ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Contents:
Surface Warfare: What Does the Future Hold?
Maneuver at Sea Keeping Open the Sea-Lanes Northern Flank Maritime Offensive The Maritime Strategy 75 Years of Naval Aviation Another Halfway Measure What is the ‘Drug War’ Threat?
Equal Rights, Equal Risks
The Public’s Right to Know
The Terrorist Threat: Is the Navy Ready?
Standby for Weigh-Off
A New Dynamic Duo for the Carriers?
JCS Reorganization
JCS Reorganization: Part II
A New Old COD
CP&I: Who Are We Kidding?
The Achilles’ Heel
Surface Warfare and Surface Warriors Is That All There Is?
The Surface Combatants
“Surface Warfare: What Does the Future Hold?”
(See Secretary's Notes, pp. 11-13, January 1986 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Robert M. Tata, U. S. Navy— Sometimes in our frenzy to retain our critically skilled “Airdales” and “Nukes,” the U. S. Navy seems to overlook that stalwart of the sea-lanes, the Surface Warrior. Meanwhile, the 1985 retention rate for surface warfare officers (SWOs) has dipped below Naval Military Personnel Command’s current “required rate” of 49% to 47%. This potentially dangerous downward trend in SWO manpower is especially worrisome as we prepare for the 600-ship Navy. Something must be done now to ensure that we have qualified SWOs to man those 600 ships. I propose the following SWO retention design (SWORD, for acronym buffs) to enhance existing programs. I believe these three practical measures will help increase retention of our quality Surface Warriors:
► Attach follow-on ship assignments to Surface Warfare Officer Department Head School orders. Behavioral scientists cite “security” and “certainty as strong motives for individuals to remain in their original jobs and career fields. Unfortunately, during the critical four- to six-year SWO “split-window” period, (when the SWO pool “splits, with roughly half going to department head school at Newport and half “splitting to civilian careers), the SWO faces some of the most severe uncertainties of his career. Accepting orders to Newport and committing to a follow-on department head tour without a follow-on ship assignment creates a situation with these disincentives: a financial disincentive that occurs with the loss of a spouse s income for six months, the costs of two permanent change-of-station moves in one year, and the additional costs associated with selling or renting property—all resulting in a considerable financial loss; a continuity disincentive that involves deciding where and when to move the family and find new schools for the kids, before he knows for certain where he will be stationed next; a control disincentive that occurs when an SWO loses his leverage with the detailer—once he commits to department head school and the consequent two-year obligation. This leaves an SWO feeling that he has little control over his own destiny.
Adding follow-on ship assignments to department head school orders will give the SWO and his family more information to effectively deal with the critical decisions that affect both lifestyle and career. Of course, the detailers will dislike the extra difficulty. But at the career point when many top SWOs head for department head school, they are also courted by Fortune 500 firms promising $35,000-plus incomes, cars, and bonus plans, at known locations. The least we can do is tell our officers where they will be stationed before we ask them for a two-and-a-half-year commitment.
► Award SWO performance bonuses (SPBs) to all first-screen primary department head school selectees. Because of various social and economic forces, the military will never be able to compete financially with private industry for top talent. Besides emphasizing other retention incentives, then, we must devise methods to get more bang for our manpower buck. Empirical studies have repeatedly supported the hypothesis that performance-linked rewards are more effective than across-the-board rewards. The SPB is performance-based, and would tend to retain our achievers while enhancing overall performance through competition. Not only would a $5,000 SPB help overcome the top SWOs’ financial losses—associated with attending department head school—but it would contribute incentives that reach further than money in improving an officer’s performance. Through the SPB, the Navy would be telling its top surface warriors, “We want you. We need you. You are important!”
► Assign senior officer “mentors” (captain or above) to all junior officers reporting aboard ship. Most of the role model, career counseling, and other nurturing functions can be taken care of by a ship’s commanding officer. But the desire to talk with a non-reporting senior in an informal and confidential manner sometimes arises. COs might come and go frequently during an officer’s early career stages, but his mentor would remain as a trusted advisor and confidant- A junior SWO might call on his mentor only once or twice a year—or maybe not
Comment and Discussion
(Continued from page 33)
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“A New Dynamic Duo for the
Carriers?”
(See J. E. Kline, pp. 124-127, October 1985
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Lawrence T. DiRitz, U. S. Navy—Certainly there are few surface warfare officers (SWOs) who have spent any appreciable time in combatants and not experienced the utter frustration of trying to maintain station during carrier flight operations, as described by Lieutenant Kline. But I find his analysis and recommended solution slightly lacking.
Having ‘ ‘personally observed flight operations on an aircraft carrier,” Lieutenant Kline correctly concludes that the ship’s movements are bound to the vagaries of the launch cycles, including wind, sea state, fuel states, and more. To aid the commanding officer (CO) in safe shiphandling during flight ops, Lieutenant Kline recommends assigning a postcommand SWO to be navigator for many reasons, including the experience such an officer could offer as “an expert in . . . navigation.”
Some obvious questions arise: What will the presence of a senior SWO on the bridge do to help the wind stay in the desired envelope? What can he do to ensure that the 1160 ensign combat information center watch officer remembers to tell the plane guard that his rudder is left? Furthermore, the support and advice a carrier CO needs are more likely to be aircraft- critical, not navigation-critical. It is unthinkable that the CO would turn to his
navigator in the midst of a recovery and ask whether 6° or 8° rudder should be used to get to Fox Corpen (launch course)! Indeed, Lieutenant Kline is dead wrong in assuming that “the advantages of having an experienced mariner on the bridge outweigh his initial ignorance of flight operations.”
Lieutenant Kline’s other recommendations are somewhat tautologic in light of existing policy. The advantages that the junior SWOs could realize by the presence of a senior SWO are available now: Carrier chief engineers fit the postcommand SWO description of the proposed navigator, and the engineer’s main collateral duty is director of the SWO training program. In fact, the “ ‘best and brightest’ concept” proposed by Lieutenant Kline to attract post-command SWOs to carriers is the method used to select them now.
I reject Lieutenant Kline’s proposal that the executive officer (XO) assume the role presently filled by the navigator “in support of the CO in monitoring flight operations during lengthy employment.” During lengthy flight ops, the XO effectively runs the non-flight operations because of the need for the CO’s presence on the bridge—a presence which he is prevented, by regulation and common sense, from delegating to anyone.
Clearly there are some problems, but they can be addressed through proper training, and this is where the senior SWO concept can be applied. The SWO junior officer training program on many carriers is extremely rigorous in order to prevent any difficulties. The finest offi' cers-of-the-deck I have observed (an admittedly limited observation of only a dozen or so) have been those who spent their formative years in carriers. What Lieutenant Kline is understandably reluctant to acknowledge is that aviators can become proficient at a skill that most SWOs like to consider their very own shipboard navigation. I urge Lieutenant Kline to spend more time in a carrier. A carrier tour is refreshing assurance that the present system, while it may be difficult to believe on the bridge of the plane guard, is the “least-worst” solution to a most challenging problem.
“JCS Reorganization”
(See T. R. Fedyszyn, pp. 80-87, July 1985; W. G. Hanne, pp. 88-96, July 1985;
R. Previdi, p. 16, August 1985; W. H. Rice, p. 168, October 1985; R. C. Burke, p. 159, November 1985 Proceedings)
“JCS Reorganization: Part II”
(See S. T. Tangredi, pp. 87-93, September 1985; J. T. Hayward, pp. 93-100, September 1985; R. C. Burk, p. 159, November 1985 Proceedings)
Michael S. Schwendeman—Capta'n
Burk makes several good points in hi* critique of the various Joint Chiefs 0 Staff (JCS) reorganization articles an letters. He is, however, off-base in h>s criticism of Commander Fedyszyn’s assertion that the United States has experl enced a “negligible loss of friendly terrl tory” under the current JCS organization-
Captain Burk implies that the blame for the loss of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia’ Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Libya, Eth>° pia, and other nations to communism o other forms of radicalism belongs to tfl JCS. This is absurd. In the case of Liby*^ Qadaffi came to power by a coup that th United States could npt help preve^ without blatantly interfering with Libya internal affairs and thus upsetting the pre carious Middle East situation and causin- a loss of U. S. influence there.
In the majority of the other case*j U. S. military power was never employ® because of decisions made by the civil* authorities, although the JCS made 1 opinions known during the decis*0
making process. Similarly, the loss of Southeast Asia to Soviet-backed North Vietnamese imperialism was only partially, if at all, a JCS failure. Military and political strategy mostly followed decisions from the civilian echelons of the National Command Authority. The final collapse of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam stemmed from the complete failure of our political and national will to enforce the Paris Peace Accords. Congressional actions in 1973 and later— typified by then-House Majority Leader Thomas O’Neill’s comment that Cambodia was not worth one U. S. pilot— blocked the Nixon administration’s efforts to support our Southeast Asian allies. With insufficient U. S. aid from a vindictive U. S. Congress and no hope of direct U. S. intervention, the South Vietnamese Government was unable to stop the communist juggernaut. Consequently, the Soviets now enjoy the sun and surf year-round at Cam Ranh Bay.
The JCS is not without flaws. However, it is important to remember that the Joint Chiefs of Staff is only one link— and not the most important one—in the National Command Authority chain. No matter how well-structured the JCS becomes, and how timely and sound JCS members’ advice may be, it will be for naught if our public and political leaders lack the vision and will to use American power with courage and decisiveness.
“A New Old COD”
(See R. H. Purnell, pp. 108-111, January 1986
Proceedings)
Lieutenant E. H. Lundquist, Public Affairs Officer, Naval Air Station Sigonella, U. S. Navy—Commander Purnell is right—the Navy liked the old C-2A Greyhound carrier on-board delivery aircraft so much that it bought 39 more. The first four C-2As are now operating with Fleet Logistics Support Squadron Twenty-four (VR-24), U. S. Naval Air Station, Sigonella, Sicily. They may look the same and have the same name, but the reprocured C-2A is an entirely new airplane, better in nearly every way. The new aircraft fly faster and farther, and are safer and more comfortable than their forerunners.
VR-24 is the first squadron to receive the reprocured C-2A. The new aircraft will eventually replace the current C-2As, called “SLEPs” because they’ve received “service life extension program” modifications. The first two new C-2As arrived at Sigonella in September 1985, and the second pair arrived in October 1985. Only VR-24 at Sigonella and
VRC-50 at Cubi Point, Philippines now fly C-2As. Eventually, six squadrons will fly the new aircraft. VR-24 will have all new C-2As by fiscal year 1988.
According to Commander William T. Meyers, the commanding officer ot VR-24 when the first reprocured aircraft arrived at Sigonella, the most important improvement is the more powerful engine, with one-third more horsepower than the old C-2A’s engine.
The old aircraft has a 260-knot speed restriction, while the new C-2A flies at the 343-knot design speed, and can fly about 5,000 feet higher and thus lW miles farther. The reprocured C-2A s engine also allows for a full takeoff l°a under adverse conditions.
The average basic weight of the new aircraft, including accessories, is about 37,000 pounds. Maximum carrier landing weight is 46,000 pounds, according to Naval Air Training and Operating cedures Standardization (NATOPS)- With additional weight for fuel included, it is not possible for the aircraft to carry the full 10,000 pounds of cargo as Commander Purnell states and Grumman Aef' ospace advertises. Grumman is working on increasing the maximum takeot weight and maximum carrier landing weight.
However, maximum weight is notusm
61 Of
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crew members don’t agree with D .^roander Purnell about installing a fe r°ll"0n/,r0ll‘off system. They
e that a pallet could not be loaded , 0peurly to remain secured in a catapult
or an arrested landing.
IK
I
y a problem. A C-2A can be com- Petely loaded to space capacity with ar®0’ leaving one row of seats for the tiireW’anc* st'^ have a cargo weight less an 7,000 pounds. Although the cargo c^®fls larger in the new aircraft, it really n t carry any more cargo because an ?ls e must be left for the crew to move ro and aft in the cabin, oading time takes about one hour and minutes, and unloading between 30- C ^lnutes- h *s lengthy and arduous, but
launch
--------------------- lanuiiig.
id re^ roembers also advise against the D a °‘ configuring the aircraft solely for 10 j6n8ers. because the C-2A’s standard car C°ns'sls thousands of pounds of and mail, and very few passengers, nav' 6 rePr°cured C-2As have improved tig I^at’orl antl communications capabili- dist' ^ac'l'tatlng the aircraft’s long- ins anCe fli8hts over water toward a mov- cont aircraA carrier, however a self- "’ouIh'i?^ inertial navigation system •s n m°re usefuL Transition training fr_, ®cessary for crew members going caus 3 C-2A to a new C-2A hero® navigation, power, and procedures are different. The new avionics are easier to maintain, and the new auxiliary power unit is tied into the hydraulic system so that system can be tested without ground support equipment.
The first two pilots to land a reprocured C-2A on a carrier, Lieutenant Commander John LaBella and Lieutenant Commander Dan Archer, sum up their opinion of the differences between a SLEP C-2A and the new one as comparable to the differences “between a VW bug and a Cadillac.”
There are a few more minor differences between the old and new aircraft. The new C-2A is three inches higher because of the new nose landing gear, and has two and one-half inches longer cargo space. There are new, more accessible life rafts, an added safety feature. There is more sound insulation and padding, and a new type of interior so it is much quieter and more comfortable, which is especially nice on a long flight to the “flat-top.” With all the changes incorporated into the new C-2A, it is still a C-2 that uses components common to aircraft in the fleet, fitting easily into fleet operations and maintenance routines.
As with any other new aircraft, there are a few problems to work out, such as the problem of getting parts. But initial indications show that the aircraft is going to be very reliable. According to the commanding officer of VR-24, Commander C. F. Wise, operational data have shown a 50% reduction in direct maintenance man hours per flight hour, which means less work requirements for maintenance personnel and less money spent on expensive spare parts.
The C-2As are busier than ever. In fiscal year 1982, VR-24 averaged 200,000 pounds of cargo and mail and 550 passengers delivered each month. In fiscal year 1985, they averaged more than 260,000 pounds of cargo and mail and 930 passengers each month, with a 30% increase in flight hours. In one cruise, VR-24 C-2As fly enough passengers to and from a carrier to completely replace all personnel in a ship’s company and air wing complement. They have supported up to three carrier battle groups at one time. VR-24 will eventually fly eight C-2As out of Sigonella.
Rear Admiral Warren E. Aut, Commander Fleet Air Mediterranean, has said that he “simply cannot support the carrier battle groups at sea” without the C-2As and CH-53 Superstallions at Sigonella. With the old C-1A Traders at the end of their service lives, and the original 12 C-2As- close to retirement, there is no doubt that the reprocured C-2A is the right airplane for this vital mission.
System An Intruder Can’t Afford To Ignore
. ^ A Qn rtrji . i : 1 _ / . . LI . — O A k/\i irr .—. .—J . f r* • I — 4 a 1C I - ? I i.
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“CP&I: Who Are We Kidding?”
(See R. D. Watkins, pp. 140-141, October
1985 Proceedings)
Captain W. James Doyle, U. S. Navy (Retired), Training Manager, RMI, Inc., builder of the special warfare craft- medium—I enjoyed reading Commander Watkins’s article. His major concern appears to be the availability of a craft suitable for coastal patrol and interdiction (CP&I). Without getting into a discussion of whether or not the special warfare craft-medium (SWCM) will be used for one or a combination of the missions Commander Watkins addresses, I would like to clarify some points on the
RMI. INC.
The Sea Viking has the space and weight required to accommodate Harpoon or Pengiun missiles.
SWCM’s armament suite.
The current Sea Viking (the approved name for the class) design includes the provision of two M-242 25-mm. automatic cannons, two .50-caliber machine guns, and a portable Stinger missile system. Space and weight assignments have been made for two EX-35 gun weapon systems (to replace the M-242 cannons) and two Lynx sight gun directors. Space and weight reservations have also been made for the installation of either a Harpoon or a Penguin missile system. Either system will provide a four-missile capability. This armament will be supported by the most advanced electronic and optical surveillance systems available.
This armament, combined with the speed advantage of a surface effect ship, results in a craft that will be extremely effective in performing any or all of the missions Commander Watkins addresses in his article.
“The Achilles’ Heel”
(See J. P. Kelly, pp. 41-45, November 1985;
R. N. Gottshall, W. H. Doherty, p. 16, January
1986 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) S. T. Con- naughton, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve— Captain Kelly’s article examines possible uses for commercial tankers in amphibious and naval operations, and he believes that “large” tankers (I assume that to mean very large crude oil carriers [VLCCs] or ultra large crude carriers [ULCCs]) should be used as decoy vessels during amphibious and naval operations to protect high-value naval vessels from enemy missiles. While the concept of using low-value units to protect high- value units is not new, the idea of using high-value units to protect high-value units is. Many will laugh at the suggestion that tankers are high-value units. In wartime, however, they will be.
Presently, the United States has only a handful of VLCCs and ULCCs in its merchant fleet, and they are engaged almost exclusively in trades that are protected from foreign competition, such as the Alaskan oil trade. The majority of U. S. tankers are comparatively small, sometimes referred to as a “handy size,” and they too are used almost exclusively in the trades protected from foreign competition. Both types of tankers are disappearing as domestic competition from pipelines and tug and barge combinations, as well as diminishing oil demands, take their toll. There are no U. S.-flag tank vessels under construction or in the planning stage. This leads to a situation in which the United States will probably be left with only a handful of tankers in the future. Those that remain will be used exclusively in the Alaskan oil trade, since that trade cannot be economically challenged by pipelines or tugs and barges. However, even these tankers may disappear if Alaskan crude is exported to Japan, presumably by foreign vessels, and crude is imported from Mexico by pipelines. The U. S.-flag fleet, the most reliable and available source of tankers for our military operations, will have few, if any at all, sizable tankers remaining.
We should consider foreign-flag tanker availability since we can rule out U. S.- flag tankers. Captain Kelly points out that currently there is a world tanker glut- While this is true, we must realize that the tanker glut is only temporary and the world tanker market is already showing signs of improvement. Within the next few years, supply and demand for large tankers will probably even out, especially when you consider that the service life of large tankers is only around ten years and that the majority of today’s tankers were built in the early to mid-1970s.
So, while there may not be an obvious comparison between the value of units such as an aircraft carrier and a tanker during peacetime, in wartime, when enemy action, increased oil demand, and the aforementioned economic reasons collide, the shortage of tankers will become acute, and tankers can, and wiH> become high-value units. Tankers are the lifeline of U. S. and world economies’ and those vessels that remain will probably be pushed to their limit in wartime to meet the world energy needs. Even ifvve buy large tankers now for use as decoy vessels, as Captain Kelly suggests, itlS quite reasonable to assume that these Pre' cious vessels will be diverted to their natural trade to serve real energy demands by the military and the economy.
If Captain Kelly is looking for decoy vessels for use when speed is not imp0^' tant, i.e., amphibious operations (lets also face the fact that VLCCs and ULCCS are not fast enough for naval operations)’ might I suggest an alternative, tug au barge combinations. This will fill tw<!
will register as a large target on enemy radar and attract enemy missiles (a loade VLCC or ULCC may not, depending the freeboard), thus answering the nee for decoy vessels. Second, by using un manned barges, we would get away fr0fl the suicide vessel syndrome that wou result from using manned vessels a decoy ships. The article argues ma manned decoy vessels could have the personnel evacuated by helicopter if tfl vessel is attacked; I find it difficult to be lieve that the Navy or Marines will ha extra helicopters available to transpo personnel off damaged vessels in a fu scale amphibious assault.
Surface Warfare and Surface Warriors”
“eeJ- Metcalf, pp. 65-80, October 1985; P. B. Manon, P- 16, December 1985 Proceedings)
Captain James K. Pernini, U. S. Navy— enjoyed the interesting interview with lce Admiral Joseph Metcalf in your ^cellent Surface Warfare Issue. His en-
sirf'aStlC’ uP‘^eat message concerning . ace warriors and ships was encourag- timdy, and on-target. However, like a miral Metcalf, “I don’t necessarily ■ f r®e wuh many of the views expressed ln the Proceedings."
am in the final days of my 27-month l jUri'n command of USS Sumter (LST- w *'■ I heartily disagree with Admiral etcalf s suggestion that the Sumter is an antCOrnPhcated ship suitable for a lieuten- commander command. During the CQSt tw° years, the Sumter successfully mpleted a wide variety of operational fissions in the Caribbean, North Atlan- ’ a"h m an extended deployment to the ti e lterranean, with an on-board popula- q " almost 600 officers and enlisted Pat ,i Navy’ 310 Marines). We partici- PhiN *n nat'onal antt multi-national am- riet l0US °Perati°ns> an(l supported a va- «, ^ S. military presence missions hmughout the Med.
in firmly believe that an LST command- lead° ''Cer re4u'res as much, if not more, c . ership and seagoing experience as his We'Ser'destroyer counterpart. The LST’s coiTM-n systems may not be technically re Pucated, but our “primary battery” leanlreS a Pr°ficien,; and experienced Ha f|f chaHenges of an LST com- and ^ 316 aS comprehensive, demanding, rewarding as any other commander C0!"mand at sea.
Is That All There Is?”
R. Harris and J. Benkert, pp. 32-37, 19st Cr '®®i5; t L. Byron, pp. 23-26, January 66 Proceedings)
^he Surface Combatants”
Murnh' Polmar’ PP- 185-187, October 1985; J. ^ ^ y» p. 112, December 1985 Proceedings)
He^enant H. Lampee, U. S. Naval aid r\C' ^etlred)—Commander Harris nlajfe lieutenant Commander Benkert hata an exceHent case for surface com- °f 1 ships which have been shoved out eXpee spotlight by more glamorous (and Certnsive> nuclear-powered carriers. v'de *i ^ carrier groups cannot pro- letj,sa 'he answers to our defense prob- gjVe’ Particularly when several, at any hme, must be in port for repairs
and replenishment.
It is difficult to accept the theory that 100 U. S. nuclear-powered attack submarines, no matter how quiet and technologically advanced, can cope with the more than 300 Soviet submarines in the vastness of the oceans. One lesson that I learned during World War II is that the oceans are BIG.
After reading Norman Polmar’s rundown of the projected 600-ship Navy, I am not at all sure that our new fleet can implement Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s admonition to “git thar fustest with the mostest . . . .”
It doesn’t help to have Polmar remind me that the 29 new Arleigh Burke guided missile destroyers will be missing LAMPS; that the Spruance antisubmarine warfare (ASW) destroyers are poorly armed; and that until the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates get LAMPS-III/ towed-array sonar, “their ASW effectiveness is extremely limited.”
The real answer to all those Soviet submarines, it seems to me, has appeared in the pages of the Proceedings for years: those full-page advertisements by Bell/ Boeing for the V-22 Osprey (formerly known as the X-15 or JVX). So far, the Navy’s only interest in the V-22 is as a Marine assault transport.
Out of curiosity, I wrote Bell in Dallas and received a packet which stated: the X-15 (JVX, V-22) can carry all current ASW weapons and sensors, including the Mk-46 torpedo; as a plane, it can do 300 knots; its wings pivot to permit efficient stowage aboard ship; and it has passed extensive shipboard tests on board the USS Tripoli (LPH-10).
Why not procure a batch of modem 30-knot gas-turbine containership hulls, convert them to auxiliary ASW carriers, and stuff them with V-22s? This would provide a cost-efficient answer to our ASW problem, not apparent in our current naval planning. In addition, since the V-22 can also carry a Tomahawk missile, our jeep carriers could be used for other missions.
Where would the money come from? Turn again to Polmar’s article and note the two-phase reactivation of the four /owa-class battleships. When that expensive exercise is over, we get ten-year ships, useful for “political presence,” with limited missile-strike capability.
Putting these anachronisms back in mothballs would shake loose some dollars. Besides, it would get the Missouri (BB-63) back in Bremerton, Washington, as a museum ship. Over the years, I’ve enjoyed boarding her just to admire the brass plate on her deck, marking the spot where the Japanese surrendered.
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at all—but he can take steady comfort in knowing that he has at least one “insider” on his side. As the junior officers begin to reach mid-grade levels and are no longer in need of their mentors, the mentors would naturally fade away through retirement. Current manpower levels would dictate a ratio of approximately 12 junior officers per mentor, a manageable load for the senior officers.
The “SWORD” I’ve offered here to help battle our sagging retention figures is by no means a panacea, but it does have a proper focus—caring. It cares enough to aid smooth relocations, to recognize and reward our best, and to guide and nurture our junior officers. The surface warfare community is commonly characterized as eating its young. It’s time we began taking care of our people, instead.
Editor’s Note: The author’s comment arises from a question he asked of one of the panels featured in the U. S. Naval Institute’s surface warfare seminar, held in Norfolk, Virginia.
“Maneuver at Sea’’
(See T. L. Jacobs, pp. 60 -64, December 1985 Proceedings)
“Keeping Open the Sea-Lanes”
(See R. A. Bowling, pp. 92-98, December 1985 Proceedings)
“Northern Flank Maritime Offensive”
(See H. K. O’Donnell, pp. 42-57, September 1985; R. B. Kelley, pp. 16-20, October 1985;
J. H. Lacouture, pp. 20-23, December 1985;
B. Grimstvedt, R. W. Komer, p. 19, January 1986 Proceedings)
Norman Friedman, recognized naval analyst and author of numerous reference books on ships and weapon systems— Neither the Soviet Navy nor the U. S. maritime strategy is readily recognizable in these contributions by Captains Jacobs, Bowling, and Lacouture. The Soviet Navy is hardly an assemblage of inexpensive warships designed for attrition warfare. It is, rather, a combination of two quite different navies: an expensive blue-water fleet and a numerous fleet of more or less coastal units, such as corvettes. Soviet blue-water warships, such as the Kirov, can hardly be described as “low-tech,” although I would suggest that we tend to exaggerate the success of the upper end of the Soviet technological spectrum.
Despite Captain Jacobs’ attempt, current U. S. tactical thinking can not easily be described in terms of “attrition” and “maneuver,” terms more comfortably used in land warfare. On land, the objective is a position; the destruction of an enemy’s army is one of several means to that end. For example, in 1940, the Germans won partly because it became obvious that the French Army could not prevent them from seizing the primary objective, the French political power represented by Paris. The French Army could not engage the Germans effectively, because the Germans maneuvered too rapidly. At sea, the objective is much more diffuse: It is to secure free use of the sea. The total destruction of the enemy naval force is the most obvious means to that end, and it can be achieved in several ways. No matter how that is done, however, it involves the attrition of the enemy force. Captain Jacobs seems to advocate what used to be called attack at source, and that is indeed the goal (perhaps poorly stated) of the current maritime strategy.
Captain Bowling’s image of a Soviet Navy designed specifically to cut NATO sea-lanes seems somewhat dated. The current consensus is surely that the Soviets will emphasize the defense of their bastions, at least at the beginning of a war. The problem of the Soviet submarine force is really rather different from the one posited by Captain Bowling. It is that, over the first few weeks of an inconclusive war, the Soviet General Staff may realize just how valuable those sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are. The General Staff would then force the navy to direct a larger fraction of its submarine force against the SLOCs. The problem for us, then, is to act from the outset to convince the Soviets that the threat we pose in their home waters is so severe that they cannot afford to go after the SLOCs. The current U. S. maritime strategy presents this threat in three primary forms: the anti-SSBN (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine) offensive, the presence of submarine-carried cruise missiles in forward areas, and the presence of carrier battle groups in northern waters. The characteristics of the new Seawolf {SSN- 21)-class nuclear attack submarine are peculiarly well adapted to this strategy.
These issues suggest some problems with Captain Lacouture’s comments on Major O’Donnell’s article. Captain Lacouture assumes that any future war would begin as a result of a reasoned Soviet decision to make an all-out attack on Western Europe. This decision in turn would be made only if the Soviets thought they could win quickly. Need one suggest that the German General
19
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Staff thought as much in 1914? Historically, short wars have rarely been the rule. Murphy’s Law applies to the East as well as the West.
Captain Lacouture’s image of a coldblooded Soviet decision for general war seems misleading. The captain is right to observe that the men in the Kremlin are indeed extremely conservative. It would take a great deal to convince them to risk a war with NATO. It would take much less to convince them to fight, say in Poland or in East Germany, to preserve their own system. That internal quarrel might, under particularly propitious circumstances, escalate—relatively slowly. Slow escalation gives NATO time to prepare, and probably ensures that the big war, if it comes, will not end quickly.
For that matter, Captain Lacouture might well argue that any reasonable Soviet military planner would opt for the quick attack in Western Europe. However, political considerations would intervene. The Soviet Government is run by Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, not by the chief of its General Staff. Mr. Gorbachev and his civilian colleagues would have to approve a plan for general war. Surely they are more likely to choose some form of gradualism. Perhaps the most important consequence of the existence of nuclear weapons is just that: The civilians may well, in an emergency, tend to overrule short-term military logic. How many times has that happened in the United States?
All this political science matters because U. S. national strategy is predicated on a tacit judgment as to which of several scenarios is most likely. If the most likely scenario is the premeditated Soviet blitzkrieg assumed by Captain Lacouture, then slow-acting maritime forces can seem less important than more first-line strength on the ground. If the slow escalation scenario is accepted as much more plausible, then the emphasis should be on the forces required to sustain mobilization in a protracted war.
Further, I suggest that some of what I see as misconceptions in these contributions are the consequence of the long absence of an overall explicit strategic outlook in the United States, and even more so in the U. S. Navy. The current maritime strategy attempts to fill this gap. Traditionally, Navy expositions of “strategy” have been lists of naval missions, without much interconnection. Such non-strategies tend to exacerbate traditional “union” tensions and also divert attention from the problems of war-fighting, which demand a much more integrated concept of naval forces.
Given severe limits on its total resources, the Navy cannot carry out its wide range of missions without close attention to the way in which they interact. This attention must include some estimate of the relative likelihood of different scenarios, or of different classes of scenarios. In particular, the same naval forces must be able to project U. S. power into the Third World and also to deal with the Soviets. The current maritime strategy envisages gaining sea control through the techniques of power projection. In doing so, it considers the Soviet threat, which is by no means limited to submarines. Instead, the Soviets threaten our sea-lanes with a combination of submarines and missile-firing bombers. The convoy antisubmarine warfare (ASW) escorts are unlikely to attrite the missile-launching bombers, which will never come within range of the escorts’ surface-to-air missiles. Something more is needed.
The U. S. Navy plans to use its long- range carrier aircraft (striking Soviet bases and fighting an outer air battle) to destroy the Soviet naval bomber force. The only alternative is to rely on land- based, long-range fighters. However, experience suggests that land-based aircraft cannot be relied upon to arrive in time to fight distant air battles over the world’s oceans.
The current maritime strategy posits a U. S. submarine threat to Soviet home areas (e.g., SSBN bastions) designed to force the Soviets to keep most of their submarines in those areas to prosecute their own ASW battle—a predilection we suspect they have. Carrier battle groups heading north are expected to provoke a decisive engagement with the other major elements of the potential Soviet sea- denial force: their bombers and, to a lesser extent, their surface and submarine antiship forces.
It is obvious that such a decisive battle would be difficult. The historical record suggests that the alternative, a Soviet naval air “fleet in being,” is much worse, because it would neutralize U. Inoffensive sea power, at just the time would be most valuable. World War I experience demonstrates the most interesting case in point. The Royal Navy faced two German threats: a conventional battle fleet and a submarine fleet. The usual argument is that the British built up their surface fleet in blissful ignorance o> the potentially decisive power of the German U-boats. Is that not what current critics say the U. S. Navy has done? Ha* it not built up a battle fleet (the earners) at the expense of ASW forces?
Both sets of critics ignore the effective integration of the two threats. In Wort
War I, the German battle fleet was quite as ^angerous a potential shipping killer as Were the U-boats. It, too, had to be neutralized. As a fleet in being, it prevented he British from using their fleet effec- hvely in the larger war in which both countries were engaged. The British tfi ere fore could not afford to use their eet to affect the outcome of the land bat- t e, for example by attacking the seaward anks of the German land army, or mov- jng into German coastal waters, where ey might have supported the kind of ,lrect attacks (and mining) which would ave neutralized the U-boat threat at its s°urce. That in turn would have been jfiuch more efficient than convoy war- are’ Particularly given the primitive state 0 ASW sensors and weapons. In this sense even an immobile High Seas Fleet Provided essential support for the U-
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In the absence of a British surface fleet o counter them, the German surface war- ■Ps would have been more effective commerce raiders than U-boats. They ere much more mobile, and could have cated merchant ships over a much ider area, since their lookouts were ,Uch higher above water. Each surface 'P also carried many more rounds of mrnunition. The U-boats were effective, j^01 because they were inherently efficient ^eans of sinking merchant ships, but cause the much more efficient surface arships had been almost completely eat^aI*zed by the British surface fleet. Se “e British World War I experience c eitls to be a reasonable analogy to the of^h*11 s'tuah°n. The Soviet equivalent bo k Seas Fleet is the missile-
^mber force of Soviet Naval Aviation. ti ?.tend to ignore the bombers (as an an- 'Pping threat) mainly, I suspect, be- y,Usei °f historical accident. In World SLOP [^e Davy’s share of Allied ^ Protection was the Central and thgStern Atlantic, where U-boats were t^ja So*e important problem. The Royal
grat^H Way contrast> faced an inte- c_ ed. submarine and air antishipping n Pa'§n. in areas like the Mediterra- man ^ north- The British used 0p y °I their escort carriers primarily to "'he^6 ^*®bters for shipping protection, reas (j § escort carriers operated pW ah groups.
tainl°StWar S. naval war planning cer- S0vy emphasize the threat posed by po *et aaval aviation. However, this as- Prot rece*ve(i little publicity, and SLOC reasect*°n was equated with ASW. One b°mbe W^y was 'hat the Soviet naval f0rc rs became described as anti-carrier that^r°m a strategic view, this meant e U. S. carrier force was expected to neutralize an extremely potent antishipping threat. Unfortunately, overall naval strategy was hardly explicit. Instead, the Navy tended to break up into “unions,” each of which dealt primarily with one aspect of the overall problem. For example, outside the carrier community, the NATO Strike Fleet was considered a kind of ritual justification for carrier operations, rather than a means of neutralizing the very serious threat of Soviet naval air attack on shipping.
This was also the era of ASW through attacks at source—as now. The new German submarines which Captain Bowling mentions had outclassed the convoy escorts, to the point that new ideas, such as mining and submarine offensives in Soviet home waters, had to be adopted. Again, since the carriers would be the means of mining and of directly attacking Soviet submarine bases, projection and sea control (ASW) were close relatives, rather than opponents competing for scarce funds.
By the mid-1950s the emphasis of U. S. planning shifted to deterrence through the threat of prompt nuclear attack. The earlier interest in shipping protection through combined antisubmarine and antiair warfare offensives was largely forgotten, because it had been restricted to only a few senior officers. By the time circumstances had changed so as to make these ideas relevant again, the cryptic position papers of the early postwar period had generally been retired to archives. The public record, in this case badly flawed, was the chief source of naval strategic tradition. Ironically, the current situation is probably more like that of the early postwar period than that of the later period of deterrence and nuclear threat.
The U. S. maritime strategy appears to be an effective solution to the U. S. strategic problem. Moreover, almost any strategy is much better than none. To choose a strategy shifts attention from arguments about basics to arguments about the means of actually implementing strategy, from philosophy, if you will, to war-fighting tactics. Most important, a strategy is a way of making the painful budget choices, among competing programs all of which are quite respectable from a technical point of view.
I believe that the choice to have an explicit naval strategy is the single most important U. S. naval development of the last five years, and also that it is still largely unappreciated. Most of us have not yet begun to think strategically. If we fail to learn to do so, we shall throw away a promising opportunity.
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The Maritime Strategy
(See Supplement, January 1985 Proceedings)
Major Glenn M. Harned, U. S. Army—I would like to provide an Army officer’s perspective of the U. S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy and its place in theater operations. The U. S. Maritime Strategy provides the Navy with an integrated strategic framework for its peacetime plans and programs, and for the wartime employment of its naval forces. It correctly takes into account the United States’s position as a global maritime power, not a Eurasian continental power. Many Army officers believe U. S. strategy must revolve around the Seventh Army and the critical Central Front of NATO. But as Admiral Watkins noted in the supplement, the United States cannot legally, morally, or strategically afford to abandon its more exposed allies to the military expediency of concentrating all its military effort on the Central Front. Some Army opposition to the Maritime Strategy occurs because the Army lacks a corresponding “Continental Strategy” for the conduct of strategic air-land operations within the context of a global war with the Soviet Union. The Army’s planning and programming suffer for the lack of a coherent global strategy.
The Army’s air-land battle doctrine intentionally avoids strategic issues, and instead focuses on the operational problems associated with winning an air-land campaign for a generic theater commander. Because of this difference in focus between Navy strategy and Army doctrine, the Army reform movement has so far focused on the operational level of war, neglecting to link these air-land operations with the strategy it must support. I congratulate the Navy on making this linkage early, and reforming its operations and tactics on the basis of a coherent strategy for deterrence, crisis response, and war termination.
Now for the bad news. While the Navy has finally published its Maritime Strategy in an unclassified forum, the rest of the services are still in the dark concerning what Navy Secretary John Lehman refers to as ‘ ‘the fundamental mechanics of war at sea.” There is no unclassified “umbrella” document that integrates the many diverse aspects of naval warfare into a unified and coherent doctrine for the planning and conduct of naval campaigns. Without such a document, the officers of other services will continue to misunderstand the reasons for the naval world view. The Navy still has not told Army and Air Force officers how it intends to fight, operationally and tactically, in support of its air-land campaigns and the overall theater campaign plan. Without this fundamental knowledge, the other services’ suspicions bom of ignorance will continue.
I first became frustrated by my dearth of knowledge about naval operations while a student at the Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth. We learned the number and type of aircraft in a carrier air wing, the size and range of naval guns, and the role of the Military Sealift Command in strategic deployment, but we learned nothing of the tactical employment of naval forces or, more important, the naval officer’s different view of the world, and how that different perspective affects Navy participation in joint operations. This CGSC failure became evident in the college’s Joint Middle East Exercise, during which the Army officers playing the unified command had no comprehension of what the theater’s naval forces (played by their Navy counterparts at the Naval War College) were, or should have been, doing. The intellectual gap between the two student bodies was staggering.
My professional curiosity piqued, I enrolled in the Naval War College’s nonresident course in the Employment of Naval Forces, and soon learned to my dismay that the Navy classifies the bulk of its tactical doctrine. I found myself studying naval tactics and techniques from collections of journal articles and faculty notes. Lacking any coherent “umbrella” document similar to the Army’s Field Manual 100-5, Operations, I had to draw some very tentative conclusions as to how the Navy intends to fight if deterrence fails.
It wasn’t until my second year of study at Fort Leavenworth that I was exposed to Navy operational theory and doctrine in a systematic fashion. As part of the Advanced Military Studies Program, we studied the Navy’s Maritime Strategy, and I was fortunate enough to help play the role of the fleet in a Southwest Asia war game. For the first time, I began to understand why the Navy thinks and behaves differently than the other services. From my efforts to wage an offensive sea control campaign during that Southwest Asia exercise, I concluded that there are good reasons for the fundamental divergence in the way our services regard war. And if we are to synchronize our efforts to maintain the “violent peace” or, failing in that, to terminate the next war on favorable terms, we must recognize that this divergence exists, and strive to minimize its effect on our warfighting capabilities. Let us examine some areas of service divergence:
- Theater perspective—Many Army officers accuse the Navy of emphasizing naval operations on the periphery of the decisive air-land campaign. This is true, because the Navy necessarily brings a theater, perhaps global, strategic perspective to any regional conflict. While the Army seeks to limit the scope of the air-land battle, the Navy focuses on gaining or maintaining naval supremacy in the theater. Given the global nature of the sea lanes, the range of Soviet naval aviation bombers, and the inherent strategic mobility of naval surface and subsurface forces, the Navy must be able to destroy, or at least neutralize, all naval threats to the theater before it can support the airland battle by projecting its firepower ashore. The Army has only recently accepted the Air Force argument that counterair to achieve air superiority is a prerequisite for close air support and battlefield interdiction. The Navy needs to make a similar case to the Army that sea control is a prerequisite for power projection and sealift.
- Avoidance of joint operations—Many Army officers believe the Navy is reluctant to get involved in joint operations to support the air-land battle. They fail to realize that the Navy is already “joint”— it possesses its own air and ground forces, optimal for supporting naval campaigns. The Navy considers joint maritime operations to be the Army and Air Force augmenting existing naval capabilities. Perhaps it is unfair for the Army to expect naval support before the Navy wins its own battle for sea control, which is why Congress created the Navy in the first place.
- Nature of combat losses—Many Army officers deride the Navy for fighting conservatively, for refusing to put its ships at risk to support the air-land battle, and for emphasizing fleet defense at the expense of offensive capability. There is good reason for this naval conservatism in the early phases of a war with the Soviet Union. While the Army and Air Force both expect a more or less gradual attrition of their forces in combat, Navy losses tend to be catastrophic. When the Navy loses a ship or submarine, it loses a complete fighting unit that cannot be replaced in the near-term. If the Army risked the total annihilation of a brigade every time it came within 300 miles ot the enemy, I’m sure it would also “figh1 conservatively.”
Despite these areas of divergence, there are critical areas of interface that require close integration among the Navy and other services in any theater war- Chief of Naval Operations Admira James Watkins mentions some of them, but they need elaboration:
- Air defense—Control of the air is the key to winning a theater war. As Admiral Watkins noted in the supplement, while the land battle may be the only way to win such a war, success on the land presupposes air and naval superiority. If the United States wins in the air and at sea, the worst it can do on the land is a stalemate. Winning in the air and at sea requires an integrated and centrally managed theater air defense effort. Only the total integration of early warning and defensive counterair/antiair assets will protect the fleet from Soviet naval aviation attacks.
- Intelligence—Because the Soviet Union has an integrated strategy seeking to employ all Soviet military forces in a coherent fashion, the U. S. unified command and service components must look for connections between Soviet land, air, and naval actions. The intelligence specialists of each service must talk to each other and know what questions to ask.
- Sealift—The Army cannot deploy or sustain itself without strategic sealift, which the Air Force also depends on for bulk resupply. There is little need to fight for sea control if we have no sealift to exploit the advantage that sea control gives us. In 1984, Secretary Lehman recognized this fact when he raised sealift to the Navy’s third primary mission. But the Navy must continue to improve its capabilities in this long-neglected aspect of sea power.
- Land attack—The Navy no longer has just naval gunfire to offer the Army. The recommissioned battleships carry a 2,500-kilometer range Tomahawk cruise missile with a 1,000-pound conventional warhead, and soon many other surface and subsurface combatants will also carry them. The Navy must determine how best to integrate this capability into theater interdiction efforts, and the Army and Air Force must learn how to request this type of naval land attack support and influence the naval targeting process.
- Logistics—There must be more commonality, not necessarily involving major items (the McNamara era amply demonstrated the futility of developing allpurpose weapon systems) but including expendables and consumables. While theater logistics is a service responsibility, the theater commander must be in a position to eliminate duplication of effort and to demand greater flexibility in order to shift combat service support to the decisive place in the theater. Service component autonomy will necessarily suffer, but the theater commander must exercise more operational control over logistics matters.
The Navy certainly can address all these operational concerns within the context of the Maritime Strategy. If the Navy is serious about emphasizing cooperation with other services, it simply must do a better job of educating the officers of those services in how the Navy intends to fight. “The Maritime Strategy” is a critical step in the right direction, but the Navy should follow it with an unclassified document of operational and tactical doctrine that can be used at Army and Air Force service schools, and at joint headquarters, to provide the fundamentals of naval warfare doctrine as an integrated and coherent whole. Given the wide diversity of specialties within the Navy itself, such a document should also be useful in reducing the parochialism among naval aviation, surface, and subsurface officers. The Navy must not let the overclassification of its doctrine stand in the way of the inter-service education process that “The Maritime Strategy” has so admirably begun.
“75 Years of Naval Aviation”
(.See Cover, January 1986 Proceedings)
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“Another Halfway Measure”
(,See F. D. DeMasi, pp. 142-144, July 1985;
L. G. Williams, p. 168, October 1985; D. T.
Norris, p. 30, November 1985 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Kevin H. Baxter, U. S. Navy— Of the many divergent opinions expressed, there seems to be a general disapproval of specialization in the surface line community. John Paul Jones wrote some 200 years ago that “It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that, of course, but also a great deal more.” The important phrase is “a great deal more.” The requirement then was for highly skilled and experienced officers, able to handle any situation. The current trend toward specialization threatens to render extinct the last vestiges of that breed—the original unrestricted line officers, now called surface warfare officers.
As Commander DeMasi notes, the weakest link appears to be in the area of engineering. It is not, as stated by Commander Williams, that the engineers cannot find their way to the ship’s combat information center without a map. Before screening for executive officer, the operations or weapons officer has to qualify as an engineering officer of the watch. Since only the engineers have any appreciable time in the engineroom during the department head tour, this qualification obviously has to be achieved during the division officer tour—no doubt in the copious free time afforded the junior officer trying to run a division, audit stamps, and qualify as a surface warrior. When this wicket and the “opposite training’ wicket for PXOs are cleared, the end product of this program is supposed to be a generalist by fiat. One is reminded of a pertinent old saw: “Six months ago, I couldn’t spell surface warrior. Now I are one.”
Another objection to the specialization scourge is that when an officer relieves the command duty officer in-port, he must be fluent in the language and function of each department. This means that he must be intimately familiar with his own division or department and also have in-depth knowledge of how the supply system works, how to line up an educator, whom to address on an operational report, and what constitutes an overheated magazine. Also, as a tactical action officer in any evolution more complicated than moving a paint-float, he will be required to have at his fingertips information on his ship’s capabilities and those of any accompanying ships, all Per" tinent data on each of the varied aircraft his ship may have to control, and everything there is to know about his potential adversary. De jure, he is an engineer, but as tactical action officer he is a de fad0 weaponeer who shoots the guys wearing black hats, and a de facto ops-type who must figure out how and to whom he should report his victory. Obviously. is not even a good approximation of a specialist.
Surface line officers must be “jacks- of-all-trades.” We are the traditiona mariners referred to by John Paul Jones- and thus cannot afford to limit ourselves to the confines of our own “fishbowls-
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What is the ‘Drug War’ Threat?”
N- c- Venzke, pp. 114-115, December 1985 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Dave Lee Brannon, U. S.
oast Guard—Admiral Venzke covers a variety of approaches to handling the struggle against drugs, but the bottom *ne appears to be the appointment of a drug czar,” preferably from the Coast Cuard, to run the entire show. Also, there are several problems with the drug situa- hon that render his sole agency solution ^effective. I have a counterproposal.
The war on drugs is not a war in the uulitary sense of the word. In combating e drug problem, there are many restraints on the use of force. People who are caught and accused of smuggling rugs must be tried in our legal system; hose people have rights that must be respected. There is no single command Providing strategic and tactical direction or the smugglers. These factors render e purely military approach to the opera- 1Qn less than effective.
The call for a drug czar ignores some Very important political realities. Like it 0r not, and I like it, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Customs Ser- v'oe, the FBI, the U. S. Attorney Gener- f s Office, the Coast Guard, and local
Play in drug law enforcement. Each of Jse agencies has a mission along with s role in the drug war. Each agency has tess-than-adequate stock of resources. ach agency assigns its own assets better ar*h more effectively than anyone else ^°uld. In view of the current political sit- atl°n, the drug czar almost undoubtedly ould not be a Coast Guard officer. °uld we (the Coast Guard) want to ear the reassignment of a Coast Guard ter from law enforcement to search ^nd rescue with the head of DEA? Would e Want our patrol boats to operate under . ustoms control? Each of these situations p much more likely than having DEA or U\V°mS wor^'n8 f°r the Coast Guard, what solutions are available? First, we . e to improve our intelligence opera- °ns and our activity in the coastal zone. e National Narcotics Border Interdic- d°n System (NNBIS) is effective in coor- Hating blue-water interdiction, but the e°ple who know the most about what is
the'n^ °n *n coasta* zone arc found in state and local agencies. They have ti® Contacts and the long-term continuity (La military doesn’t have. In Miami,
*S a ^'ver Intelligence Group, origi- no ^ targeted at the Miami River, but arW covering the entire Dade County ea- It is made up of the Florida Marine
Patrol, local police departments, the FBI, Customs, NNBIS, and the Coast Guard. This group consistently uncovers useful intelligence and facilitates good working relations in the field. NNBIS should encourage the formation of these groups throughout the country, share NNBIS information, and disseminate local group intelligence.
The Department of Defense must participate more effectively. The Air Force has an air defense mission. The aircraft used for smuggling drugs could just as easily be carrying terrorists, Soviet agents, nuclear devices, or other unwanted payloads. The Air Force should be checking these planes and should force those that do not properly identify themselves to land at the closest airfield. The A-10 would be an excellent aircraft to handle these low, slow aircraft. One reason the military in various Latin American countries do not take our drug interdiction program seriously is that we treat these air contacts too lightly.
The Navy also needs to take a more effective role in boarding suspected drug-smuggling vessels. The Posse Com- itatus Act was meant to end the use of Federal troops to police state elections in the former Confederate states after the Civil War. The act does not bar naval action against U. S. vessels, as illustrated by the Navy’s policy of boarding U. S. vessels. U. S. law does not give foreign vessels greater rights than those afforded U. S. vessels. Therefore, if the Navy can be used as a platform to board U. S. vessels, there is no domestic law preventing the Navy from boarding foreign and stateless vessels as well.
The use of Navy vessels against foreign and stateless vessels is also not prohibited by international law. Both Articles 22 and 23 of the Convention on the High Seas contemplate the use of warships to enforce the right of approach and hot pursuit when the laws of the coastal state have been violated. The definition of a warship under Article 8 of the Convention on the High Seas covers a Navy vessel, just as it does a Coast Guard cutter. Thus, there is no international law prohibition.
Current Navy policy allows the Coast Guard to board—from Navy vessels— U. S.-flag vessels, stateless vessels, and foreign-flag vessels that give their consent. This results in the ludicrous situation of a boarding party going on board a foreign-flag vessel, finding contraband, being told by the master to leave, and returning to the Navy vessel to watch the smuggler continue on his way. A Spru- ance-class destroyer then stands by until an 11-knot Coast Guard buoy tender built
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FLY WITH CONFIDENCE
in the 1940s arrives to handle the situation. The boarding party leaves the Navy vessel, boards the Coast Guard vessel, and then boards the smuggler who, by that time, has had ample opportunity to dispose of any incriminating evidence. This must change.
We have a system that jogs; we need a system that sprints. We can make this happen by getting even more active help from the Department of Defense. Surveillance alone is not enough; we have to catch the people we see. President Reagan declared the struggle against drugs to be an important issue of national security, and he assigned Vice President George Bush to head the fight. The entire U. S. Government needs to work together to win this fight.
“Equal Rights, Equal Risks”
(See R. M. Hixson, pp. 37-41, September I9S5; R. J. Keevers, R. A. Fielding, L.
Masters, pp. 106-109. November 1985; K. C. Mathews, p. 110. December 1985; R. F. Couey, p. 16. January 1985 Proceedings)
Commander H. F. Van Der Grinten, Merchant Marine Reserve, U. S. Naval Reserve—It is good to see that the problem of women in the Navy is open for discussion again. We in the civilian seafaring professions can possibly lead the way in establishing a policy for female service in the Navy which will stand the test of time. The civilian professions are not hampered by combat restrictions, legal restraints on nepotism, or the rigorous prohibitions on fraternization which inhibit the Navy’s efforts to solve the problem of women on board Navy ships.
It is apparent from Commander Hixson’s article that the Navy is trying to conform to the modem trend of blurring the distinction between the sexes in career paths: A woman is to be treated as just another one of the guys. This might be the wisest course to follow right now, and as long as women can be considered to be just like the guys, it will probably be successful. As Commander Hixson pointed out, however, the difficulty lies in defining the limits of this illusion.
There is an alternative solution which celebrates the differences between the sexes. For eons, men and women have worked together successfully as married couples. Yet Navy policy steadfastly abstains from considering such a possibility on board ship, perhaps for fear of conflicting with the aforementioned prohibitions on fraternization and nepotism. I can, however, provide recent anecdotal evidence that married couples can work together successfully at sea.
My wife and I spent more than four years working together on board a 165- foot seismic vessel in the North Sea, a body of water which is officially recognized for its severe conditions. We were happy spending ten continuous months aboard ship each year. Not only was it a pleasure, but I believe that we contributed greatly to the excellent productivity of the vessel. We are convinced that there is merit in putting romance to work for seafaring. There surely is an enormous number of couples with the skills and aptitude for doing as we did.
A class of vessels is coming on line which could be used to test the hypotheses that married couples perform superbly in a ship’s crew, especially during a long deployment. These vessels—i.e., the Stalwalt-class T-AGOSs—are manned by civilians and will spend many weeks at sea, engaged in ocean surveillance. I suggest that the Navy crew them largely with married couples.
“The Public’s Right to Know”
CSee w. Sidle, pp. 37-43, July 1985; J. F. Abel, M. J. Offenbach, p. 16, September 1985; R. S. Reade, p. 171, October 1985 Proceedings)
Major Andrew J. Franklin, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, Associate Regional Director, Family Planning, International Assistance, African Regional Office— General Sidle mentions “the now famous photo of a dead U. S. pilot on the beach at Grenada” as an example of possible media overcoverage that does not really fall under the public’s “need-to-know category. It would have been more appropriate had this photo been considered by his panel as an example of the American media’s propensity for displaying exercises of force by U. S. troops in the most unfavorable light possible. In an operation noteworthy for the low number of friendly casualties, the prominent display of a dead serviceman could only serve to demoralize public opinion—f°r pictures certainly have more emotional impact than narratives do. Every minor setback and delay in completing the seizure of Grenada was blown out of Pr°' portion by media representatives who seemed to relish the thought of U. S- combat ineptness, regardless of the truth or the real reasons for prosecuting th<j campaign in a deliberately measure manner. Unless the overwhelming maj°r' ity of media representatives can correct or suppress their ideological bias and rein i° their kneejerk tendency to report everything from a negative perspective, these reporters will just have to become accus tomed to being excluded from the ear y stages of military operations.
The Terrorist Threat: Is the Navy Ready?”
(5ee M. B. Pizzo, pp. 121-125, November 15,85 Proceedings)
Captain M. H. Decker, U. S. Marine orps-—Major Pizzo believes the Marine orps task of providing “detachments nd organizations for service on armed Vessels of the Navy, and security detachments for the protection of naval property a naval stations and bases” is a signifiCant niission that does not receive enough Priority from the Marine Corps. But since , National Security Act of 26 July 1947 . So requires the Marine Corps to main- am tf)ree division/wing teams, the man-
IPm ^6Ve^ op t^lc ^eet Marine Force MF) must be considered when allocat- i*8 Marines to the Marine Corps Security forces (MCSF).
When NSC-68 was signed by President arry S. Truman on 30 September 1950,
> ° Weeks after the 1st Marine Division cin6 ^ at ^nc*10n> United States offi- ^la !y shifted from an exclusively nuclear J" errent strategy to one based on both r nventional and nuclear force deter- ^nce- Since then, readiness has been a ,^aJor topic at congressional budget hear- a3s' As the services reduced strength to er the Vietnam War, Congress began 9 (westion the reason for more than rack Marines serving at Marine bar, c s. and the effects this practice could on FMF readiness.
and °n^.ress atso noted the cost of training bel rna'nta*ning a Marine for duties far Un ?w h>s capabilities. The Marine Corps Catierst00d that there would be no justifi- *°n h°r an end-strength increase while dm at'tra*ned Marines were standing bil^ °n questionable posts. About 3,000 ye ®ts Were eliminated over the next few has S understand better the effect this the °n reac*'ness> try to imagine going to andCOrnrnanding general of each division ^ asking him to give up 1,000 Marines. in„ S’ lhe 6,500 ceiling for Marines serv- rtteans ^ MUSF is not arbitrary by any
55 e Wtary of the Navy Instruction u, '4 WaS j°int,y drafted by the Com- Chipf ant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and sure °f Naval Operations (CNO) to en- C0n.P^°Per employment of the MCSF. anj p,!IWas Purposely placed with CMC ttamt ^ rather than the unified corn- aged Cr ^ecause MCSFs must be man- 6,5qo w a 8l°hal scale. Dividing the ci'fic Pi annes dually among CinC Pa- Pleet r?Ct (CinC PacFlt), CinC Atlantic pUro’ OinC United States Naval Forces ,euisPr’ 3nd Commander Naval Sea Sys- -j, °rnmand is not feasible.
e support billets (or “overhead”)
for the MCSF were considered when Sec- Navlnst 5530.4 was drafted. The Marine Corps Requirements Manual is used to determine the number and type of support billets needed for Marine-specialty training, administration, and logistics. The percentage of support billets is lower than the percentage found at a unit supported exclusively by Marines, because vehicle and facilities maintenance and other services are all provided by the Navy.
Major Pizzo’s figure of 14% overhead is accurate, although it has been lowered in the past year by removing some of the billets listed in his table. For example, the 37 barracks and grounds noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were removed from the MCSF rolls after a renewed commitment from the CNO to ensure that barracks receive adequate support from the naval bases in facilities maintenance and landscaping. On the other hand, the listing of marksmanship instructors as unnecessary billets for Marines is an interesting concept, as is the listing of the ship detachment supply unit, since this unit supports the Marine Corps-unique supply requirements of MCSFs afloat. The MCSF overhead is lower than most organizations’, and whatever overhead it has directly supports the guard force.
As for Major Pizzo’s reaction force initiative, the comments of the barracks commanding officers (COs) he interviewed say it all. MCSF reaction forces are not organized or trained to be SWAT teams; they are organized to attack and destroy intruders.
The Marine Corps’ current end- strength can provide only 6,500 Marines for MCSF duty while accomplishing our primary responsibility of maintaining a ready three division/wing force. Unfortunately, Marine detachments afloat, a part of the MCSF, were not accounted for in the original MCSF reductions. The expansion of the Navy’s aircraft carrier fleet and the reactivation of four battleships will push the MCSF’s afloat figure to more than 1,500 by 1990. Overall, the reduction in MCSF Marines from 8,000 to the 6,500 ceiling—in the face of an increasing terrorist threat—constitutes a dangerous challenge.
“Standby for Weigh-Off”
(See F. Montarelli, pp. 111-113, September 1985; J. E. Jackson, pp. 148-149, November 1985 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John M. Brownell, U. S. Navy—Commander Jackson’s response to Mr. Montarelli’s article indirectly identifies the major problem with airships—their vulnerabil
ity to missile attack. In his response, Commander Jackson presents a scenario in the Gulf of Sidra, where an airship conducts a multipurpose mission in support of a surface action group (SAG). The scenario contains errors concerning reconnaissance operations, but it highlights the weaknesses of operating an airship near a hostile country. For one thing, an airship 350 feet long would present a large cross-section to Libyan early- warning radars, giving them ample warning of the SAG’s arrival (one airship means one SAG underneath) and ample time to prepare for attack. Second, the Libyan Air Force possesses many MiG-25s, presumably equipped with the much longer range AS-6 missile, which could engage the airship at long range without depending solely on infrared (IR) homing (MiG-2Is could also carry non- IR missiles). A large, slow-moving airship would become a magnet, attracting frustrated Libyan pilots who seek to avenge the August 1981 downing of one of their Su-22s. Consequently, the airship would probably attract more than four air-to-air missiles per attack. Third, even if the SAG were concerned only with airship defense, it would probably not be able to defend successfully against all incoming air-to-air missiles (don’t forget aircraft with guns, either), in which case the airship and all its multipurpose capabilities would be lost and the SAG would be on its own again. History has shown that it is foolish for any SAG to venture into hostile waters within the range of potentially overwhelming numbers of enemy . aircraft without the probable means to gain tactical air superiority. No amount of reconnaissance is going to provide that superiority, whatever the reconnaissance platform.
As such a platform, the airship has enviable endurance and payload capabilities. Nevertheless, it has several obvious drawbacks—including vulnerability, flexibility (what if something interesting is happening 300 nautical miles away?), and integration into the system (who really wants to fly blimps?). The airship may once have been a feasible reconnaissance platform, but placing one in a vulnerable position today is inviting disaster especially since all its capabilities would make it a prime target. Rather than investing large amounts of money and effort in finding a new panacea for the Navy’s reconnaissance needs, it would be more efficient to concentrate on improving current assets and integrating the operations of mission-dedicated platforms.
(Continued on page 98)