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Contents:
Reflections on the Code of Conduct
Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?
Tomahawk: The Implications of Strategic/ Tactical Mix
Rickover: Controversy and Genius, a Biography
The Gulf of Sidra Incident
XO!, XO! . . .
The Role of the U. S. Surface Navy in Nuclear War
Containerized Ballistic Missiles
Combat Readiness: Naval Air vs. Air Force
Unconventional Warfare Afloat
A Chaplain Speaks to COs
Forgotten Lessons of Riverine Warfare No Place for Women
U. S. Maritime Policy and Strategy
A Soviet View of Soviet Naval Doctrine and Perceptions
ENTER THE FORUM
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“Reflections on the Code of Conduct”
(See K. G. Schacht. pp. 34-38. April 1982 Proceedings)
The White Hat Cluh
Edna J. Hunter, Pli.D., Center for Prisoner of War Studies—I have been involved in numerous discussions on the efficacy of, or even the need for, the Code of Conduct for Prisoners of War (POWs). The French novel, The Manifesto of Camp No. I, written by Jean Pouget in the late 1960s, is an account of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu which places the Code in perspective. No official report of the French experience in Vietnam has been published. Their defeat was so painful, the government decreed that nothing could be written on that conflict for 50 years! However, a French government official revealed to me that the Pouget novel accurately reflects the French experience. I vividly remember one short passage in the book to the effect that “The Americans now have a Code of Conduct, but in time we shall see how well it really works for them.” A former Vietnam POW told me that in his particular camp, for lack of something to do, the POWs would time each new prisoner to see how long it took for the captor to break him. It ordinarily took only one-half hour to three hours, except for one vulnerable-looking young man who held out for seven days—but all eventually broke. I’ve heard military men exclaim with bravado, “No one could make me do something I didn’t want to do,” but those are men who have not been tested. Vietnam POWs admitted that it was impossible to follow the Code literally under the conditions to which they were subjected.
There are indeed large individual differences in people’s ability to resist under pressure: thus, when the words ”to the best of one’s ability” are included, a command is not law: it's a code of ethics. Unfortunately, men who adhere to a firm ethical code or standard usually do so whether or not it is written, and those who really need one will not follow it anyway. Cer
tainly. most of the POWs in Vietnam followed the Code to the "best of their ability," not because it was law. but because they had their own built-in code of ethics, and they tried not to do anything that would hurt a fellow POW. But here again, the POWs disagreed as to what actions might be harmful to others. To attempt escape was deemed harmful, and yet not to try to escape was contrary to the Code—again an ethical judgment. The Marine Corps still teaches a very literal interpretation of the Code, yet in Marine survival training, men are taught “to do whatever they have to do to survive"—it’s a double-bind message. A Code of Conduct is good for guidance, but it should be an ideal or a standard, not a law.
As far back as 1963. Edgar H. Schein stated. “What we should be thinking of is not giving the prisoner rules, but rather giving the prisoner what we might call a role—a consistent, overall strategy in terms of which the prisoner can organize his daily existence." Schein emphasized that “rules are important but they should be rules which lay out the goals and standards to he achieved by the prisoner. . . . He should have freedom to maneuver and to develop his own personal strategies of how to fulfill the goals and standards.”
Schein strongly advocated that we should abandon the standard of 100% resistance; instead “the way of maximizing resistance ... is to build strong groups rather than strong individuals,
. . . formulate standards of conduct, put these in the form of positive goals to be achieved, and then give maximum training to people in varieties of ways in which they as an individual or as a group can meet those goals.” He was firmly convinced that "as long as we continue to take an attitude of let's set up some rules, and then let's punish the people who break the rules,... we will not be able to combat effectively Communist techniques of prisoner control." We can now admit to the French that our Code didn't work too well, and we all should reread what Schein suggested in 1963.
“Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?”
(SVf B. D. Bruins, pp. 52-56. January 1982: C. H. Amine, p. 27. March 1982: T. C. Buell, p. 20. April 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John E. Jack- ion, U. S. Nary—Many fine defense specialists have negligible experience in uniform, yet they are still highly respected within both the Department of Defense and what Dr. Bruins labels the “defense intellectual community.” Many of these experts have impressive academic credentials, and can speak with expertise on a number of specific strategic and programmatic •ssues and weapon systems. These armchair strategists, whether at think- tanks or in academia, are in a position akin to that of a business school professor who is free to prescribe how a given operation should be conducted—knowing he will never be held accountable for carrying out the plan.
Making full use of a naval force demands a high degree of familiarity with the naval service, particularly the intricacies of operations at sea. Such familiarity can only be gained through the long-term education and socialization process which is an inherent part °f uniformed naval service. This is not to suggest that extended exposure to saltwater automatically endows naval officers with some mystical insight into . e conduct of naval warfare. Rather, 't recognizes that experience is the best teacher, and no amount of study or research can serve as a substitute for years of hands-on exposure to the challenges of the maritime environ- otent. Neither uniformed experience nor disciplined observation, however, ls enough. What is best is a combination of operational experience, conceptual and analytical training, and Practice.
In the defense arena of the 1980s, We find two competing groups of would-be strategists: intellectually rained but operationally inexperienced civilians, and uniformed mem- ers of the naval service who are full- nrie officers and part-time strategists. The key word here is “part-time." ecause the demands and pressures °n an officer’s time are such that even ose individuals who have demonstrated a capacity for (and an interest ■n) wrestling with strategic issues are rarely afforded the time to do so. The 'S constructed to reward those 0 hcers who are “do-ers,” and not
those individuals who are perceived as “thinkers.” This is the case despite the lessons of history—as exemplified by men such as Ernest King and Ar- leigh Burke—which prove that the two are not mutually exclusive. And the system still regards the time spent in academic pursuits such as service colleges as time lost between the operational and staff assignments that really count. As a result, the uniformed strategist finds himself forever swimming upstream, unable to develop the skills or the credibility necessary to compete with the highly regarded think- tank analysts, except at a calculated risk to his own career.
The solution to the problem of inadequate Navy involvement in the Navy’s strategic planning is easy to articulate, but difficult to implement. What is required is the development of a climate within the Navy that encourages the growth of strategic thinking at all levels of the officer corps. The Navy may not need a new Mahan to single-handedly revolutionize maritime strategy, but it does need naval officers who are trained, encouraged, and rewarded for considering issues beyond the confines of a given type of hull or airframe. In short, naval strategy requires the integration of many divergent systems, doctrines, and procedures; it demands both broad- based knowledge and the opportunity to practice conceptual and original thinking.
Several recent initiatives indicate that the senior Navy leadership has become aware of the need to develop in-house strategic expertise. Dr. Bruins cites the formation of the Long-Range Planning Group (OP-OOX) as one step in the direction of returning control of the Navy's future to seagoing professionals.
The formation of another group of strategists is of equal, and perhaps potentially greater, importance. This group is a part of the new Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. One component of this new center is the Strategic Studies Group (SSG), the mission of which is to do the creative thinking that promises to provide the Navy with the maximum operational return on its investment in manpower and machines.
There are three other facets of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. The Center for Advanced Research offers Naval War College resident students and outside scholars the opportunity to explore in-depth subjects of particular interest to themselves and the Navy. Another facet of the CNWS is the Center for War Gaming, which is rapidly being developed as a tool for exploring the implications of plans, concepts, and strategies. Finally, the Naval War College Press will serve as a forum for the publication and discussion of new ideas, using itsjournal, the Naval War College Review, and monographs. The Center for Naval Warfare Studies was established by the Chief of Naval Operations, who charged the Center and the Naval War College to spearhead the effort to rekindle the spirit of strategic thinking within the officer corps.
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“Tomahawk: The Implications of
Strategic/Tactical Mix”
(See P. G. Johnson, pp. 26-33, April 1982
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Joseph F. Bouchard, U. S. Navy—The blurring of the tactical- strategic threshold is not unique to cruise missiles. Carrier-based aircraft or B-52 bombers launching attacks on the Soviet homeland raise the risk of escalation just as easily as Tomahawk attacks on the same targets. There is no solution to the escalation problem other than to exercise prudence in the conduct of a limited war. Avoiding escalation of a conflict grants an adversary sanctuaries—including his homeland. The gray-area problem is not so much one of weapons as it is one of strategic objectives and a weighing of the costs and benefits of escalating to strikes on gray-area targets.
Although he correctly identifies verification as the crucial arms control problem raised by current Tomahawk deployment plans. Lieutenant Johnson does not get to the root of the issue—that verifiability is a function of the design of a weapon, not just of its pattern of deployment. He also overlooks the serious impact that arms control could have on Tomahawk and U. S. naval forces.
The Soviets will not accept a strategic weapons treaty that does not impose limitations in an area of weapons technology in which the United States holds a commanding lead unless they are granted a countervailing numerical superiority. But, at the same time, it would be difficult for the Reagan Administration to persuade the Senate to ratify an arms treaty that embodied Soviet numerical superiority. It probably will not be possible to exclude Tomahawk from the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START, the successor to SALT), because it has been identified as a strategic weapon in the current U. S. strategic weapon procurement program, because cruise missiles of a similar range capability were limited under SALT II, and because the Protocol to the SALT II treaty set a conceptual—though not binding—precedent by identifying SLCMs as eligible for limitation.
To facilitate the differentiation of cruise missile-launching platforms from platforms carrying other types of weapons, the concept of “functionally related observable differences” (FRODs) was established in the 1979 SALT II treaty. As employed in SALT II, aircraft which might be capable of launching cruise missiles would not be counted against the limit on cruise missile carriers if they could be distinguished from actual carriers by the lack of some observable feature essential to the function of launching cruise missiles. Because there are no FRODs between platforms carrying the antiship or conventional land-attack versions and platforms carrying the nuclear land-attack version, the only means of establishing a numerical limit on SLCMs would be to count every submarine and surface ship capable of launching Tomahawk under the U. S. total.
This count could have either of two possible consequences—both undesirable. The overall quantitative limits on numbers of launchers could be greatly inflated by inclusion of all Tomahawk launchers. Press reports have quoted numbers of SLCM launchers proposed by the Navy as high as 2,600. Even if only 500 to 600 of these were actually intended for strategic missions, the entire lot of 2,600 would be counted against U. S. totals. Such an inflated number could work to the disadvantage of the United States if actual strategic weapons deployments fell far short of the allowable limit for budgetary or political reasons (a shortfall the Soviets would have little trouble verifying because of the open nature of U. S. society). An inflated number of launchers also tends to magnify the Soviet advantage in throw-weight, an advantage the United States can no longer counter with more warheads and greater accuracy.
The other possible consequence is that there will be no inflation of the total numerical limits, thus forcing U. S. strategic planners to make some difficult choices regarding strategic weapons procurement and deployment. The Reagan Administration, by changing the name of the arms talks from SALT to START, has committed itself—implicitly if not explicitly—to quantitative limits below those in the SALT II treaty. This commitment could carry significant weight in the arena of U. S. politics, particularly because of the growing pressure to reduce defense expenditures.
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If the total number of launchers were indeed reduced, the United States would either be forced to commit a large portion of its general purpose naval forces to the strategic deterrence mission, at the same time sacrificing land-based strategic weapons, or it would be forced to severely restrict the deployment of Tomahawk SLCM launchers, no matter what their intended mission. Neither course of action is attractive.
Segregating Tomahawk deployment. as Lieutenant Johnson suggests. will not solve the verification problem. The Soviets do not sign arms control agreements on the basis of trust in U. S. public pronouncements. Advertising a segregated pattern of Tomahawk deployment will not change this—no FRODs. no treaty.
The solution is to design and deploy two cruise missiles that can be distinguished on the basis of functionally related observable differences. One of these two cruise missiles would be a continuation of the present Tomahawk program, but would include only the antiship and conventional land-attack versions of the missile. The other would be a nuclear land-attack SLCM that could not be launched from any system (torpedo tubes, box launchers, or vertical launchers) designed for Tomahawk.
For example, enlarging the diameter of the present Tomahawk design so that the larger missile could not fit in the launchers for the original missile would provide the requisite FROD for verification purposes. The disadvantages of such an enlargement would be a larger radar cross section and a more complicated logistical support: but the larger internal volume of the missile would allow for enhanced guidance capability, a larger warhead, more fuel for longer range, addition of deception or decoy devices, or other increased capabilities. Deriving the larger missile from the present Tomahawk should reduce the time and expense required to develop a new design.
The enlarged Tomahawk for the strategic mission should not be deployed in the manner which has been proposed for the present missile: Deployment of the two missiles should be segregated in the manner recommended by Lieutenant Johnson. Scattering launchers for the strategic SLCM throughout the fleet would only regenerate the same verification problem that arose with Tomahawk.
The ideal launch platform would be a new class of nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (SSGN). An SSGN derived from the Los Angeles- class fast attack submarine could carry the larger SLCMs in an internal magazine added by lengthening the hull or in a magazine external to the pressure hull. A modified Los Angeles-class SSGN would almost certainly cost much less than the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine. Finally, an SSGN would be much less vulnerable to a Soviet preemptive first strike than any land- based system for launching either cruise missiles or ballistic missiles.
The remaining verification problem is the treatment of tactical nuclear versions of the antiship and land-attack versions of the original Tomahawk SLCM in a START treaty. Because of the lack of FRODs described above, the Soviets would be likely to insist that any nuclear version of Tomahawk be counted as a “forward-based system” capable of strategic attacks on their homeland.
The simple solution would be not to deploy any nuclear warheads on Tomahawk. SSGNs carrying the nuclear-armed enlarged Tomahawk could be assigned to strike high-priority targets such as Soviet battle groups operating under the cover of land-based air support, although this mission would divert them from their primary strategic deterrence role. As much reliance as possible on conventional weapons in naval warfare could control escalation, but at the same time, possession of tactical nuclear weapons can deter the use of similar weapons by an adversary. The decision whether to deploy tactical nuclear warheads in Tomahawk should be made in the context of the overall fleet weapons posture, including carrier aircraft capabilities. In this broader context, the additional nuclear capability may not be vital for performance of the missions assigned to the Navy.
Far from being the end of arms control, the deployment of SLCMs could be the best means of furthering the strategic arms limitation process without jeopardizing national security.
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The Electronics Croup
“Rickover: Controversy and Genius, a Biography”
(See P. Braestrup, pp. 100—101. April 1982 Proceedings)
Francis Duncan—historian in the Department of Energy, assigned to Admiral Hyman G. Rickover’s Division of Naval Reactors, and coauthor with Richard G. Hewlett of Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962, (University of Chicago, 1974)—Mr. Braestrup, in his balanced appraisal of Polmar and Allen’s Rickover, pointed out that the book suffers from confused organization as well as an undistinguished and diffuse prose style. Other reviewers have noticed the same traits. The phenomenon is puzzling, for Rickover’s life is extremely interesting, and both authors appear well-qualified for their task. What alchemy transmuted the gold to lead?
There are several reasons, not all of which were under the authors’ control. Most important of these, as Mr. Braestrup observed, was Rickover’s refusal to help. But among the other possible causes are indifferent research and an inability to grasp the discipline demanded by a complicated technology: for these flaws the authors must take responsibility.
The following examples of poor research come from that brief portion of the book which is biographical. I have chosen them because they are easily understood, and because some reviewers have commented upon them.
Rickover’s official records give his birth year as 1900. However, the authors found a high school record that shows Rickover was born on 24 August 1898. They conjecture that because he was uncertain of passing the entrance examination to the Naval Academy, he might have falsified his age—making his birth year 1900—so that if he failed in his first attempt, he would still be young enough to try again the next year.
But immigration records at the National Archives in Washington show that Rickover. his mother, and his sister entered the United States in 1906. At that time, his mother stated that her son's age was six. In addition. Rickover attended the Lawson Elementary School in Chicago from 1911 to 1914. Lawson records (which the authors incorrectly state do not exist) show 1900 as his birth year. Had the authors consulted these sources, they might have concluded that Rickover was born in 1900 and added two years to his age—from 14 to 16—so he could work at night for Western Union and, with the money he earned, help his family and go to high school.
The second instance of incompetent research is the account of the galley explosion on the destroyer Percival (DD-298) which occurred on 23 August 1922. Rickover, an ensign only a few months out of Annapolis, was temporarily assigned to the Percival in San Diego while waiting for transportation to his own ship, the La Val- lette (DD-315). On his last night in the Percival, a galley explosion injured two men, one seriously. Rickover signaled to the Charleston (CA-19), the flagship, for a boat to take the critically injured man to the hospital. He got back the reply: “Send your own boat.” Rickover has referred to the incident in congressional testimony as an example of naval insensitivity.
The authors examined the logs of the Percival, the Charleston, and the Arctic (AF-7), the ship which was to take Rickover to the La Vallette. The Percival's log showed that Rickover was transferred some time on the day of the explosion. The Arctic's log showed he reported on that ship six hours before the explosion. Their suspicions aroused, the authors searched the log of the Charleston for 21 August for a record of the signal or some other corroborating evidence. Why they chose 21 August is not clear, for the explosion did not occur until the night of 23 August. Even had they looked on the right day, they would have found nothing, for a rapid scanning of the Charleston's log reveals that it does not contain that type of information.
But had they turned a few more pages in the Percival's log. they would have found a reference to a court of inquiry and a board of inquest. Had they obtained these documents from the Archives, they would have found that Rickover was indeed in the Percival on the night of the explosion— he was in the wardroom.
The authors’ account of Rickover’s work at the Cavite Yard before World War II is also flawed. They cite an unnamed submarine officer whose ship was overhauled at the yard while Rickover was there. The officer found Cavite "the poorest-quality yard I have ever experienced." On the other hand, the authors had access to the oral history of Vice Admiral William P. Mack. In reminiscing about his service in a
destroyer just before World War II, Mack praises Rickover by name for the excellent overhaul given the ship while at Cavite.
By poor research and by citing a condemnatory appraisal and ignoring a commendatory assessment, the authors, with doubtless inadvertence, lay themselves open to the charge of imbalance.
Most important, Polmar and Allen do not recognize the technical achievement of nuclear propulsion. A revealing clue to their grasp of the subject occurs when they describe the pressurized-water and sodium-cooled reactor approaches. Both were carried through to shipboard application. The pressurized-water approach used in the Nautilus (SSN-571) proved best for naval propulsion, and all of the Navy’s nuclear ships are propelled by this type. The sodium-cooled reactor •n the Seawolf (SSN-575) was replaced by a pressurized-water reactor. Polmar and Allen consider the Pressurized water a “conventional” approach and the sodium cooled a ‘highly advanced” approach, but both they term “developmental.” Whether “developmental,” which is an activity striving for advance, and “conventional,” which is something established, can be linked together is an interesting question in logic.
More to the point, at the start of the program both approaches were new, and both faced tremendous technical problems. The uncertainties were immense because the technology was in its infancy. Metals and materials had to be tested for their ability to maintain their integrity under intense radiation over prolonged periods of time. The reactor had to be designed to operate safely and reliably. Components had to be developed and fabricated to unprecedented standards—and the standards were often not known. To say that the pressurized-water approach was conventional is equivalent to calling the Wright brothers’ plane at Kitty Hawk conventional.
As Mr. Braestrup stated, the book is rich in Rickover anecdotes. Piling one on top of another, however, fails to evoke a convincing description of Rickover, or to account for the superb record of performance of the nuclear ships or the quality of the people who
are part of the nuclear program.
That a leader can often be measured by the people who work for him is a truism but not without value. The people who worked for Rickover were very able. Despite the long hours of demanding work, the burden of personal responsibility which they had to accept, and their instant accountability for their actions, his people usually stayed with him for years. They did so by doing their work and arguing and opposing him when necessary. Those people who left the program usually did well. Would men and women of that caliber have remained in the effort for years—and be successful afterwards—if Rickover were the man depicted by Polmar and Allen? It is very doubtful.
Mr. Braestrup concluded that Polmar and Allen have set forth the broad outlines of the benefits and costs of Rickover’s reign over naval nuclear propulsion, and that now pro- and anti- Rickover folk can take up their cudgels. This is true, but anyone who bases his arguments on the reliability of Rickover: Controversy and Genius, a Biography must exercise care.
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“The Gulf of Sidra Incident”
(See D. R. Neutze, pp. 26-31, January 1982
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Joseph R. McFaul, U. S. Coast Guard—Commander Neutze concludes that the U. S. fleet was in international waters at the time of the Gulf of Sidra incident. If so, it does not follow that the United States behaved according to international law principles. Libyan claims of U. S. violations could be correct.
If the Gulf of Sidra is regarded as the high seas, the Libyan jets had a perfect right to be in the area. The Convention on the High Seas states that “the high seas, being open to all nations, no state may subject any part of them to its sovereignty." No country can exclude ships and planes from traversing the high seas. The notices to mariners and airmen are advisory
New
only and have no legal force on Libyan ships and planes. If the notices were intended to exclude ships and planes from the area, the United States has violated international law by exercising sovereignty over the high seas.
The diagram and the text in the article indicate that the United States has excluded or could exclude ships and aircraft from the exercise area. Commander Neutze implies that nuclear tests, for example, justify excluding ships and planes from a portion of the high seas. There is quite a bit of authority to the contrary. The French nuclear tests in the South Pacific provoked suits in the International Court of Justice by Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and other countries. International Law for Seagoing Officers notes that the exercise is stopped if another country’s ship enters the test area.
Assuming that the Libyan jets were over the high seas, the U. S. jets’ action cannot be self-defense if they were attempting to prevent the Libyan jets from entering the test area. The term interception describing the action of the F-14s covers a multitude of actions, including advising the Libyans of the exercise by radio, forcing the Libyan jets off course, or even getting into an advantageous firing position.
The United States cannot claim selfdefense if the Libyan attack had no chance of success. Considering possible technological differences in flight characteristics and electronic warfare capabilities between an F-14 and an export version Su-22, U. S. action was only retaliation, not self-defense. That the Libyan missile was unsuccessful while both U. S. missiles were successful is evidence of technological differences. Also, both Libyan jets were shot down. Grumman ads in the Proceedings reveal that an F-14 can track and attack six separate targets with missiles. In a peacetime incident, there is no justification for shooting down the second plane.
To place the matter in perspective, let’s reverse the roles. To impress the United States, the Libyans declare a danger zone 60 miles south of Mobile, Alabama, to conduct a missile test. The Libyans could not exclude U. S. ships from the area of the test, and U. S. fighters would probably overfly the exercise. If Libyan jets attempted to exclude the U. S. jets from flying in international airspace, I would not be surprised if the U. S. jets fired a missile at a Libyan jet. The United States would justify the action by some of the same arguments made here.
I am assuming that the U. S. missile exercise was a good faith test of Libyan territorial claims. International law would not support a U. S. attempt to provoke Libyan action by the threat of force. I doubt that any neutral observer believes that the area was selected for the exercise “because of its relative isolation from the main traffic routes,” as stated in the Proceedings. The United States probably had other motives in sending the task force so close to Libya and recourse to international law is an afterthought. When nations are unwilling to negotiate, and to present their claims to the International Court of Justice, resolution becomes a matter of who is stronger rather than international law. I cheer for the winning pilots, but the lesson is that a strong navy will decide more disputes than international law.
“XO!, XO! . .
(See B. D. Cole, pp. 104-107 February 1982
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Mike Adams, V. S. Coast Guard, Executive Officer, USCGC Dependable (WMEC-626)— This is without doubt the finest piece I have ever read in the Proceedings (and you have certainly published a lot of great stuff, including mine).
Commander Cole missed only one thing. He stated, correctly, that a good XO must provide the CO with options. What he failed to note was that a really good XO will provide the CO with three options, two of which are completely untenable and the third of which is the one the XO wants to see implemented.
“The Role of the U. S. Surface
Navy in Nuclear War”
(■Sfp J. D. Douglass and A. M. Hoeber. pp.
57-63. January 1982: T. Q. O'Rourke, pp.
17-18. April 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander T. Wood Parker, Jr., U. S. Navy—Dr. Douglass and Ms. Hoeber correctly identify a general disbelief in the possibility of nuclear war, either general or limited. They also argue that the present environment is not supportive of programs and doctrines addressing tactical nuclear war at sea. This is true, even in light of the CNO’s recent assertion that the Navy must improve its capabilities in this area. The crux of the problem lies in the attitudes of civilian and naval leaders—these must he overcome before we can make significant progress in terms of tactical nuclear weapons and an employment doctrine for their use at sea.
The general feeling in Washington that a tactical nuclear war at sea is simply unlikely is based upon three faulty assumptions. The first is that nuclear war at sea will never precede nuclear war on land. Persons who hold this view believe that the Soviet Union would not employ nuclear weapons at sea against the U. S. Navy because of the risk of nuclear escalation on land *° the detriment of a Soviet conventional land campaign against NATO. The advocates of this position point °ut that the Soviet Army dominates the Soviet high command and that the •and battle is the principal factor in their overall military strategy. More- 0ver, it is to the Soviets’ advantage to ensure that the land battle in Europe remains conventional. Not only would the introduction of theater nuclear weapons reduce the tremendous advantage they have in conventional armament, but it would also pose a threat to the Soviet homeland itself. Therefore, the military and political leadership will prevent the Soviet Navy from using tactical nuclear weapons at sea prior to their use ashore.
If the U. S. Navy were divorced from the other military services and the land battle in Europe (and, of course, it is not), this assumption may be attractive to naval leaders. This is so because it is to the U. S. Navy’s advantage for the battle at sea to remain conventional. If the nuclear threshold is crossed at sea, the advantage would shift almost decisively to the Soviet Navy. In addition to their superiority in terms of naval tactical nuclear weapons, the composition of the two navies provides the Soviets with a significant advantage in a nuclear war at sea. The U. S. Navy is built around a limited number of “high- value” units. Without these units, which provide excellent targets for nuclear weapons, our Navy is weakened almost to the point of impotency. (Hopefully, the introduction of Tomahawk and other offensive systems will modify this situation, but presently the U. S. Navy depends almost exclusively on these high-value units.) The Soviet Navy, on the other hand, is comprised of numerous, widely dispersed air, surface, and sub-surface units, many of which are capable of employing nuclear-armed missiles against our ships.
Within the context of this tremendous advantage that the Soviet Navy gains if the sea battle goes nuclear, we must realize that the NATO nations cannot win the land war if they lose at sea. Accordingly, we must recognize that the incentive for the Soviets to employ tactical nuclear weapons at sea can be almost irresistible. Although the Soviets are very circumspect when there is a possibility of war—particularly nuclear war—with the United States, they are also rational and objective. If war breaks out and they can defeat the United States and NATO by employing nuclear weapons at sea, they will use nuclear weapons at sea.
The second assumption is that nuclear war, once begun, cannot be limited to the oceans. Accordingly, the fear of escalation to an all-out thermonuclear war will prevent the use of nuclear weapons at sea. Those who hold to this view believe that neither superpower would accept a defeat at the hands of its principal adversary without firing its last shot. In other words, any war between the superpowers would inevitably escalate through the tactical nuclear level to the use of strategic intercontinental systems. However, nuclear war at sea produces a unique set of circumstances. Tactical nuclear weapons can be employed at sea with little or no collateral damage to civilian populations or territory. Accordingly, escalation to an intercontinental nuclear exchange is not inevitable.
Limited nuclear war at sea becomes more plausible when one considers that the U. S. Navy is the most likely service to come into contact with Soviet forces in a military confrontation. If weapons are fired, the opposing forces will attempt to inflict maximum damage on the other. Unless the hostilities can be stopped very quickly (assuming that the U. S. Navy is winning the conventional battle), the political and military leadership of the Soviet Union will be hard pressed to use tactical nuclear weapons. This could occur without a simultaneous NATO-War- saw Pact conflict, and a widening of the conflict to a major war throughout the European theater would not automatically follow the naval battle.
The third assumption is that if a war goes nuclear, the resulting destruction renders all naval planning inconsequential. Americans generally pronounce anathema on any level of nuclear war. If nuclear deterrence fails, according to adherents of this philosophy, nuclear war is too terrible to even contemplate. The destructiveness would be so great that it makes little sense to prepare to actually fight the war. The Soviets, on the other hand, view nuclear weapons as an integral part of their military arsenal— not as a deterrent adjunct to their conventional forces. They have not only thought about nuclear war. but have also formulated detailed plans for its actual conduct, going so far as to plan for the aftermath. Moreover, they are prepared to employ nuclear weapons in their own best interest, and would undoubtedly prefer to use tactical nuclear weapons as compared with strategic ones.
Recognizing the fact that wide-
spread and terrible damage will result in any war between the superpowers, it is in the U. S. Navy’s best interest to prepare now for tactical nuclear war at sea. The implications for deterrence, as well as actual combat, are obvious. The first step in this process is to overcome the three widely accepted and deeply ingrained assumptions discussed above.
The White Hat Club
John T. Chapin, Former Damage Controlman First Class, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve—Tonight, I had the
unfettered pleasure of witnessing the resurrection of a very large, very old, and certainly unique organization, “The White Hat Club.”
A beautiful, talented, and absolutely sexy-as-hell lady, Suzanne Somers, was the focal point of a nationally televised special filmed sometime ago aboard the USS Ranger (CV-61).
Now. I'd watch Miss Somers if she were dressed in furs and mukluk boots at the North Pole, but looking beyond the lady, this special had. indeed, a special appreciation by me. Her audience of enlisted men were clad in traditional Navy dress blues, right down to the white hats and triple- creased, white-piped collars. For the first time in many years. 1 saw a group of men who looked like sailors. There’s no doubt that they felt like sailors as well. It was a terrific sight.
My own 13-button, tailor-made dress blues were regulation Navy with one accoutrement. On the right sleeve just above the wrist was sewn a silver shield, the only visible delineation between the Navy and Coast Guard. I was fiercely proud of that uniform, for no other regulation dress could, or ever will, make a young man feel so incredibly “salty.”
I am so pleased that, for the general enlisted ranks, the Navy has returned to the internationally recognized symbol of a seagoing man. In returning to traditional dress, the Navy has profited by an increase in morale. May the “Z-grams” rest in moldy peace in the bottom of a dusty file cabinet.
“Containerized Ballistic Missiles”
(See R. C. Smith, pp. 64-71. August 1981:
K. Stehling. p. 101. September 1981: R. E. Chatham, pp. 23-25. January 1982 Proceedings)
Dr. Kurt Stehling—At the risk of continuing a Liebnitz-Newton type of dialogue and correspondence (28 years), I should like to comment upon Mr. Chatham’s observations:
► I agree that a destroyed missile-laden sub is an expensive loss; but a decoy diesel (or other engine) vehicle, with no missiles, is a comparatively small loss which would probably have cost the enemy a good deal.
► As for super-strong silos, I doubt that anything but an essentially direct hit could seriously damage or dislocate a silo with ten feet of ferro-concrete tube walls, plus the “beanie” I suggested. Nuclear explosions are fearsome but not absolute. Even the most intensive electromagnetic radiation is highly attenuated by the sort of armor I proposed.
► 1 presumed that a radioactive cloud from a missile site attack—drifting westward—would precede an all-out saturation attack on population centers. By the way, what has happened to the notion of our launching missiles soon after the Bolshevik rockets leave their tubes? Isn’t that supposed to be the whole idea of early warning spacecraft, radar, etc?
► “Why a giant missile?” I asked. As an old (well, not too old) rocket and space engineer, I can point to a history of decreasing missile size (e.g., Polaris, Scout, etc.) with increasing propellant specific and density impulses, higher mass ratios, and more efficient (i.e., lighter) payloads. I suspect that the next generation of missiles (MX) may not be much—if at all—larger than current Minuteman or Poseidon (Tridents, etc.).
► As for the subs, I have other suggestions. We might study fuel cell or (again) H202-N2H4, etc., power plants. I know a lot has been done in this area, but why not more—or use what we’ve learned (e.g., Bray- ton cycle turbine vehicles)? How about solid propellants for such vehicles? Of course, there would be exhaust problems for the combustion-type powerplants. A "simple sub” could tow a remotely controlled submersible streamlined barge or barges, with missiles either vertical or horizontal; the horizontal missile containers could be jacked up to vertical on command.
Mr. Chatham’s synthesis proposal is a good compromise. I suggest a further synthesis: Tow the contain- ered missiles behind like a string of bratwurst, each with a buoyancy-controlled bladder. Of course, that scheme has its dangers; the “sausages” could rip loose and float—embarrassingly—to the surface, with the sub crew desperately trying to retrieve them!
Comment and Discussion
“There's nothing wrong with . . . [the Air Force’s flight training program], except that the Air Force pilot becomes accustomed to a rather rigid program of instruction and evaluation throughout his career. Any NavylMarine pilot who has worked with Air Force units is immediately impressed with the very regimented process that attends any Air Force flight.”
“Combat Readiness: Naval Air vs. Air Force”
,(See S. W. Smith, pp. 41-45, February 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Denis J. Kiely, U. S. Marine Corps, Naval Aviation—While I do not wish to demean the accomplishments of Lieutenant Smith or attack our Air Force colleagues. I do want to set the record straight by challenging the unfair treatment of naval aviation before we wind up fighting another interservice battle over facilities and training. The Navy caught a belly shot on this one. and Lieutenant Smith beat us to the ready room. I'm angered by it. Only half the story was told; all the good of one program, all the drawbacks of the other, with no attempt to fairly appraise either one.
Unfortunately. Lieutenant Smith must draw from a somewhat limited
background. His fleet tour—two cruises—was as a first-tour aviator in an attack squadron. Needless to say, much of it was a learning experience, and he apparently suffered from a malady common to all junior officers who become caught up in their primary duty—being unable to see how their contributions fit the overall picture. That he performed well is selfevident; selection for an exchange tour is highly competitive. Score one for him.
While his remarks about the differences in flight training programs are basically correct. Lieutenant Smith fails to see the underlying philosophical differences between the two. It is important to remember that the Air Force undergraduate pilot training (UPT) is a one-syllabus program administered to all students. Later assignment to type training follows designation as a pilot. Selection is by class standing generally, but can be influenced by the needs of the various aviation communities. Many of the instructors in the Air Force are recent UPT grads, which tends to make instruction very much “by the book." This leaves little opportunity for student exposure to fleet experiences, and no chance for instructors to expand the teaching points of a syllabus flight for a gifted candidate. There’s nothing wrong with that approach, except that the Air Force pilot becomes accustomed to a rather rigid program of instruction and evaluation throughout his career. Any Navy/Marine pilot who has worked with Air Force units is immediately impressed with the very regimented process that attends any Air Force flight. In contrast. Navy training emphasizes airmanship and an individual's good judgment, and encourages and recognizes the outstanding competitor. Fleet experience is. in all but very few cases, a criterion for assignment to instructor duty- These experienced second-tour drivers provide that flavor which lends much to the standard syllabus. For those reasons, and not the “pipeline system that Lieutenant Smith cites. Navy “Nuggets" are better prepared for line duty than their Air Force counterparts. The Marine Corps experience with UPT underscored the differences between the two programs; the UPT graduate was at the same level of training as his Navy op' posite would have been following completion of the advanced instrument phase. These Marine aviators from UPT have done well, but not without experiencing early problems with the differences in training.
Lieutenant Smith sees the Air Force system as more conducive to combat readiness than the Navy’s system with its many collateral duties. All of us m naval aviation have, at some time, had coffee mess, embark, barracks. °r other duties that seemed to be unre' lated to aerial warmaking. Lieutenant
°f the
constant competition, and the
Smith fails to understand that each collateral duty is much like looking for Charley Noble. It will teach him what ne must know about running a squad- rpn. As he progresses in rank, the du- *'es increase in responsibility and authority, finally bringing the more Promising leader to the foreground as a commanding officer. Lieutenant Smith would do well to find out why mere are none of those duties in an A|r Force squadron. He has but to cross the street and look at the pon- er°us headquarters of a Tactical Air Command fighter wing to find the an- ^Wer- He will then discover that his Alr Force squadron commander is nothing more than a glorified flight cader when compared with a Navy or "Marine commanding officer. We see he Philosophical differences in the Services, with emphasis on specialist'011 on the one hand and a jack-of- a 1-trades on the other. The merits are dative. The former requires more Pe°ple, offers greater stability, and re- Pces the individual load. The latter a*es less people, requires greater allfound talent, can be frustrating, but is mcontestably more satisfying because
e^ards for outstanding performance.
m his article. Lieutenant Smith re- ,ers to various exercises to back up ls argument for Air Force aviation uPeriority. Red Flag, the Canadian ^rmed Forces Maple Flag, College arts. Cope Thunders, and many other lr Force exercises are outstanding in v.e Judgment of any knowledgeable avy or Marine pilot. Unfortunately, leutenant Smith never took part in eh°Se exerc'ses unt'l he was on ex- ange duty. Owing to his limited ex- er,ence, and being in the attack com- unity. he may not know that Marine °rPs units are regulars in each of the Xepcises I've mentioned, and fighter evvs from the Navy have also par- JPated. If he considers it a measure combat readiness, he'd do well to famine the record. He’ll find that na- £a aviation does very well in those creises. On any given day during eu Flag, he'd be able to see Marine Q0rPs F-4s, A-4s, EA6s, and KC-130s the Nellis ranges, being a signifi- nt part of the force. More importnt’ however, and something Lieu- Pant Smith failed to mention, are the . erling programs of Navy Fighter ^eapons School (TopGun) at Mira- tr, .r’.ar|d the Marine Corps weapons ln'ng instruction program at Yuma.
There aren't two programs anywhere that do more to hone those skills that Lieutenant Smith claims are dull.
Anyone who has been around an aircraft carrier has been told he must "look good around the boat.” That's not only for safety, but plain old good operational sense and an appeal to squadron pride. Lieutenant Smith is wrong, however, when he implies that combat readiness suffered as a result of an emphasis on safety. Some of the missions don't do much for a shipboard squadron’s readiness but they are necessary. Navy squadrons are drilled to perfection, and then tested in a wing operational readiness inspection (ORI) before they deploy. During a cruise, it is necessary to accept some dulling of that fine combat edge because of lack of ranges, short line periods, and fuel limits. The label “combat ready” is a somewhat subjective evaluation. After all, it is only a prediction of how a unit will perform. The degree of success in combat is determined as much by the grade one received in an ORI, as it is by the degree of proficiency demonstrated by the enemy. In other words, being combat ready involves good, solid initial mission training and reasonable opportunity to maintain proficiency. The Gulf of Sidra incident shows that naval aviation is indeed combat ready, even though the two aircraft carriers involved had been deployed for some time. When the two Su-22 Libyan fighter planes fired a missile at the two U. S. F-I4s, the F-14s fired back, destroying the Libyan aircraft. The incident lasted about one minute. Yet, according to Lieutenant Smith, the U. S. naval aircraft shouldn't have been mission capable, much less combat ready.
I didn't know that much of what we developed in Vietnam was now outdated. The Alpha Strike, which Lieutenant Smith treats with some contempt, still has a function, although it’s not the complete answer. If he were aware of all that went into those missions he would understand that it's a pretty workable solution to the mass strike problem, and, considering the environment, a very survivable concept. There's much more to it than just attack birds rolling in four at a time. "The only ground threats were antiaircraft artillery and. SA-2 missiles,” states Lieutenant Smith, implying that he’ll face something more. When it comes to surface-to-air threats, that's all there will be the next time, too. They won’t be SA-2s, but then, some of us faced those things without any or. at best, minimal electronic countermeasures to meet the threat. He's in much better shape today than his predecessors on Yankee Station. He has the benefit of experience which developed tactics and equipment to lessen his chances of doing a tour in the next war's Hanoi Hilton, or of not coming back at all. Significantly, he doesn't mention what the Air Force uses. I think he'd be amazed to discover that Air Force tactics haven't changed much either, judging by what 1 have seen at Red Flag. That’s not a criticism. Much of what was experienced in Vietnam has been examined, refined, and where it appeared worthy. retained.
It grieves me that Lieutenant Smith should demonstrate his inexperience in so public a manner. It grieves me too that Proceedings, august magazine that it is, should opt for his effort to the exclusion of something more thought provoking. Lieutenant Smith would be well advised to revisit this issue. It bears more analysis than the high side pass it received in his article.
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“Unconventional Warfare Afloat”
(iff R. L. Crossland. pp. 36-41. November
1981: J. H. Alexander and W. J. Holland.
pp. 112-114. February 1982 Proceedings)
Captain Kenneth G. Schaclit, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Holland challenges Commander Crossland's contention that someone must be available to sink merchant ships by asking, “Whose?” He then goes on to say that the “potential enemy has only four major open ocean shipping routes, the Northern Sea route, the Baltic Sea and Black Sea littorals, and the Sea of Okhotsk. Only the last would be a reasonable target for U. S. diesel submarines.” This fails to take Crossland’s entire point into account: “No nuclear submarine is going to risk disclosing her position to sink a merchant ship worth a small fraction of the submarine’s strategic and monetary value. Yet someone must be available to sink merchant ships. . . Decisions on whether to attack an unimportant target must be expected by a submarine skipper and could be a factor to consider before denouncing the diesel submarine. In addition, the four shipping routes that Holland mentions could be effectively patrolled by either nuclear or diesel subs; only where heavy air opposition is expected should the area be denied to the diesel sub.
Responding to Crossland’s statement that “the diesel submarine (is) less restricted than the nuclear submarine in navigable waters available to her. . Admiral Holland calls it “patently false if the Arctic areas are included.” This is also subject to question. If "navigable waters” are interpreted as shallow water areas normally transited by the SS (considerably smaller than the SSN) where she can enter, carry out her special mission and leave without having exposed her snorkel, then little is wrong with Crossland’s statement. To include an Arctic ice-capped area as “navigable waters” available to the SS is ridiculous.
Holland throws off the argument for shallow water penetration by asking. "With cruise missiles . . . who needs to?" This reply is difficult to comprehend. unless the writer has little operational experience in submarines, or is very opposed to a smaller, cheaper alternative to the Los Angeles (SSN- 688)-class attack submarine.
The Navy wisely came forth initially with a family of different-sized nuclear submarines, which ranged from the 2.640-ton Tnllibee (SSN-597) to the 6.670-ton Triton (SSN-586). Not unexpectedly, the Triton was decommissioned after nine-and-one-half years of operations; whereas the smaller, slower Tnllibee has remained operational since 1960. The implication that the submarine-launched cruise missile automatically eliminates a shallow water penetration requirement depends upon several factors. First, we should assess the capability of the missile. Will it be vulnerable to countermeasures by lasers, particle beam and electromagnetic pulse systems, and false targets? Second, we should examine water depths in what may be strategic areas, e.g., the eastern portion of the Greenland-U.K. gap. Sea of Japan, Aegean Sea; shallow water operations could be important.
Crossland's statement that “Four to six diesel boats can be built for the cost of one nuclear submarine. . ."is contested by Holland, who gives the Dutch Walrus and Los Angeles a ratio of 3:1. Both men could be correct, subject to the characteristics of the SS, and accuracy of the quoted SSN construction cost figure ("two for $809.6 million”). However, the reader is cautioned that pricing a ship is far more complex than estimating construction costs. It is a task which few are qualified to perform. The bottom line should be the costs per year based upon lifetime costs. Cost categories usually overlooked include: tender and shipboard maintenance, casualty repairs, personnel (shipboard, tender, staff and bureau support), training, base facilities, etc. In each of these, the SS’s costs are much cheaper than the current class of SSNs. Incidentally, personnel costs (OPNAV 90P-02A Navy Program Factors Manual) for nuclear submarine personnel are—for some unknown reason—classified.
Holland remarks that Crossland “is fighting the last war, not the next one,” and goes on to say that the "type of propulsion is not significant in mine warfare and Special Forces operations beyond those advantages that are inherent in nuclear submarines— greater endurance (etc.). . . This misses the major point of Crossland's article, which is that unconventional warfare afloat (guerrilla warfare options, etc.) is being overlooked; the current fascination is with "big guns” (carriers, etc.).
“A Chaplain Speaks to
Commanding Officers”
(See J. M. Doyle, pp. 58-61. February 1982
Proceedings)
James D. Ferguson—Chaplain Doyle’s fine article says a great deal that has wanted saying ever since men went to sea in numbers which warranted a spiritual comforter. However, he should have looked more closely into the two-way flow generated by his calling. While there are all kinds of commanding officers, whose response to religious matters affecting their ships' companies may or may not be positive, the same must apply equally to the seagoing chaplain.
Perhaps one of the most insurmountable difficulties he has to overcome is his near-total identification with the wardroom, and his subsequent identification in non-commissioned
eyes with officers' country. Many years \ ago, the Royal Navy allowed its chaplains to wear civilian clothes even when embarked on board combatants, and this helped to provide a partial bridge over an evident gap (this, it seems, is no longer so). I suspect I am far from alone in suggesting that the wearing of clerical dress would be widely welcomed by many naval personnel, and suspect that numerous chaplains share this view.
Another point might also apply in the wake of Chaplain Doyle's discussion about evils of the executive flesh:
Are all his colleagues suited for a seagoing ministry? Given the close confines of any military seagoing community. the chaplain and his every action will be under that much greater scrutiny than in any shoreside parish- This demands a peculiar breed of man- whose abilites have to go well beyond the scope of normal clerical duty- Some, but a very few. measure up t0 this exacting yardstick in every way- The vast majority get along as besl they can. and the remainder are obviously miscalled to serve God at sea- Without being able to properly assess a chaplain candidate over any meaningful period, any selection board has to work by guess and (occasionally* by God. Too many applicants lack adequate personal experience of life |l' self, and have little or no idea how the other 90% live, so are chosen for the ( orthodoxy of their particular theolog) rather than for their communicative abilities as required by seagoing needs-
“Forgotten Lessons of Riverine
Warfare”
(See C. A. Abel, pp. 64-68. January 1982; R.
Enrione. p. 20, April 1982 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Frit: Steiner, U. S. Navy (Retired)—This article provided me with the impetus to vent my spleen about the way we conducted riverine warfare in Vietnam. I went there in 1967 as an enthusiastic volunteer and returned in 1968 after the Tet Offensive a disillusioned cynic.
I agree completely that "aggressive and successful riverine combat is carried out from the water and not merely on it." Unfortunately, if any lessons to that effect had been learned from the French experience. I wasn't aware of their application by us in 1967-68. On the contrary, in the words of some recent popular songs. “We did it our way." because “nobody does it better." Our arrogance in believing that we could overwhelm guerrillas with massive doses of “good ole" American technology, weaponry, and money was matched only by the absurdity of the way we tried to do it. The only way to defeat guerrillas is to be better guerrillas than they are. but we haven’t done that since 1776.
We created the Mobile Riverine Force (Task Force 117). an elephantine armada of slow-moving modified mechanized landing craft (LCMs) that was mobile in the same sense a sloth is agile. These were mated with the 2nd Brigade of the U. S. 9th Infantry Division whose every item of equipment was emblazoned with the slogan “From Kansas." This lumbering, awkward conglomeration had no chance of catching, let alone beating, the elusive Vietcong and paid a heavy price whenever the VC decided to fight. The soldiers of the 9th were prepared for rice paddy warfare in the wheat fields of Kansas, and it showed. Paradoxically, the Marines remained infatuated with the meat grinder of I Corps.
Game Warden (Task Force 116). of which I was a member, was far better suited for riverine warfare. It consisted of fast, heavily armed, shallow- draft river patrol boats (PBRs) that could penetrate virtually every waterway in the Mekong Delta. It also had air support from Navy Seawolf helicopter gunships. Task Force 116 could have carried the war to where the Vietcong lived. But, alas, Saigon’s “rules of engagement" forbade our force from leaving the major rivers or from going ashore after the VC.
Sailors were not trained for that sort of combat. So, instead. PBRs endlessly patrolled the wide rivers, futilely looking for nonexistent Vietcong craft and contraband. All too often, they were fired on by unseen enemies in the tree lines along the river banks. They could return fire and then retire to lick their wounds, but they couldn't beach their boats and “go get ’em.” Just why the PBR sailors couldn't have been trained for limited combat ashore is baffling. Had they been permitted to roam the Delta’s waterways and take the war into “Mr. Charlie’s” back-country sanctuary, they might have been able to hurt him. This would not have been without additional risk, but if defeating one’s enemy is the objective of war, risks taken to achieve that end quickly and decisively must be considered worthwhile. Saigon declined to take the risks.
Underscoring the problems with riverine warfare, American-style (and the whole war), was the naive concept that Americans were there only to assist the South Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese just needed “a little help from their friends," and Americans were supposed to take a back seat. But the soldiers of the Army for the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) refused to fight. They had been trained and equipped for conventional set-piece battles against a like-minded enemy. After years of being booby-trapped, ambushed, and mauled by the “Here he is. now he isn’t" Vietcong, the ARVN quit. They developed some innovative new tactics to maintain the appearance of combat, while the Americans took over the fighting. (Such innovations included the battalionsized “Search and Avoid" and "Eighteen-Inch Sweep" operations. The former involved sweeping an area while making so much noise that any self- respecting VC who wanted to leave rather than fight could do so. The latter involved “sweeping" in single file, which ensured that only the point man would be exposed to hostile fire.) In any event, by the time the Mobile Riverine Force and Game Warden had been organized, it already was our war. But Saigon and Washington continued with their Alice-in-Wonderland notions, so we had no chance.
No matter how well we might have been able to fight. I don’t believe we ever could have won. Americans were fighting South Vietnam's war while the
ARVN. who should have cared, stepped aside and watched. The Vietcong, on the other hand, lived the war. and. political ideologies aside, they probably were just as invincible as the American patriots who beat the Red Coats.
“No Place for Women”
(See D. Evans, pp. 53-56, November 1981: C. Mollison. F. R. Hamlett. and T. C. Nichols, pp. 10-17. February 1982: M. A. Brewer, pp. 18-21. March 1982: L. J. Korb. pp. 87-90. April 1982 Proceedings)
Captain James H. Brother, IV, U. S- Army—In the six years I have served in the U. S. Army field artillery, I spent all my troop assignments in units with female soldiers.
Some of the problems Colonel Evans surfaces are certainly present, but what is their cause? When the units I served with went to the field, we all went, regardless of sex. In Germany, a battery commander, a fire direction center chief, the ammunition platoon leader, and a fuel tanker driver, to mention just a few, were female. My wife was a truck platoon leader in a transportation company. If someone suggested that she or the other female soldiers in either of our units were not to go to war with their units or that they couldn’t do their jobs, they became very angry.
The suggestion that eliminating women in the Fleet Marine Force would eliminate fraternization and sexual harassment is akin to having only white soldiers to reduce racial friction. The problem would no longer be present, but the attitudes that fostered it would just be taken downtown. In addition, privacy and separate sanitation facilities in the field were not a problem in our units. Each female soldier, like an officer, was issued two shelter halves. If she wanted her own tent, she used that; if not, she slept in the section tent.
The colonel also states that much time is spent deciding on work suitable for female soldiers. A soldier is a soldier. Either they can do the work required for their military occupational specialty, or the military has no place for them. If my 90-pound fc' male. 2.5-ton fuel tanker driver got 3 flat tire, she fixed it. In most cases 1 have witnessed, the reason a female could not or would not do her job was because the males around her were all too willing to help. This is a failure ot leadership.
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U. S. Maritime Policy and Strategy: A Partnership
Rear Admiral George H. Miller, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Section 101 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, sets forth the merchant marine policy of the United States. It begins by stating that the U. S. Merchant Marine is necessary for national defense and development of foreign trade. It states that the U. S. Merchant Marine shall be prepared to serve as a naval and military auxiliary (in other words, as an auxiliary navy as well as military sealift) in time of war or national emergency.
The 1936 Act establishes the size of the U. S. Merchant Marine as one capable of carrying all domestic and a substantial portion of the foreign waterborne commerce of the United
States. Both Congress and the Maritime Administration have interpreted the term “substantial portion” as a minimum of 50% of foreign waterborne trade. A merchant marine capable of carrying that portion of U. S. foreign trade would consist, according to the law. of a fleet of about 5.000 U. S.-flag ships, manned by U. S. citizen naval reserves, many of which would operate routinely at sea in support of the combat Navy. The Soviet Union already has a fleet of 4,000 merchant ships, with more on the way.
The U. S. Government’s indifference to the debilitated condition of its combat and merchant navies—and to the laws governing them—has given the Soviets virtually a free hand in flooding world seaports with their merchant ships, allowing them to build up trade, resistance groups, agents, and weapons to manipulate the coups and revolutions in key overseas areas. While the Department of Defense prepares for future land war. Soviet maritime strategy (with little opposition from the West) is gaining control of world shipping choke points in Southern Africa, the Middle East. Southeast Asia, and Central America.
Soviet naval strategy supports and protects the swiftly expanding foreign operations of their merchant marine: their crewmen are politically trained naval reservists. The Soviet Merchant Marine and Navy coordinate at the highest government level.
The U. S. Government has recently indicated its intention to double the size of the combat Navy. But unless it also builds the merchantmen necessary to augment and support the combat Navy, as the law requires, the United States will still have only half a navy. The 5,000 U. S. merchant ships, called for by Section 101 of the Merchant Marine Act. are just about what the United States would need to support allies and U. S. troops overseas. to carry the international and coastal trade essential to a war effort, and to support the combat Navy.
General John J. Pershing. Commander-in-Chief of American Expeditionary Forces in World War I, speaking before the Sixth National Merchant Marine Conference in 1933. said: "The knowledge of the woeful lack of American shipping for the transportation of our armies abroad in 1917 and 1918 should make an indelible impression upon the mind of every American and drive him to the conclusion that we must provide an adequate merchant marine under our own flag . . . ."
A few months before Pershing spoke these words, the United States inaugurated a President who understood the seas and the decisive role of sea power in the lives of nations—Franklin D. Roosevelt remembered Pershing's words.
In 1934. President Roosevelt signed the Vinson-Trammell Shipbuilding Act- which enabled America to begin building the combat ships we needed for the coming war. In 1938. Roosevelt sponsored a merchant marine ship' building program of 50 ships a year- That program was to be doubled and redoubled by the time we entered World War II.
Yet. despite Roosevelt's supreme effort to revitalize America's naval forces, the U. S. merchant and combat navies were still far below required strength, and uncoordinated.
when the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor. Even with the emergency ship' building program, three more years were to pass before America and its allies were able to land their forces on the shores of Western Europe. The principal shortage up until then was not troops, planes, tanks, men. °r combat ships—but merchantships-
Current U. S. Navy and Merchant Marine shipbuilding programs are virtually nonexistent. The United States does not even have a continuing research and development program f°r ships that is comparable to those for aircraft, missiles, and space. Moreover. the U. S. Navy and Merchant Marine are no better prepared to operate together in an emergency today than they were prior to World War BUnlike before, the British are no longer able to hold off the aggressor whde the United States corrects its oft-repeated mistakes midst the shock and onrush of another emergency.
History teaches that nations which emphasize maritime strategy gain won influence and economic strength- Those which emphasize land war hemorrhage their youth and critics resources. Accordingly, the U- -,- Constitution points the way for a maritime policy and strategy for nation3 defense.
If Americans are to survive and remain free, they must abide by the Constitution in national defense as the> now do in matters affecting individua rights.
“A Soviet View of Soviet Naval Doctrine and Perceptions”
(See T. A. Neely and D. C. Daniel, pp, 124126, December 1981 Proceedings)
Donald C. Daniel and Theodore A. Neely, Jr.—In order to fully understand Soviet naval developments, one must look beyond Soviet writings and hardware trends to peacetime operations.
“Out-of-area” ship-day totals constitute a rough and general measure °f the Soviet Navy’s presence in forward waters. Soviet naval forces are out-of-area” when they operate beyond the Black, Baltic, and Japan seas and waters contiguous to Northern Fleet and upper Pacific Fleet bases. As measured in ship-days, the Soviet Navy’s out-of-area posture for 1980 surpassed that of any calendar year since the Soviet Navy embarked on sustained forward deployments, nearly two decades ago. The accompanying table records the 1980 levels hy ocean area for all units except bal- hstic missile submarines. The overall 1980 total converts to a daily mean of 144 ships out-of-area.
Soviet Navy Out-of-Area Ship-Days—1980
Atlantic 13,750
Caribbean 700
"Mediterranean 16,600
Pacific 9,700
ndian Ocean 11,800
Total 52,550
N°le: Does not include ballistic missile submarines
Ships which were in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, South China ^ea, and off West Africa provided the Soviet Union with a visible continu- °Us standing naval presence and served as “graphic indicator^]” of he U.S.S.R.’s global military reach, he Mediterranean and Indian groups averaged 45 and 32 ships, respectively .eluding 10 to 12 surface warships ln both areas), and the West African Contingent ranged between 6 and 8. * he size of the South China Sea group ls more difficult to determine since many of the units are primarily trans- ltlng to and from the Indian Ocean, ‘ten with an intermediate port call in ‘etnam. A Reuters report in May "Si quoted “informed Western sources” that the Soviet Union had “permanently stationed” general- purpose nuclear submarines in the South China Sea and that both “Echo II” and “Charlie” cruise missile submarines regularly patrolled there. The aircraft carrier Minsk and accompanying escorts spent approximately three months in those waters (much of it off Vietnam’s coast) as well as some time in the Gulf of Thailand.
The number of forces maintained on the high seas was partly a function of the Soviet Navy’s ability to replenish and service them. The navy relied not only on its auxiliaries but also on Soviet merchant ships assigned to a fleet support role. It is estimated that the latter account for about half of the liquid stores provided to forward-deployed Soviet units. While much of the resupply and upkeep took place in anchorages (especially in the Mediterranean and Indian squadrons), the Soviets also benefited significantly from access to foreign repair and port facilities. In the Mediterranean, these included regular use of Yugoslavian shipyards and Syrian and Tunisian ports, as well as periodic visits to Algerian ports. In addition, the Noerion Shipyard of Syros Island, Greece, entered into its second year of repairing Soviet Navy noncombatants. Along Africa, Soviet forces could usually be found in Conakry, Guinea, Contonou, Benin, or Luanda, Angola, while those in the Indian Ocean relied most heavily on using Ethiopian and South Yemeni facilities, with the former now including a Soviet floating dry dock off Dahalak Island. The Soviet Navy also benefited from limited access to ports in Mozambique, Mauritius, and Seychelles, but its use of Umm Qasr in Iraq fell victim to the outbreak of the latter’s war with Iran. In the Far East, the use of Vietnamese facilities became well established with activity increasingly concentrating at the former U. S. installation at Cam Ranh Bay at the expense of Danang. The Soviets have maintained a submarine tender there since February 1980. Soviet inroads into Vietnam were offset by Singapore’s refusal to continue to repair Soviet naval auxiliaries. The refusal, which was intended to protest the Afghan invasion, did not apply to Soviet merchant ships. Also, Soviet ships have ready access to Cuban ports when in the Caribbean, though Soviet Navy combatants and submarines did not take advantage of it in 1980.
Soviet Naval Aviation, however, did routinely deploy reconnaissance aircraft to Cuba. Soviet aircraft also regularly operated from Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Vietnam. The Soviet Navy was thus provided with a valuable forward staging for ocean surveillance and intelligence gathering along the U. S. East Coast, the Atlantic, Arabian Sea, and Pacific.
While most Soviet ship visits in 1980 seemed intended to replenish stores, provide respite from sea duties, and effect repairs, a small number of visits was clearly political in nature, often being primarily intended to exhibit Soviet interest in good relations with the host state. Among the hosts in 1980 were Ethiopia, Kampuchea, Mexico, Poland, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia. The visit to Mexico seemed nicely timed to build on anti- Americanism with the laying of a wreath to victims of the 1914 U. S. intervention in Mexico.
The Kampuchea visit was the first to an East Asian state other than Vietnam since 1969, when Kampuchea (nee Cambodia) was again the host state. Consistent with its own previous practice and that of other East Asian states, Thailand turned down a Soviet request for Soviet Navy ships to visit in 1980. This development may reflect the desire to stay clear of the Sino-Soviet rivalry.
While some ship visits may be intended to exhibit Soviet desire for friendly relations with the host state, other specific naval activities may be more oriented to coaxing particular states to adopt Soviet positions or otherwise to demonstrate Soviet interest, concern, or even displeasure at ongoing events. One can identify at least three possible instances of such activity in 1980. The first was the Soviet Navy’s participation in Comradeship- in-Arms, a Warsaw Pact exercise held in the Baltic and East Germany. It included a sizeable amphibious landing in northern Germany with air cushion vehicles ferrying tanks and landing craft ashore. The exercise was highly publicized in Eastern Europe with extensive television coverage and press reports. Some Western commentators view the evolution and its widespread publicity as part of the Soviet war of nerves to keep Poland in line, and they offer as evidence a statement by Marshal Kulikov, commander of Warsaw Pact forces, that the exercise was staged “to prove that bloc countries are ready to defend the revolutionary