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The reserve associations
Prov'H uetense Authorization Bill 'ervjf,J, l^e Senate and House Armed
■trvjc ^cimie anu nouse /vrmea
Port “S Committees with an annual re- °utlining in detail what changes
^l^eCorps Reserve: The Foundation of the Total Force Concept
Tlic ■
dose r!o ^’n<^s °f associations maintain c°ntinu'atl0ns w’t*1 an orientation toward suPDorf ^ 3 StronS national defense and dinatio md'tary personnel. This coor- i’Hateral 'S ac^‘eved> not only through specific. ant^ niultilateral meetings on j, c°ncems of mutual interest, but tough common membership in
mg vari • ^‘gaiiiiauuiis. mub,
access 0Us 'ndividual organizations gain °fDefe° tae ^*te House, Department ment ofu’ ^ePartment of State, Depart - attenda 6 ^avy’ and Congress through and nr, n<Ce anc* Participation in briefings
^ onferences.
tPultfa^1 more established of the Horr0*31'011 organizations are the tary o ^nnimittee, the Council of Mili- Navvju8anizations (COMO), and the is SOniar,ne Corps Council. While there each ha6 0VedaP in membership, they C°m ^ a separate focus. The Ad Hoc Phasize 66 *S serv*ce‘oriented and em- nati0n ,S <\0oPerat'on in strengthening the P°se js. defense. COMO’s stated pur- °n niut ° ?rov*4e liaison and cooperation denyjn„Ua ^gislative endeavors without ifdiviri . .any member-organization its tine Co Prero8atives. The Navy-Ma- advjn rl>s Council has as its mission the the meCm,Cnt t*le collective efforts of organizations in areas of
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'ssuesSP0nse on all but the most generic focuSjn° national security, and, yet, by their d'ff°n tbe'r c°mmonality instead of tiaricahi erences> they can achieve a re- Piost ; ^ Unified and potent position on ^a,
■isociatin J . - dderab] ■ or8anizations and wield con- tions an j ’nduence in their joint deliberation o e^orts- And these multi-associ- '^Pact ®an'zations can have a significant 0ne °.n Havy decision-makers. t(>is res° the more dramatic examples of *'°n in #uVe 'nduence is the recent directs] yee Conference Report of the Fis- l° Pm„J984 defense Authorization Bill
h
y ^jor i.-1------------------------------
Edward Home, U. S. Marine Corps,
^he
\y Marine Corps Reserve means 'n8s in our modem, automated NiQej *ts various components are . r the- x citizen Marines who volun- and th*1. regularly to their country Marine Corps. Today’s Marine
will be accomplished in that fiscal year to provide the Guard and Reserve with new missions, more modem equipment, and greater integration with the active forces in keeping with the total force concept.” The Navy was asked to look at agenda items prepared by one of the reserve associations. The product of this prompting accompanied the Navy’s fiscal year 1985 budget submission to Congress. It is titled, “A Report to the Congress on the Navy’s Total Force.” It is more commonly called the Newell Report after Rear Admiral Bruce Newell, U. S. Navy, since retired, who directed the special task force that prepared the report. Without an earnest in-depth study, the Navy was in danger of reaping the wrath of Congress in the form of a reduced active duty Navy end strength. Further, Congress had the General Accounting Office performing an independent review of potential new missions for the Naval Reserve. In addition, there was considerable formal and informal input to Congress, including hearings and testimony from the reserve associations.
In order to lend credibility, the Newell Report was prepared under the direction of Op-090 (Navy Program Planning) by the Navy’s Total Force Advisory Group located at the Center for Naval Analysis. Ten full-time officers (regular Navy/ training and administration of the Naval Reserve) and three Selected Reserve officers recalled to active duty were assigned. The report was reviewed and concurred with by most of the Navy’s vice admirals and, as a result, the Naval Reserve now enjoys the genuine support of the active duty forces.
The most telling statement of why Congress so strongly demanded this report may be contained in the following excerpt from the report, “Navy has perhaps understated its progress in Total Force integration and its seriousness of purpose in using fully its Reserve components.” This posture had resulted in the past in Congress giving the Navy highly specific and detailed directions on the reserve force structure. As a consequence, senior Navy leadership complained of micromanagement. An annual
and Guy D. Schein
reservist stands ready to help the Marine Corps recognize its full potential in its assigned tasks through the Total Force policy.
The primary mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to train individual Ma- “Newell Report” should prevent this kind of impolitic climate in the future.
The partnership of active duty and reserve leadership is critical to continuing the Navy’s role as the centerpiece of U. S. presence around the world. This partnership demands the coordination, education, and participation of the active duty Navy leadership in accomplishing the changes for the reserves in new missions, more modem equipment, and greater integration with the active forces as mandated by Congress.
It demands increased coordination of the active duty and reserve leaderships in using the positive influence of the reserves in achieving the Navy’s integrated Total Force appropriate for any mobilization scenario. It demands the education of the active duty leadership not only in the best employment of reserve forces but in the application of the potent influence of reservists for the good of the Navy. And it demands the participation of active duty leadership in reserve educational and lobbying activities where it is legal.
Of all the armed services, Navy officers represent the smallest percentage of members of their respective reserve or guard organizations. Active duty Navy officers need to redefine their participation in these organizations as an investment in the Navy’s future. Navy officers need to exercise their political rights by writing their congressmen within the limits of the law. They need to be active in defining the Navy’s missions and roles externally, as well as internally.
Through all of these avenues, the Navy can stay on course for its stated missions and objectives. But it can never take its reserve forces for granted. The U. S. Navy has never won a war without its reservists, and it never will.
Commander Steiner holds a master’s degree in political science from the University of Massachusetts. Commissioned through Aviation Officer Candidate School, he served on active duty from 1968 to 1973, during which time he flew helicopter combat support in Vietnam. Since 1973, he has been a member of the Selected Air Reserve in a variety of operational and staff positions. He is currently the commanding officer of HM-1686, a helicopter minesweeping squadron augment unit at Naval Air Reserve, Norfolk. He is also the National Treasurer of the NRA. As a civilian, he is a senior analyst at NASA.
fines to be proficient in their military occupational specialties and to train units to function efficiently in their traditionally assigned roles as part of a Marine air- ground task force (MAGTF). Successful accomplishment of the training mission
Table 1
Reserve Total Force Contributions
25% | Wartime |
| Structure |
33% | Wartime |
| Manpower |
40% | Tanks |
33% | Heavy Artillery |
40% | Beach/Port Operations |
| Capability |
25% | Bulk Fuel-Handling |
| Capability |
67% | Force Reconnaissance |
| Capability |
100% | Civil Affairs Capability |
30% | Light Attack Aviation |
14% | Helicopters |
24% | Observation Aircraft |
33% | Light Antiaircraft Missile |
| Battalion Capability |
25% | Forward Antiair Defense |
| Capability |
with the opportunity to remain more tively involved in the day-to-day °Pe . tions of the reserve establishment participation in projects under the c°= zance of Headquarters Marine Corp
depends upon the availability of personnel and equipment. Accordingly, the Marine Corps Reserve has an extensive personnel management system built around the Marine Corps Reserve Support Center (MCRSC) in Overland Park, Kansas, and has fully integrated its equipment procurement and management programs with those supporting the active forces.
Currently, there are more than 90,000 combat-trained Ready Reservists, nearly half of whom operate from the 184 training centers in 45 states and Puerto Rico, the first Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) unit to be located outside of the continental United States. Soon Alaska will join the other states that host SMCR units within their borders. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve represents 25% of the total force structure for the Marine Corps. All SMCR units are organized in a manner identical to active force units and are established as separate commands under three major organizations which are collectively referred to as the 4th Division-Wing Team (4th DWT).
At present, the majority of the Marine Corps Reserve’s 302 Selected Reserve units form the 4th DWT. The nearly 42,000 men and women of the 4th DWT provide the foundation of the Marine Corps Total Force concept. The DWT is organized and trained for several probable employment roles as part of the Marine Corps’ Total Force. The planned roles include augmenting and/or reinforcing the deploying active forces, furnishing a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) with independent operational capabilities, providing the full DWT if augmen- tation/reinforcement is not ordered, and supplying a nucleus around which to reconstitute the DWT in the event of full mobilization. This entire team can be deployed anywhere within 60 days.
The three commands which comprise the DWT are the 4th Marine Division, the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and the 4th Force Service Support Group. The division and the aircraft wing are headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and the Force Service Support Group is based in Atlanta, Georgia.
In 1983, the Marine Corps Reserve assumed full responsibility for prior service recruiting for the reserves. A new recruiting force, with 44 offices in 26 states and more than 200 full-time support reservists at the Marine Corps Reserve Support Center, has full responsibility for the program.
At the end of fiscal year 1983, 3,165 officers and 39,525 enlisted reservists were serving with the SMCR. In addition, 44,424 Marine reservists are members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and are available to fill vacant personnel slots or to retrain in the event of mobilization.
Special programs such as reserve augmentation units (RAUs) and mobilization
(HQMC) or the respective headquan of the DWT major commands. There 108 MTUs and 30 RAUs.
RAUs are SMCR units whose me bers (Individual Mobilization mentees [IMAs, a relatively new c gory of Marine Corps reservist]) a regularly scheduled drills and occ ^ specific line numbers on m°bilizationg lated tables of organization for M ^ units. An RAU, however, is on ynot administrative classification and <J°eS ^ have a commanding officer or corJllJ1ngs
ctnmtnrp \/lTT Tc cirrnmnri.scd 01 -
who attend regularly scheduled mee > ^ in an unpaid status to keep infornie(5 Marine Corps policies and develop!** while participating in support Pr°J .of under the direction of sponsoring m commands. . 0f
Each of the foregoing category ^ personnel is included in the ^ea yj0us serve. Other personnel with Pre . uS service remain available under va Q mobilization conditions fr°m . js other sources which are identify the Standby Reserve and the Re
S ann System-
i,standards USPd i
used in this evaluation are
>dei
nticai
* *0
limited^tland” equipment resources are eqUipl° *l10se items of individual ***** anci major end items which are ^eserv • l° suPPort the Marine Corps Eruph C.s . Primary mission: training. serve fS*S *S Placed upon providing re- Servic °)t'ces with the most modem and that Ca°*e equipment available to ensure p^Wty, interoperability, sup- m°blii^’ and sustainability exist upon
Sume^ayse °f the significant role as- Part 0j- ^ the Marine Corps Reserve as stantiv "le "l°tal P°rce, readiness is con- tions ’V e',a*uated through various inspec- spectj , tests- SMCR units undergo in- Marin°n^hy the Inspector General of the nance t-°rps, field supply and mainte- t°rs frana'ysis offices, technical inspec- bases °m the Marine Corps logistics COlTlrn r ttetuhers of the three major ttleasu h Sta^s' Operational readiness is Pabiijty through a rigorous tactical ca- the vj assessment program known as ^Valuatanne~ ^orPs Combat Readiness °f acti'v' r° those used in the evaluation 3? SM^orce, During fiscal year 1983, resuiti ° untts were evaluated with a The re frc°mbat-ready figure of 90%. Oiobiij^ lfleSS ^MCR units to actually °f the nu measured under the auspices Moh r ^ through evaluations known E>epi0llzation Operational Readiness S] syment Tests (MORDTs). One-hun- •Mopp^enty-six SMCR units received 93% , s during fiscal year 1983 with Seve^1]^ .ready for mobilization, the . significant changes enhancing Mituted 'ne Corps Reserve have been inhere .Jjr*n8 the expansion of the Total he Reserve Full-Time Support (FTS) Program provides reservists who serve on active duty in direct support of the reserve establishment. They participate in preparing and administering the policies and regulations affecting the reserve component. In addition, FTS personnel serve on active duty in connection with organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, and training the reserve component.
Since 1981, the Full-Time Support Program has grown from 67 officers to an authorized fiscal year 1983 end-strength of 678 officers and enlisted personnel. The Full-Time Support Program has reservists serving on active duty at 17
All Selected Marine Corps Reserve units are organized as the active forces are to make it easier to use the reserves if and when they are called. The supporting elements—4th Force Service Support Group personnel, left, work a logistics problem—join reserve ground and air forces to form a reserve air-ground task force.
find
Within the Marine Corps we
used as tasking elements of a
major commands and staff organizations from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Marine Corps Resource Support Center.
Each year, reserve officers and enlisted personnel enhance readiness through attendance at professional development instruction courses. For the first time since the full implementation of the allvolunteer force concept, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve strength is in excess of 40,000. Educational assistance and monetary bonuses for prior and nonprior service reservists are now available within the Marine Corps Reserve.
As part of this push, the Marine Corps Reserve has been increasing the number of quotas for reserve officers to attend professional development courses. Quotas have jumped from 746 in fiscal year 1981 to 1,115 in fiscal year 1983.
In 1983, for the first time, the Marine Corps Reserve obtained quotas for reserve officers to attend two full-length (44-week) regular top-level service schools: College of Naval Warfare and the College of Naval Command and Staff, both located at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.
The Reserve Counterpart Training Program allows members of the Individual Ready Reserve to participate voluntarily for two weeks training alongside their regular Marine counterparts. During
1982, 1,500 reservists took advantage of this program. In addition, the quality of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve continues to increase. By the beginning of
1983, 87% of the SMCR population were high school graduates, of which more than 14% possessed college degrees.
This decade will see automated data processing and word processing equipment, both for the garrison and the field, being placed in all Selected Marine Corps Reserve units. This modernization will enhance reporting procedures to ensure not only the availability of timely and
accurate data to commanders and p an ners but also, and of greater important^ the means to ensure individual reservi receive proper administration.
way to blend the talents of the reser' with the needs of the active force mander. Unique among all of the U. forces, the Marine Corps is commits ^ a concept of employment that is nized around the specific mission and air-ground team. The Marine air-groU^ task force is a composite of comman, air, ground, and supporting elements lored to the mission at hand. js
Marine
Reserves Respond
sources. The call went again to the MTU members from Washington, and a night shift of media officers was esta ^ lished. Reserve and active-duty Marines worked side by s 24 hours a day, for six days until the casualty notificati011' had been completed.
The OCG was in place and fully operational when the United States and its allies initiated military operations in Grenada on 25 October 1983, and was now charged wit11 coordinating HQMC actions in response to two diverse an widely separated operations. The performance of the OC . remained consistently superb, even under fatiguing condi: ^ generated by 12-hour watches and the requirement to con numerous briefings each day.
in the OCG. Under conditions of mobilization, the OCG would be manned by members of the PP&O Reserve Aug'^.^ mentation Unit (RAU). Although a mobilization condition not exist, volunteer members of the RAU responded im>nL ately to assist in the grim tasks awaiting the Marine Corps the wake of the bombing.
The Marine reservists of the public affairs mobilization training units (MTU) also began responding during the ear - morning hours of 23 October. Because they had received annual reserve counterpart training (RCT), the members o the Washington, D.C., MTU were experienced practitioner and quickly arrived to man the phones next to their active duty counterparts. Several members notified their civilian employers of the situation and prepared to operate as Man1 for the duration of the crisis.
Sunday afternoon the national wire services published 1 phone numbers for the Division of Public Affairs as an *n mation “Hot Line.” As could have been expected, the soon became overwhelmed with frantic calls for informal , about the condition of relatives and friends. This necessity an around-the-clock operation which could not be mainta* without supplementing the division personnel from reserve
As hostilities in Lebanon escalated last summer, it was recognized that additional help was needed in the Joint Public Affairs Bureau (JPAB), Beirut, to better handle the flood of media representatives to the Marine positions within the Multi-National Force. Because of the existing personnel constraints within the public affairs field in the active force structure, it was determined that the better alternative was to activate two reserve public affairs officers to augment the Beirut JPAB.
The request for volunteers was barely on the street before applications from around the country began arriving at the Division of Public Affairs. Within a short period, the tasking requirement had been filled and orders were produced. After briefings from Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and the Pentagon, the first Marine reservist was en route to Lebanon. He arrived at the Beirut Airport on the afternoon of 23 October 1983.
During the early morning hours of Sunday, 23 October 1983, a terrorist attack destroyed the headquarters of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment in Beirut, killing 241 U. S. military personnel. Recognizing the enormity of this tragic event, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), HQMC, directed that the Operations Coordination Group (OCG) be activated. The OCG is an extension of the Headquarters Command Center and is activated during significant exercises or operations to provide a well-staffed central coordinating point to collect and disseminate information pertinent to the operational situation. It works with the National Military Command Center and keeps the Commandant and his staff aware of significant events.
A number of key active duty staff officers were assembled to man the OCG. Local Marine mobilization designee reservists who had been monitoring the situation in Lebanon recognized the need created by the Beirut crisis and immediately volunteered to work alongside their active-duty counterparts
142
Proceedings / OctobC
Planning missions according to nee ^ where the Marine Reserve plays suc vital role. Established with a seParort division, wing, and force service supP^ group, the Marine Reserve is trained equipped to assume a distinct mm mission if desired. Flexibility being ^ key, the reserve potential could also
iforce made up of members from a units lnat'on °f reserve and active force
p0^nderstanding the success of the Total sUede’ Congress has aggressively pur- vvith exPans'on °f the reserve forces S(Jre3 conc°mitant increase in the pres- uiitm ° C^ed'cate specific worldwide com- of t: ents t0 the reserve force. By the end of Sfa' year 1984, the Selected Reserves
167 nnnSerV'CCS w‘d have grown by by (. ® People from the level inherited gr0 ® Reagan administration. That is a Period °f £dmost 20%. During the same by the active force will have grown hasn l The Department of Defense the wheduled a further 17% growth in 1989 ar*ne *~orPs reserve manpower by forCe’ C°mParcd to only 5% for the active
ists h'S !ncreased emphasis on the reserv- foeir 3S ’mProved their attitudes as well as reCematerial capability to wage war. A Marj Comrnanding general of the 4th aC Aircraft Wing demonstrated this the te6 ant* readmess to fight as part of Olo ain hy simply replacing the phrase- m°hilizati°n with “activation.” °rmer carries the connotation of
^2!?en Reserve Officers:
By " " —
leutenant Commander M. J. McMaster, U.
Se^0alen officers in the Selected ReA, g lydRes) in drill status (categories grou ’ and D) are a minority without a iefi)ldeMity. They have not been stud- Ufose 'f are they considered as a group by iightsln Personnel field or in women’s % ,f°ups. This may be a good indica- conditions are favorable to jf n °fflcers in the SelRes. gr0llDw°man officer identifies with any is pr ^nailer than the Naval Reserve, it Mt!) ab'y the functional community eers h ™cb sde*s associated. These offi- atesave a great deal in common: associ- atid’ Career Patterns, gaining commands, tyj^'ve duty training (AcDuTra). fo„ js J!, n° group identity? One basic rea- 0fFlCedat there are so few women SelRes l>3rd t"S around. Reliable statistics are blent ° bnd since the Defense Depart- Uot a3nd Navy personnel departments do ^elRe ^ °n tdc composition of the 'VotneS' however, the total number of I.OOq11 SelRes officers is approximately ^iRe' °r between 5% and 6% of the sfotesS officer force. Spread among 50
’ “tat means not many women in ^istrjbe.P'ace- one might expect, the Utesa*10n reflects state population fig- !foljf0ae largest concentrations are in la and New York, the smallest in
gathering together to make ready; the latter means we’re ready, just tell us where to go.
This readiness to fight is at least in part a state of mind. To always train as the second team and never get a chance to sit on the sidelines at the stadium is at best discouraging. But this past neglect and underuse of the reserve force’s peacetime potential is changing. For the first time in the Marine Corps, reserve units are standing in for the first team regulars. As Marine aviation transitions to the new F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft, three reserve squadrons are being tasked with the responsibility of assuming specific Joint Chiefs of Staff contingency missions. If we went to war tomorrow, these reserve squadrons would be supporting the Fleet Marine Force.
The logic is plain. Use what you need from all your resources in a way that maximizes the individual capabilities of each element. This allows selective tasking and best accomplishes the mission with available manpower.
The availability of the unusually flexible Marine Corps Reserve allows the commander to task the best assets for the
No Group Identity
S. Naval Reserve
t
Nevada and Wyoming. It is conceivable that a woman would be the only woman officer in her reserve unit throughout her reserve career.
In addition to the geographic spread, there is a wide range of career specialties. While there remains a concentration of women in the medical fields, they are expanding into other professional areas— including six women SelRes pilots. Women have been integrated into a large percentage of reserve jobs. In addition to grade and designator requirements, assignments in the reserves are governed by the last letter in the Reserve Functional Area Code. As of 1 August 1984, 70% of all billets were coded for either male or female officers. This figure from the Chief of Naval Reserve represents a minimum number. Many additional billets are actually available. In a recent incident at Readiness Command Six in Washington, D. C., a unit’s entire officer force was prescribed to be “male only.” A single letter from the gaining command changed 15 of the 16 billets to the “either” category.
Most women SelRes officers, possibly as high as 90%, have prior active duty service where there is no tradition of a strong women’s group identity. There
mission at hand. The reserves can be counted on to provide whatever support is needed. By creating an environment that allows the specific talents of the citizen Marine to be expanded and enhanced with participation and through comprehensive training programs, the Total Force can develop professional reserves, fully integrated into the strategic mission and combat ready.
Major Horne is a magna cum laude graduate of Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Economics. He entered the Marine Corps in 1966, completing Officer Candidate School and flight school subsequently in 1969. After spending four years in the Reserves, Major Home returned to active duty under the FullTime Support Program in his current assignment as the Reserve Information Officer, Division of Public Affairs, Headquarters Marine Corps.
Mr. Schein was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1973, majoring in political science. He served as weapons officer on the USS Trippe (FF-1075) and the USS Saratoga (CV-60). Mr. Schein is currently serving as Major General J. J. Went's Legislative Affairs Officer for the U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.
have been varying degrees of interest in creating a network or association over the past two decades; journal articles advocating such action have appeared on occasion and some areas have local organizations. Individual voices, rather than the group’s, arise to express concerns on women’s issues.
The reserve environment, by its nature, is different than active duty. Working in the Navy on the average of four, four-hour drills per month and 12 AcDuTra days per year is significantly different than being in the Navy 24 hours a day, every day. Work assignments, interpersonal relationships, and personal perspectives differ from those of active duty officers.
Work assignments tend to be individualized, stressing the development of an expertise or the use of an existing expertise. The goal is greater functional professionalism. Whether the dominant policy is to prepare for mobilization qualification through individual training or through support to a gaining command, assignments are generally parcelled to individuals. This practice accommodates professionals with a variety of skills and work schedules. It creates a personal accountability and, for those
143
lings / October 1984