This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
id'
behind him were shot, one fatally.
Greene came face to face with Brown, who was ing his carbine. Greene slashed down with his s .
On a lazy Sunday evening, a man calling himself Isaac Smith slipped quietly into Harpers Ferry, Virginia, with 18 armed men. This band of zealots, composed of both white and black men, seized the U. S. arsenal there and killed, wounded, or took as hostages several townspeople. Smith was identified as the notorious abolitionist John Brown. The day was 16 October 1859, and it became infamous as the events following the seizure led to the Civil War.
Militiamen from Maryland and Virginia and irate citizens rushed to the scene and, after a wild exchange of shots. Brown and his men removed their hostages to the armory’s firehouse. A message was sent to Washington by telegraph requesting assistance. Because the nearest regular Army troops were garrisoned in Fort Monroe, Virginia, the War Department asked the Navy Department for Marines. By mid-afternoon of 17 October, a detachment of 86 Marines from the Washington Barracks, under the command of Lieutenant Israel Greene, the officer of the day, was on its way by train to Harpers Ferry.
Greene’s orders were to report to the senior Army officer present, Brevet Colonel Robert E. Lee, who was home on leave from Texas when the War Department ordered him from his residence in Arlington, Virginia, to proceed to Harpers Ferry. Lee was joined by a cavalry lieutenant named J. E. B. Stuart who volunteered to be his aide. They arrived in Harpers Ferry at 2200 on the 17th. They contacted Greene and his Marines, and the federal force marched to the arsenal grounds.
When they arrived, they relieved the militiamen who 168 appeared unwilling to close in on the fanatics they ^ cornered in the firehouse. Lee assessed the situafl0^oUSe decided that if Brown did not surrender, the fire ^ must be stormed. Greene was ordered to form two s(0 ing parties, using 27 of his men and have them rea assault “John Brown’s fort.” The militiamen wcr^e(j fered the opportunity to make the assault but dec Lee’s offer.
A short time after daybreak, Stuart was sent t° „o with a note demanding surrender. There were to jt„ negotiations. If Brown refused to surrender, the P‘a^ vised by Lee and Greene called for Stuart to wav a(1d plumed hat, for which he later would become note > the Marines would storm the firehouse. .gtlio
The Marines, armed with sledgehammers in addi ^ their usual firearms, waited patiently as J. E. ^d moved forward. Brown refused to surrender, the P ^g hat was waved vigorously, and the Marine "b°avValc party” went forward as if they were scaling a £u with cutlass and pistol in hand. With the sledgebal1 inland using a ladder as a battering ram, the Marines ,.fe, mered down the double doors and poured into tn $ house, Greene leading the way. Two privates rac - ; rel°a'
opening a deep gash on Brown’s neck. The wounds^ litionist was dragged from the building and laid on to tress in the grass. Greene’s men bayoneted two death, but most of the raiders were dead or woundv
°niy
^ ____________________ r_ __ __
Vering -n Marine Corps but would be accused of wa Nns .ln Royalties. Brigadier General Edwin H. Sim- W 'pi,noted U. S. Marine Corps historian, reports in his 'eQrs United States Marines: The First Two Hundred W“/75~/975 (Viking Press, 1974) that Harris
replaced Harris after his death.
8 this period. Marine officers generally were of
b,
urin
laSes ‘°US day’s wdd firing with the militia. The hos- "'as uncjCre ^reed uninjured, however, and the situation *o Sear ^r control. The Marines conducted a short patrol train f ^0r 0,her Brown supporters and then boarded a ^reene°r ^ash*n£ton. Unfortunately, the success of %ij|aa,ld his small band of Marines did not foretell of T^e MCCeSSes during the Civil War. r°le jf)., ar'ne Corps was doomed to play only a minor Se . c War- This lack of action was caused, in part, by 'n thejrl0J Mtirine officers. The field-grade officers were ’heir anS’ <dt’ f°r field service and unimaginative in C°nflict r°aC^1 t0 t*ie r(de ’hcif service could play in the %m.' Brigadier General Archibald Henderson, the r'§ht |ean,^ant u’h° had provided half a century of forth- Hn (jUership, died in 1859 and was replaced by Colonel ^U0vv p*1’5’ a *ar ^ess capable officer. Like most of his I ’Upgrade officers, he was an old man. He not nCy ^ _d resolution in ensuring discipline and effi-
_m , ____ „____ , ________ wa-
1(1 an 0ri° lhe extent of giving a letter of recommendation ()|yCer 8°*n§ south.” Unfortunately, the aged field- JVreICers stood firm, or, as Simmons says, "infirm." ’Hitth v °U'^ n° re''ef f°r this inefficiency until the ‘1h]e Zear of the war when Colonel Jacob Zeilin, a more utucer lesser quality than those of the regular Army and Navy. They were not graduates of formal training provided by the military and naval academies, although some were dropouts from these institutions. This problem was aggravated by the defection of its southern officers. Half the captains and two-thirds of the lieutenants or one-third of the officer corps (20 of 63) resigned to take commissions in the Confederacy. Some of the most talented and promising field officers went South. Greene was among them.
The period from the election of Abraham Lincoln as President on 6 November 1860 until his inauguration the following March was one of anxiety and grief in the Marine Corps as it found its small organization torn apart internally. Esprit de corps was at its lowest ebb The defections did little to enhance the Marine Corps’ position with the Lincoln administration. The new President put an abrupt end to the resignations by dismissing any officer who requested separation. Thirty-eight new officers most of them inexperienced and many of them patronage appointments, were commissioned to fill the gaps of those who had cast their lot with the Confederacy and offered
ier 1984
ltlRs 1 Novemlw
their services to the Confederate States Marine Corps (CSMC). Congress authorized increases of 28 officers and 1,750 enlisted men in 1861. There would be subsequent increases, but at no time during the war would the Marine Corps be stronger than 3,900. This period of history would not be the Marine Corps’ most illustrious.
In his book Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marines (Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1980), Allan Millett succinctly summarized the situation:
“Given the character of the naval war against the Confederacy, the Navy Department might have developed its own amphibious assault force to capture and occupy Confederate coastal and river fortifications rather than depend on the Union Army. From hindsight, this mission might seem the ‘natural’ function of the Marine Corps, and at least two Navy officers, Rear Admiral Samuel F. DuPont and Rear Admiral S. P. Lee, proposed that Marine regiments be formed for such duties. With a couple of exceptions, however, the Marine Corps did not provide battalions of adequate strength, training, and organization for amphibious assaults. The basic reason was simply the failure of imagination within the Navy Department and Headquarters. John Harris and his successor, Jacob Zeilin, simply did not recognize the amphibious assault mission or else rejected it for being too much like an Army task.”
The Marine Corps took the position that its sole mission was to furnish guards for Navy vessels in order to enforce shipboard discipline, man guns, and join landing parties for limited operations ashore.
This position seems ironic when one of the Marine Corps’ first combat missions was to provide a hastily put together battalion to support Major General Irving McDowell at the First Battle of Manassas or Bull Run, the name depending on which side a person fought. The battalion of 13 officers and 336 men, mostly raw recruits, was led by hard-fighting Major John Reynolds. Unfortunately, the battalion members had little war experience except for Major Jacob Zeilin, four other officers, and nine noncommissioned officers. The battle would prove to be an inglorious fiasco and despite Reynolds’s valiant efforts, the Marines broke and joined the general disintegration of McDowell’s army.
There were other battalion-sized operations, such as the expedition against Port Royal, South Carolina, in November 1861. Unfortunately, the steamship Governor, which had been chartered to carry the Marines, foundered in a severe storm and began to sink. All but seven Marines were rescued, but the amphibious assault planned for them by Admiral Samuel F. DuPont had to be cancelled, and they were relegated to serve as garrison troops after their late arrival at Port Royal. DuPont would use his Marine battalion, which became a highly efficient and disciplined force, for the next five months to hold Confederate coastal fortifications that were surrendered until Union Army forces could be sent to garrison them. However, although DuPont preferred to use Marine landing parties, the battalion became a logistical burden and was disbanded in March 1862.
Marine battalions serving ashore had better luck
an d
performed effectively against Confederate raiders ^ Havre de Grace, Maryland, in 1864 and against rioters in New York City in 1863. These battalions ^ Marine Barracks assigned to Navy shore stations ^ oped a reputation for military efficiency, discipline, appearance. This fact, coupled with exceptional, va 0 service by shipboard Marines who served throughou fleet, helped to advance the prestige of the Marine ^ and overcome the blemishes of the early war year*' j Lyn Montross points out in his book The United _ Marines: A Pictorial History (Holt, Rinehart and . eS ston, 1959), “For the most part, however, the M ^ and U. S. Army regulars played second fiddle in a fought by citizen soldiers on both sides.” . , 0i\v The CSMC Marines shared the same fate as their ^ ^ ers in the North. The Confederate Congress organic ^
CSMC in legislation passed on 20 May 1861. Tj16gfie called for “one colonel, one lieutenant colony
major, one quartermaster with the rank of major, one ‘ ,
tant with the rank of major, one sergeant major, °^nants,
termaster sergeant, ten captains, ten first lieutei
:orp°'
twenty second lieutenants, forty sergeants, forty j, rals, 840 privates, ten drummers, ten fifers, and tw°1 ^
dans.” Small in number, the Confederate leatne j performed most of their service as gun crews an t> detachments on ships of the South’s small navy. f5 Surprisingly, and perhaps to the chagrin of the de^ from the Federal Marine Corps, command of the j, was given to a former Army officer, Colonel L at| Beall of Virginia. The fact that he was a colonel inj^ ^
that the CSMC had little political influence in u'~ ^ir nation and perhaps was held in as poor regard a0f sea-soldier brothers in the North were in the initial y
the war. Their field-grade officers and company
manders were largely former U. S. Marine officers ^
roots were questionable. Like their counterparts North, they suffered from poor recruiting and, as ^efe feat of the South approached, “their enlisted ran beset with desertions and near mutinies.” They dl; i f0r-
with distinction on board the fighting ships Virg[n 's, merly the converted ironclad Merrimac, and Ten ^ and at Fort Fisher and the Drewry’s Bluff defens^^- Richmond. They also conducted raids on Union 0f aders and fought as a naval brigade at the Ba'
Saylor’s Creek in April 1865. Although a few Con -ved
uajivn a ui rvpiu luuj. nuuuugu u iv»- -
Marines would fight on in commerce raiders that r news of the war’s end months after the fact, the
died at Saylor’s Creek. .
The Federal Marines, on the other hand, had ^nsl^ their reputation by the end of the war and ree^taced, firm ties with the Navy. Their numbers were redj^ the-v
may have been expected by a nation at peace^
at*
were strong enough politically to overcome se” (0 which called for the transfer of the Marine Corp sfiip Army. The Marines had evolved from perform1 ^insecurity and musketry in sea battles to providing aftd party infantry and naval gunners, their primary r0vVol1^ the Civil War. Expertise in amphibious warfare come later.
tltf
170
Proceedings
/ Novenl
iber’