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On 10 May 1966, the USCGC Point Grey (WPB-82324) was patrolling the east side of Ca Mau Peninsula when her crew spotted bonfires on the beach. While investigating the fires, the patrol boat picked up a steel-hulled target on her radar about six miles to seaward attempting to close the beach. The contact was tentatively identified as a 100-foot Chinese Nationalist vessel, traveling on a course of 260° at ten knots.1
The Point Grey began to shadow the trawler. At 0240, the trawler was within one mile of the beach opposite the fires, with three to four persons observed on deck. By 0500, the contact was within one-half mile of the beach, and the Point Grey's commanding officer notified his operational commander on the destroyer escort USS Brister (DER-327) that he would board the trawler at daylight.
At 0700, the Point Grey closed the trawler. The craft was found aground and deserted. As the men of the Point Grey attempted to board the trawler, they came under fire from the beach. The cutter moved out of small arms range and began to lob 81-mm. mortar rounds at the gun positions on the beach.
For the next six hours, the Point Grey kept the trawler under surveillance. At 1330, without air or naval gunfire support, the Point Grey again closed the trawler. At about 200 yards from the beach and within 100 yards of the trawler, the cutter came under "extremely" accurate small arms and automatic weapons fire.2 Within 20 to 30 seconds, three of the four men on the bow of the Point Grey were hit: a coastguardsman, a U. S. Army major "along for the ride," and the South Vietnamese Navy liaison officer. Commissaryman Second Class Kepler was the first coastguardsman wounded in the Vietnam War.
The cutter took about 25 hits, but no one was seriously hurt. Air strikes were called in to suppress the fire. The Point Grey's crew then boarded the vessel.
The haul from the trawler proved impressive. Contraband, including an estimated 50-60 tons of arms, ammunition, and supplies, was confiscated.
At 0100 on 14 March 1967, a patrol aircraft spotted a trawler 40 miles offshore and closing the beach. The Brister began to track the contact by radar and assigned a fast patrol boat, PCF-78, to intercept.
At 0530, PCF-78 reported that she was under heavy small arms and possible recoilless rifle fire, with many hits and one minor casualty. The USCGC Point Ellis (WPB-82330) proceeded at high speed to assist.3 She arrived at 0625 to find that the trawler had been beached.
The Point Ellis joined with the Brister in shelling the beach. While engaged in the gunfire mission, the commanding officer of the Point Ellis, Lieutenant (junior grade) Helton, maneuvered his cutter in a zigzag attack on the trawler. Suddenly, an explosion thundered across the water, and the trawler disappeared in a cloud of smoke. When the smoke cleared, only debris remained.
Later, salvage operations recovered approximately 1,200 rifles, several machine guns, and miscellaneous ammunition. The Coast Guard War Diary notes that “amazingly enough,” no hits were taken by the Point Ellis, probably “attributable to the excellent manner” in which Helton handled his command.
On 29 April 1965, newspaper readers were surprised to learn that units of the U. S. Coast Guard had been ordered to Vietnam. The U. S. Navy, the newspapers announced, had requested Coast Guard assistance in the form of 82-foot patrol boats. The deployment of these boats marks the beginning of the Coast Guard’s role in the Vietnam War.
The Viet Cong were commonly perceived as elusive, silent figures, slipping through the night, living off the land, and, at battle time, mysteriously appearing with weapons cached in a hut or some other hiding place. True, the Viet Cong could live off the land, but they did need a supply line to obtain weapons, ammunition, and other material. The most direct route was the sea.4
In 1964, as insurgency increased, the North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi made an important decision concerning the supply of forces in the south. Until this time, the insurgents had used French, British, and U. S. weapons. Under the new strategy, all arms would be standard, using the same caliber of ammunition, and more modem artillery would be employed. The most important weapon was the AK-47 Soviet assault rifle. Other new weapons included 7.62-mm. machine guns, rocket launchers (RPG-2s), 82mm. Soviet and Chinese mortars, and 47- and 75-mm. recoilless rifles. This required an increase in infiltration.5 The South Vietnamese Navy was pushed to the limit in trying to patrol 1,200 miles of coastline.
At 1030 on 16 February 1965, Lieutenant James S. Bowers, U. S. Army, flying a helicopter from Qui Nhon, sighted a camouflaged vessel in Vung Ro Bay on the central coast. Bowers radioed Second Coastal Zone Senior Adviser Lieutenant Commander Harvey P. Rogers, U. S. Navy, in Nha Trang.
The vessel, found carrying a large supply of arms and equipment, was engaged and sunk by the Navy. At last, U. S. advisers had proof of infiltration. More important, buried materiel was found nearby, proving that shipments had been increased.6 The “Vung Ro Incident” led directly to Operation Market Time and the involvement of the U. S. Coast Guard’s 82-foot patrol boats in Vietnam.7
On 3 March 1965, at the request of General William C. Westmoreland, a conference was held in South Vietnam to discuss seaborne infiltration. Those attending the conference decided that the “best tactic to interdict coastal traffic would be to assist and inspire the Vietnamese Navy to increase the quality and quantity of its searches.”8
Infiltration of weapons and equipment by sea was accomplished in two ways: by coastwise junk traffic mingling with the more than 50,000 registered civilian craft plying Vietnam's coastal waters; and by vessels of trawler size (usually steel-hulled), which sailed innocently in international waters and, at a given location, would make a perpendicular approach to the coast. The trawlers probably originated in North Vietnam and the People's Republic of China.
To stop trawler infiltration, the conference members proposed that a conventional sea patrol be established by U. S. Navy ships and aircraft. They planned to establish a defensive area extending 40 miles to sea then have South Vietnam authorize U. S. naval forces to stop, board, and search vessels in its waters and the contiguous zone.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan on 16 March. On 11 May, the South Vietnamese Government granted permission for Market Time units "to stop, search, and seize vessels not clearly engaged in innocent passage inside the three-mile limit of the Republic of Vietnam’s territorial waters."9 Operation Market Time was now under way.
Market Time operations were divided into nine patrol areas, stretching from the 17th parallel to the Brevie Line in the Gulf of Thailand.10 Normally, a destroyer escort (radar) or an oceangoing minesweeper was responsible for each patrol area. Five coastal surveillance centers, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, and An Thoi, were responsible for coordinating patrol units.11
On 16 April 1965, with Market Time planning in full swing, Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze requested Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler to inform him on the availability of U. S. Coast Guard units to deploy to Vietnam. Three days later, the Commandant of the Coast Guard informed the Navy Department that 82-foot and 40-foot patrol boats were available. After a meeting between Navy and Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard agreed to deploy 17 82-foot patrol boats. The official joint memorandum to the President was sent on 29 April, advising him of the deployment. The next day, U. S. Coast Guard Squadron One was formed.12
The patrol boat was ideal for Market Time. She had unique design features that allowed for a small peacetime complement of eight men. The machinery was designed to facilitate underway operations without a continuous engine room watch. Engine speed was controlled by throttles on the bridge. Main engine and generator alarms were also mounted in the wheelhouse. The bridge was designed so that all navigation equipment, radio, radar, and engine controls were centered on a console about the wheel. If necessary, one man could steer, control the speed, guard the radar, observe the Fathometer, and operate the radio. This ability was especially useful when most of the crew was on deck during operations.
The patrol boat was twin-screwed, propelled by two turbo-charged, 600-shaft horsepower VT-12M Cummings diesel engines, one on each shaft. The hull was constructed of black steel and had six water-tight compartments. The superstructure was built of aluminum. The patrol boat displaced 65 tons and, most important, drew only six feet of water.
Finally, she could berth and mess a crew for a short period of time. This craft was the only shallow-water patrol boat that had this ability, thus, she could remain on patrol for longer periods of time.
The patrol boats were modified for their combat role. A 50-caliber machine gun was mounted on top of an 81-mm. mortar. This piggyback armament was then placed on the boat’s bow. Four additional 50-caliber machine guns were installed on the main deck, aft the wheelhouse. Ready service boxes were installed on deck to store the additional ammunition. Other changes ranged from better reefers to more bunks.
On 6 May 1965, the 17 patrol boats were loaded as deck cargo on merchant ships in New York, Norfolk, New Orleans, Galveston, San Pedro, San Francisco, and Seattle. Five days later, coastguardsmen began to report to the West Coast for training.
Initially, 47 officers and 198 enlisted men formed Coast Guard Squadron One. Their four weeks of training consisted of courses in gunnery, communications, escape and evasion, and other military training. After training, the men joined their patrol boats in Subic Bay.
At Subic Bay, the patrol boats received last-minute modifications, crews were assigned, and the squadron was organized. It was divided into two divisions. Division Eleven consisted of eight boats; Division Twelve received the remainder. Division Twelve sailed for Da Nang on 15 July, arriving five days later. Division Eleven sailed on 20 July and arrived at An Thoi on 31 July.13
The cutters, as were all Market Time surface units, were expected to "conduct surveillance, gunfire support, visit and search, and other operations as directed along the coast of the Republic of Vietnam in order to assist the Republic of Vietnam in detection and prevention of Communist infiltration from the seas."14 Because of the many junks, sampans, and other craft in the area, a priority system of boarding had to be established. A ranking of boardings was developed with the following scheme: vessels transiting the area, junks fishing or operating in restricted areas, fishing boats anchored and not working nets, and last, fishing boats working nets.15
When ready for patrol, a cutter would report to the minesweeper or destroyer escort maintaining outer barrier patrol. The outer patrol would provide radar and navigational assistance to the cutter. In a like manner, the cutter would provide the same information to South Vietnamese Navy junk units working close to the beach. In the Gulf of Thailand, six of the nine patrol boats were constantly on patrol, each in one of six designated subareas. The boats were under way for four days, and then they returned to the support ship for two days. Each boat rotated through all the subareas.16
Life on board the small patrol boats was rough. The crews usually worked from 12 to 16 hours a day when under way. In the Gulf of Thailand area, for instance, the boats had a three-section watch: three men—the officer-of-the-deck, helmsman, and radioman—stood a four-hour watch; a second section served as boarding party; and a third would be off duty. The captain and cook stood no watches. An officer was on hand for all boardings. The men had to be on guard constantly. Any common fishing craft could suddenly open fire with automatic weapons. Eventually, most crew members learned the maxim: "Don’t relax. It could mean your life!"17
On her first patrol near the 17th parallel, the USCGC Point Orient (WPB-82319) came under mortar and machine gun fire. In an incredible oversight, the cutter was still painted her peacetime color of white. As one officer said, "White cutters are a beautiful sight on a moonlit or flarelit night, that is, unless you are on the cutter."18 The next day, the boats began to be repainted.
When not under way, the patrol boats moored alongside a support ship. While lying to, the coastguardsmen painted, repaired, and took on supplies for the next patrol. The sailors had little time to relax. Moreover, there were no recreational facilities in the boats. Therefore, the Commander Squadron One, had two spare boat crews so that each man could have five days of rest and recreation every three months.19
One Market Time operational policy did not set well with many coastguardsmen. The Navy's Swift boats were not suited for offshore work in adverse weather. The Coast Guard patrol boats, however, could weather many storms. In September 1967, the Market Time Commander decided that the Coast Guard boats should shift with the seasons. In other words, Coast Guard patrol boats followed the monsoons, while the Navy Swifts followed the sunshine.20
In the first month of patrols, the cutter crews boarded more than 1,100 junks and sampans, inspected more than 4,000 Vietnamese craft, and worked more than 4,800 man-hours. To counter the cutters’ efforts, the Viet Cong told local fishermen that the U. S. boats were driving them from the best fishing grounds so that U. S. fishing boats could fish there. Indeed, this must have appeared true, for the best fishing grounds were frequently in restricted waters, and the cutters had to displace the fishermen. To counter this move by the Viet Cong, the U. S. Coast Guard, Navy, and South Vietnamese developed a program to help the fishermen, which included medical care.
By October 1965, it became apparent that Market Time forces were spread too thin, especially along Vietnam’s southeast coast. On 29 October 1965, Secretary of the Navy Nitze requested an additional nine cutters be deployed to Vietnam. This group, Division Thirteen, took station at Vung Tau in early 1966.21
The year was a busy and dangerous one for the men of the small cutters. The USCGC Point White (WPB-82308), only in-country for a month, was patrolling in the Soi Rap River area. The cutter’s customary operations method was to steam into her area “to show the flag,” steam out, and then try to covertly reenter the area. On this occasion, the ruse worked, for the cutter spotted a junk crossing the river and attempted to halt the craft. The junk opened fire with automatic weapons and small arms. The Point White returned fire and rammed the junk, throwing the hostile vessel’s crew into the water. One of the junk’s passengers was a key Viet Cong leader of the Rung Sat Zone.
But junks and sampans were not the only craft firing on the cutters. On the night of 11 August 1966, the USCGC Point Welcome (WPB-82329) steamed near the demilitarized zone.22 Suddenly, the cutter was illuminated and under attack by friendly aircraft. Several hits ripped into the wheelhouse. A gasoline fire blazed on deck. The crew tried to fight the fire and repel the attack simultaneously. Finally, there was nothing to do but run the cutter aground and abandon her.
Later, other Coast Guard units arrived on scene to assist the Point Welcome. The rescue units found the commanding officer of the cutter and one crew member dead. The executive officer, two other crewmen, the South Vietnamese liaison officer, and a Life magazine reporter were wounded. The Point Welcome was refloated and towed to port for repairs.
At the beginning of Operation Market Time, the Chief of the Naval Advisory Group, Rear Admiral Norvell G. Ward, foresaw the necessity of returning the responsibility of naval operations to the South Vietnamese Navy. His command and control decisions were therefore predicated upon training South Vietnamese to eventually relieve U. S. forces.23
Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., upon assuming command as Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam, on 30 September 1968, concentrated on developing an accelerated plan to transfer U. S. Navy equipment to the South Vietnamese. In 1969, two South Vietnamese Navy lieutenants reported on board patrol boats, initiating the first phase of the turnover program. One month later, 17 South Vietnamese Navy ensigns and two lieutenants reported to Squadron One. On 16 May 1969, the USCGC Point Garnet (WPB-82310) and Point League (WPB-82304) were transferred to the South Vietnamese Navy at Saigon and renamed the Le Phuoc Duc and Le Van Nga, respectively. On 15 August 1970, the last of the 26 cutters were transferred to the South Vietnamese Navy. This ended the role of the 82-foot U. S. Coast Guard cutters in Vietnam.24
The statistics of Coast Guard Squadron One are impressive. The Coast Guard boarded 236,396 junks and sampans, inspected 283,527 vessels, participated in 4,461 naval gunfire missions, cruised 4,215,116 miles, damaged or destroyed 1,811 vessels, and wounded or killed 1,055 of the enemy. The Coast Guard casualties were seven killed and 53 wounded.25 Most important, the cutters helped shift the enemy's supply route. General Westmoreland noted that before 1965 an estimated 70% of the enemy's supplies arrived by sea; "by the end of 1966, our best guess was not more than 10 percent" arrived by sea.26
The Coast Guard's involvement in Vietnam was not restricted to the 82-foot patrol boats. At sea, 56 different combat cutters, including high-endurance cutters, were assigned to Vietnamese waters. Noncombat cutters also participated in the war. For example, four buoy tenders and one cargo vessel were assigned to Vietnam. The buoy tenders assisted in aids-to-navigation duties, such as setting buoys and other markers for the safe navigation of ships. Shore units included port security, which supervised the loading and unloading of dangerous cargoes. Also, shipping advisers and Merchant Marine details helped merchant shipping.
But Operation Market Time proved the military ability of the U. S. Coast Guard. This small service was able to go from its peacetime role of search and rescue to war halfway around the world in less than 75 days. The Coast Guard performed and worked effectively with other services and played a major role in actions requiring small craft. In short, the U. S. Coast Guard proved the truth of Semper Paratus.
1 Information on the Point Grey's engagement from Commander, Coast Guard Squadron One Diary, 1-15 May 1966, Navy Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
2 James A. Hodgman, “Market Time in the Gulf of Thailand,” Proceedings, May 1968, pp. 39-40; Commander, Coast Guard Squadron One Diary.
3 Information on the Point Ellis's engagement from Commander, Coast Guard Squadron One Diary, 14 March 1967.
4 R. L. Schreadley, “The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970,” Proceedings, May 1971, p. 182; W. C. Westmoreland, Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1964-June 1968 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 128.
5 Westmoreland, pp. 87-88.
6 Schreadley, p. 187.
7 Schreadley, pp. 186-187; Eugene N. Tullich, The United States Coast Guard in Southeast Asia During the Vietnam Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Division, U. S. Coast Guard, 1975), p. 1.
8 Schreadley, p. 188.
9 Ibid.
10 The Brevie Line is the geographic division in the Gulf of Thailand between Vietnam and Cambodia. Islands and territorial waters to the north of that line are Cambodian and to the south, Vietnamese. Schreadley, p. 190.
11 Ibid.
12 Hodgman, pp. 39-40.
13 Hodgman, pp. 40-45; Tullich, pp. 3-5.
14 Schreadley, p. 190.
15 Tullich, p. 5.
16 Ibid.
17Hodgman, p. 49.
18 Tullich, p. 6.
19 Hodgman, pp. 53-54.
20 Tullich, p. 12.
21 Tullich, pp. 6-8.
22 Information on the Point Welcome from Tullich, p. 10.
23 Schreadley, p. 191.
24 Schreadley, pp. 197-198; Tullich, pp. 14-15.
25 Tullich, p. 55.
26 Westmoreland, p. 128.
Author’s Note: I wish to thank Professor Robert E. May, Department of History, and Kevin Reid, Department of History, Purdue University, for their helpful comments.
Senior Chief Noble entered the U. S. Coast Guard in 1957 and retired in 1978 as a Senior Chief Marine Science Technician. He received bachelor’s and master’s degrees from the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. Since retirement, he has been the Director of the Delphi Public Library, Indiana, and he is studying for his doctorate degree in U. S. history at Purdue University. Senior Chief Noble is the coauthor of two books and author or coauthor of more than 20 articles.