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“Continuing expansion” is the phrase most applicable to navies of the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia in 1981.
The trend persists toward acquisition of small, fast, and lethal patrol boats in the 100- to 500-ton range, most with a main battery of surface- to-surface missiles (SSMs). Typically, new acquisitions represent net additions to naval inventories, although some are replacing large and aged ships—legacies of the colonial era.
Virtually all new fleet units are ordered from abroad, but a few states are achieving the capability of fabricating their own hulls and, in rare cases, their own propulsion and weapon systems. Shortages of trained manpower and inadequate maintenance procedures and facilities continue to be major problems.
Few navies in the area have well- balanced fleets. Air defense systems, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, and mine countermeasure (MCM) forces are the assets most conspicuously missing. Lack of adequate antiair warfare (AAW) capabilities would seem to be the most significant vulnerability since patrol boats generally operate within range of land-based aircraft. ASW and MCM are less critical because few potential adversaries operate submarines or have large mine inventories.
In the Persian Gulf area, the Iraq- Iran war remains stalemated with no end in sight and few indications of naval action. Saudi Arabia is pressing ahead with a massive naval buildup and has been the moving force behind formation of the new Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). While thus far emphasizing economic cooperation, the GCC clearly has an evolving security dimension. With similar conservative regimes, potentially complementary naval assets, and a common stake in maintaining the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf states (less Iraq and Iran) may be on the verge of establishing meaningful collective security arrangements. Some sort of naval cooperation would seem to be a logical first step.
In North Africa, the assassination of President Sadat sent shock waves through the area but has yet to result in any fundamental changes in Egypt's alignment or security policies. The Mediterranean was the scene of two rather bizarre naval incidents in 1981: the four-day hijacking of a new Iranian missile boat by anti- Khomeini forces, and the Gulf of Sidra incident in which U. S. carrier aircraft shot down two attacking Libyan jets. Israel used its naval assets in 1981 to support attacks into Lebanon, and Soviet amphibious warfare forces conducted a practice landing in Syria.
In South Asia, and indeed on the entire Indian Ocean littoral, India remains the premier naval power and gives every indication of intending to enhance that position.
Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula
Iran: Which fleet units are afloat; which are afloat and can get under way; which are afloat, can get under way, and can fight are all questions which cannot now be answered with any degree of confidence. For a speculative discussion, based on press reports, of the state of the Iranian Navy in the wake of the revolution and in the context of the Iraq-Iran War, see this writer’s “Naval Warfare in the Gulf: Iraq versus Iran” in the June 1981 Proceedings, pages 114-117.
Virtually all of the Shah’s orders for new ship construction were cancelled by the revolutionary government, with the exception of one large replenishment ship (Kliarg), two logistic land ships (La van and Tonb), and the last three La Combattante-II missilearmed fast patrol boats from a 12-boat order (Khanjar, Neyzeh, and Tabar- zin). The replenishment and logistic ships were laid up in Britain during 1981 when the U. K. Government refused export permits because British nationals were being held prisoner in Iran. Ihe three missile-less boats were delayed, then released by the French Government last August, initiating one of the most bizarre episodes in recent naval history.
A group of exiled Iranian monarchists led by a former commander in chief of the Imperial Iranian Navy- Admiral Kamal Habibolahi, hijacked the Tabarzin on 14 August just off the coast of Spain. The Tabarzin was in company with the other two missile boats en route to join the Iranian fleethaving set sail from Cherbourg on 2 August and subsequently from Cadiz after taking on fuel and provisions- The hijackers forced the crew of a
Spanish tugboat to approach the mis- boats about 5 miles off Cadiz. Apparently, there was some prior arrangement between the hijackers and Members of the Tabarzin's crew, because the missile boat slowed to let the tug catch her, and several crew- then then threw lines to the hijackers °n the tug.
Following the takeover of the Ta- arzin, the Spanish Navy escorted the other two missile boats to Algeciras, hthere they stayed overnight before departing eastward. Meanwhile, the abarzin, under control of the hijackers> made her way to Casablanca where, on 15 August, the hijackers rePortedly threatened to blow up the ^essel unless they were provided with o°d, water, and fuel. Moroccan authorities complied with the demand, 'hen escorted the missile boat out of Moroccan waters.
On 18 August, the boat put in to Marseilles, where the hijackers once a8ain demanded provisions and also Pleased about 30 members of the original crew. The French refused the ethands despite a repeat of the threat 0 blow up the boat. After negotia- lons, the. hijackers surrendered the ^essel and received political asylum rorn the French. The Tabarzin subsequently rejoined her sister ships.
Except for these La Combattantes, he Iranian Navy is composed of vir- Ually the same major ships that it or- ered ten years (and more) ago, less ^nibat losses and cannibalized hulls. vvnat was once by far the most ca- Psble naval force in the Gulf was said 0 be able to get only one-fifth of the eet under way for exercises in the sPring of 1980, several months before 'ae war with Iraq began.
Iraq: As with Iran, “facts” and figUres on the Iraqi Navy at this point w°uld be highly speculative.
It is known that Iraq’s Soviet- equipped navy, built around 14 “Osa- s and "IIs,” was showing the ef- ects of its age before the war. According to one report in 1979, Iraq was uen planning to double the size of its navy. The Iraqi Government apparently expected to acquire ten “Nan- ttchka” corvettes from the Soviet union as the result of negotiations in "76. When the “Nanuchkas” were n°t forthcoming, the Iraqis placed an order with Italy for four Lupo-dass ‘rigates, six 650-ton missile corvettes, a Stromboli-class replenishment ship, at1d a 6,000-ton capacity floating dry
dock in January 1980.
Meanwhile, Iraq has taken delivery of a Yugoslavian-built training ship and a fourth “Polnocny”-class LCT. Other orders include a diving tender from the Netherlands, the 2,000-gross registered ton presidential yacht Qad- disyat Saddam from Denmark, a “state barge,” from a Danish builder, for use on the Tigris River, and six “SRN-6”-class hovercraft from a British firm.
Iraq is reportedly pressing Kuwait once again to lease its two strategically positioned islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. President Hussein is said to want a site on Bubiyan for construction of a naval base. (See Raphael Danziger’s “The Naval Race in the Persian Gulf” on pages 92-98 of this issue for further details on this topic.)
Saudi Arabia: The Saudis are in the midst of a naval buildup whose relative magnitude is virtually unprecedented. The navy program is only one part of a tremendous overall arms buildup ($105 billion in the current five-year plan) inspired by the knowledge that Saudi Arabia literally has more to lose now than in the days of cheap oil, and by the perception that the security environment has markedly deteriorated in recent years.
In 1979-80, the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) still had fewer than 2,000 men and barely 1,000 tons of fighting vessels. If the delivery of warships presently on order is accomplished on schedule, the navy’s size will have increased more than tenfold in less than five years. Meanwhile, the Saudi Coast Guard, a completely separate organization under direction of the Ministry of the Interior, has already increased to 430 craft of various sizes and descriptions.
The ten-year U. S.-designed Saudi Naval Expansion Program (SNEP) will shortly come to fruition with delivery of four missile-armed corvettes and nine missile gunboats, only six ol which had been completed at the end of 1981. Four coastal minesweepers and a variety of amphibious and service craft have already been turned over by the United States. A significant part of the SNEP has been the development of logistic, servicing, and training infrastructures, including a Saudi naval academy and naval bases and supply depots. It is likely that this aspect of U. S. assistance will continue well after delivery of
The new Iranian Government cancelled many of the Shah ’s naval orders. One of these three new, French- built La Combattantes, the Tabarzin, completed since the revolution, was hijacked while en route to Iran in 1981. She was recovered later, and continued on to Iran.
U. S.-built ships. To date, the value of U. S.-supplied equipment and services has totaled about $6 billion.
As reported last year, the second phase of development of the Saudi Navy has fallen largely to the French, who are now filling a $3.5 billion order for four 2,000-ton frigates, two 10,475- ton underway replenishment ships, 24 Dauphin helicopters, and two Atlantic fixed-wing aircraft, together with training and logistical support packages. The underway replenishment ships provide a clue to Saudi operational thinking, since the vessels should serve quite well as “mother ships” for the escort of small, shortlegged boats transiting from the Gulf to the Red Sea, or vice versa.
While it is likely that more Saudi naval assets will routinely be deployed in the Gulf than in the Red Sea (since the oil fields are on or near the Gulf and most threats emanate from that direction), it is possible to conceive of circumstances in which the Saudis might want to concentrate forces on the Red Sea side. The two Yemens have caused the Saudis plenty of worries in the past. The South Yemen Navy has enough assets to challenge Saudi interests in maintaining unimpeded traffic through Bab el-Mandeb and undisturbed oil pipeline and oil storage operations on the Red Sea coast and under the sea.
More troublesome still is the recently announced treaty of friendship and cooperation signed by the leaders of South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Libya in Aden on 19 August 1981. Libya is also known to be actively supporting North Yemeni rebels, intent on overthrowing North Yemen’s Westernleaning regime.
Meanwhile, the Saudis have been active in promoting the newly formed Gulf Cooperation Council, which came formally into existence, or at least came to public light, in the spring of 1981. Membership in the Riyadh- based GCC consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in addition to Saudi Arabia. While GCC spokesmen have publicly emphasized the economic dimension of the organization, it is clearly meant to foster joint security cooperation as well, particularly in areas of internal security, intelligence exchange, and suppression of subversive activities. No consensus seems thus far to have emerged from the GCC consultations on just how to implement joint security measures, the main bone of contention appearing to be the relationship, if any, to be established with Western powers. It would seem that the formula most likely to prove acceptable to all parties will be some sort of limited naval cooperation among themselves.
Kuwait: Designated as a coast guard rather than a navy, Kuwait’s maritime force is administered by the Ministry of the Interior. With 500 men,- it operates approximately 50 coastal patrol boats, of which about one-third are armed. Five landing craft round out the current assets.
On order from Lurssen of West Germany are eight missile boats, six of which are of the “TNC-45” class and two of the “FPB-57” class, displacing 259 and 398 tons respectively. Six “SRN-6” Mk-8 hovercraft were ordered from Great Britain in 1981.
There are indications that Kuwait intends to establish an "official” navy in the near future. In October 1974, the late Emir Sabah announced plans to develop a nucleus of naval personnel, and, in 1977, a contract was awarded to a Japanese firm to construct a naval base. The missile boats now under construction may be earmarked to be the navy’s first operational vessels.
Bahrain: Bahrain’s nascent navy ordered two “TNC-45” missile boats and two “FPB-38” gunboats from Lurssen of West Germany in 1979. The two somewhat larger "TNC-45s” will mount four MM-40 Exocet missiles when delivered in 1983-84, while the 205-ton “FPB-38s” Al Riffa and Hawar were completed in mid-1981.
The coast guard, administered by the Ministry of the Interior rather than the Ministry of Defense, operates 14 coastal patrol boats, 10 dhows, 1 “Loadmaster” amphibious warfare craft, 1 tug, and 1 hovercraft.
Qatar: The least populous state in the Gulf (230,000 residents) operates a naval force consisting of six 120-ton fast patrol gunboats and 36 small gunarmed patrol boats, including seven recently delivered Watercraft “P-1200s.” On order from France are three La Combatante-III-class patrol boats armed with eight MM-40 Exocet SSMs and 76-mm., 40-mm., and 30mm. guns. Three Exocet coastal defense systems are also said to be on order.
United Arab Emirates (U. A. E.): The federation acquired six MM-40 Exocet-armed “TNC-45” patrol boats from Lurssen of West Germany during 1980-81. According to one report, the U. A. E. may have placed an additional order for six 54-meter gunboats. Also in service are six 140- ton Vosper Thornycroft gunboats. The Emirates also have approximately 50 small patrol boats of various descriptions.
Oman: A follow-on order was placed in early 1981 with Vosper Thornycroft (U. K.) for construction of two more 56-meter missile patrol boats. Together with the vessel already under construction, Dhofar, the 363-ton ships are to be known as the “Province”-class. Like Dhofar, the two additional boats will be armed with two triple MM-40 Exocet SSM launchers, a 76-mm. OTO Melara gun, and a twin 40-mm. Breda gun. Accommodations include space for trainee personnel, a possible tip-off that more orders for this design type may be placed in the future. Two of the six 37.5-meter British-built patrol boats now in service carry two MM- 40 Exocet missiles each.
Also delivered to the Omani Navy in May 1981 from Vosper Thornycroft (Singapore) were four 25-meter gunboats intended for surveillance duties in territorial waters, while a 30-meter ramped landing craft designed for transporting up to 100 tons of armored vehicles and general cargo, including fuel and water, was delivered by the same builder later in the year. Principal design criterion for the landing craft was that it must be able to beach in a strong surf and to operate along a coastline exposed to the Indian Ocean.
Progress is being made toward “Omanization" of the navy. All officers in the patrol boat squadron except for the commanding officers are reported to be Omanis. It is anticipated that sometime this year the first Omani will take command of a patrol boat.
The Omani Navy has been heavily involved in controlling shipping traffic patterns in the Strait of Hormuz since November 1979—a large demand on such a small force, but one met with considerable professionalism. Also operating a number of patrol and logistics patrol craft is the Omani Marine Police Force, which recently took delivery of patrol boats from Sweden (where an order has been placed for a second unit), the Netherlands, and Great Britain during 1981.
South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemem, PDRY): By objective standards, and relative to most other states in the Middle East, South Yemen has a small navy lacking in1' pressive capabilities. Its principal units are of Soviet origin and include six “Styx”-armed “Osa-II" patrol boats, four torpedo boats (two “P-6s^ and two “Mols,” two large “S.O.l ' class gunboats, two small “Zhuk"' class gunboats, one “PoIuchat”-class patrol boat, one 4,400-ton “RopU' cha”-class LST, four “Polnocny”' class LCTs, and one “T-58”-dasS fleet minesweeper which is configured as a corvette.
The South Yemen Navy is signifi' cant beyond its nominal capabilities, however, because of its geographical area of operations and relationship with the Soviet Navy. With hs “Osas” and torpedo boats, the South Yemen Navy poses a threat to ships which transit the Bab el-Mandeb Strait en route to and from the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal. Bab el- Mandeb, linking the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, is approximately 17 miIeS wide and 20 miles long and is split by the South Yemen-owned Perim Is' land, located in the Strait some three miles off the South Yemen coast- While most maritime traffic and all deep-draft vessels transit the Strait on
The Egyptian Navy's targe combatant force is composed of old ships which need replacement hut for which no reliefs are in sight. The navy’s small combatant force, however, is being updated by deliveries of the Ramadan- class (Khyber, pictured) and “October”-class missile boats.
G. ARRA
its western side between Perim Island ar|d the African coast, such passing Vessels are still vulnerable to FPB at- from the South Yemen side. enm provides a degree of cover for ast patrol boat operations and could serve as a location for fortified gun emplacements established and served bV South Yemen’s amphibious lift caPability. While a peacetime attack on fransiting vessels is highly unlikely, 11 is not without precedent. In 1971, an Israel-bound tanker was attacked °y bazooka fire from an island in the Strait, albeit by Palestinian Liberation yrganization operatives and from an ■sland other than Perim.
Control of Bab el-Mandeb in war- 'me would obviously be an advantage
0 strategic proportions. This helps ®xPlain the Soviet connection. The
®viet Union signed a 20-year treaty S friendship and cooperation with . °uth Yemen in 1979 and has moved lnt0 Aden in a big way. Naval service and repair facilities there, including submarine pens, have been upgraded aud expanded by the Soviets, who use bem to service their own fleet units °Perating in the Indian Ocean.
North Yemen (Yemen Arab Repith- lc' YAR): Though three times more Populous than South Yemen and also strategically located vis-a-vis the Bab ei~Mandeb Strait, North Yemen has a navy much smaller than that of °uth Yemen. None of its five regaining patrol boats is missile armed.
1 Wo of these boats are 60-ton ex-SoViet “Zhuk”-class gunboats. Three
b-ton patrol boats are of U. S. origin. Unlike South Yemen’s leadership, which has been firmly in the Soviet Camp for a number of years, the gov- Crnment of North Yemen has, with c°nsiderable success, steered a more neutralist course. The strategy has Paid off in terms of aid and military b9uipment from both the Soviet Union and the United States as the superpowers have competed for leverage in that strategic corner of the Arabian Peninsula. North Yemen’s tightrope act may soon yield additional and more modern naval vessels as it has already yielded tanks and aircraft from both East and West.
The political complexion of the North Yemen regime can change literally overnight, as it has several times through the instrument of assassination. Furthermore, discussions are on again between North and South Yemen over the possibility of a merger into one political unit next year’s review may address only the Yemen Navy—but don’t bet on it.
Jordan: It was officially stated in 1969 that Jordan has no navy as such, but maintains the Jordan Coastal Guard, sometimes known as the Jordan Sea Force. All of its six small patrol boats operate from Aqaba at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, which accesses the Red Sea.
During the Iraq-Iran War, King Hussein has authorized the landing at Aqaba of equipment for trans-shipment overland to the Iraqi forces.
North Africa .
Egypt: The assassination of President Anwar Sadat on 6 October 1981 immediately threw into question the future course of Egyptian foreign and defense policy. But both the declaratory policy and the actions of President Hosni Mubarak have evidenced a high degree of continuity with the slain leader’s general policy directions—at least over the short term. A long-planned joint military exercise, “Bright Star,” involving U. S. and Egyptian military forces, went ahead on schedule in November 1981 and reportedly included a U. S. Marine Corps landing force and supporting amphibious elements of the U. S. Sixth Fleet.
However, the status of two pending
U. S. requests remains uncertain. The United States, seeking improved access to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, had asked Egypt to allow nuclear-powered warships to pass through the Suez Canal under a set of safety provisions that U. S. submarines could meet but Soviet ships could not. Washington was also pressing Cairo to sign an agreement providing for U. S. use of a port and airfield at Ras Banas on Egypt’s Red Sea coast. President Sadat reportedly gave his personal, but verbal, assent to the second proposition during his visit to Washington in August 1981. Whether Sadat’s word will prove to be binding on Mubarak and whether the U. S. Congress, without some sort of written agreement, will allocate several hundred million dollars for improving the extant facilities at Ras Banas remain to be seen. Nor is the status of the Suez transit request clear at this writing.
Meanwhile, the Egyptian Navy has continued with its modest modernization program and slow transition from Soviet to Western doctrine and equipment. It remains by far the largest in the Arab world in numbers of ships and total tonnage. Its strength on paper is deceiving, however, because most of the ships are old and most are of Soviet origin and lacking in spare parts and proper servicing.
51
The nucleus of the fleet is represented, by four ex-Soviet “Skory”- class destroyers, one ex-British destroyer, and three ex-British frigates of the Black Swan, “River,” and “Hunt”-classes. All of the navy’s destroyers and frigates are 30 to 40 years old. Before the Camp David Accord, Egypt signed a letter of intent to buy two Lupo-dass frigates from Italy and approached the U. K. for purchase of second-hand Royal Navy vessels including a “County”-class guided missile destroyer. But withdrawal of
Saudi financial support put those orders in a state of permanent suspension until September 1981, when the two Lupos were again reported to have been ordered. Egyptian submarine assets now include six Soviet “Romeos” and six “Whiskeys,” at least some of which are thought to be non-operational. A proposed order for two French A^o.vt«-class subs has apparently been dropped for financial reasons, but one report indicates that China may transfer some “Romeos” to Egypt. Plans to transfer a U. S. Navy Tfl/jg-class submarine have been dropped.
It is only in the light forces sector of the navy that the modernization program is currently going forward. All six Ramadan-class missile patrol boats have now been launched by Vosper Thornycroft (U. K.), the last on 17 June 1981 at the company’s Portchester shipyard. The first Ramadan was actually accepted by the Egyptian Navy on 20 July and the second on 15 September 1981. The 312- ton Ramadans mount launchers for four Otomat missiles abaft the main superstructure, as well as a 76-mm. gun forward and a twin 40-mm. gun aft.
The light forces inventory also includes: 5 82-ton “October”-class missile-armed patrol boats with 3 additional hulls reportedly being built in Alexandria: 8 “Osa I” and 2 “Komar” missile boats; 6 “Shershen,” 20 “P-6,” and 4 “P-4” torpedo boats; 12 “S.0.1" gunboats; and an assortment of small patrol craft. Coastal defense is augmented by truck-mounted Otomat SSMs.
Egypt's sizeable amphibious force includes three “Polnocny”-class LCTs, 14 LCUs, and 10 LCMs. Mine warfare vessels number 12—all built in the Soviet Union.
Egypt is one of the growing number of Middle East navies now operating hovercraft, with three refurbished "SRN- 6s” already on duty and another 14 reportedly on order. The “SRN-6” is capable of laying up to four 500-pound ground mines—the first hovercraft so configured.
Though Egypt's is a “two-sea navy,” most of its assets (about four- fifths) remain in the Mediterranean. While the peace treaty with Israel has reduced the threat in that area, relations with Qaddafi’s Libya remain tense. Red Sea units can be rapidly reinforced if necessary through the
Suez Canal, for example, to bolster Egyptian support for the Sudanese Government. Sorties into the Indian Ocean are extremely rare.
Libya: It was the Libyan Air Force, not the navy, which gained notoriety during the past year with the Gulf of Sidra incident of 19 August 1981. Two Libyan “Su-22s” were shot down by twoF-14 Tomcats from the VSSNimitz (CVN-68) after one of the Libyan planes fired a heat-seeking “Atoll” missile at the Tomcats some 60 miles off the Libyan coast. The incident occurred during a fleet exercise in an area claimed by Libya as territorial waters—a claim unrecognized by the United States and unsanctioned by international law. It remains a mystery why the Libyan planes attacked, particularly under such unfavorable circumstances, but the incident is not without precedent. In September 1980, two Libyan aircraft reportedly fired on and missed an unarmed U. S. Air Force EC-130 in international airspace.
In a year of such sensational events, the Libyan Navy unobtrusively continued its acquisition of new fleet units, taking delivery in March 1981 of a fourth new Soviet “Foxtrot” submarine, Al Mitraqah. Two more “Foxtrots” are on order and building in Leningrad, while Libyan crews continue training in the Soviet Union. Soviet advisers, reportedly as many as a dozen in each boat, are still attached to Libya’s four operational “Foxtrots.” In October 1981, the first of a reported order for four Soviet “Nanuchka” -class missile corvettes, the Ain Mara, was delivered: this package is reported to also include two “Koni”-class export-model frigates.
The Libyan Navy was also authorized to receive three completed La Combattante-II - class missile patrol boats after the French Government had earlier blocked delivery in reaction to Libyan military operations in Chad. The Libyans pulled out of Chad last November under pressure from the Organization of African Unity as well as from France and other Western countries. The three La Combat- tante-Ih, armed with four Otomat SSMs and 76-mm. and 40-mm. guns, are the first of ten ordered from France in May 1977. Delivery of the other seven is expected this year.
Also received by the Libyans in recent months were two new Soviet- built “Natya”-class MSOs and the first two of nine ordered Turkish “C-107” -class LCTs. Upon delivery of all nine “C-107s,” the Libyan Navy will have a rather substantial amphibious lift capability with an inventory which already includes two 2.800-ton LSTs, three 1,050-ton Polish-built “Polnochny” - class LSMs, and a 3,100-ton roll-on/roll-off transport ship.
The Libyan Navy continues to carry on its inventory 1 Vosper Thornycroft multipurpose missile-armed frigate, 4 Otomat missile-armed corvettes, I older 500-ton gun-armed corvette, 12 ex-Soviet "Osa-II” missile boats, and 3 Vosper-built patrol boats mounting SS-I2 wire-guided SSMs.
Despite reports from dubious sources that the Libyans have placed orders for three French-designed Daphne -class submarines from Spain, none has been ordered. Nevertheless, the Libyans have continued to search for a non-Soviet submarine supplier: two miniature subs are said to have been ordered from Yugoslavia. Still pending is delivery of 14 “SAR-33” -class gunboats of German design under construction in Turkey; these will be operated by the customs service.
On paper, at least, the Libyan Navy has a formidable array of missilearmed platforms and considerable balance among surface, subsurface, and amphibious capabilities. One clear disadvantage, however, is the complicating mix of Soviet, British. French, West German, Italian, and Turkish hulls and weapon systems, which is bound to create tremendous logistical problems. Reports also indicate that the Libyan Navy suffers from a serious shortage of trained manpower in both operations and maintenance categories. Problems notwithstanding, the Libyan Navy represents a force to be reckoned with by neighboring states and by others who operate navies in the Mediterranean. When all units on order are delivered, there will be at least 34 antiship missile-armed craft in service.
Tunisia: Though situated between the much more powerful Algerian and Libyan navies, the Tunisian Navy has undertaken a few steps to modernize or expand its own modest capabilities. Maintenance of a low naval profile is consistent with the Tunisian foreign policy objective of non-provocation of its neighbors, particularly Libya. Its limited naval program may also be
explained by Tunisia’s long-term reliance on French protection when the going gets rough. France, for example, dispatched five warships to Tunisian waters in 1980 when the Libyan Government stirred up communal disorders in the Tunisian city of Gafsa.
Tunisia’s most capable naval units at present are two Vosper-Thorny- croft guided missile patrol boats, two Chinese-built “Shanghai IF’-class gunboats, and three “P-48’’-class large Patrol boats with eight wire-guided SS-12 SSMs. An ex-U. S. DER (classed a frigate by the Tunisians), two ex-U. S. coastal minesweepers, one 400-ton ex-German large patrol boat, ten small patrol boats, and a seagoing tug constitute the balance of the Tunisian fleet.
Late in 1981, financial arrange- nients through the French Government permitted the ordering of three 395-ton La Combattante-Ill missile boats to be armed with eight MM-40 Exocet missiles, one 76-mm. OTO Melara gun. a twin Breda 40-mm. gun- mount, and two twin Emerlec 30-mm. gunmounts. Their delivery will considerably enhance the Tunisian Navy’s overall capabilities, but will do little to rectify the relative imbalance with respect to neighboring fleets. Their delivery will considerably enhance the Tunisian Navy’s overall capabilities, but will do little to rectify the relative imbalance with respect to neighboring fleets.
Algeria: Algeria’s is a Soviet-built navy. With its most recent acquisitions—a “Koni”-class 1,900-ton frig- ute and two “Nanuchka IF’ -class missile corvettes—the Algerian Navy bas considerably enhanced its offensive punch. The 900-ton corvettes, though considerably smaller than the frigate, have more missile firepower: one SA-N-4 SAM launcher and four Styx” SSMs, compared with only °ne SA-N-4 system on the frigate. But the frigate does have more guns and an ASW capability.
Meanwhile, the Algerians continue possess nine “Osa-II" and three Osa-I” fast patrol boats with four Styx” missiles each and six “Komar” fast patrol boats mounting two ‘Styx” SSMs each. Six large gunboats, two ocean minesweepers, and °ne amphibious vessel—all of Soviet origin—comprise the balance of the Algerian inventory. The navy also has assigned to it in a maritime reconnaissance role an air force squadron of 11 Fokker F-27s. The Algerians intend to build four large missile boats in their own facilities at Mers-el-Ke- bir, and a contract was let to Vosper Thornycroft in late 1981 to design a gas turbine and diesel-powered craft of about 400-ton displacement for production there. Two medium landing ships, similar to Oman’s 2,000-ton Al Munassir, were ordered from Brooke Marine in Great Britain during 1981.
In addition to its naval assets, Algeria maintains a substantial coast guard, including 16 small gunboats of Italian construction (Baglietto), acquired in 1976 and 1977.
Morocco: Preoccupied with a six- year war against the independence- minded Polisario Front over control of the Western Sahara, Morocco’s King Hassan has spent much of his recent defense budgets on land and air forces. But the navy has not been overlooked, because Morocco has both an Atlantic and a Mediterranean coast to protect, as well as strained relations with two North African neighbors whose navies are growing: Algeria and Libya.
Spanish-built units were ordered in June 1977—a 1,479-ton Descubierta- class frigate and four 339-ton fast patrol boats of the Lazaga type. There have been reports that Morocco would like to purchase four more Des- cubiertas, but that is considered unlikely until the Western Sahara imbroglio is settled, and the first unit has yet to be delivered. The weapons complement for the frigate will include Sea Sparrow SAMs, SSMs (probably Exocet), one 76-mm. and two 40-mm. guns, one 375-mm. Bo- fors twin ASW rocket launcher, and six (two triple) Mk-32 torpedo tubes.
The Lazaga patrol boats are armed with four Exocet SSMs, one 76-mm. gun, and one 40-mm. gun.
Morocco’s remaining naval inventory is comprised of French-built units, all mounting guns but no missiles, including three large fast patrol boats, seven small fast patrol boats, two large patrol boats, and three small patrol boats. The Moroccan Navy also includes four amphibious warfare vessels and a marine infantry battalion of 600 men.
Eastern Mediterranean
Israel: According to a number of reports, future development of the Israeli Navy is likely to include a step up in the size of its next generation of surface vessels. State-owned Israeli Shipyards Ltd., Haifa, has designed an 850-ton corvette intended to have the speed and maneuverability of a large fast patrol boat, but an operational radius, survival capability, and weapons and electronics package which represent improvements over current fleet units. Meanwhile, the new 485-ton Saar-V missile boats continue to join the fleet with a total of six expected, and three already commissioned. The first two Saar-V (Ali- yah) -class units mount the same number of missile launchers as the smaller Saar-IV (Reshej) -class missile boats.
Israel continues to make improvements to the basic Saar boat design. The Saar V-class guided missile boat (Aliyah pictured) has a flight deck and a fixed hangar.
but feature a helicopter hangar and landing platform; only one 40-mm. antiaircraft gun can be carried, however. The third unit, the Romat, omits the helicopter facility but does have enhanced gun armament.
Israel carries eight Saar-lVs on its inventory after having transferred a second of the class, Chipana (ex- Keshet), to Chile in February 1981. Israel's Saar-IVs are armed with both Gabriel and Harpoon SSMs and with 76-mm., 20-mm., and 12.7-mm. guns. Six of this class have been built for the South African Navy, three in Israel and three at Durban. Six Saar- Ill s and six Sacir-IIs complete the list of large missile patrol boats, the original gun-armed Saar-Is having been reclassified as "IIs” when Gabriel missiles were installed. Augmenting the missile craft are 37 Dabiir-class small patrol boats mounting 20-mm. and machine guns.
Three ex-U.S. LSMs, an 1,150-ton German-built LSM, and six Israeli- built LCTs form the nucleus of an amphibious force which also includes two Sealand Mark-Ill hovercraft purchased in the U. K. The navy's submarine force consists of three IKL/ Vickers "Type-206" boats displacing 600 tons submerged. There are 300 naval commandos on the personnel rolls of the Israeli Navy.
In addition to the remaining Saar- Vs, there are two Flagstaff II hydrofoils and three Seascan marine reconnaissance aircraft on order. The three Seascans will bring the total inventory to seven, whereas the Flagstaff IIs are meant to be the first of 11. There are indications, however, that the Israelis may be having second thoughts about the U.S.-designed hydrofoils on both economic and operational grounds.The Shimrit, the prototype, built in the United States, failed to meet her design specifications during trials after launch in May 1981 and delivery has reportedly been rejected; the status of the second hull, built at Haifa, is uncertain.
During 1981, Israeli naval vessels on several occasions provided shore bombardment in support of Israeli ground and air attacks against suspected PLO bases in Lebanon. In the navy's other operational area, the Red Sea, one of its Saar-class missile boats ran aground on a Saudi reef in late September after losing her power. It reportedly took 62 hours to refloat the boat as Saudi forces looked on but held their fire.
The operational situation, particularly in the Red Sea, will change fundamentally for the Israeli Navy after military provisions of the Camp David Accord become fully effective in 1982. With the Sinai withdrawal, the length of coastline in Israeli hands along the Gulfs of Suez and Aqaba will shrink from 375 miles to 7.5 miles. The remaining Israeli base at Eilat will then be more than 150 miles from the Strait of Tiran and the open sea. Israel’s Mediterranean coastline will be shortened by about a third by withdrawal from the Sinai.
As of this writing, the fate of an Israeli-U. S. memorandum of understanding concerning strategic cooperation signed on 30 November 1981 was in doubt because of a strain in relations over Israel's formal and unilateral annexation of the captured Golan Heights area of Syria. The agreement included provisions for joint naval and air exercises in the eastern Mediterranean.
Lebanon: Lebanon’s small force of patrol boats includes one French- built, six “Aztec"’-class (Italian-built), and two “Tracker” -class (British- built) boats. The Lebanese also carry one ex-U. S. LCU on their inventory. As far as it is known, there have been no Lebanese naval craft involved in hostile action against Israeli coastal raids or any other intrusions during the past year.
Syria: The largest units in the Syrian Navy remain two ex-Soviet “Pe- tya-I” - class frigates, although according to one naval annual it is believed that Syria is in the market for additional frigates, perhaps of Western European construction. The Syrians have a relatively large number of missile boats—6 each of “Osa IIs,” “Osa Is,” and “Komars"—although their six “Komars” may be phasing out of service. Other Soviet-supplied hulls include eight "P-4" - class torpedo boats and four minesweepers.
It remains to be seen if the 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in October 1980 by Damascus and Moscow will improve the fortunes of the Syrian Navy as it has the army’s and air force's. Perhaps as a gesture to seal the new treaty, the Soviets, in July 1981, conducted practice landings of amphibious forces on the Syrian coast. The landings, first ever of Soviet troops in the Middle East, were part of a week of joint Soviet-Syrian maneuvers.
South Asia
India: New Delhi’s long odyssey toward development of a capability to domestically produce submarines took another turn in 1981. Although India acquired eight Soviet-built “Foxtrot" subs in the late Sixties and early Seventies, an indigenous submarine construction program was not initiated. The Desai regime of the late Seventies reportedly approached France, Holland, Italy, Sweden, and West Germany concerning purchase of a submarine and development of an Indian capability to locally construct additional boats. After narrowing the choices to either a Swedish or a West German boat. New Delhi apparently chose the West German design. But a recent report indicates that the Indians and Germans are still trying to come to terms on a final agreement. According to the report, a high-level German team was recently in New Delhi with a new proposal to build two “Type-209” submarines in West Germany and to arrange license-manufacture of the same boat at Bombay’s Mazagon Docks. The Indians were said to want to build two of the submarines themselves. Earlier talks between the two governments had apparently failed because of an Indian demand for written assurances that Germany would not suspend shipment of spare parts in the event of an “emergency.” Though the Germans reportedly are now ready to commit themselves in writing to an uninterrupted supply of spares, an Indian ministerial committee is said to have been investigating all aspects of the proposed contract.
While the Indians may well choose the Swedish package if the German deal falls through, there also exists the possibility that the Indians may return to their recent, almost exclusive, reliance on the Soviets for naval procurement. Such a move would be a setback to Western interests in weaning the Indians away from a heavy reliance on the Soviet Union, at least until the Indians' own naval construction facilities come more fully on stream.
The year 1981 did not see the delivery of the second of three 4,750-ton Soviet "Kashin"-class guided missile destroyers to join the Rajput, delivered in 1980; but the Rana reportedly had run trials, and the Ranjit is to follow in about a year. The Godvari, the first of three Indian-designed 3.600-
ton frigates, continued fitting out. and her sister, the Ganga, was launched during October; these steam-driven ships will carry a mix of Soviet and European-supplied armaments and sensors, and plans are progressing for a second series with gas turbine propulsion. The Vindhyagiri, the last of six progressively modified versions of the British Leander-class frigates, Was commissioned at Bombay in July. Plans are being prepared for an Indian-built carrier to replace the 37- year old Vikrant, and construction of missile corvettes in India is being studied. A number of auxiliaries are also being built, including a series of three large survey ships.
Meanwhile, the Indian Coast Guard continues to develop. Formally inaugurated after its authorization by the Indian Parliament in 1978, the coast guard’s first units were two frigates and five patrol boats transferred from the navy. Eventually all marine-associated responsibilities of the customs agency will become the sole responsibility of the coast guard, which functions under the Ministry of Defense but is budgeted by the Department of Revenue. Orders have been Placed with Mazagon Docks of Bombay and with Garden Reach of Calcutta, respectively, for three 1.600- ton cutters and for three 200-ton inshore patrol vessels. The cutters are being configured to carry an Alouette helicopter (with hangar). As the coast guard continues to grow, it will be increasingly capable of releasing the navy for “blue water” missions.
Pakistan: With continuing Soviet military action in Afghanistan, Pakistani defense planners have placed a higher priority on upgrading land and
air forces than on modernizing the navy. Four Chinese-built “Hoku”- class missile patrol boats were delivered during 1981. each armed with two Chinese versions of the “Styx” missile. The nucleus of the Pakistani Navy remains its submarine force of four Daphnes, two Agostas, and four midget subs, together with eight aging destroyers of U. S. and British construction. Two additional U. S. Gearing (FRAM I)-class destroyers remain to be transferred, while the tender Everglades (AD-24) was slated for transfer during 1982.
Always with a wary eye on India, Pakistan has in recent years reoriented its foreign policy toward an emphasis on friendly relations with Islamic states of the Middle East. New links with Persian Gulf states are proving to be mutually beneficial: Pakistan provides laborers, professionals, and military personnel to the Gulf states who end up sending much of their income home, thereby enhancing Pakistan s balance of payments position.
Pakistani commissioned naval officers and petty officers are becoming virtually indispensible to several of the nascent navies of the Gulf. It is likely that greater numbers of Pakistanis will serve in Gulf navies in the future as new naval vessels are delivered and the already critical manpower shortages in the area become even more acute.
Bangladesh: No major naval acquisitions were reported by Bangladesh in 1981—a year in which the state lost its president to assassination.
A dispute last year between Bangladesh and India apparently resulted in naval demonstrations by both coun-
As is the case with many of the world's navies, multiple sources for replacement parts tax the support capabilities of these navies. This photo of the Indian Navy’s 42-year-old exBritish cruiser Mysore and its new Soviet-supplied and missile-armed Vija Durg illustrate the problem.
tries. The uninhabited island of Moore in the estuary of the Haribhanga and Raimangal rivers at the boundary between the two countries was the object of conflicting claims of ownership. The island was occupied by Indian troops, who were reportedly subjected to harassment by three Bangladeshi gunboats. New Delhi, charging that the Bangladeshi boats were interfering with Indian shipping, sent unspecified “warships” to the area. There was no indication that the incident resulted in hostilities.
Sri Lanka: Three additional 44-ton coastal patrol craft have been completed by the Colombo Dockyard to complete a class of seven. They mount two 20-mm. guns and are capable of making 19 knots. Sri Lanka has reportedly applied for membership in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). If accepted, there may be ramifications for Sri Lanka’s defense planning since ASEAN is moving closer toward forming a loose defense alliance.
Mr. Dowdy is a professor of political science at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia.