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The Last Gasp__________
sink in an inverted configuration-
Given these ditching characteristics,^
is no surprise that 78% (31 out of 4 ) the survivors of helicopter accidents^
severe impact on the survivability
“Statistics from the Naval Safety Center show that from July 1963 to February 1975, 234 helicopters with a total of 1,093 occupants either crashed or were ditched at sea: 196 persons died in those accidents, 130 were listed as lost/unknown, and 29 suffered either a fatal injury or an injury which caused drowning. The remaining 37 victims were not injured but drowned nonetheless. Of 897 survivors, 437 (49%) egressed underwater. . . . Major problems encountered by survivors were: inrushing water, disorientation, confusion, panic, entanglement with debris, and unfamiliarity with existing release mechanisms.”1
This quotation provided the rationale for the Navy’s implementation in 1977 of the 9D5 Helicopter Underwater Escape Trainer program as an improved means of educating helicopter crews in post-ditching egress procedures. The 9D5 has proven to be an invaluable training aid in helping helicopter crews deal with the problems inherent in escaping from an inverted or sinking aircraft. This training emphasizes the importance of delaying the release of the restraint harness until all airframe motion has stopped and the buffeting produced by the force of in- rushing water has completely subsided. Long-standing water survival doctrine stresses the value of being slow and deliberate during underwater egress to control panic, fight disorientation, and lessen the chances of becoming entangled in aircraft debris.
Studies conducted during the 1970s in the fields of hypothermia and respiration physiology, however, indicate that sudden immersion in cold water induces a physiological reaction which results in involuntary hyperventilation. This enhanced degree of respiratory stimulation produces a “gasp reflex,” which significantly reduces an individual’s breathholding ability when the body is immersed in cold water.
A study conducted at the Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory in 1973 states that sudden immersion in water colder than 25°C (77°F) “results in an immediate involuntary increase in the rate of respiration with an inspiratory shift.”2 This study also states that, “Clearly, when one is immersed in the cold sea at the end of an expiratory phase of breathing, he risks uncontrolled aspiration of a large volume of water; [and] drowning would be inevitable.”3
Current research indicates that there is a direct correlation between decreasing water temperature and the duration of an individual’s breath-holding ability. This effect may be one of the causes of aircrew deaths in water-related helicopter accidents, as sudden submersion in cold water can degrade an individual’s ability to hold a breath long enough to escape from a sinking aircraft.
A ditching in sufficiently cold water might so reduce a crew member’s ability to hold his breath that he would be likely to release the restraining harness early. Since this would be in direct contradiction to the survival doctrine reinforced by the 9D5 egress trainer, an increased susceptibility to disorientation and panic may be a possible lethal byproduct of the gasp reflex.
Although the existence of the gasp reflex phenomenon has been recognized within the Navy since 1973, it has been poorly promulgated within the naval aviation community, which has led to a general ignorance of the problem among aviation personnel at the operational level. Given the frequency with which our helicopter crews ditch at sea (72 incidents involving 330 occupants for calendar years 1978-83), it is essential that the dangers of this phenomenon be understood by the Navy and Marine Corps rotary-wing communities.
Since the inception of naval aviation, aircrews have had to deal with the possibility of ditching at sea. Initially, the problem was lessened somewhat by the types of aircraft that were in use. During the early stages of naval aviation, the relatively low speeds with which water im
pact normally occurred, coupled W light airframe construction, often resu in incidents in which the airframe mained afloat. This frequently Perrnlom. the aircrews to escape prior to being c pletely immersed in the water. The ^ vances in technology which took P during World War II led to heavier craft, but ones which were still co monly capable of floating long en°^jai for the aircrews to escape before submergence occurred. . u
After World War II, the shift to mg speed jet aircraft resulted in ditch1 K which produced such high-water irnP forces that it became nearly imp°ssl for the aircrews to escape prior to b completely submerged. The advent o ejection seat, however, significantly 1 proved the chances of aircrew survtv • The introduction of the helicopter ^ naval aviation presented its own unlj* survival problem. Although helicop tend to be lighter and more buoyant tt_ fixed-wing aircraft, they are not in ently easier for crewmen to escape ^ in a ditching situation. After ditching' rotary-wing aircraft will do one of 1^ things: float upright, float inverted, calendar year 1983 egressed after ha ? been totally submerged. Because U- ^ Navy helicopter crews do not^have ready source of oxygen, they, unlike fixed-wing counterparts who have a ited capability of using their °^^on masks underwater, must rely s0 e -me their breath-holding ability from t*ie, of their immersion until they reach surface. Therefore, any phenomen^ which has a detrimental effect on an m ^ vidual’s breath-holding ability will ha^._
copter crews. nt
There have been several imp0 ,
f cO»u
studies relating to the effects oi ^ water on humans. Much of this resea f has contributed to the understanding
hypothermia and the attendant physio
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,Ca Actors which impact on the survival pnie of humans exposed to cold , 0r some time, specialists in the area of ypothermia have recognized that sudden .. rtlersion in cold water produces a ^gasp inspiration” followed by a degree hyperventilation which increases in agnitude as the water temperature deeases. Although it had been assumed at this gasp reflex would have a delete- ous effect on individual breath-holding ' tty, little interest was shown by the *ation community until the Coast became alerted to the problem in
.The Coast Guard’s interest came about cause of three incidents; all three re- hed in drownings which were sus- ^cted to have been facilitated by a re- uced breath-holding ability in cold • ®[1]er- The first incident occurred in j '> when eight crewmen were trapped a large air pocket in the forward com- jphrnent of a capsized utility boat. Only relatively short swim was required, yet e survivors discovered that they “had ■tlicuity holding their breath long n°ugh to make the egress” in the 45°F ater.4 Only six of the eight crewmen entually escaped, and most of the sur- lv°rs had to make repeated attempts be-
The second and third accidents occurred in 1979 and involved two HH-3F helicopters. These ditchings involved a total of nine crewmen; only three survived. Of those who perished, none had injuries extensive enough to have prevented their escape from the inverted (but floating) aircraft. The post-crash investigation revealed that all victims had drowned while actively attempting to egress in ambient water temperatures of 56°F and 57°F. In each accident, the physiologic breath-holding reduction effects of sudden immersion in cold water were implicated.
To examine more closely the effects of cold water immersion on breath-holding capabilities, the Coast Guard requested that Dr. John Hayward of the University of Victoria in British Columbia test this relationship. Dr. Hayward’s study used 14 physically fit students whom he immersed in a test tank to create a rough simulation of submersion in an inverted helicopter. Although these students could hold their breath for an average of 108 seconds in 70°F air, sudden immersion in water produced the following results: onds at a water temperature of 50°F, for 23 seconds at 70°F, and for 50 seconds at 90°F.
This study convinced the Coast Guard that it was essential to provide its helicopter crews with a survival device which would provide an emergency breathing source. This decision led to the development of the Coast Guard’s Underwater Escape Rebreather (UER).
The most significant research to date on the relationship between water temperature and breath-holding capability could well be a follow-up study headed by Dr. Hayward. In this study, entitled “Temperature Effect on the Human Dive Response in Relation to Cold Water Near-drowning,” the temperature range was expanded, more physiological factors were measured, and the numbers of subjects tested greatly increased.
Although this study was designed specifically to explore aspects of the human dive response on near-drowning, it also clearly indicates that there is a drastic reduction in breath-holding ability as the water temperature decreases. The study was constructed to simulate closely the conditions which might be expected to occur in accidents involving cold-water
Id
The study also showed that cl ^ water,” as it relates to the reducti°n breath-holding ability, is a relative te ^ Breath-holding ability was shown to reduced even at the 35°C (95°F) P°
which is nearly body temperature.
Emergency Underwater Breant Devices: The Naval Air Develop111 Center (NADC) is evaluating two ej^. gency breathing devices for use by j copter crews which have been designa as the Helicopter Emergency Egress vices (HEED) 1 and 2.
ratns
immersion. The tests involved 160 student volunteers (a 50-50 male-to-female mix) who were randomly assigned to testing at one of eight water temperatures (0-35°C in 5° increments). Each group of 20 students maintained the 50-50 male- to-female ratio, and each group was tested at only one water temperature.
To obtain a baseline for breath-holding duration, all subjects were timed for their ability to hold a single breath without any prior hyperventilation (outside air temperature variance of plus or minus .8°C). This pre-submersion test resulted in a mean breath-holding duration of 60.5 seconds for the test group. (See Figure 1.)
During the next phase of the test, the subjects were suddenly immersed. This was done by placing the subjects on a collapsible seat at the top of a two-meter- long slide. The researchers could then release this seat, and the subjects would slide feet-first into the water. Prior to the beginning of the test, the researchers allowed each subject to take one final deep breath.
Once the subject completed this presubmersion inspiration, the seat was collapsed and the timing started. The elapsed time required to travel the length of the slide was one to two seconds, which was included as part of the total submerged breath-holding duration. All subjects were required to float in a facedown position and were instructed to remain as motionless as possible. The timing stopped when the subject surfaced to breathe, and the average elapsed time between two stopwatches was the time recorded.
The subjects then remained in the water in a standing position with only their heads out of the water for a two- minute period to allow them to become acclimated to the test water temperature. For the last ten seconds of the period, the subjects were instructed to hyperventilate by taking five deep breaths. At the completion of the fifth breath, the subject quickly resubmerged, which started the timing for this final phase of the test. This data is displayed in Figure 1 along the second submersion line.
Dr. Hayward’s research clearly links exposure to cold water with a significant reduction in breath-holding ability (5075% less than the pre-submersion mean in 0-15°C or 32-59°F water). As this study allowed the subjects to take a full breath prior to submersion and minimized their physical activity, it is expected that fear and physical exertion would probably decrease breath-holding ability even further.
The significance of this difference to
U. s. NAW IX"®
the underwater escape problem is un|!^e takable. If test subjects could en , breath-holding for only 12-17 secon 0°C, can we expect our helicopter ct ^ to have a high probability of surviving ditching at such a temperature? A tintc ^ 12 seconds is barely long enoug egress from the 9D5 underwater esc trainer under ideal conditions. jy
Another important aspect of the s is that it indicates that even brief acc tion to the water temperature-—'' -n coupled with hyperventilation—resu a near doubling of submerged brca ^ holding ability. Therefore, if a Pers^ (0 trapped in an air pocket, it is be1 e j wait long enough to become acchm before making an escape attempt-
The HEED 1 is a rebreathing apPal which combines the functions^ an
in-
C02 Inflation Assembly
Overpressure
Valve
Reflective Tape Attachment (TYP)
Rebreather Hose
Survival Equipment Stowage / .
stable flotation device, a survival vest, n an emergency source of 100% oxy- I This device is designed to provide at 6ast.two minutes of oxygen and may ^tovide up to eight minutes of breathing 1Ir>e, depending on the user’s physical and mental state.
addlt- device is configured to be worn as vest and is essentially identical to the teviously mentioned UER being pro- Ured by the Coast Guard. The vest is Ejected to cost the Navy between $300 n S350 per copy if it is approved for
Procurement.
j HEED 2 is a significantly different ^esjgn which is similar to a miniature _Cuba tank. This system was initially Ponsored by the Marine Corps, who had es‘gnated it the Emergency Breathing ystern (EBS). This device consists of a ^ressurized bottle, a regulator, an on- mand air flow manifold, a pressure >cator, a hose, and a rubber mouth- P|ece. The device is lightweight (22 nces) and is small enough (two inches n diameter by 11.5 inches long) to be arried in the pistol pocket of the SV-2 SUrvival vest.
The HEED 2 is designed to provide e[ween two and four minutes of underater breathing time and is expected to I °st aPproximately $ 150 if procured on a r§e scale. The device is simple to actu- . c> requiring only that the on-off knob be j rned 1-5 turns. Once the mouthpiece is Serted, the user can breathe normally. If ater happens to get into the mouthpiece, can be eliminated by exhaling through e mouthpiece while depressing the pUrge button.
2 Unfortunately, the HEED 1 and HEED evices, while simple to use, could po- "daily seriously injure the untrained Ser- Because of the water pressure dif- "rentials involved, the wearer must ex- Ia e during the ascent to prevent the ngs from being damaged as the inhaled Sases expand in volume. Along with the Potential for rupturing the lungs, there is s° the risk of incurring a potentially atal air embolism.
Procurement of either HEED system ePends on the test and evaluation re- *ts- Currently, both systems are under- Th'ng teLdln'ca' evaluation by NADC. "e systems must pass the following test ecluirements before being accepted for ^rational evaluation:
Provide a minimum of two minutes of ^"derwater breathing time Pe capable of working at a maximum dePth of 20 feet
junction in a water temperature of
The HEED 2 is expected to meet these dteria without significant problems.
There is some doubt, however, that the HEED 1 will pass the 20-foot depth requirement because of water-pressure problems.
The HEED procurement program has received a high level of visibility because of its Chief of Naval Operations sponsorship. As a result, the HEED is currently the number-one funded priority of the Aircrew Survival Safety Board, which sets the priorities for developing and procuring aviation survival equipment. Therefore, there is little more that can be done to hasten the normal procurement process. In the interim, however, the Navy and the Marine Corps should do the following:
- Immediately educate our aircrews on the effect that cold water can have on their breath-holding capability.
- Immediately indoctrinate aircrews on the use of the HEED 2; NADC personnel are currently preparing a slide program to present to fleet units, and with the proper priority, this program could be implemented now.
- Conduct hands-on training for air crew members by using commercially procured HEED 2 devices and using pools available at the unit’s locale.
) Purchase enough off-the-shelf units to at least provide a rotating pool of emergency systems within each squadron. This may require using unit funds if higher level support cannot be obtained and will also require commercial air recharging and maintenance as squadron personnel would not be qualified to service such equipment.
- If squadrons cannot obtain the funds to purchase the units, then individuals who have had the training should be strongly encouraged to buy their own commercial equivalent of the HEED 2. As the Aviation Crew Systems Manual (NavAir-13- 1-6.7) authorizes each individual to carry up to five pounds of personal survival equipment and the HEED 2 weighs only 1.5 pounds, it would technically be legal to carry the system. This equipment has been available for some time through dive shops and can be obtained directly from the manufacturer for approximately $150.00.
- Reevaluate the policies concerning flights over cold water. The current policy in the Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization General Flight and Operating Instructions Manual (OpNav 3710.7K) discusses cold-water overflight only as a governing factor for requiring the wearing of antiexposure suits when the water temperature is below 60°F. As the “gasp reflex” is a separate problem from hypothermia, a statement of warning addressing this danger should be included in the OpNav 3710.7. In addition, such a statement should provide a solid definition of what constitutes “cold-water operations.” As physiological responses commonly become more pronounced commencing with exposure to 70°F water, researchers in this area generally consider this temperature an excellent benchmark for defining “cold water.”
The U. S. Coast Guard also considers this temperature as a valid definition of cold water and requires the use of wetsuits by aircrews when overflying water at 70°F and below. Thus, 70°F water might also constitute an adequate definition for Navy and Marine cold-water operations. This does not necessarily mean that wetsuit guidelines need to be changed, but that the whole problem of cold-water survival needs to be thought of in terms broader than hypothermia alone.
- Encourage commanding officers to determine personally whether certain missions are operationally necessary when they include flight over extremely cold water.
- The Navy’s water survival training should immediately incorporate into the syllabus information concerning the respiratory effects of cold-water immersion. This is especially important as the “gasp reflex” may force individuals to make their escape attempt earlier than the current water survival training course prepares them for.
The Hayward studies clearly link cold- water immersion with a decreased ability to hold a breath while submerged. Other studies have linked the gasp reflex with an involuntary and deadly inhalation of water. Therefore, there is a clear need to educate our helicopter aircrews about the physiological effects of cold-water immersion. There is an even greater need to provide these crewmen with the physical means to increase their chances for survival. The HEED 2 system can provide this capability in the future, and it must be made available as soon as possible. Given the realities of the procurement process, the HEED 2 will reach fleet units no earlier than late 1986. Therefore, it is obvious that some form of underwater breathing device is needed in the interim. As a commercial equivalent of the HEED 2 device is readily available, it can fill this need, providing a real and immediate answer to this problem.
The purchase of the off-the-shelf version of the HEED 2 should be pursued by the commanders of helicopter squadrons as a means of equipping their crews with an enhanced survival capability until an officially approved emergency system finally reaches the fleet. Individuals should be encouraged to purchase their own off-the-shelf survival equipment if other funding cannot be obtained.
'William Cunningham, “Helicopter Underwater Escape Trainer (9D5),” NATO AGARD Conference Proceedings, No. 255, December 1978, p. 66-1.
2Alan Steinman, telephone interview, 8 November 1984.
3William Tansey, “Medical Aspects of Cold Water Immersion, A Review,” Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory—Report Number 763, 19 September 1973, p. 5.
4Alan Steinman, “Underwater Escape Rebreather (UER) Update,” Flight Lines Aviation Newsletter, No. 281, July 1981, p. 15.
Commander Eberwein was graduated from Indiana
State University, Troy State University, an Armed Forces Staff College. He received ^lS ,^ate mission through the Aviation Officer Can ^ School. His flight experience encompasses t e 46D, UH-1, and TH-57 models of aircraft. assignments have included tours in a vertical Mv ishment squadron, the USS Shreveport (L ^ ^ and search and rescue. Commander Eberwein ^ ^ advanced helicopter flight instructor at Training^ Wing Five, NAS Whiting Field. He is current y HC-16 in Pensacola.
MOU: Nemesis of Unsafe Ships
By Commander J. W. McCurdy, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired)
On 26 January 1982, an agreement notable in the history of maritime safety was executed at Paris. The agreement, referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Port State Control, was formulated to rid the seas of substandard ships that are unsafe on any sea. It was signed by 14 European nations: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These nations are not only concerned for the safety of life at sea but are deeply aware of the ever-present threat to the European littoral.
The coastal devastation wrought by the Torrey Canyon (See “The Black Wake of the Torrey Canyon,” Naval Institute Pro-
tive. The agreement provides that withj'j three years of the date of enforce©® 25% of all foreign ships visiting a sig^' tory state will be inspected to make s that they conform with the follow* “relevant instruments”: j
- The International Convention on U°
Lines, 1966 , e
- The International Convention f°r Safety of Life at Sea, 1974
ackroyd PHOTO*3”*
The emergency fire pump on board the merchant vessel Protector Alpha was inoperable for six months prior to the fire which destroyed the vessel’s after end—a detainable offense under the Memorandum of Understanding on Port of State Control.
ceedings, December 1967, pp. 38-44; Comments, April 1968, pp. 100-103) and Amoco Cadiz (See “The Amoco Cadiz: An Avoidable Disaster,” Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1978, pp. 109-110) disasters was not lost on the signatories to the agreement. The MOU is a tacit recognition that existing enforcement of the various conventions for the safety of life at sea has been ineffec-
- The Protocol of 1978 relating *° ^
International Convention for the Safety Life at Sea, 1974 . e
- The International Convention f°r ^ Prevention of Pollution from Sh'P ’ 1973, as modified by the Protocol
1978 • on
- The International Convention .
Standards of Training, Certification. a Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978
1985
►To
lati:
exchange of information
n Convention on the International filiations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972
The Merchant Shipping (Minimum tj andards) Convention, 1976 (Interna-
°nal Labor Organization Conven- hon 147)
The implementation of the MOU by authorities signatory to the agreement hrough a committee which determines e'nodus operandi. The committee is imposed of a representative of each au- 0rity and, significantly, an observer Q0rn both the International Maritime fanization and the International Labor rganization. More specifically, the ^°I?mittee’s duties include the following: (lo cany out the specific tasks assigned it under the memorandum I :° Promote by all means necessary, eluding seminars for surveyors, the rnionization of procedures and prac- es relating to inspection, rectification, ^e|ention, and delay of ships *o develop and review guidelines for frying out inspections under the MOU ^ lo develop and review procedures for
keep under review other matters re- lng to the operation and the effective' of the memorandum *n applying the relevant instruments, e authorities will ensure that ships entitled to fly the flag of a state which is not a party to that instrument are not favored. Further, they will ensure that the foreign ships inspected will not be discriminated against.
Shipboard inspections are conducted by professional surveyors, who should have a seafaring background and be intimate with carrying the burden of a ship at sea. To assure a common approach in conducting surveys, there will be regular seminars to update surveyors on policy, inspection procedures, legal, and technical matters relative to inspections. The importance of these seminars transcends the dissemination of data; they are conducive to a spirit of shared responsibility between the surveyors of the various authorities and a common respect for their individual contribution to the safety of life at sea. The power of the surveyor to cause delay or detainment of a vessel is impressive; this power will grab the attention of those errant shipowners practiced in avoiding their obligations to the conventions. (See “Flagging the Unsafe Liberian Flag Ships,” Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1977, pp. 102-103).
Ship inspections will be expedited by direct access to a computerized data bank covering all of the ships surveyed. The data bank, currently located at St. Malo, France, will be moved to The Hague where a permanent secretariat will be set up to administer the MOU.
The MOU became operational on 1 July 1982. A review of statistics compiled in the first two years are impressive: a total of 18,686 ships were inspected in the various ports of the authorities. Of this number, 6,948 ships were found deficient in life-saving appliances; 3,942 deficient in fire-fighting appliances; 1,240 deficient in regulations of the International Load Line Convention; 2,768 deficient in navigation, and 2,405 deficient in safety in general. The number of ships delayed and/or detained was 707. In the first year, 15% of the ships calling in MOU ports were inspected; in the second year, 19% were inspected. MOU is expected to realize its goal of inspecting 25% during the current year.
There is no doubt that the effect of the MOU will extend worldwide for the benefit of both seamen and landsmen and that it will be a financial burden to the participating states. Yet, all maritime states have a moral obligation to support this momentous agreement.
Commander McCurdy is a Marine Consultant, a surveyor, and a member of the National Association of Marine Surveyors. He has written previous articles for the Proceedings on maritime safety.
Reinforcing NATO’s Northern Flank
" —
y Colonel A. F. Whitehead, Royal Marines
to
°rway, together with Norwegian troops
h the mountains above Harstad in 0rthern Norway, the wind howls, turn® freshly fallen snow into crusty |ndslab and freezing human flesh within ■nutes. It is an environment unforgiving mistakes or lack of training, fast below the skyline, edging their ls carefully against the steep slope, a am of four men moves cautiously for- ^ ard. In the light of dawn, they are diffi- u 110 spot. Clad entirely in white, with en their weapons bound in white tape, vjfT are grateful for the driving snow hich quickly covers their ski tracks. They are a long way from home. Each ^aa is a competent skier. Even more lrtlportant, he is familiar with these fountains and is trained and equipped to 'ght in them. Three of the patrol’s mem- ers are British, and one is Dutch. They i^e all marines. They are members of the fountain and Arctic Warfare (M&AW) c°mponent of the United Kingdom/Neth- edands Amphibious Force (UK/N1AF) j*ad are taking part in a NATO exercise in
and many other NATO allies, as they have done each winter since 1970.
Formed around Three Commando Brigade Royal Marines, the UK/N1AF is a good example of NATO cooperation within a versatile force which is balanced and well equipped. In common with all amphibious forces, it is trained and equipped to land, independent of ports and airfields, over a beach, or, using commercial shipping, through a port. Among a variety of NATO tasks assigned to the force is the requirement to reinforce NATO’s Northern Flank. To that end, a substantial part of it is trained and equipped for M&AW operations. Every year for approximately three months, the Headquarters, three out of the four infantry units, and the majority of the combat and logistic support units train in the conditions under which they might have to operate—the Northern Flank in winter.
The UK/N1AF consists of Headquarters of Three Commando Brigade Royal Marines, which includes an Air Defence Troop equipped with the Blowpipe missile and four infantry battalion-sized units. These are the 40, 42, 45 Commandos Royal Marines, and One Amphibious Combat Group (ACG) Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (RN1MC), and an independent infantry company (Whisky Company) from the RN1MC.
Combat support is provided largely by the British Army in the form of a Commando Regiment Royal Artillery equipped with the 105-mm. light gun, so successful in the Falklands Conflict, and two commando squadrons of Royal Engineers, one regular and one reserve. Helicopter support comes from the Royal Navy’s commando squadrons equipped with the Sea King IV and Wessex V troop lift helicopters, while antitank and reconnaissance helicopters are provided by Three Commando Air Squadron flying the Gazelle and Lynx aircraft armed with the TOW antitank missile.
Logistic support is supplied by an integrated Logistic Regiment in which navy, marine, and army personnel serve to provide medical, supply, repair, and trans-
suf-
dual
ments. Training consists of basic vival, mobility, fitness, and indivi' tactical and weapon training. ^
Instructors in skiing, survival, mountain operations are provided by 1 Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre, small unit made up of highly traiue^ Mountain Leaders. Group training ta an additional three weeks and concc11 trates on troop (platoon) and company level tactics by night and day. Non-tacj^ cal and tactical movement on skis, assa
and patrol techniques, reconnaissance-
and defensive procedures are all taug ' and they are practiced by the troops- During this period, the specialists the force apply their skills to the con tions of snow and ice. Mortarmen » antitank gunners fire their weapons, as artillerymen; engineers, helicopter pu° ' signallers, and logisticians of every **
pit their training against the environrne
of
until they are proficient members
port facilities. Landing and raiding craft are organic to the force in the shape of the Brigade Landing Craft Squadron.
The majority of the force is M&AW- trained and -equipped. The methods of mobility are the helicopter, the landing craft, the Volvo BV202E tracked oversnow vehicle, and the ski. Individuals are clothed and equipped with light, windproof clothing suitable for ski troops, and warm protective items for extra cold conditions. But it is the training that forms the best protection against the difficult conditions of Norway in winter. This training enables each man to
British commandos provide combat support for the United Kingdom/ Netherlands Amphibious Force, here with a 105-mm. light gun, while the amphibious transport dock HMS Fearless operates in a Norwegian fjord during an amphibious exercise.
survive so he may fight effectively.
Recruit training in the Royal Marines lasts 32 weeks and produces a marine ready to take his place in a 30-man rifle troop of a commando unit. Officer training initially takes one year, at which point a second lieutenant will start his first experience as a troop commander. Training in the RN1MC is similar. A key ingredient of the training is the Commando Course—six weeks of training designed to develop physical and mental stamina, and to promote the individual characteristics of resourcefulness and team spirit which are the marks of a commando-trained marine. Successful completion of the course results in the award of a green beret, worn with pride by all Royal Marines and their colleagues from the Royal Navy, British Army, and Royal Air Force who serve in Three Commando Brigade and who must complete the course before joining.
Upon assignment to one of the M&AW units of the brigade, training for the specialist role begins. Each autumn, for about six weeks, units move to the mountains of Wales, Scotland, and the Lake District. They practice simple rock climbing, mountaineering and rescue skills, navigation, survival, and medical training, to equip them to operate in the mountains. Often called Blackshod, to distinguish it from Whiteshod (ski-borne) Training, the weeks are characterized by the wet and windy weather that is so typical of these parts of Britain in early winter. They are a testing time for men and equipment.
It is at this stage that the Dutch colleagues link up once more with the remainder of the brigade. During Black- shod and Whiteshod Training, both One ACG RN1MC and W Coy RN1MC are fully integrated members of the force. W Coy normally trains as the fourth Rifle Company of one of the commando units,
thus extending the integration of the N1AF to the lowest level.
Having learned in the United King 0 as much as possible of the theory of wirl ter operations during the two weeks > mediately before Christmas, the units of the UK/N1AF deploy to Norway in early January. Accommodated initia in a wide variety of camps up and do the country, their Norwegian millta' hosts offer invaluable assistance a friendly hospitality, without which 1 ^ success of the training would not be p sible. Local terrain knowledge, infonn tion on the environment, and an un ^
standing of the military characteristics ^ Allied forces are essential ingredients effective training in this vital NATO ro ^
The period starts with three weeks 0 Arctic Warfare Training (AWT) for th°s^ on their first winter, from which none exempt. At the same time, continual training is carried out by individuals w are no longer novices to build on experl ence gained during previous depl°)
team. The simple business of maintaini’L and driving a vehicle, even one as g°
as 'he Volvo BV202E, becomes a whole new operation when the route is steep and Covered in deep snow.
Recreation takes the form of cross C°untry ski racing—culminating in a ^°mPulsory 20-km. ski shoot competi- *°n downhill skiing, and such home- aoe entertainment as can be brought Cas,'ly °n the deployment, such as films and videos.
Training approaches a climax with the Production of unit-level exercises, after jeh the whole force concentrates, nor- I in northern Norway, for a brigade- vel exercise. This demanding training rir>gs together all the professional skills
learned by novices and veterans alike over the previous two months and is also the occasion upon which the force deploys and exercises, often under NATO direction, with Allied troops from Norway, Canada, Germany, Italy, and the United States.
The training is long, often arduous, and occasionally dangerous. But it is satisfying and worthwhile. As well as producing a demonstrably competent amphibious force trained in the special skills of mountain warfare in winter, the annual winter deployment of the United King- dom/Netherlands Amphibious Force is a continuing witness of the commitment of two European Allies to the defense of NATO’s Northern Flank. The force is made cohesive by virtue of the continuity of training and the permanently formed organization of British and Dutch personnel.
Colonel Whitehead spent two years as a staff officer in Headquarters, Allied Forces Northern Europe in Oslo, Norway. Between 1978 and 1980, he was Brigade Major (Chief of Staff) of three Commando Brigade Royal Marines. Until 1983, Colonel Whitehead commanded 45 Commando Royal Marines during two years of annual winter training in northern Norway and during the involvement in the Falklands Conflict. He is currently Assistant Defence Attache in the British Embassy in Washington, D.C.
trolli
■ng envelope of one or more of the
V/STOL 10:
duri
mg the ponderous beachhead off-
lOj
The V-22 Osprey—A Breakthrough
^-aPtain Gerald G. O’Rourke, U. S. Navy (Retired)
, The V-22 Osprey, the latest in vertical chort takeoff and landing (V/STOL) air- ra‘t. is the result of a concept that Reived over the past 15 years. At that 'Pe, this concept was the “Great White c °Pe” of naval aviation. V/STOL air- a't were expected to revolutionize war- are at sea. We would no longer need the 8e> nuclear-powered aircraft carriers llh their massive catapults, arresting j=ear» and several acres of aircraft landing Pace. Instead, warships no larger than a ^'gate could carry a few V/STOLs, unching and recovering them as simply s a helicopter. Naval armadas could then widely dispersed across vast ocean xPanses, yet remain tightly coordinated r°ugh both space-based networks and aircraft.
„ The V/STOL aircraft would provide e eyes and ears so necessary to the bate groups for surveillance, identification, aed detailed tracking of hostile targets, nensively, the heavy, lethal weaponry epld be kept on board the ships “on- al* ’ for missile delivery far beyond the Surface horizon but well within the con- sensor aircraft. Defensively, the Ss of a single ship would be serious, but n°> fatal, to the overall effort. All that Was needed were a few good V/STOL aircraft.
dozens of prospective designs were considered. There were tail sitters, wire angers, tilt-wings, tilt-rotors, tilt-fans, augmented wings, lift-jets, ducted fans, and deflected thrust designs on paper, in jn°ck-ups, and actually flying in proto- 7Pe forms. The Marines were most in- ^'gued with V/STOL, primarily to lessen "e vulnerability of amphibious forces 'ading phase of operations. The Air
Force was interested more in the STOL than the V, anticipating bomb-cratered runways in a European war. The Army wanted V/STOL aircraft to move lots of combat troops and mobile armor all around the rough terrain common to most land warfare.
For reasons never fully understood, rotary wing helicopters were rarely considered as members of the V/STOL fraternity, despite their outstanding vertical takeoff and landing performances. Helicopters were believed to be part of the present. For the future, they would be the jack-of-all-trades military vehicle much like the jeep in World War II—handy and useful, but only in supporting roles.
As the 1970s passed, so did most of the high hopes for V/STOL. Some of the aircraft were over-designed and complex. Others were simple, but operationally impractical. Almost all were notoriously short-legged after a vertical takeoff. One, the thrust-augmented wing concept, became the butt of a series of new V/STOL jokes, because it could not blow hard enough to become airborne.
The only survivor is the Marine Corps AV-8A/B Harrier, originally a British deflected thrust fighter design. Our prime competitor, the Soviets, were just as active as we were, but all they have to show for their efforts is the “Forger,” essentially a “Chinese copy” of a German Lift and Lift/Cruise design. While both aircraft are revolutionary in design, neither is highly respected by the military aviation community. The Harrier is notably the better of the two but cannot fly very fast or very far. The “Forger” seems to be relegated to naval missions requiring only very short ranges and airborne times.
The U. S. Navy soon returned to im-
For V/STOL?
proving the slow speed flight characteristics of its stable of conventional aircraft. It still relies upon the catapults and arresting gear of its mammoth aircraft carriers to get the needed short takeoff and landing performance out of them.
But there is change in the air now. A new candidate for the exclusive, illusive V/STOL fraternity, the V-22 Osprey, has appeared on the horizon. An unusual feature of this aircraft is the lack of hoopla, fanfare, and grandiose publicity so characteristic of its late unlamented brethren. Known first as a tilt-rotor, then as the XV-15 prototype, next as a JVX (for joint service use), and, most recently, as the V-22, this new bird may well turn out to be the real sleeper of the entire V/STOL saga.
Surprisingly, there is nothing visibly exotic about the tilt-rotor V-22. In forward flight, it looks and acts just like a twin-engine turboprop. For vertical flight, the engines swivel around each wing tip, the “props” become “rotors,” and the airplane looks and acts just like a twin-rotor helicopter.
When a little runway is available, intermediate positioning of the prop-rotor permits a healthy overload to be carried aloft after a very short takeoff run. Because it was sized to carry 24 combat Marines, the V-22 represents a pretty hefty package, with a tip-to-tip width of some 85 feet. To accommodate basing the aircraft on board crowded ships, the rotor blades fold along the wing and the wing swivels to a fore-and-aft position, making a neat, compact rectangle for stowage.
As in the case of the Harrier, the Marine Corps has fallen heir to the difficult service pioneering task for the tilt-rotor. The Navy wants a few for combat search
THE V-22 Osprey Multimission Tilt-rotor
Blade Deice
Advanced Composite Rotors
Transmission
Interconnect
Shaft
Auxiliary Power Unit
Loading Ramp
Fail-Operate
Conversion
System
Automatic Fold System
IR Suppressor
Refueling Probe ~
Single and Dual Point Cargo Hooks
Multimode
Radar
n, . 24 Crashworthy
Pilot Night jroop Seats
Vision System
Engine Engine Air Particle Separator
Run Dry Drive System
hundreds of miles, then hover and b a^ away with active acoustics to both dete'- and prosecute the threatening submar111 The V-22 is better than conventional ai craft such as the P-3 in its ability to hov and dip or “soft-deploy” both sub^ rine-hunting systems and submarine-* ^ ing weaponry from a single aircraft on
and then triangulate to pinpoint the tar
cnrL
: hid'
weapons to bear against submarines
BOEING VEFTTOL
and rescue, and the Air Force wants a few for special operations, such as the ill- fated Tehran rescue attempt. The Army remains uncommitted, although it is interested enough to consider a respectably large buy further along. The V-22, to be built by the combined efforts of Bell in Fort Worth, and Boeing Vertol in Philadelphia, will first fly in 1988, with initial service use slated for 1991.
The most interesting facet of the story has yet to be revealed, however. The Navy, faced with an almost insurmountable threat from modem-technology Soviet submarines, is now casting about for new capabilities in antisubmarine warfare (ASW). There are two parts to the problem: the submarines must first be detected (hunted), then they must be “prosecuted” to an attack (killed). The Navy’s P-3 land-based Neptunes and carrier- based S-3 Vikings, in concert with various listening arrays implanted on the ocean’s floor, do pretty well at hunting while ships’ hull-mounted sonars and helicopter-dipping sonars, using active acoustics, tend to be better as the killers.
Navy submariners are more amused than impressed by either the sonobuoy- dropping aircraft or the sonar-dipping helicopters. They believe that a submarine is the best weapon to use against another submarine, since both are immersed in the same environment, and U. S. submarines have notable technological and tactical superiorities. Beclouding this thinking, however, are these facts: the Soviet submarines are now making significant progress in modem acoustic technologies, are building new boats at an alarming pace, and are rapidly improving their tactical prowess.
Soviet submarines are becoming notably quieter and much more numerous. Therefore, traditional sonobuoy listening tactics will probably not suffice for hunting as time goes by. With the Soviet penchant for sub-fired, long-range antiship missiles, as well as torpedoes, the hull-mounted and helo-dipping active sonars will not reach out far enough for timely killing.
While this is an admittedly oversimplified summary of a vastly complex problem, it nevertheless describes the ASW stage that the V-22 could enter in the 1990s. The V-22’s advantages over the helicopter show up most dramatically in range and speed. It promises to dash out at turboprop airplane speeds to ranges of
single mission.
In a number of more complex A scenarios, the V-22 could emplace nn long passive listening arrays and re later to retrieve the high cost portions such equipment. The “soft-deploy pability implies that many of the Pa.^s ing complexities and costs for devi using conventional aircraft deploym can be avoided. There are also lots promising new high-tech gizmos n coming along in the ASW developme mill. . 0
Further into the future are interests possibilities for exploitation of nlU static sensors. The V-22 might plans number of “cheap” listening sonobuoy or arrays, dip a booming noisema* ’ measure the reflections off a submarin ’
get. The V-22 can also bring sensors an
19*5
this
case, the tilt-rotor could be used to
helj,
■copters and short-endurance Harriers.
has
so far been confined to amphibious
lnE Under the Arctic ice far beyond the J?ach of a normal helicopter. Also, since , e ^'22 is self-deployable over most of e globe, a large number of these aircraft ^'ght quickly be “massed” on board s 'Ps, islands, or oil platforms to meet sPecific threats in isolated regions. Best aU, they could be “sea-staged” on ard ships hundreds of miles away from Carrier battle group or a surface action group, yet stiii routinely provide the jnuch-needed ASW services for those °rces. The V-22 fits nicely into the rapaho concept of operating aircraft r°m hastily converted merchantmen. In
Provide the high altitude, long-endurance Urveillance, command, control, and C°mmunications, distant ASW, and lo- S'stics to complement the short-legged
Although the focus of official attention
"'urfare and, only recently, on ASW, nurnerous opportunities wait for an airCraft that can fly in either fixed-wing or helicopter fashion. These include coastal defense, minesweeping, minelaying, border patrolling (or penetrating), exploring remote areas, a variety of logistical tasks, all sorts of air tasks in support of surface warships, and making “connections” with distant submarines or ocean stations. While an Arapaho merchantman would be no match for a Nimitz (CVN- 69)-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, it might be invaluable for a small nation with either commercial or military interests a few hundred miles out to sea.
Thus, the Navy’s ASW community is closely watching and waiting as the Marines labor the V-22 through the bureaucratic mazes of Pentagonia. Some critics decry this wait, seeing it as a tactic. Others applaud it, citing the development dangers inherent in leaping from the
- pound XV-15 prototype to a
- pound V-22 without first trying a few mid-size designs. Other services have a number of future military needs which could provide inspiration—and funding—for development of a smaller tilt-rotor. Should one of these materialize the concept is assured a long and healthy future, with inevitable opportunities for developing a whole family of designs, each sized and tailored for specific tasks.
The second decade of the next century might mark the next revolution in commercial air traffic. Any big fiat-topped building could become a helipad to relieve our saturated airports. Someday, there may be a commercial tilt-rotor to whisk you from suburban Washington to the top of New York City’s Pan Am building in about 30 minutes.
A 1944 graduate of the Naval Academy, Captain O’Rourke commanded several all-weather fighter squadrons, an ammunition ship, and the USS Independence (CVA-62). Prior to retirement in 1974, he directed the Navy Fighter Study Group. A former member of the Naval Institute’s Board of Control, Captain O’Rourke authored “A Good New Idea” (on the Arapaho concept), ‘‘CVNs Forever! Forever?” and “Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners” for the Proceedings.
jjie Ultimate Force Multiplier
Commodore Thomas A. Brooks, U. S. Navy
Victory comes to him who has the M°st forces, has the most technologically a vanced arms, is best trained and best eu, and fights with the greatest degree of “ravery. ”
Again and again, history has proven *s quote wrong, when forces with all of ® above attributes have lost to forces •Uch were inferior in all respects, but Maneuvered better, adapted better to the actical situation, or were otherwise able ° neutralize effectively the advantages of he “superior” force.
Very often, the element which has ultimately tipped the balance has been the victor’s superior knowledge of the characteristics of the battlefield: where is the enemy, in what strength, and what are his 'mentions? These are variations of the rst two laws of warfare as espoused by military strategists as far back as Sun Tzu r°ugh Napoleon Bonaparte and Karl ^°n Clausewitz: know the battlefield, and n°w the enemy.
These classic dictums are commonly b°ught of in their application to land "mrfare. But the principles are equally aPplicable to war at sea. The foremost Sample is the Battle of Midway, where °Ur knowledge of the enemy’s location and his intentions enabled us to defeat a Vastly superior force.
At Midway, as in most other examples, there was another element involved. In addition to knowing the enemy and the battlefield, the victorious commander frequently enjoyed the advantage of surprise. He knew where the enemy was, but the enemy did not know where he was. When these two factors combined—a knowledge of the enemy and the battlefield, and the ability to deny the enemy a similar knowledge of his whereabouts the results have usually been victories, even over forces which were superior in all respects.
Today, there are some specific applications for this principle. With the advent of weapons having ranges well beyond the horizon, the ocean battlefield of today encompasses tens or even hundreds of thousands of square miles—well beyond the task force’s integral sensors’ ability to
see. .
Victory may not go to the force with superior weapons or doctrine but to the commander who has at his disposal the surveillance system which enables him to know where the enemy is, what he is about, and the battlefield environment (e.g., merchant ships and other forces in the area); thus, he is able to target his weapons. If that commander also has the ability to deny this same knowledge to the other side, then it will not matter very much how many forces the other side has.
The ultimate force multiplier then is the ability to locate, observe, and target an enemy force over-the-horizon while remaining undetected and denying that enemy the ability to bring his weapons to bear—at least not until after you have revealed your presence by initiating the attack.
What kind of system would provide such advantages to the battle group commander at sea? Surely, nothing we have today. Passive electronic intelligence collection systems can make a contribution, but they depend on a cooperative target. Active radar satellites are a much-touted potential component of the “ideal” surveillance system, but present a formidable correlation problem: which of those blips is the enemy ship and which is the neutral merchant ship?
Over-the-horizon radar has promise, as do high-altitude, long-endurance drones, but they present the same basic correlation problem. None of these systems can exercise the judgment required to survey the “battlefield,” characterize it for the commander, and discern the location of hostile combatants and report them. They cannot even conduct limited damage assessment—“spotting the fall of shot.”
Clearly, such a system would require a man in the loop, meaning a manned surveillance platform in space. Provide this
While it is too early to ascertain ultimate purposes of the Soviet
the milita1^
The United States should look beyond the Soviet space plane, above, to the larger implications of the half dozen space events support ships which the Soviet Navy operates. Are these ships the link with the manned space reconnaissance/weapon system which could provide the Soviets with the ultimate force multiplier?
man in the loop with the capability to destroy, neutralize, or deceive enemy space surveillance systems and you have provided the battle group commander with the ultimate force multiplier.
All this sounds like Buck Rogers and much too expensive to consider seriously. Surely, it is not feasible for the near future. But wait a minute. Look at the Soviet manned space program and the Soyuz/Salyut Space Station System. What you have is essentially a military manned space program. Little or nothing is revealed of its content. Yet we know from reports from our own astronauts that warships can easily be detected and reported from space.
As for a connection between the Soviet military space program and the Soviet Navy, consider for a moment the investment which the Soviet Navy has made in Space Events Support Ships (SESSs). The Soviet Academy of Sciences operates an SESS fleet in support of the civil space program. Yet, besides these ships, the Soviet Navy now operates a half dozen of its own and reportedly has additional SESSs building. What role could the SESSs play that could be so important to the Soviet Navy that they would justify the expenditure of these kind of resources? Could it be the link with the manned space reconnaissance/weapon system which could provide the Soviets with the ultimate force multiplier?
Clearly, something in space is of great importance to the Soviet Navy to justify the expenditure of scarce shipbuilding
rubles and facilities.
A program of this sort would be coin pletely in consonance with the Sov character. The Soviet Navy, and its Tsjtf ist predecessor before it, has a long tra ' tion of looking for the cheap equalize ^ the shortcut weapon which moots advantage the enemy has in super' numbers or capabilities. The Sovi were among the first to use expl°s*v ^ ordnance, the mine, the submarine in ^ earliest stages, and the antiship cruis missile.
All of these weapon systems 'ver^ adapted by the Russian and Soviet navie in an effort to enable them to do bat with vastly superior fleets without havme to build and sustain a similar fleet, be ous thought must be given to the potent^ implications of a Soviet Navy manne^ space reconnaissance and ocean surv lance system—particularly if the sp platforms involved have the capability neutralize our sensors in space.
At the same time, the United Sta ® should be thinking about these kind o military/naval applications in sPa ' While there is significant sentiment demilitarizing space, there is lidle e dence that the Soviets have any real int<-r est in a truly bilateral agreement of 1 nature—at least not as long as they ha a significant advantage in this area- similar U. S. program would not on ) prevent the Soviets from gaining a sign icant strategic advantage over V'/eSte^ naval units at sea but might provide impetus required to make the Sovi ^ think seriously about demilitarization 1
space.
fanned space program, it is not too soon see the implications of a manned space Urve’llance platform armed with an anti- atellite capability. Inasmuch as fielding ,ls sort °f system takes years of advance P anning, the United States might be well V|sed to give serious thought to the implications of a Soviet Navy manned space program which has no parallel in the West.
No one can afford to give a potential enemy the advantage of a superior, and conceivably a one-sided, capability to know the enemy and the battlefield.
Commodore Brooks was commissioned via Officer Candidate School in 1959. He has served tours of duty in OpNav, as a naval attache, in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and on afloat staffs. He was officer-in-charge of a Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center. Commodore Brooks recently served as Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USCinCLant/ CinCLantFlt. He is currently on duty in the Washington area.
Seabees: Update ’85___________
Rear Admiral Thomas S. Maddock, Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve
From Adak to Peru, from Midway to ota, Naval Reserve Seabees performed overseas deployments last year. The a tie of an Navai Reserve Seabee con- ruction efforts during fiscal year 1984 galled $33 million. Many of the projects ere directed toward improving the qual- y of life for Navy personnel as well as Providing essential operational facilities at directly support the fleet, in addition, Naval Reserve Seabees ade 12 deployments for the purpose of Uitary and professional training. Five of ese “homeport” deployments were eSimental or battalion-sized operations.
Reserve Seabees are the largest component of the Reserve Naval Construction °rce (RNCF), a nationwide command oiade up of 18,000 people in more than subordinate units. The RNCF repreSents one-fifth of the Naval Surface Re- j^rvej and nearly seven-tenths of the avy’s entire construction capability. et> the Reserve Seabees seem to be one the Navy’s best-kept secrets.
The RNCF consists of the following Parts:
^ Reserve Naval Mobile Construction ^n'ts (Reserve Seabees)
Reserve Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (RDNavFac) Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval °rces Europe Assistant Chief of Staff Construction Management (Cin- EUSNavEur ACOS/CM) " ne technical sponsor for this major aval Reserve program is Naval Facili- les Engineering Command.
The 19 Naval Reserve Readiness Com- Uand Regions and their Naval Reserve enters throughout the United States sup- P°rt local RNCF detachments and units.
The Reserve Seabees include both c°mmissioned units in an inactive status and reinforcing units that mobilize to ac- 'Ve duty commands at Construction Bat- alion Atlantic (CBLant) and Construc- ‘°n Battalion Pacific (CBPac). The c°mmissioned units are identical to their active-duty counterparts in terms of both Pufsonnel and equipment. These self-sus- a'ning units are Advance Base Functional Components (ABFCs). The commissioned units include one Naval Construction Brigade, nine Naval Construction Regiments, 17 Naval Mobile Construction Battalions, and five Naval Construction Force Support Units.
The ABFCs have an allowance of 14,000 men (no women for combat units) and are currently 90% manned.
The headquarters of the first Reserve Naval Construction Brigade is colocated with the RNCF, and the commander double hats as a brigade commander. The nine Reserve Naval Construction Regiments are headquartered throughout the United States and are responsible for the command and control of subordinate Reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (RNMCBs) and Naval Construction Force Support Units.
The Reserve Seabee battalions, which are the heart of the two brigades, each have an allowance of 738 men (no women) and 24 officers. There are 266 pieces of construction equipment for each battalion; these are in war reserve stock at the Naval Construction Battalion Centers (Port Hueneme, California; Gulfport. Mississippi; and Davisville, Rhode Island), except for the Air Detachment portion of the allowance.
Each active and reserve battalion has a 90-man, highly mobile air detachment which includes 34 pieces of air transportable construction equipment. For reserve battalions, this equipment is placed at the Permanent Drill Site/Headquarters of the battalions and support units, and is used for training by battalion personnel.
Two reserve battalions, RNMCBs 23 and 24, conducted first-ever mobilization and mount-out exercises of their air detachments in 1984. These highly successful evolutions proved the ability of Reserve Seabees to mobilize, prepare their equipment, and air deploy. These exercises must meet the same standards as those required for active-duty battalions.
The Naval Construction Force Support Units have an allowance of 200 men (no women) and an equipment allowance of 286 pieces. This heavy equipment, which includes rock crushers, concrete pavers, and asphalt plants, supports the construction operations of several battalions.
The commissioned units mobilize based on the Time Phased Force Deployment plan to activities which directly support fleet operations in the Atlantic, Pacific, and European theaters. A substantial number of the regiments and battalions mobilize to Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) commands, where they are integrated into the MAF Force Support Services Group.
The units which mobilize to augment active Naval Construction Force commands at CBLant and CBPac provide the capability for these organizations to handle the significantly increased loading which would result from the influx of reserve units during a mobilization.
RNCF units are assigned to augment CBLant, CBPac, and the 20th, 30th, and 31st Naval Construction Regiments. These units provide 65% of the wartime strength of these active-duty commands.
Each of the 19 Naval Reserve Fleet Hospital Commands in the United States includes a Construction Battalion Hospital Unit. These units, with an allowance of 3,016 Reserve Seabees, are responsible for erecting and maintaining the fleet hospitals, which directly support Marine Corps MAF operations. Reserve Seabees erected and maintained the prototype fleet hospital components at Marine Corps Base Twentynine Palms, for hot weather testing, and at Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California, for cold weather testing.
Two weeks annual active duty training (AcDuTra) for Reserve Seabees includes deployment of full battalions for technical, military, and operational training. Technical training is typically obtained at the Naval Construction Battalion Centers in Port Hueneme and Gulfport so that Reserve Seabees receive the same training as their active-duty counterparts.
Military training for Reserve Seabees is typically scheduled at Marine Corps bases Camp Pendleton and Twentynine
civilian, he is president and chief executive
ICIll dllU LI11C1 CACkUii’v
Boyle Engineering Corporation, headquartere Newport Beach, California.
Palms on the West Coast and Quantico and Camp Lejeune on the East Coast.
In addition, some 2,000 Reserve Sea- bees—in up to 60 detachments of 40 to 60 men—perform their AcDuTra overseas. The deployment sites read much like a travelog of the free world: Adak, Hawaii, Midway, Johnson Atoll, Guam, Peru, Guantanamo Bay, Roosevelt Roads, the Panama Canal Zone, Bermuda, and Rota. The list grows each year as more installations request their help. As a byproduct of their training, Reserve Seabees make quality-of-life improvements and construct high-priority facilities at these key active-duty naval stations around the world.
Reserve Seabee capabilities are illustrated by two operations in fiscal year 1984. The first involved international cooperation; the second provided support to another Naval Reserve program.
On 12 May 1984, a request was received to send a detachment of Reserve Seabees to Callao, Peru, to assist the Peruvian Navy in recovery from serious storm damage to the naval base. In less than three weeks, a detachment was formed from RNMCBs 16 and 17 of the First Reserve Naval Construction Regiment, equipment lined up, and transportation arranged. Two intensive weeks later, “Peru Detachment 1984” returned from Callao with more than 100% accomplishment of exercise objectives and a shower of congratulatory messages from the Chief of Naval Operations on down. Even the reservists involved had nothing but praise for the evolution.
We received another call, this time from our friends in the Supply Corps. They wanted a cargo handling battalion training platform built at Naval Training Center Great Lakes. Detachments from the Second Reserve Naval Construction Regiment began construction on 16 June 1984; the platform was dedicated on 13 October. The 47-by-77-foot structure, which is 61 feet high, mounts two 65-foot cargo booms, each with a three-and-one- half-ton lifting capacity. As an example of how Reserve Seabees can save precious dollars, the platform is valued at $450,000. Actual construction costs were about $100,000, and the platform is expected to pay for itself in less than two years through savings of travel dollars.
The RDNavFac includes the units which augment the Naval Facilities Engineering Command headquarters and the field activities which it manages, on mobilization. The RDNavFac commander’s mobilization billet is Deputy Commander NavFac for Acquisition, a Reserve Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) flag officer billet.
NavFac-managed activities include Engineering Field Divisions, Public Works Centers, officers in charge of construction, and the Naval Construction Battalion Centers.
RDNAVFAC is manned by 1,000 personnel (500 officers and 500 enlisted); enlisted personnel are primarily in the Public Works Center units. On mobilization, Reserve CEC officers double the active-duty staffing of NavFac. This command is currently assisting NavFac with mobilization planning for its field activities.
The CinCUSNavEur ACOS/CM °r^ nization provides the capability for Na Forces Europe to execute Commander i Chief U. S. Forces Europe (a Joint Chiet of Staff command) directed regional war time construction management respond bilities in the southern region of the Euro pean theater. This reserve organizatm functions on a day-to-day basis as an • tegral part of the Naval Forces Europ headquarters staff located in Lj0n<\>1’ England. Since there is no active- counterpart, this organization must trained and ready to function as an m pendent organization on mobilization- A Reserve CEC flag officer is assign^ to the NavEur headquarters sta ACOS/CM mobilization billet. The man staff includes engineering designs officers from the Army Corps of Eng^ neers and U. S. Air Force Engineering and Services because of the Joint serv construction responsibilities. The orga zation mobilizes to the Mediterranes area. It functions as the Regi°nal ^^aai time Construction Manager for Na Forces Europe and is responsible managing the construction for all servi ^ during wartime, based on Europe Command priorities. .
Naval Forces Europe, in its role as t Regional Wartime Manager, exercise operational control over Army, Navy- and Air Force construction troops, a the Department of Defense construct!0 agents (Officer in Charge of Constru‘d tion, Mediterranean, and Army Corps Engineers, European Division). -s Annual training for this organization ■ usually held in the European theater an includes validating Civil Engineer Sup^ port Plans at major activities for all se vices and participation in European J°* service exercises.
The hallmark of the Seabee is cheerful reply to any request: “Can Do- As they move confidently into their 4 year, all Seabees look forward to adduL more laurels to their already legendary reputation.
Admiral Maddock was graduated from Virginia technical Institute, MIT, and the Stanford Gra School of Business. He was commissioned in ^ Navy Civil Engineer Corps in 1952 and serve ^ active duty for three years. In the Naval Reserve^^ has served as a battalion commanding officer, a ^ mental commander, and as Chief of Staff f°r ^ ^
serve Naval Construction Force. Admiral Ma was selected for flag rank in 1981 and served aSt sistant Chief of Staff for Construction Manage jS to Commander U. S. Naval Forces Europe- ^ ^ currently commander of the RNCF headquartcre ^ Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California- ,
■ officer.