we were gradually building a national industrial capability. This buildup is declining at an alarming rate. Even if we restore previous funding levels, there still would be an appreciable time lag before we could restore our capabilities to the 1980 levels.
Our current buildup of conventional naval forces is just about keeping pace with our increasing worldwide commitments. Area and regional shortages of combatants win continue to prevail for the Caribbean. AM Vs present an acceptable approach to fulfilling Caribbean Basin mission needs, while providing the nation with the assets and opet' ational experience it needs to assess fully the military worth of its AMVs for larger, more capable combatants- 'Wesley L. McDonald, “Our Atlantic Strategy; Strengths and Weakness fense, August 1983.
2Grenada: October 25 to November 2, 1983, Department of Defense, 1983- 3Samuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic 1938-1943 (Little Brown Company, 1947).
Program, and Gemini Manned Orbital Program. His Navy assignn (1969-85) were as Chief of the Advanced Design and the Surface Eff®c ^ Space Projects Office and as Program Manager for both the Exten Planning Annex Program and for the Reverse Technology Transfer r gram at the Naval Sea Systems Command. Mr. jStoiko has written wa technical articles; 11 of his books have been published in the Uni States and several foreign countries.
Mr. Luedeke received his bachelor of science degree in mechanical en»
master. Early 1
his career, he joined General Motors as a designer. From 1964 to J ^aS he was with Hughes Aircraft Company. Since 1974, Mr. Luedeke been employed at RMI, Inc., in a variety of positions. He is curre directing marketing design and construction activities on a 60 long SWATH craft for commercial and law enforcement application.