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It must have seemed to the U. S. naval forces off Guadalcanal 40 years ago that they were under attack from the entire Japanese submarine force. The destroyer O’Brien, right, survived one torpedo hit, but three torpedoes mortally wounded the Wasp, background, and another torpedo ripped into the battleship North Carolina. Who did all this damage? How many submarines were actually involved?
Torpedo Junction was the name we had given to the sea area southeast of Guadalcanal into which the Wasp (CV-7), North Carolina (BB-55), and O’Brien (DD-415) steamed, with other ships, on the afternoon of 15 September 1942. Two weeks earlier, in a position not far distant, the Saratoga (CV-3) had been torpedoed. Hardly a day had passed since without sonar contacts, periscope sightings, or other evidence that enemy submarines were on the prowl.
The sky was clear, visibility unlimited, and a 20- knot tradewind was blowing from the southeast. Whitecaps covered the surface of the sea—good hunting weather for submarines, dangerous for their prey. The Wasp and Hornet (CV-8) were escorting six transports carrying the 7th Marine Regiment to reinforce the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal. With the transports on a parallel course over the horizon to the south, the carriers were steaming within sight of each other and had reached a position about 250 miles southeast of the objective.
Each carrier formed the nucleus of a separate task force (see Figure 1). The two task forces, each in its own circular cruising formation, were separated by a distance that varied from seven to ten nautical miles, as measured between the carriers. The North Carolina and O’Brien were with the Hornet, as was the heavy cruiser Pensacola (CA-24). I was the Pensacola's officer of the deck.
On the bridges of the Pensacola, North Carolina, and other ships in the Hornet force, first warning that something was wrong came at 1445. The Wasp had just completed a launch and recovery of aircraft, during which all ships of both task forces had been headed temporarily on a southeasterly course into the wind. With flight operations over, all ships commenced a right turn together to resume base course 280° on their roundabout advance toward Guadalcanal. At the start of this turn, heavy smoke was seen rising from the Wasp. Studying her through my binoculars from a distance of about 12,000 yards, I could see that several of her planes had dropped overboard and were floating nose-down past her stern. This, coupled with the absence of any radioed alarm or other emergency signal, led me and others to the false conclusion that an aircraft casualty on the carrier’s flight deck had started a fire, and burning planes had been pushed over the side to prevent the fire from spreading. Such occurrences were not unusual during wartime flight operations and were no cause for any particular apprehension on board other ships.
Two or three minutes passed, and still no alarm or explanation. More and more smoke was billowing from the carrier, which appeared to be almost dead
in the water and still on a southeasterly heading. Soon, violent explosions began to erupt from her flight and hangar decks, indicating that fire had reached armed aircraft. And yet, the hundreds of officers and men watching from ships of the Hornet force still did not know that the Wasp had been struck on her starboard side (her far side, as viewed from the Hornet force) by three torpedoes fired from a Japanese submarine, and, because of severe be- low-decks damage and raging gasoline-fed fires, the ship was already doomed. All attention remained riveted on the stricken carrier, as the Hornet force, at 18 knots, continued its right turn toward base course 280°.
Suddenly, the silence on the ships’ bridges was broken by a burst of static from the tactical radio speakers, followed by an incomplete and barely audible message: “. . . torpedo headed for formation, course zero eight zero!” This warning, it was later learned, had come from the Lansdowne (DD-486) in the Wasp's screen. Because of the Lansdowne's position between the two carriers, the message could only mean that a torpedo was headed toward the Hornet force. But voice radio was unreliable in those days, and on some of the ships, the Lansdowne's well-intended warning was not immediately understood.
Then, at about the time the Hornet force steadied on course 280°, another radio warning blared from the bridge speakers, but it, too, was incomplete: ”... torpedo just passed astern of me, headed for you!” That was all. No identification was heard, and the several excited voices which then came on the air made all unintelligible. Emergency signal flags at the yardarm of the Mustin (DD-413), in the Hornet's screen, warned of a torpedo; but just what ship
had been meant by ”you” remained undetermined. All eyes scanned the whitecapped sea for torpedo wakes, but none could be seen until it was too late. Meanwhile, the Hornet, whose movements were normally required to be followed by her escorts, was seen, by the tilt of her flight deck, to be turning sharply right.
In the pilothouse of the North Carolina, the captain, upon seeing the Hornet begin to swing right, ordered: “Right full rudder! Emergency flank speed!” Seconds later, the whine of the powerful blowers that sucked air into the boilers could be heard speeding up, and vibrations could be felt all over the ship as the propellers churned faster in the sea. Topside and below decks, men knew at once that something was wrong and began running to their battle stations even before the general alarm sounded.
To those on the bridge of the ponderous battle- wagon, time seemed to stand still. With the ship just beginning to lean into her turn, the muscles of the men tensed as the boom of an explosion was heard from off the port quarter. There, a great plume of white spray leaped skyward, completely engulfing the destroyer O'Brien. Her bow had been shattered by a torpedo.
Suddenly, at 1452, while the North Carolina was passing course 295° and just beginning to gather speed, a torpedo slammed into her port bow abreast of her forward turret. The entire ship lurched and shuddered. A tower of oil and water shot upward as high as the stacks, and a churning cloud of spray and smoke enveloped the ship’s upperworks. Tons of water cascaded over the superstructure and tumbled along the decks aft, washing one man over the side. Running feet pounded on the decks forward as the men of repair parties rushed through acrid, yellow-
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Base course 280°
Speed 16 knots Zigzagging
Wind 20 knots from 120-130°
(S______
Ships
^ ------------------- x
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/
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T Wasp (CV^7Y \
\
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cV
' O
* /
x Lansdowne (DD-486)
/ A'°V
J /
/ ®
t S
V S h i,
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i
North/
Carohna (BB-55)
iMustin (DD-4ll3)
Hornet (CV-8) i
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Pensacola
(CA-24)
'\0’Brien (DD-415)
Figure 1: Approximate relative positions of the Wasp and Hornet task forces as of 1400, 15 September 1942, before the Wasp commenced flight operations.______________________________________________________
/
7 Helena (^L-50)
Although all ships in both task forces are shown, for simplicity the names of ships not mentioned in the text are omitted.
Formations and station assignments were derived from the official action reports of the ships named.
For clarity, ship symbols are at approximately double the scale of the chart.
Scale in thousands of yards
0 1 2 3 4 5
10
15
20
ish brown smoke to the scene of the damage. There, a hole the size of a large truck had been blasted clear through the side protection below the armor belt. Nearly a thousand tons of water had flooded into the ship.
Meanwhile, on signal from the task force commander in the Hornet, the ships of her force increased speed to 25 knots and executed two consecutive emergency turns to the right to clear the area. The North Carolina took these maneuvers in stride and maintained her station in the formation as though nothing had happened. Although she had taken a list of 5'/2° to port immediately after the hit, that was corrected in about five minutes by counterflooding. Of course, repairs in a drydock were now imperative, but the quick and effective reaction of the battleship’s crew to such serious damage was impressive.
The Mustin, immediately after the “fish” passed under her stern, turned sharply to her left and, two minutes after the hit on the North Carolina, made sonar contact on a possible submarine about 3,000 yards southwest of where the battleship had been when struck. The Mustin closed her target and dropped a barrage of nine depth charges with no apparent result. Contact was then lost and not regained during the ensuing 20-minute search.
Meanwhile, destroyers of the Wasp's screen had been engaged in a similar effort to destroy the submarine whose presence was certain but exact location was not known in an area southwest of the Wasp and at least 8,000 yards from the Mustin s possible contact. That effort was also fruitless.
In postaction analysis, the O'Brien contributed to speculation that as many as three Japanese submarines might have been in the vicinity. She recorded in her action report that the torpedo which struck her, along with another which missed, was on course 350° True, a course which those two torpedoes could not have followed if fired from anywhere near either of the locations of the antisubmarine warfare actions mentioned above. The O’Brien s damage was severe, but she staggered away from the scene under her own power. She underwent temporary repairs at Noumea, New Caledonia, then headed for home. Off Samoa on 19 October
1942, her hull damage caught up with her, and she broke up and sank; all hands were saved by ships in company.
The Wasp continued to burn with fierce intensity, explosions rocking her from bow to stern. The ordeal was so devastating from the start and all those on board were so preoccupied with the damage, it is no wonder she volunteered no explanation or warning to the other ships present. Despite heroic efforts to save her, at 1520 she was ordered abandoned. Her casualties totaled 193 killed and 367 wounded. At 2100, she was given the coup de grace by torpedoes fired by the Lansdowne.
The Japanese submarine, 1-15, lurking nearby, witnessed the Wasp's sinking and duly reported this news to her headquarters at Truk. Her sister submarine, 1-19, reporting separately, claimed to have torpedoed Wasp. There is no record that any Japanese submarine ever claimed the hits on the North Carolina and O’Brien.
So, whodunnit? How many enemy subs took part? What were their positions? Who launched which torpedoes at which ships?
Efforts of historians to establish exactly what happened have been greatly handicapped because key Japanese participants did not survive the war. The 1-15 was sunk near Guadalcanal on 2 November 1942, and the 1-19 failed to return from a patrol during the U. S. operation to recover the Gilbert Islands in late 1943. In addition, official records maintained by the Imperial Japanese Navy in Tokyo were almost totally destroyed by bombing and fire in 1945. In the immediate postwar years, concerted efforts were made to have former command and staff officers of the Japanese Navy reconstruct important records from memory. Results were valuable, but far from complete.
The claim of the !-19 to have fired the spread that struck the Wasp has been universally accepted. As for the unclaimed hits on the other two ships, several U. S. historians, including Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, have credited the 1-15. She was in the vicinity, as revealed by her report of the Wasp's 2100 sinking, and therefore could have done the job coincident with the 1-19's attack on the Wasp. Morison mentions the possibility that the 1-19 was responsible for torpedoing all three ships, but he discards this explanation with the comment, . . her torpedoes would have had a mighty long run.”
Other historians, including the respected German authority on submarine warfare, Jurgen Rohwer, have asserted that the 1-19 unknowingly accomplished all five hits. They submit that, of the six torpedoes which they believed were fired at the Wasp in a single spread by the 1-19, the three which did not hit the carrier raced across the several miles separating the two task forces and, by pure chance, scored on the other two ships. This dazzling explanation of the mystery has not been widely accepted in U. S. Navy circles, but until now, no detailed exposition of it has been published in a form that would permit it to be evaluated.
Although eyewitnesses on the Wasp's bridge actually saw only four torpedo wakes—three hits and one miss across the carrier’s bow—normal Japanese practice was to fire six torpedoes in a spread ah an important target. According to one former Japanese subcommander, his usual firing interval within a spread was three seconds. The fact that the 1-19 did not claim hits on the battleship and destroyer does not rule out that possibility, since her skipper. Commander Takaichi Kinashi, could hardly have been expected to stick around to learn of such unanticipated good fortune while trying to escape the angry pack of destroyers in the Wasp's screen.
As Morison points out, if any torpedoes of the 1-19's spread aimed at the Wasp reached the O'Brien and North Carolina, a much longer torpedo run would have been required than usually met with success in 1942. Japanese torpedoes of that era had no homing capability. The right turn of the Hornet task force back to course 280°, which occurred during the torpedo run, would have shortened the run; but whether this would have placed the two victims within range would have depended on the range and speed characteristics of the type of torpedoes fired by the 1-19. This is not known, but there are at least two possibilities.
The Navy’s Bureau of Ships stated in a 1949 report of the North Carolina's torpedo damage. The damage to North Carolina indicates a charge approximating the 660-pound charge ot Shimose [picric acid] used in the Type 89 Japanese submarine torpedo.” This torpedo was in common use by Japanese subs at that time. According to former Japanese submarine officers, the 21-inch Type 89 torpedo was air-driven, had a range of 6,000 yards when set to run at 45 knots, and a maximum range of 11,000 yards at 35 knots. This information, if it applies, appears to place the one-submarine theory beyond the limit of physical possibility.
It is possible, however, that the Bureau of Ships was mistaken in its estimate of the type of torpedo, and that the Type 95 Model 1 was used, as several historians believe. This 21-inch torpedo, which was also in operational use by Japanese subs, ran on 100% oxygen, had a range of 13,000 yards at 45 knots, and carried an 891-pound explosive charge. These characteristics would not only make the one- sub theory physically possible, they would make it fit like a glove if one is prepared to ignore almost impossible odds.
A widely held misconception regarding the timing of the hits on the O’Brien and North Carolina has contributed further to the confusion. Morison, Rohwer, and other historians have accepted as fact the
13
•’-Maximum range of Type 95 Model 1 torpedo
Chronology—Keyed to numerals on chart
1. Assumed position of the Japanese submarine 1-19 at time of firing, approximately 1444. The spread is estimated to have included 6 Type 95 Model 1 torpedoes, all intended for the Wasp.
2. Time 1445—The Wasp struck in starboard
side by three torpedoes. This occurred immediately after the carrier had commenced a right turn, intending to resume base course 280°, following completion of flight operations. A fourth torpedo was seen to cross the Wasp’s bow. (Based on subsequent events, it appears probable that two torpedoes of the l-19's spread missed ahead of the Wasp, while another either passed unobserved under her keel before steadying on its preset depth or missed astern.)
3. At an unrecorded time soon after the Wasp was hit, the Helena observed the wake of a torpedo which passed astern, estimated to be on a course of 060°.
4. Time 1448—The Lansdowne, while turning
right, observed wake of a torpedo which passed directly under ship, from bow to stern. According to the Lansdowne's action report, this torpedo came from true bearing 240° and was on a course of 060°. (The Lansdowne was mistakenly understood to have reported over tactical radio that torpedo course was 080°.)
5. Time 1450—The Mustin sighted torpedo
wake broad on port bow, approaching from 240° T. Wake passed about 30 feet astern, indicating to the Mustin that torpedo had run directly under ship. Radio and flag hoist warning issued.
6. Time 1451—The O’Brien, then on course 260°, turned sharply right to avoid a torpedo, which missed astern. Immediately thereafter, the O'Brien hit in port bow by a second torpedo. (See also Note C.)
7. Time 1452—The North Carolina hit, apparently by same torpedo which had previously missed the Mustin, Lansdowne, and Wasp.
8. Time 1454—The Mustin, after making sharp left turn, established echo-ranging contact with a possible submarine in the approximate position indicated. Attacked with depth charges. Lost contact. Continued search for 20 minutes with negative results. (See also Note D.)
9. Location of the author, who was an eyewitness to the episode as officer of the deck of the Pensacola.
Notes
A. Ships not directly involved in the action omitted from diagram. Positions of destroyers differ from those in Figure 1 because destroyer screens had been reoriented for flight operations and were again upon orders to resume base course. The Mustin and O'Brien were moving forward toward, but were still about 1,500 yards short of, their Figure 1 screen stations.
B. Times are believed correct to nearest whole minute. Those given for events 4 and 6 have been advanced by two and three minutes, respectively, from times noted in action reports to correct for obvious nonsynchronization of timepieces, as evidenced by fact that all recorded times are off by same fixed amount from those recorded by other ships for same events.
C. The O'Brien’s action report asserts that torpedoes which came her way were on course 350° T. Author discounts this, attributing the inconsistency to excitement which must have prevailed on the bridge of ship that had just been torpedoed, coupled with likely disorientation as a result of sharp turn and narrow escape preceding hit. Moreover, since no other sub claimed participation in the attack, it is difficult to believe that any torpedoes, other than the
1-19 s were in the water.
D. The Mustin's unconfirmed contact, in view of its location: (1) might have been merely the swirl caused by the screws of the adjacent screening destroyer (see Figure 1): and (2) in any case, does not appear to have played any role in the action.
The assistance of the Director of Naval History and staff, which made this analysis possible, is hereby gratefully acknowledged. Also acknowledged with thanks Is the counsel of Captain Robert J. Celustka, USN (Ret.), who was OOD of the North Carolina during the above action and who concurs in the author's findings.
misinformation that the O’Brien was hit two minutes after the hit on the battleship. If this were true, it would be impossible to reconcile it with the one- sub, one-spread theory, because at the moment the O’Brien was hit, she was about 1,000 yards closer than the battleship to the Wasp force and hence to the firing position of the 1-19. (Nonsynchronization of timepieces, reflected in the action reports of two of the ships, including the O’Brien's, appears to account for this error.) I can attest, and other eyewitnesses will confirm, that the O’Brien was hit less than a minute before the North Carolina, thus helping to support the one-sub theory.
On the other hand, there is the question of what role, if any, the 1-15 played in the attack. There is previously mentioned evidence provided by the Mas tin and O’Brien that more than one sub may have been present in attack positions. There are reconstructed Japanese records which reveal that no less than eight submarines, including both the 1-15 and 1-19, were patrolling southeast of Guadalcanal in the general area (several hundred square miles) of the 15 September attack. The same testimony shows, however, that all eight of these boats survived that patrol and returned to port.This would appear to rule out the theory that a sub scored on the battleship or destroyer without living to tell of it. Prime suspect 1-15, along with the 1-19, is recorded as undergoing maintenance at Truk as of 23 September. The absence of any reconstructed record that the 1-15, or any other sub except the 1-19, claimed success on 15 September leads to the conclusion that none did.
Is it really possible then that the 1-19 alone, with one spread of torpedoes, did all that damage? Figure 2, taken from the action reports of the U. S. ships involved, should solve the mystery to the satisfaction of even the most critical naval sleuth.
The one-submarine theory conforms almost exactly to the established facts of the tactical situation that applied to all six U. S. ships from which torpedo wakes were seen. The series of near misses was, by itself, extraordinarily coincidental. That the North Carolina and O’Brien were struck by stray torpedoes reveals, when a graphic plot is examined, that the two ships, entirely by chance, ran into the torpedoes! Adding to the luck enjoyed by the skipper of the 1-19 is the fact that the torpedo which struck the mighty North Carolina was almost at the end of its run.
Lucky or not, this incredible accomplishment by the 1-19 ranks among the all-time record successes of submarine warfare in any navy.
Captain Kinashi, I salute you!
Captain Blee, a graduate of George Washington University, served as a line officer from 1940 to 1967. He has commanded three ships, the Meredith (DD-890), Shadwell (LSD-15), and General W. A. Mann (TAP-112). He has served on the staffs of Cin- CNELM. CinCLantFlt, and CinCPacFIt in naval intelligence and as the naval attache in Singapore and Malaysia. He presently resides in Jacksonville, N.C.
As I Recall . . . “Sink the Waspl”
By Vice Admiral William R. Smedberg III, U. S. Navy (Retired)
When the destroyer Lansdowne (DD-486) was commissioned in late April 1942, Lieutenant Commander Smedberg was her first commanding officer. For the next few months, she was involved in shakedown training, escort duty, and antisubmarine warfare in the Atlantic. While operating in the vicinity of the Panama Canal on 12 July 1942, she attacked the German U-135 and was later credited with the kill. In mid-August, the Lansdowne and the other three ships of Destroyer Division 24 were assigned to escort the USS South Dakota (BB-57), which was the flagship of Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee, Jr., Commander Battleship Division 6.
We rendezvoused with the South Dakota, took her down to Panama, and went through the canal with her on 21 August. When we arrived in Balboa, Admiral Lee, the skippers of the four destroyers, and our division commodore, Commander Thomas J. Ryan, were ordered to report to the Commandant Fifteenth Naval District, who was Rear Admiral Clifford E. Van Hook. When we got to his office, Admiral Van Hook got up, closed his door, locked it, and said, “Gentlemen, I have the most terrible thing to tell you. We have just lost the cruisers Vincennes, Quincy, Astoria, and the Australian cruiser Canberra. This is very highly classified, but since