“Mary Ann” has always been prohibited from combat. But combat has been transformed by technology: A Maverick, Harpoon, or Hellfire can take out more machine gun nests than a Thompson. Is it time women were granted another right— the right to bear arms?
Since the end of the Vietnam War, American society has undergone a fundamental change comparable only to the abolition of slavery. This change produced in 1984 alone the first woman vice presidential nominee, the first woman astronaut, the first woman to walk in space, and numerous first gold medals in Olympic events previously held only for men. One first absent from the ebullient news stories of 1984 was the first U. S. woman combatant killed in action. Although units of American forces overseas were subject to terrorist attacks in 1984, no women were involved because statutes and service policy prohibit female service members in combat units.
Should these prohibitions remain? Can women justly demand and receive equal rights and equal opportunity in nil sectors of this nation’s life without accepting the risks men now carry in defending that way of life? Should current statutes and service policies hand to women a windfall °f opportunity by ensuring only male fatalities in the next War? The idea of women in combat triggers in Americans emotional reflexes, not intellectual responses. The vision “Mary Ann” attempting to take out an enemy machine §un nest grates on popular images shaped by Sergeant Alvin York, Audie Murphy, and John Wayne. The issue is troublesome and complex. But as Congress declared in ^storing draft registration in 1980, determining who should be required to fight for the nation is a social issue °f the highest order.1
The movement toward gender-free societal roles has brought the issue of women in combat to the forefront. Ibis matter requires the study, reflection, and discussion available only in peacetime. The unhappy eventuality of the first woman killed in action should not be a surprise, rudence demands the issue be addressed now; soon demographics may compel an answer, well-formulated or not.
What role should the military play in helping national leadership shape policy? Should not the military’s position be the same regardless of which branch of government ultimately assumes control of the policy process? The military will discharge its duty as counselor for national security only by acknowledging that many billets currently classified as combat duty can be fdled by any healthy American woman. This candid admission will foster an atmosphere in which objective study and thoughtful recommendations can enlighten our civilian leaders. Whether Congress, the President, or the courts remove the ban on women in combat, the military must implement the change quickly and efficiently.
Background: Congress, by statute, has barred women from military aircraft and ships engaged in combat missions.2 Army and Marine Corps internal policies prevent women from serving in combat units. But just what is “combat,” much less a “combat unit”? The armed forces’ present interpretation of “combat” is ambiguous. For example, the Air Force assigns women officers to strategic missile duty, which in war would mean launching missiles at enemy targets. The Air Force classifies these billets as “noncombat” assignments. According to the Department of Defense, “The core meaning of the term [combat] involves physical proximity with the enemy rather than merely performance of functions that may invoke killing or being killed.”3
An operational definition of “combat” based on physical proximity posits a distinction without a difference and impedes the determination of a gender-based assignment’s legitimacy. Consider infantry fighting: it readily satisfies the physical proximity definition and provides a powerful and emotionally charged prototype to opponents of female involvement. But what of such duty as close-air support aircraft, heavy artillery crews, convoy escort duty, or carrier air controllers? Arguably, they close with the enemy but do not invoke the specter of “Mary Ann” being run through by a bayonet. Military billets with the potential for killing or dying greatly exceed the assignments which may press upon the enemy.
Unlike federal taxation practices, policy on this question cannot turn on a mere technical definition. Resolution of issues affecting national survival demands broad principles and practical concepts. Rather than looking for a bright line between combat and noncombat duty, any discussion of female war fighting should address basic concerns governing general plans for assignments to a spectrum of units. Surely, some women are suitable for assignment to any combat unit in today’s armed forces. They are the exceptions, the inverse of males who are not suitable for combat assignments. However, a majority of current combat billets could be filled by any healthy women.4 National policy must reflect this reality.
Who Decides?: While combat’s meaning is unclear, some politicians oppose the idea of female combatants unequivocally. Senator John C. Stennis (D-MS), during hearings on the 1980 draft registration bill, put the matter bluntly: Congress would do nothing “ . . . leading to the conscription of women for anything like heavy combat duty. That is just not going to happen. People won’t be for it. They will be actively against it.”5 However, was Senator Stennis correct in 1980 and is he correct today? Can military leaders adopt his view as a basis for their role in the policy process?
Senator Stennis’s assessment differs markedly from the Senate’s formal position in passing the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) resolution in 1972. In floor debate the senators resoundingly defeated three attempts by the late Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D-NC), to change the proposed amendment’s text. Senator Ervin wanted the ERA to retain the prohibition on assigning women to combat duty.6 His concern was due in part to then Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist’s testimony that passage of the ERA would require assigning women to combat units.7
A new ERA resolution probably will be debated by Congress in the next session. If in passing a new ERA, Congress persists in its ambivalence on the risks women must bear, individual men may attempt to settle the issue in the courts. The case can be made that the present ban on female combatants denies to men in combat units equal protection of the law. Arguably, the ban is unconstitutional.8 However, the courts are not the best forum for answering this important question. Military leaders should counsel and promote in the political branches a course which would avoid this eventuality.
The elected branches of the government must address the issue and formulate the policy. Although the courts revise national policy, the burden rests with the political leaders because ultimately our society exercises its control through the electoral process. Congress has the explicit constitutional duty to raise and maintain armed forces. The President is expressly assigned the duties and authority of commander in chief. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, the entire constitutional system rests on the accountability to the electorate of those who oversee and control the military establishment.9
The elected leaders, however, should not construe their constitutional charter as a bulwark against judicial review of military policy. This attitude would exacerbate the political temptation to neglect realistic policy formation and could result in subjecting the military to judicial edicts rather than executive orders.
Recently, courts have addressed long-standing gender- based practices of the military. The doors of the service academies were opened to women under pressure of pend-
NAVY (DAVE GARRISON)
ing litigation.10 The Navy’s civilian and military leaders, anticipating enactment of the ERA, advised Congress to revise policies that would violate the new amendment, for example, no women on ships.11 Nevertheless, a group of Navy women brought a civil rights class action suit (Owens vs. Brown) challenging the statute banning women on ships. On 27 July 1978, in U. S. District Court, District of Columbia, Judge John Sirica declared the statute unconstitutional. However, he did acknowledge the Navy’s efforts to have Congress amend the statute were near fruition.12 Interestingly, one can infer from Judge Sirica’s opinion that he would have stayed his decision in the civil rights suit had the Navy’s lawyers made a motion to that effect.13 On 20 October 1978, Congress removed the ban on women serving on noncombatant ships.14 Military counseling that identifies the key factors shaping female combatant policy can help political leaders prevent future judicial end runs. The military’s criteria for women combatants should illuminate, not obfuscate, the political process.
Technology, Handmaiden to the ERA: National policy is influenced by technology. Indeed, the most troubling questions arise when technology outpaces formulation of public policy: Consider the baboon heart baby case or questions concerning euthanasia. The women’s liberation movement has ridden the broad shoulders of technological progress. Military leaders are wrong if they view the recent changes in society’s attitudes on women’s roles as the handiwork of radical ‘‘women’s libbers.” The changes are the unavoidable consequences of technological advances affecting every aspect of modem life. Absent that progress, typified by instant coffee, the electric washer, and the pill, women’s lives today would be substantially the same as 50 years ago. Basic necessities would still dictate sexual roles. The fundamental change in women’s roles is a harvest come to ripeness through forces beyond the control of those now gathering in the fields. The change cannot be undone.
Technology has created new opportunities for women in
the military, as well is civilian life. The physical effort needed to cook a meal in a microwave oven differs only slightly from that required to launch an ICBM, to operate a fire control system, or to intercept a “bogey” at 20,000 feet. Strong evidence indicates today’s ban on female combatants is the result of archaic and overbroad generalizations reflecting earlier generations’ views on “a woman’s proper place.” The ban is not based on rigorous analysis of objective data but merely reflects and reinforces sexual stereotypes rendered irrelevant by technology. Military planners must break out of this trap.
In banning females from combat the military lags behind the civilian community in removing gender-based obstacles to personal and professional development. Interestingly, the lag is inconsistent with the historical pattern °f change in the military vis-a-vis the civilian community. The commander in chief integrated the armed forces well before the Supreme Court found school segregation unconstitutional. The military’s historical push to advance the state of weaponry has incorporated progressive training and enlightened personnel policies. Personal development and professional advancement in the armed services depend not on who one knows but on what one knows, what one can do, and how one can lead. The merit pay system and the comparable worth concept, under so much discussion in civilian society, inhere in the military's promotion system.
Gender is baseless as a technological criterion. The computer keyboard, the control console joystick, the how- rtzer’s firing lanyard, and the ship’s helm respond equally to the male and female touch. The machine is unconcerned whether the operator wears a crew cut or a pony tail. But regrettably, the question of women serving in combat units escapes single factor analysis. Although technology Permits today’s women to fight effectively alongside men, the question remains because combatants are humans, not machines.
The Human Criteria: Fighting units are human structures dependent on hardware and sensitive to subjective
The military has not realized, like the private sector, that technology has done more to equalize the sexes than legislation and bra burnings, and that with proper conditioning, some women can pull their own weight.
influences. History is replete with cases of subjective factors—esprit de corps or grim determination—overcoming material considerations in deciding the battle. Thus, excluding the subjective aspects of women in combat units is, at the least, a dangerous omission. The criteria for assigning women to combat units should focus not on physiology of females qua females, but rather the requirements of the particular combat unit.
Formulation of the human criteria must start with the premise that some women are suitable for any combat assignment and that some combat assignments can be filled by any woman. Military planners must identify those situations wherein combat effectiveness depends more on group dynamics than on individual capabilities. The female criteria must be a composite of threshold requirements, physiological adaptability, and sociological limits. The criteria must be rooted in combat effectiveness and not peacetime bureaucratic efficiency and convenience.
Physical Strength—An Appropriate Threshold Requirement?: Generally, women are physically weaker than men. But is physical strength, per se, a meaningful criterion for a policy on female combat duty? Indeed, is physical strength meaningful in assessing anyone’s effectiveness in combat billets? If physical strength alone were chosen as a threshold requirement, individuals with great stamina might easily be excluded from combat duty. Examples wherein stamina, not strength, is the more important requirement for combat duty include port and starboard watches in the combat information center and extended patrols behind enemy lines.
If recent reports are credible, less than half of the nation’s youth are physically fit. Consequently, prudence dictates giving a qualifying strength test for combat duty after basic training. Realistic test requirements and a meaningful conditioning program will permit most women trainees to pass.
Empirical data developed by the U. S. Army in the late 1970s indicates proper physical conditioning enables women to assume duties even where military effectiveness requires physical strength. In one test, 13 female office workers underwent a three-week physical conditioning program. Then they trained for the Army’s noisiest and heaviest job: battery teams for 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers. On standardized Army artillery performance tests, the women were rated “professional, outstanding, and phenomenal.”15
Any woman electronics technician can carry a multimeter from radio transmitter to radio transmitter. But not every woman could handle powder casings in a 16-inch gun turret. Consequently, any national policy for women in combat must rest on an objective compilation of the billets requiring particular levels of physical strength. Military manpower planners must identify physical strength requirements for combat billets under their cognizance.
Physiology: Are there not aspects of the female anat-
When the system is fair, success is measured by qualification, not tradition. Kristine Holdried was the top graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy’s class of 1984—only four years after the first women graduated from the academy.
omy other than physical strength that support the total ban on women in combat? Combat units must be responsive and mobile. Would women members, qua women, derogate these essential characteristics? How can a broad military policy cope with monthly hormonal imbalances or the potential for pregnancy? These potential problems are uniquely feminine, but their net effect is not unique in the military. For example, is a destroyer’s executive officer burdened to any greater degree on the eve of a West Pac deployment by a female electronics technician announcing she is pregnant than by a male electronics technician claiming he is a homosexual? Indeed, the woman might remain on board until replaced while the man could not.
Adverse consequences of a particular woman’s physiological cycle are medical problems the military handles on an individual basis. More female than male service members may suffer periodic hormonal imbalances, but using the increased probability of recurrent hormonal problems as the justification for a ban on females in certain billets is no more valid than choosing the black population’s greater susceptibility to sickle-cell anemia as justification for a racial ban on certain types of duty. The possibility that a particular woman may be unsuited for duty in a mobile and highly responsive combat unit cannot translate into a ban on any woman in a combat unit.
Pregnancy poses a more complex policy problem for the military than for a civilian company and presents two primary facets to military planners. The first is the personnel administration process for the pregnant service member. The second facet is the morale ramifications of a unit member’s pregnancy. On one hand, a woman—like a man—assigned to a combat unit should be expected to behave in a manner which fosters unit effectiveness. Because pregnancy would affect adversely a female’s ability to contribute to the unit’s mobility and responsiveness, the ideal female member would avoid pregnancy while assigned to the unit.
Although the ideal is unattainable, is it reasonable to assume a vast majority of women will exercise mature judgment in decisions affecting their duty to the unit? Is dealing with the individual unauthorized absentee or drug abuser any easier for the military bureaucracy than handling the administrative problems related to the immature female who opts out on the wings of the stork? Arguing that the absolute ban is justified by the possibility of deliberate pregnancy insults the integrity and maturity of American women.
Sociological Limits: The other aspect of the pregnancy potential, the impact on morale, is sociological in nature. Impregnation by a female member’s husband or off-duty lover presents the combat unit commander with the individual personnel problem previously discussed. However, a pregnant member in a forward-deployed unit may manifest a seething discipline problem. Pregnancy would be prima facie evidence that the female and one or more
males violated regulations against fraternization. But does this situation present to the commander a problem essentially different from a man apprehended abusing drugs? Each case presents a violation of regulations. Sometimes regulations dictate immediate transfer of the drug abuser. The pregnant female might be able to continue military duties until a timely replacement arrives. In hostile theaters the pregnant female physically unfit for duty constitutes a problem identical to that of a seriously wounded unit member. The important difference between the effects wrought by the drug abuser and by the pregnancy resides not in the specific details of the individual infractions but in the unit’s morale.
Although widespread drug abuse in a unit devastates combat effectiveness, isolated cases have a much more limited effect. On the other hand, the activities preceeding pregnancy could easily promote tension and hostility among men in the unit, particularly if the conduct is promiscuous. A commander who knows and looks after his troops should be able to quash fraternization before it corrupts morale. But would not normal appetites of healthy individuals in forward deployed units generate conditions which could overburden even the most conscientious unit commander? Unit categories can be identified by planners as being hypersensitive to sexually based morale problems and women banned from their ranks.
The Navy’s experience with female crew members on deployed ships deserves careful study. As the attitude of equality among sexes grows deeper roots in society, the military commander can enforce regulations against fraternization more easily. The national policy on female combatants must be thoughtful and not merely a reflex rooted in the military’s libido.
In developing the sociologically based criteria for assigning women to combat, military planners must also consider the asexual attitudes of male members. Although some might argue that asexual attitudes are impossible,
any criteria must deal with members’ views of the opposite sex qua combatants. Would the presence of female members undermine the mutual trust and respect among unit members to the point where military effectiveness is diminished? Certainly, the first generation of units comprised under a gender-free assignment policy will experience growing pains. But why should combat units differ in kind from civilian police forces in large cities which ignore gender in making assignments? These organizations have overcome difficulties rooted in gender-based attitudes. Should the armed forces admit to being less competent? Should the services persist in barring female combatants because “the men won’t accept women as equals”? Certainly, the presence of a “butch” female threatens combat effectiveness no more than a male who emulates Boy George during his off-duty hours.
But can a mother perform as effectively as a father in a combat unit? Whether dependent children detract from a mother’s military effectiveness is a question which must be addressed on an individual basis. If women are to receive true equal treatment, maternal status should carry no greater weight in assignments than paternal status. Military planners should acknowledge that women assigned to combat units must look after their private affairs as the men do. The leadership talent for dealing with the “my child, he” type of special request is merely an extension of the commander’s talent for dealing with the “my wife, she” type of special request. Although maternity, like paternity, may on occasions warrant special consideration, neither should be the basis for service-wide policy, much less an absolute ban on women in combat units.
Sociological limits and military effectiveness are the key factors in deciding where women can serve. However, the details of the individual unit’s mission, modus ope- randi, and special equipment should set the balance for weighing the wisdom of including female members. Peacetime provides the optimum opportunity to remove the ban on female combatants. Peacetime routine and exercises will afford military leaders a chance to assess field experience and make necessary adjustments. Peacetime also permits applying resources to minimize the adverse effects of sexual stereotypes on combat effectiveness.
Notwithstanding a peacetime break-in period, can women hope to pursue genuine career opportunities in eombat units? Can women expect to lead effectively in combat? Leadership potential is a function of both organizational attitudes and individual personality. Remove the cloud of the organization’s structural bias and new branches of leadership will blossom. Consider the black experience in the armed forces. Nothing explains the dra- n'atic emergence of black leaders in the military after World War II except the elimination of racial bias from the niilitary’s perception of potential combat leaders.
Make the military’s value system gender free and individual talent will determine the question of whether Women have the ability to enjoy career opportunities in combat units. Witness a straw in the wind: a female graduated at the top of the Naval Academy’s class of 1984. She Wore the stripes of a brigade officer and the stars of academic achievement. Given Geraldine Ferraro’s vice presidential candidacy and Margaret Thatcher’s tenure as Britain’s Prime Minister, is the argument against women’s leadership ability anything more than incantation of outdated sexual shibboleths?
Technology enables any modern American woman to serve in most combat billets. However, because fighting units are influenced to a significant degree by subjective elements, technological feasibility alone does not justify placing a woman in a particular combat unit. Modem American women demand equal rights and opportunities. To meet those demands justly, American society must ask women to assume equal risks. The nation’s leaders must decide what risks women will assume in the next war. Only military leaders have the expertise to make sound recommendations on women’s roles in combat. However, military leaders have the difficult job of breaking with sexual stereotypes before they can formulate those recommendations. Overcoming the structural bias against women in combat will be difficult. Therefore, the task of planning for the change must gain widespread attention now, in peacetime, to gain full benefit from a controlled implementation of a fundamental change in policy. Fairness to American society allows no delay.
'S. Rep. No. 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1980).
210 U.S.C.A. § 6015 (West Supp. 1983); 10 U.S.C.A. § 8549 (West Supp. 1983). Assistant Secretary of Defense Danzig in a dialogue with Senator Nunn during Senate Hearings on Defense Department manpower matters. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for F. Y. 1981—Part 3: Manpower and Personnel; Hearings on S. 2294 Before the Senate Comm, on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1663-64 (1980).
4See generally, Department of Defense Background Study: Uses of Women in the Military (2d Ed. 1978) and, M. Binkin and S. Bach, Women in the Military. department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for F.Y. 1981; Hearings on S. 2294 Before the Senate Comm, on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1980).
6l 18 Cong. Rec. 9337.
7118 Cong. Rec. 9347.
*Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S________ 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2658 (1981) (J. White
dissenting) and Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 513 (1975) (J. Brennan dissenting).
9Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 10 (1973).
10Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for F.Y. 1976; Hearings on H. R. 9832, A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination with Respect to Appointments and Admissions of Persons to the Service Academies, Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Armed Services Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
11 Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for F.Y. 1979: Hearings on S. 2571 Before the Senate Comm, on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2997 et seq (1978) (testimony of V.Adm. Watkins). Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for F.Y. 1979: Hearings on H.R. 10929 and on H.R. 7431, Assignment of Women on Navy Ships, Before the House Comm, on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 544 et seq (1979) (testimony of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Hildalgo and VAdm. Watkins). nOwens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 302 (D.D.C., 1978). liOwens, 455 F. Supp. 291, n. 42.
,4Pub. L. 95-485, Title VIII, § 808, 92 Stat. 1623, amending 10 U.S.C. § 6015, Women members: duty; qualifications; restrictions.
15Selective Service Registration, Hearings Before the Task Force on Defense and International Affairs of the House Comm, on the Budget, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 51 (1980). See also U. S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral Sciences, Women Content on the Army REFORGER 77 (REF-WAC 77).
Commander Hixson is currently Deputy Commonwealth’s Attorney in York County, Virginia. He was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1961, received a master’s degree in international relations from American University in 1969, and was graduated from the Marshall Wythe Law School of William and Mary College in 1983. Serving mostly in cruisers and destroyers while on active duty, on his last cruise he was executive officer of the USS South Carolina (CGN-37).