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The Caribbean basin, here defined as both the Caribbean islands and Central America, is undergoing a revolutionary transformation. The Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the revolutionary re- 8une in Grenada are remaking their countries into what some observers view as clients of the Soviet Union and Cuba. Meanwhile, left-leaning guerrillas in El Salvador have been receiving S. arms from the Soviets and military instruction from the Y.abans. These events and the deteriorating socioeconomic con- mtions in the region have also contributed to the growth of guer- groups in countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, and even 'rolombia.
. The upheaval in the Caribbean—particularly in El Salvador— ls Portrayed as a serious challenge by the Reagan Administration, W^'ch is seeking a means to counter Soviet and Cuban support 0r revolutionary forces there. To understand the reasons for this support and its consequences, it is necessary to address the fallowing questions: What is the Soviet strategy in the Caribbean asin? To what degree is Cuba pursuing a course different from hm espoused by the Soviet Union? What is the extent of Soviet- Wuban military cooperation in the region, and in particular joint oviet-Cuban naval-maritime activities? How strong is Soviet and uban support for the revolutionary regimes in Nicaragua and renada and the guerrilla movement in El Salvador? What are • S. interests in the Caribbean basin, and how can they be pro- ected in light of the Soviet and Cuban challenge?
Soviet “Anti-Imperialist” Strategy in the Caribbean Basin: A £areful reading of Soviet sources suggests that the Soviet Union as. developed a strategic vision with regard to the Caribbean ,as'n- It is an integrated, though flexible, plan aimed at achieving °lh specific and long-term ideological, political, economic, and military-security objectives. In terms of ideology, the Soviet obJective is to help create and support “anti-imperialist” (but not aecessarily Marxist-Leninist) regimes that might eventually em- ark on a path toward socialist development, as Cuba did in the 70s. Though experience has taught the Soviets to be cautious and not overly expectant, they have nevertheless expressed the farIy hope that Nicaragua and perhaps Grenada and El Salvador 'Vl11 follow this route.
The success of the Communist revolution in Cuba has encouraged the Soviets to continue their efforts to export “anti-imperialism” to the Caribbean, and now the Cubans are assisting as well. Revolutionary regimes have been much in the news in Nicaragua and El Salvador in recent years, but the small island of Grenada is also the site of a government under strong Soviet-Cuban control. The scoreboard pictured on the opposite page shows a curious juxtaposition of cultures—the British game of cricket, the U. S. drink of Coca- Cola, and the revolutionary slogan of the government which has been in power since 1979.
To forestall more Grenadas, the United States needs to adopt political and economic policies which solidify its position in the region.
Political considerations also play a part. The Soviets continue W view the Caribbean basin as being the “strategic rear” of the mted States.1 However, they no longer believe the Monroe Doc- rine to be viable in this area. “The Monroe Doctrine has outlived
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THE BLACK UN
r INNINGS D INNINGS
Dr. Valenta, a native of Czechoslovakia, earned degrees in nuclear technology and political economics in that nation in the 1960s. After immigrating to this country, he received a Ph.D. in international relations from Johns Hopkins University in 1975. Since 1976, Dr. Valenta has been a professor in the department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. During the 1981-1982 academic year, he is a joint senior research associate, Research Institute on International Change at Columbia University; an international affairs fellow. Council on Foreign Relations, New York: and an international relations fellow. Rockefeller Foundation, New York. He has written several articles for the Proceedings and the book Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision', he has also coedited two books on international security matters.
its times,” said Nikita Khrushchev in 1960. To the Soviets, U. S. acceptance of the Cuban Revolution was proof that President James Monroe’s 1823 pronouncement—which put the Western Hemisphere off limits to European intervention—had died “a natural death.”2 After 1960, Soviet policies with regard to the countries in the region were formulated to encourage “anti-imperialist” and “progressive” (meaning anti-U. S.) changes wherever opportunities might arise for so doing. Equally acceptable were violent methods and/or the “peaceful road.” In the latter case, a prolonged political process might allow "progressive forces” to gradually build national coalitions to challenge U. S. influence. Thus, the Soviets’ strategy provides for support of guerrilla activities in countries having pro-U. S. and antiCommunist regimes and the pursuit of diplomacy in those nations friendlier to the Soviet Union. In the last decade, the Soviets and Cubans have primarily used political and economic means in courting the late General Omar Torrijos’s “progressive” regime in Panama. The “gradualist” approach was used in dealing with the “progressive” Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley until his electoral defeat in 1980 and with the democratic regimes of Mexico and Costa Rica.
The Soviet strategy for dealing with the pro-U. S., anti-Communist regimes of Nicaragua (prior to the fall of Anastasio Somoza in 1979), El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, has been to encourage revolutionary struggle. In the late 1970s, when there was a growing wave of radical anti-U. S. sentiment in the region, generally more emphasis was placed
on revolutionary struggle than on peaceful transformation. The Soviets took advantage of what they viewed as a shifting “correlation of forces” in the world caused by U. S. “defeats” in Vietnam, Angola, and Ethiopia. Coinciding with this were the Soviets’ increasing military and economic capabilities, which made possible a more mature, assertive role in the Third World. The 1973 overthrow of President Salvador Allende in Chile increased Soviet doubts about the feasibility of a “peaceful path” toward socialism in Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World. Subsequently, the successful 1979 revolution in Nicaragua, the coup that same year in Grenada, and the upswing in guerrilla warfare in El Salvador from 1979 to the present confirmed these doubts and fed Cuban—and also Soviet—optimism about the tide of revolution in the Caribbean basin, even in democratic countries such as Colombia. Cuba’s renewed support for guerrilla groups in Colombia suggests that the Soviets and Cubans have reappraised their strategies. The death of Panama's Torrijos increased the likelihood that there would be political instability and violence— conditions that could in turn be exploited by the Soviets and Cubans.
Although Soviet economic interests figure low on the list of strategic priorities in the Caribbean basin, they cannot be ignored. There is little doubt that the discovery of natural resources—particularly in Guatemala, Mexico, Venezuela, and the Caribbean proper—have spurred increasing Soviet interest. For example, the Soviets are working with the Mexicans on long-term cooperation in oil matters and may be interested in similar cooperation with other oil producers in the region. The Soviets have also encouraged Mexico to supply crude oil to Cuba and to assist Cuba with oil exploration efforts along Cuba’s north coast. Soviet economic cooperation with Marxist regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada, and also what they view as a friendly regime in Mexico, is part of the Soviets’ “anti-imperialist” strategy in the area.
The Soviets’ military-security objectives contribute to their strategy in the region. These objectives are gradually to secure access to and maintain naval and air facilities in the basin so as to better project Soviet power and influence while undermining that of the United States. The basin—whose confines have grown out of a geopolitical concept—constitutes a key transit zone for oil and vital raw materials en route from Mexico, Guatemala, Venezuela, and the Caribbean islands to the United States, as well as for all seagoing vessels approaching the Panama Canal. In an extreme case, such as during wartime, a substantial Soviet military presence in the basin could endanger logistics support for U. S. allies m Europe and the delivery of oil and other strategic materials to the United States. During such times,
Cuba might serve as a forward base for submarines and aircraft. According to Soviet Air Force Lieutenant Viktor Belenko, who defected to the West in 1976, the Soviets view the island as “our aircraft carrier.”3 But the discussion must be qualified at this point. So far, the Soviet military presence in the region is limited by the lack of facilities and logistic support necessary for the permanent deployment of a fleet far from home. The Soviets do n°t now have sufficient strength in the region to be ^hle to disrupt the flow of oil to the United States. Moreover, they would probably attempt such action °nly in case of all-out war and then close to Europe or the Persian Gulf rather than in the Caribbean hasin. However, if permitted, the Soviet Union is hkely to establish additional facilities in the region lri order to create a stronger and more permanent Military presence than it has now. This trend is sug- §ested by recent Soviet tactics in Nicaragua, Grenada, and El Salvador.
. The Soviet Navy and Cuba: Despite obvious lim- hations, the Soviets have been able to establish a aulitary presence in Cuba, including the use of modern docks and repair facilities. They also have built a*r facilities for reconnaissance aircraft; satellite stains, and sophisticated intelligence equipment for Monitoring U. S. satellite and microwave conversations, U. S. ship and air movements, and NATO advanced weapons testing in the Atlantic. The detection of crates of new Soviet aircraft at an airfield outside Havana in early 1982 indicates that the Soviets are continuing to supply the Cubans with MiG-23 “Flogger” aircraft, some of which may be a special ground attack version. Some analysts view these planes as being capable, after some modification, of carrying nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Soviet Tu-95 “Bear D” reconnaissance planes are periodically deployed from their Northern Fleet bases in the Soviet Union to either Jose Marti Airport or San Antonio de los Banos in the Havana area for monitoring U. S. naval activities in the Atlantic. Within the last few months, the tempo of Cuban- based “Bear D” operations has increased both by continuous presence in Cuba and in the number of surveillance missions.4 In addition to a Soviet combat brigade of 2,600 men, there are several thousand other military and civilian advisors and technicians. Cuba also serves as a center for close Soviet-Cuban coordination of espionage in the basin itself. Finally, several Cuban bases are used specifically to train guerrillas for various countries in Latin America.
Though proceeding with caution, the Soviets would undoubtedly like to expand their military presence (particularly that of the Navy) in the Caribbean basin. This has been suggested by Soviet plans to make
permanent use of the naval facilities at Cienfuegos, plans which were partly shelved in 1970 because of vociferous U. S. protests. Since the 1960s, some 20 Soviet naval task groups have deployed to the Caribbean Sea and made Cuban port calls. (Each task group usually consists of three destroyer-cruiser types, an oiler, and an occasional submarine.) The most recent deployment occurred in April 1981, when the Soviet naval group included a cruiser. The visit was significant and was a clear demonstration of Soviet military support for Cuba. Shortly before the visit, Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev, while delivering an important speech on the Polish crisis, publicly emphasized the Soviets’ role as protector of Cuba’s security and appeared to link the crisis in Central America to the crisis in Poland.5
The regular deployment of Soviet warships to Cuba is also designed to further cooperation between Soviet and Cuban armed forces. As General I. Shka-
dov, chief of the group of Soviet advisors in Cuba in the 1960s, put it, “Friendly visits by Soviet warships to parts of Cuba make an important contribution to strengthening cooperation between Soviet and Cuban soldiers.”6 The Soviets deploy not only warships, but also intelligence, merchant, oceanographic, and fishing vessels. (Soviet intelligence collectors patrol off the U. S. East coast almost continuously—in the vicinity of Norfolk, Kings Bay. Charleston, and Narragansett Bay.) There have also been increasingly frequent Soviet and joint Soviet- Cuban marine cruises in the Caribbean for the purpose of conducting fishery and oceanographic research as well as gathering and establishing future channels of information. The Soviets also have assisted with reconstruction of ports in Havana and Cienfuegos.
Overall, the small yet growing Soviet naval and merchant deployment in the Caribbean basin is designed to help encourage policies along the lines of what Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Serge' Gorshkov would refer to as “progressive changes offshore.” The “demonstration activity” of the Soviet Navy, in his view, makes it possible to “achieve , political goals without resorting to armed struggle.'
The security, political, and economic aspects of Soviet strategy in the region are mutually complementary since Soviet naval visits to the Caribbean are facilitated by the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations. As the Soviets see it, “pro-
gressive changes offshore” make the Caribbean environment more amenable to Soviet interests.
Cuba: A Soviet “Brother-in-Arms” Although Premier Fidel Castro’s foreign policy is not totally subservient to that of the Soviet Union, it would be arfetched to think of Cuba as an independent or even semi-independent actor. Cuba’s emergence as a major player in Africa and the Caribbean basin in the 1970s and early 1980s has been possible mainly because of growing Soviet military and economic Power and Soviet willingness to exploit changes in .be international system. More specifically, the mil- Uary operations of Cuban “mulatto legions” in Angola and Ethiopia in the 1970s have been possible ecause of Soviet military-strategic cover, Soviet sealift and airlift, and Cuba’s expectation that Soviet suPport and protection will be forthcoming in the event of an attack on the island. Moreover, the So- v,ets subsidize the Cuban economy with an estimated $8 million per day. Without this help, Cuba’s altering economy could never have absorbed the c°st of military interventions in Africa. The major Portion of Cuba’s African campaign expenses has een picked up by the Soviets or by the recipient countries, who in turn have received the money from bo Soviets. There obviously exists a basic agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union regarding be coordination and implementation of “anti-im- Penalist” strategy in the Caribbean basin.
Castro, of course, has some very pragmatic se- ouruy-mifitary, political, and economic interests of Is ovvn in pursuing a joint “anti-imperialist” strategy with the Soviets. His first objective is to ensure e survival of the Cuban revolution, preserve Cu- a s political independence, and secure further security guarantees for his state in the face of what be Cubans see as continuous U. S. hostility. But astro also wants to build bridges to other Carib- . ean countries. In the wake of the unpopular Soviet !J?vasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, many Third orld countries have become less willing than be- ®re to accept Castro as leader of the nonaligned ,0rld and defender of progressive Third World re- jbmes. In political terms, Castro wants now, more an ever, to increase the prestige and influence of ls regime and refurbish his tarnished image.
Cuba also receives some significant economic Payoffs for pursuing an “anti-imperialist” strategy Vls~u-vis its neighbors. Because Cuban willingness 0 deploy regular troops in Africa and to vigorously uPport the revolutionary forces in the Caribbean asin became indispensable to the implementation Soviet “anti-imperialist” strategy in these re- ^0ns, Cuba gained the status of a privileged ally. It ras able to insist on further adjustments in Soviet- uban economic relations, such as Soviet subsidies nd credits to bolster the Cuban sugar and nickel
industries and subsidies of petroleum prices. These enable the Cubans to purchase oil at roughly one- third of the price on the world market. The Soviets even agreed to construct a nuclear power plant in Cuba between 1981 and 1985.
Another payoff for Cuban assistance in implementing the strategy has been Soviet modernization of Cuba’s armed forces with sophisticated weaponry. The Cuban armed forces (227,000 regulars and 60,000 reservists) are now better equipped than any other armed forces in the basin, including those of Mexico. They have considerable mobility and significant defensive and offensive capability. In the whole of Latin America they are second in size only to the armed forces of Brazil. Of the Soviet allies, only Poland, which has four times the population of Cuba, has greater forces. As Cuban Minister of Defense Raul Castro boasted in 1975, “We have the most powerful army in Latin America; we have more tanks than all the Latin American armies put together.”8 (The Soviets have supplied the Cuban Army with T-62 tanks and in early 1982 with a squadron of ground attack helicopters.)
The Soviets also have helped to build a modern and efficient Cuban naval and merchant fleet. In the last few years, they have equipped the Cubans with nine guided missile patrol boats, more than a dozen “Turya-”class hydrofoil patrol boats, antisubmar-
ine frigates, several landing craft and two “Fox- trot”-class diesel-powered submarines. In 1981. the Soviets delivered one of their newest and biggest Cuban warships, the 2,300-ton “Koni”-class frigate. Though this ship is about two-thirds the displacement of an Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate, she is viewed as a major improvement in Cuban naval inventory and may, in larger numbers, enable Cuba to project its power into the Caribbean basin and intimidate its neighbors. The Soviets have also helped the Cubans to update their merchant fleet with passenger ships, oil tankers, and contain- erships.
The Soviet arms transfer to Cuba is relatively advanced in the overall context of the Soviet arms aid program. It reached major proportions last year, when the Soviet Union reportedly shipped to Cuba at least 62,000 tons of arms, the largest amount since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.9 This total is larger than that for the three previous years combined.
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Grenada: Following the Cuban Example? For the Soviets the triumph of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in July 1979 signaled an important juncture in the “progressive” transformation of the Caribbean basin, equal in importance only to the victory of Castro in Cuba 20 years earlier. In both cases, the United States was perceived by the Soviets as suffering humiliating political defeat. In the view of such Soviet officials as Vadim Zag- ladin, deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee, the Nicaraguan revolution was one of the “starlets” of the “anti-imperialist” movement in Latin America. Zagladin, at least implicitly, has tried to link the "victory of Nicaragua” with Soviet-Cuban supported “anti-imperialist strategy” and has expressed the hope that Nicaragua will “have its continuators.”10
Prior to and shortly after the Sandanistas’ victory, the Soviets exercised a great deal of caution and were typically guarded in their willingness to make commitments to the new regime, as they were originally in 1959 in Cuba. After a gradual reassessment of their options, however, the Soviets decided to pursue implementation of their “anti-imperialist strategy” in Nicaragua following the overthrow of dictator Anastasio Somoza. Subsequently, the Soviets and their East European allies concluded a variety of economic, technical, and trade agreements with Nicaragua. These mainly concerned fishing and marine affairs, water power resources, mining and geological surveys, communications, and scientific and cultural cooperation. The Sandanista Liberation Front (FSLN) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union also agreed on future party-to- party contacts, along the same lines pursued by the Soviets with various other revolutionary forces, such as the regimes in Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviets donated 14,000 tons of wheat to Nicaragua and also granted the country a $50 million credit. Credits granted by other Soviet East European allies included $35 million from Czechoslovakia, $20 million from Bulgaria, $10 million from East Germany, and $5 million from Hungary.
More significant, the Soviet Union and its allies have already provided military aid to Nicaragua. Twenty-eight million dollars worth of Soviet, East German, and Cuban arms transferred to Nicaragua in 1981 included 25 T-54 and T-55 tanks, many armored personnel carriers and two Hip helicopters, heavy artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and large quantities of automatic rifles. Preparations for delivery of MiG jet fighters seem to be under way at the time of this writing. East Germany has delivered 800 military trucks. There are about 4,000 Cubans in Nicaragua, 2,000 of which are security and military advisors. In addition, there are 70 Soviet advisors teaching the Nicaraguans how to operate the equipment. Nicaraguan pilots are being trained to fly Soviet planes in Cuba and Bulgaria. With Soviet and Cuban assistance, Nicaraguans are building new runways at four airfields, probably to enable them to accommodate MiG fighters. According to a Sandanista leader, this military equipment was purchased in response to “the danger of U. S. invasion.”" From the U. S. point of view, the arms transfer of sophisticated weapons to Nicaragua represents a threat to stability in the basin. Since heavy tanks are not included in the inventory of Nicaragua’s Central American neighbors, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have begun making large- scale purchases of arms in order to upgrade their own equipment. The transfer of tanks and the efforts of the Nicaraguan regime to build, with the help of the Cubans, many new facilities and a militia of about 70,000 men—the largest in the region after Cuba—is bound to fuel the already strong arms race in the region. In early 1981, the Nicaraguan armed and security forces had about 22.000 men, and the People's Militia had about 20,000. Thus, ironically- the Central American nations, which desperately need money, may be entering an arms race similar to the battleship race that took place in Latin America in the early years of this century.
Cuban and Nicaraguan military advisors are running advanced training programs for guerrillas destined for El Salvador and other countries in the region. Nicaragua, like Cuba, may soon serve as an important transition center for guerrilla warfare experts. These operations may pose a more serious threat since the guerrilla movement can be supported and exported more easily from Nicaragua in Central America than from an island such as Cuba.
As in the past with Cuba, the Soviet Union is developing naval and maritime cooperation with Nicaragua. The two nations have signed agreements
Reconnaissance Administration.12 A large floating Soviet workshop operates off Nicaragua’s Pacific coast, where it will repair domestic and foreign ships.13
The victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua prompted the Soviets to anticipate a chain reaction of leftist upheavals and revolutions throughout Central America. After Nicaragua, the Central American country singled out by Soviet writers as being most pregnant with revolutionary opportunities is El Salvador, which the Soviets see as occupying an “important strategic position in the region.”14
The Cuban training of Salvadoran guerrillas increased sharply after 1979. Though originally very cautious, the Soviets decided, after a meeting of the various guerrilla groups organized by Castro in Havana in December 1979, to back the Cuban involvement there and to supply weapons.15 In the spring of 1980, the Soviets also agreed to provide for the
s ^lch call for joint fishery and oceanographic re- ^earch programs, the training of Nicaraguans at So- let fishing schools, and Soviet aid in repairing Ni- Qaraguan vessels. Six Soviet ships equipped for Ceanographic, fishing, and marine biology research Ire already conducting research in Pacific and At- nt’c waters adjacent to Nicaragua. Soviet ships ch as the research vessel with the designation RTAt 8-453 from Vladivostok belong to the sci- Htific research fleet of the Pacific Ocean Fishing
military training of a group of Salvadoran youths. Cuban assistance with the transfer of armaments from Soviet-allied countries has been significant. In 1980, Castro actively assumed the role of broker in attempting to unify the various revolutionary groups. The search for arms in the East by Secretary of El Salvador’s Communist Party Schafik Handal was conducted in the summer of 1980 with the assistance of men such as K. Brutens and his deputy, M. Ku- dachkin, Soviet officials responsible for Third World affairs. Handal’s visit to the Soviet Union and several other East European countries led to the shipment of U. S.-made weapons (M-14 and M-16 rifles,
Reconnaissance photographs taken by U. S. planes were released by the Department of Defense in March of this year as a demonstration of the influence of the Cubans and Soviets in building up the military capabilities of the current revolutionary regime in Nicaragua.
M-79 grenades) from Vietnam and Ethiopia to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Thus the Soviet Union could, by proceeding with caution, deny its involvement if accused. The Soviets’ East European allies (with the exception of Poland and Romania) provided communications equipment, uniforms, and medical supplies, while the Soviets helped to arrange for the transport of the weapons to Cuba in 1980. From Cuba the weapons were conveyed to Nicaragua, and from there by ship, air, or overland (through Honduras) to El Salvador.
The Soviets and the Cubans have established a foothold in Grenada which is strategically located close to the oil-producing nations of Venezuela and Trinidad. The political importance of Grenada for the Soviets and Cubans became obvious after the electoral defeat of Prime Minister Manley by Western-oriented Edward Seaga in Jamaica in November 1980. Grenada then became the only Caribbean island under strong Soviet and Cuban influence. The revolutionary Prime Minister Maurice Bishop who came to power in 1979 is a close friend and admirer of Fidel Castro. Grenada has supported the Soviet
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Union in the international forum by voting against fhe condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the United Nations. (During this vote, even Nicaragua abstained.) Soviet equipment and financial assistance from the Soviet Union and Libya have enabled hundreds of Cuban workers and technicians to begin building a new international airport at Port Salines in Grenada. When finished, it will be capable of handling all types of Soviet and Cuban aircraft, including the Soviet “Backfire” bomber. Moreover, in Grenada, which has a population of 120,000, more than 50 Cuban military advisors are helping to build a new revolutionary army of some U500 to 2,000 men. In addition, there are several hundred Cuban military and civilian advisors, doctors, and construction workers serving in Grenada.
. As in Nicaragua, the Soviets are assisting in build- lng and promoting a fishing industry in Grenada for which the Cubans have supplied a fishing trawler. After Admiral Gorshkov’s visit to the island in 1980, there were reports about the Soviet intention of building naval facilities there.16 Grenada could become, with Soviet and Cuban sponsorship, a center for guerrilla activities in the Caribbean. According to some reports, scores of recruits from Trinidad may already be undergoing training in guerrilla tactics in Grenada.17
U. S. Interests and Options in the Caribbean Basin: For those who live in the United States, the Caribbean basin is not just a refuge from the inconvenience of winter weather. The United States has vital security, political, and economic interests in the area. U. S. military installations at Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico, the Panama Canal, and Guantanamo Bay in Cuba make the Caribbean basin strategically important for the defense of the U. S. southern flank. U. S. security interests in the area are compounded by the existence of key shipping lanes from Venezuela and the Caribbean island oil refineries, the networks of U. S. listening posts monitoring ships and submarine activities, and potential Caribbean supply routes to U. S. allies in Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific (through the Panama Canal) which would need to be activated in case of war.
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such as the Persian Gulf. Finally, the Caribbean basin is important to the United States because of its economic potential as a supplier of oil and other raw materials, particularly bauxite, which are indispensable to U. S. industry, and because of the investment made by U. S. business. The protection of U. S. economic interests in the region requires preventing abrupt economic dislocation, massive immigration, and hostile radicalization of the basin’s economies, which in its cumulative and ultimate implications would put U. S. economic interests in jeopardy.
The bearded fellow at right is Maurice Bishop, the revolutionary prime minister who came to power in Grenada in 1979. Assistance from the Soviets, Libyans, and Cubans has aided development work in Grenada, which is building a revolutionary army.
COTTON COULSON/WOODFIN CAMP. INC.
Because of the presence of natural harbors which, as in Cuba, could be used by potential hostile powers such as the Soviet Union for visits and repairs of naval vessels, it is in the security interest of the United States to deny use of the Caribbean basin to such powers. The increase in the number of military facilities in the region could make a major difference by tying up U. S. forces needed in other theaters during wartime. U. S. freedom of action depends on its ability to prevent the establishment of proSoviet regimes in its Caribbean “southern flank.” U. S. policy in the basin is geared to preserving regional stability and fostering peaceful change. The continuous erosion of equilibrium by the emergence of political regimes allied to and/or having close military ties with the Soviet Union represents a clear threat to vital U. S. interests. Tolerance of hostile regimes on its southern flank can be detrimental to U. S. political credibility in other important regions
Given U. S. interests and capability for challenging the Soviet Union, U. S. policy in the basin is an important factor affecting Soviet-Cuban strategy and tactics in Central America. In the wake of Vietnam, Cuban and Soviet activities were scarcely constrained by the United States because of the unwillingness of the American public and Congress to support any forceful response to such assertive behavior. This point was well demonstrated during the Soviet-Cuban interventions in Angola and Ethiopia. Furthermore, President Jimmy Carter’s empty rhetoric in 1979 about the “unacceptable” Soviet combat brigade, which suddenly became “acceptable,” hardly served as a meaningful deterrent to Soviet military activities in the Caribbean basin.
It seems, however, that Soviet and Cuban perceptions about U. S. willingness to defend vital interests in the Caribbean are now changing, as demonstrated by Soviet and Cuban uncertainty regarding the policies of President Ronald Reagan. In 1981, the Reagan Administration repeatedly warned that the United States would take all necessary measures to stop the arms transfer to El Salvador, not excluding military action against Nicaragua or even Cuba. Considering its interests in the area, the United States should take all the steps feasible from the standpoint of domestic politics to curb the expansion of Soviet-Cuban military activities in the Caribbean, particularly further expansion of Soviet naval activities. As Secretary of State Alexander M- Haig, Jr., put it: “We are considering a whole range of options—political, economic and security—in response to Cuban intervention in this hemisphere.”18 President Reagan has also left his options open on military measures: “I rule nothing out, nothing in.”19
Nicaragua may be the best place to begin curbing Soviet and Cuban military support for future clients. The Reagan Administration wisely did not rule out the use of a blockade or military force against Nicaragua or even “going to the source” (that is, Cuba), if necessary, as Secretary of State Haig put it, to prevent further Cuban involvement in El Salvador. Although the use of force most certainly is the last option, the threat of use of force was taken seriously by the Cubans, who subsequently decided to organize a territorial militia defense system, call up
lheir military reservists, and declare a state of emer- Sency. If the drift toward establishing a Soviet-Cu- ar> military presence in Nicaragua and/or contin- u°Us Soviet-Cuban military aid to El Salvador continues, the United States may be forced to take drastic measures.
A naval blockade or military intervention would .e very costly and would hinder U. S. capabilities ln other areas (Europe, the Middle East, and Pa- C|hc). Such an action would also entail great international risks. The deployment of U. S. combat forces ,n El Salvador may be opposed by the Congress and ntay cause domestic polarization that could in turn Undermine the Defense Department’s efforts to c°unterbalance the Soviet military-strategic and conventional buildup. If there were a concentration ?. hJ. S. forces in this region, it could jeopardize • S. ability to resist Soviet diversions in other areas, naval blockade of Nicaragua, though perhaps less lsky than outright military intervention, could be ^°re difficult. There are inherent risks in blockading c°ntinental nation such as Nicaragua, as opposed .? (he blockade of an island such as Cuba. Fur- ermore, a blockade at the present time would be nch more difficult than the one in 1962 because ® U. S. Navy is smaller now than it was then. There are less risky, nonmilitary measures that
El Salvador continues to be a Central American hot spot, with fighting frequently flaring up between government forces and Salvadoran rebels. They kill each other and innocent bystanders as well. Below left, a Salvadoran civilian throws water on his bus at San Vicente in March of this year after it was set afire by leftist guerrillas during fighting in the area.
should be used to strengthen U. S. influence in Nicaragua and El Salvador. So long as they are feasible, diplomatic and economic means, including negotiations through intermediates such as Mexico, should be used to reverse the negative trends in Nicaragua. Similarly, in El Salvador the U. S. Government should attempt to strengthen the democratic forces by providing economic and military aid and by encouraging reforms and opposing a right-wing takeover. Needless to say, there are also possible military measures which would be less risky than the intervention or blockade mentioned above. The Navy would play a substantial role in such actions. The United States could expand its naval presence in the Caribbean, acting on but surpassing President Cart-
er’s 1979 decision to establish a Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force (CCJTF) at Key West, Florida, and Reagan’s 1 December 1981 decision to upgrade and reclassify the CCJTF as a new U. S. military command for the Caribbean (Commander U. S. Forces Caribbean)—and to home-port a squadron of new missile-armed patrol hydrofoils at Key West. These additional measures could include building new naval and air facilities in the Caribbean basin, perhaps in Venezuela, Colombia, and Honduras; assigning permanent forces to COMUSFOR- CARIB; and scheduling occasional, if not regular, deployments of a U. S. aircraft carrier battle group in the basin. The Navy should increase P-3 patrol plane surveillance operations, conduct more ship visits than now to Caribbean countries in order to show the flag, and hold more periodic surface combatant task group exercises, including participation by the battleship New Jersey (BB-62) when recommissioned.
The United States should heed the writings of both Gorshkov and Alfred Thayer Mahan on how to use naval power during peacetime in order to further political objectives. After all, the United States has been successful in conducting regular deployments in the Mediterranean Sea and Pacific Ocean for quite some time. This country could also initiate with its Latin American allies a regular multilateral deployment within the framework of the current UNITAS exercises and even increase other naval activities within UNITAS. In light of advanced Soviet arms transfers to Cuba and lately to Nicaragua, the United States has little choice but to sell some weapons to friendly nations in the Caribbean basin.
What is needed most, however, is a comprehensive U. S. strategy with coherent objectives. Such a strategy would encompass a variety of different instruments, not only military but also political, psychological (Nicaragua and Cuba are vulnerable to criticism via U. S. broadcasts regarding treatment of their dissidents and the Moskito Indians near the Honduran border), cultural (wide-ranging scholarly exchange programs), and above all economic. The latter might include such elements as free trade arrangements, investment incentives for private enterprise, emergency economic aid to nations such as El Salvador and Costa Rica in economic distress, and tax sharing.
As the Cuban and Soviet setback in the Jamaican elections of 1980 suggests, the U. S. patient wait- and-see approach, together with support for dem-
ocratic forces, can bring fruitful results. The same aPproach, of course, may not work elsewhere. Nicaragua seems to bear this out. Nevertheless, it is miportant that each country be treated as a special Case and that the wide-ranging cultural, social, and Political diversity in the area be appreciated. If nectary, military aid should be upgraded to countries such as El Salvador, but it should be coupled with comprehensive economic, financial, and technical assistance. The roots of the problems in the region are socioeconomic and, as this author suggested in spring of 1981, call for a kind of “new Marshall Plan” in support of the beleaguered and often weak democratic forces in the region.20 . The Reagan Administration’s Caribbean basin initiative, details of which were first presented at the 24 February 1982 meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS), contains proposals aimed at the economic, political, and security problems of the region. The plan includes three trade arrange- mcnts to increase the diversity and quality of items Produced for export as well as preferential duty-free •acentives to attract investments by American entrepreneurs. It also provides for technical assistance and training to help the private sector in the Caribbean basin. The plan further recommends the al- °cation by Congress of $350 in supplemental aid or fiscal year 1982; $100 million of this would be §|ven to El Salvador, $100 million in new economic a’d, and $35 million in military aid.
The governments of nations in the Caribbean basin v°>ced a variety of opinions, mostly positive, in response to President Reagan’s economic program.
.ft the ambassador from Costa Rica and the prime ■hmister of Jamaica expressed agreement with the ^ministration’s underlying assessments of the Problems of the region. However, some Caribbean eaders, notably those from Guiana and Barbados, Itiestioned the appropriateness of such a heavy emphasis on free enterprise, given the area’s preponderance of mixed economies and serious developmental problems. Other observers argued that attempts to entice private investors may not succeed in countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala since civil war, political insecurity, and unrest make the investment of foreign capital extremely risky. In the opinion of the author, the Reagan Caribbean initiative is a new and imaginative approach to this region. Hopefully, it will serve as the basis for the development of a comprehensive U. S. strategy for the Caribbean basin.
It is of enormous importance that while implementing President Reagan’s program—which is aimed at resisting Soviet-Cuban activities—the United States should not lose track of the complex nature of this conflict. The present crisis in the Caribbean cannot be solely attributed to Cuban and Soviet interference. The major cause of the crisis in El Salvador and to varying degrees in other countries in the Caribbean is the rapid decay of outmoded political, economic, and social orders. Socioeconomic polarization and the specific cultures have also contributed significantly to the rise of internal and intra-regional conflict in the area. The United States should take further economic initiatives and new political ones to be coordinated, if possible, in a multilateral way with Mexico, Canada, and Venezuela. They should go beyond the current Reagan plan as a means of arresting Soviet-Cuban anti-imperialist strategy in the Caribbean basin.
I am indebted to Andrew Marshall and also to a number of individuals for their comments on an earlier version of this article: first, the editor and the editorial board; also, Captain Donald Gentry, USN, Lieutenant Commander William Lyda, USN, and Dr. Richard Feinberg who was formerly with the State Department.
Ip
r a detailed discussion of the political objectives of Soviet strategy. ^ee <his author’s “The USSR. Cuba and the Crisis in Central America,” , ' Bcinberg fed.). Central America: International Dimensions of the Crisis ew York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, forthcoming 1982). jj ASs (Moscow), 12 July I960.
°hn Barron, MiG Pilot: The Final Escape of Lieutenant Belenko (New 4G°rk: Readers’ Digest Press. 1980). p. 65. e°rge C. Wilson, “Crates of Soviet Aircraft Detected near Havana,” !e shinpton Post, 13 January 1982; and Michael Getler, “U. S. AWACS 5p0t ^(fusion of Soviet Jets," The Washington Post, 27 January 1982. s or Brezhnev’s speech, see Pravda (Moscow), 8 April 1981. y rmy General I. Shkadov, “Soviet-Cuban Brotherhood-in-Arms,” T°yenno-Istoricheskiy Zhumai, April 1981, p. 59.
Chiral Sergei Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Moscow. 1976), P- 403 8a • '
, "interview with Raul Castro, El Dia (Mexico City), 19 September 1975. IOy ic“k° Tribune, 19 February 1982.
loo ^a8latIin. “On the Threshold of the Eighties," New Times, 1 January it??’ PP- 5-7.
^ (Paris), 17 July 1981, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information er' ice-Latin America, 17 July 1981.
'-Vladivostok Maritime Service, 11 May 1981. reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-USSR, 19 May 1981; and Managua Radio San- dino. 1 September 1981, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Ser- vice-Latin America. 9 September 1981.
IJPrela (Havana), reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service- Latin America, 26 April 1981.
I4V. Korionov, “El Salvador: The Struggle Sharpens," Pravda, 30 December 1981.
'■'“Communist Interference in El Salvador," Special Report No. 80, U. S. Department of State, 23 February 1981.
'‘'AFP (Paris), 15 January 1981. reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Latin America, 21 January 1981.
'’’Trinidad Guardian (Port of Spain), 9 January 1980, reported in Foreign Broadcast Service-Latin America, 14 January 1980.
'"Hedrick Smith, “Struggle in Salvador Pinches Washington's 'Vietnam Nerve,’ " The New York Times, 7 February 1982.
''‘The New York Times, 28 January 1982.
2”Valenta, "The USSR. Cuba, and the Crisis in Central America," a paper presented at the Conference on International Aspects of the Crisis in Central America. Washington, D.C., 2-3 April 1981.