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The “Inner Leadership” of West Germany’s Military
By Second Lieutenant Charles K. Dalgleish,
U. S. Marine Corps
. . . supervision may be lacking on the modern battlefield, and the soldier may have to lead himself, exercising great initiative.
German militarism appeared to have been incinerated in the firestorm that consumed the Third Reich in 1945. Not even their own countrymen ever again expected to hear the pounding of jackboots on the cobblestones. In the eyes of the world, the German Welirmaclit shared the guilt of the Nazi experience but, to many Germans, soldiers were often little better than criminals and treated as such. Some of those interned in the Soviet Union were not released until many years after the end of the war.
Beyond the loss of men, material, territory, and honor loomed yet another loss destined to become crucial in the dawn of the postwar years —leadership.
The end of the Welirmaclit in 1945 was soon followed by the political condemnation of Germany’s leaders at Nuremberg and the denazification and demilitarization programs of the Allies. The goal of the Allied powers at Potsdam was the total destruction of German militarism.
Yet, in ten years, the German military, like Lazarus, would rise from the dead in both East and West Germany.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Bundeswehr was fathered by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, whose Rhineland roots made him distrustful of the militaristic Prussians. The concept that would guide the Bundeswehr was called Innere Fiihrung or inner leadership, the reverse of the Welirmaclit style of leadership, Aiissere Fiihrung or external leadership. The basic Innere Fiihrung concept was molded in the ten-year interval between the end of World War II and the rearmament.
The inner leadership handbook (Handhuch Innere Fiihrung) outlines the leadership principles employed by Innere Fiihrung. Inner leadership places the majority of responsibility on the individual soldier, not on his chain of command. The premise is that every soldier, a citizen in uniform, should be a free thinker and know where his duty lies. Also, of equal importance, is the consideration that supervision may be lacking on the modern battlefield, and the soldier may have to lead himself, exercising great initiative. Historically, initiative has been a strong facet of the German Army, even under very authoritarian leadership. When the chain of command was broken, soldiers were still able to perform their duty.
In order to operate effectively, more than any other type of leadership. Innere Fiihrung requires a great deal of education. The Bundeswehr receives most of its short-term recruits through a national service obligation. Therefore, the Bundeswehr has large numbers of high-quality recruits coming in for service all the time. Particular emphasis is placed on providing the officers with professional education. In fact, a large percentage of senior officers have completed their doctoral studies.
The Bundeswehr stresses political education for the troops. The goal of this approach is to give the individual soldier a sense of direction. Loyalty is not necessarily to the German Government, but to the democratic ideals which the government represents and protects. German soldiers also learn about the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations; this helps to provide them with the ability to cope with the tremendous amount of Soviet propaganda that filters into West Germany. Soviet psychological warfare may be less effective if its targets are guided by a system of inner leadership.
The school for Innere Fiihrung is presently located in Koblenz. It educates German officers in modern military leadership. Most officers above the rank of major have attended the school which includes discussions of morality, military and international law, personnel leadership, and political education.
The commander is responsible for the effectiveness of Innere Fiihrung as a system in his unit. He is assisted by a personnel officer and an Innere Fiihrung officer.
The “Soldiers’ Law” is a unique document that guarantees rights to soldiers of the Bundeswehr. It ensures that the concept of Innere Fiihrung is
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Proceedings / February 1982
preserved. The “Soldiers’ Law” makes hazing, demoralization, and harassment of the German soldier illegal. A soldier who thinks his rights have been infringed on can lodge a complaint. This complaint is forwarded to a monitor outside the mil- •tary, who is a civilian in the defense establishment. Keeping in line with the citizen-in-uniform concept, the majority of legal cases involving soldiers are tried in civilian courts.
The Bundeswehr consists of more than 475,000 men. A large reserve is maintained because soldiers have an °hligation to continue in reserve status after active service. West German combat power is totally integrated mto the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) chain of command. The wartime performance of the Bundeswehr is yet to be seen; however, respect for it among other NATO countries is growing. If the West German police commandos’ raid to release hostages being held by terrorists at Mogadishu, Somalia, is any indication of the effectiveness °f German training methods, they Would probably be quite successful •n combat.
The study of German history is an important facet of Innere Fiihrung. German history provides examples and builds a case for the new style of leadership and its relationship to a democratic form of government. The German Army has historically been a pioneer in military organization. The Prussian General Staff, which later evolved into the German General Staff, was a very important component of German military successes. Though this institution no longer exists, its legacy remains. Its methods of military training, emphasizing selection, examination, specialized training, study of history, technical expertise, and analysjs, are as characteristic of the Bundeswehr as they were of the Wehrmacht.
Military historians have often attempted to discover the key to German military achievements. The German soldier was no more devoted, courageous, or gallant than the soldiers of many other countries. He did, however, serve in an organization that created both scholars and fighters. As probably one of history’s most tradition-minded armies, the Wehrmacht never succumbed to blindly following tradition to the extent of ignoring the present and future aspects of the art of war. The Soviet Army so admired the German General Staff that it adopted the Germans’ basic structure and methods.
The Bundeswehr is just as methodically organized as the Wehrmacht ever was. Initiative, which was a strength of the Wehrmacht, is emphasized even more in the Bundeswehr. This initiative, referred to as Auf- tragstaktik or mission tactics, is a doctrine which has the unit commander respond to a situation as it arises, without having to wait for orders from higher command levels.
There is a story that has served as inspiration for German soldiers for more than a century which applies today. Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia was berating a major for committing a tactical blunder. The major protested that he had only been obeying orders, to which the Prince replied, “His majesty made you a major because he believed you would know when not to obey his orders.” Thus, Innere Fiihrung would seem not to be a new idea, but a new implementation of an old and honored concept.
Pr
HARPOON.
By Lawrence L. Bond
A multiplayer game of surface, air, and subsurface combat with current weapons of the US, USSR, UK, PRC, and France. The rules and data are complete within one 8V2 by 11 inch, 64-page booklet. The game provides realistic tactical situations to be solved with measuring tapes, dice, miniature ships and any flat surface. The data is current to April, 1981, and the formulas needed to keep up to date are included. The game does not require special knowledge or experience.
Please send copies at $7.95 each.
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Adventoke ■ Vies.
1278 Selby Ave. No. 8 St. Paul, MN 55104
oceedings / February 1982
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