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"The Airborne Destroyer”
(See W. G. Marshall, pp. 27-34, March 1974
Proceedings)
Arthur E. Fajans—As the U. S. Navy’s 13th designated Naval Aviation Observer (Tactical Evaluator)—we were not called TACCOs then or even Naval Flight Officers for that matter—I feel obliged to respond to Lieutenant Marshall’s article from a perspective which is either warped by time or perhaps mellowed with age. Speaking from an era when the sophisticated equipment for solving "Julie” problems (explosive echo ranging) consisted of maneuvering board paper, a thumb tack, a shoe lace, a broken pencil, and, in my unfortunate case, the ever-present barf bag at the ready, I find some sympathy with the article’s description of the plight of the TACCO.
I say some sympathy, for Lieutenant Marshall goes too far in his canonization of the TACCO. If the article suggests that the TACCO should be professionally competent, a leader in his own right, imaginative, creative, and, above all, a contributing part of an effective P-3C ASW crew—these are the points on which there is agreement. However, to suggest that the TACCO "in his responsibility is as the mind to the body” is to exalt the TACCO’s role to the point of dooming the crew to the very mediocrity in performance the article seeks to remedy. The TACCO could be described just as easily as the kidney through which the impurities of ASW tactics flow. To carry the analogy to oblivion, a body can do with just one kidney, a kidney may be transplanted, and weak
kidneys, though aggravating may be tolerated by the rest of the body.
I cannot comment on the efficacy of the fleet ASW exercise data with which the article opens, for I do not have access to the information. But while the conclusions regarding ASW fleet air and surface performance can be considered credible generalizations—/.e., marginal comprehension of aggressor’s capabilities, general lack of ASW task force unit capability, and no comprehension of the dynamic elements in the search for a submarine—they can be misleading to the casual reader. What we don’t know was the objective of the exercise. Was it sea denial of a specific geographic area, protection of a convoy, protection of a landing force, prevention of a submarine missile launch, or maintenance of open sea lines of communication? Was the weather during the exercise favorable or unfavorable? What were the sonar conditions? What was aircraft availability; sonobuoy availability; equipment reliability? What was the training objective? What was gained in post-exercise critique?
All these questions aside, what really offends is the attempt to use these deleterious descriptions as a base for the aggrandizement of the TACCO. This demagoguery fortunately is revealed by the author himself when he quotes Kierkegaard’s observation about the college freshman justifying his indolence.
1 consider that the P-3C ASW system was not designed to minimize differences between crews but rather to make available a better technological standard, a superior point of departure from which ASW crews might seek to better their
performance. Technology cannot and should not supplant creative effort. Despite technological advances in the last decade, the ASW problem continues to be dynamic and just as melodramatic as the Hollywood confrontation between the wily sub skipper and the wizened merchant sea captain. No matter what technology has brought to ASW, the fact remains that you are still looking for a needle in a haystack. The success or failure of that patrol will depend not only on how your ASW crew team works together but also on how well the supporting elements of the entire team- maintenance, OPCON, tactical and technical schools, the sonobuoy manufacturer, lady luck, and the person or persons who made your breakfast that morning—perform. Lieutenant Marshall makes the point that "in ASW one cannot overcome technology with buoy placement or esprit de corps alone.” What he fails to realize is that you cannot interchange buoy placement and esprit de corps with technology or an omnipotent TACCO.
It saddens me to read of the frustration that career-minded TACCOs still face. But it is all too easy for middle
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.
managers to decry the lack of leadership and action "from the top” and fail to realize that action and leadership are necessary qualities at whatever level of management one finds himself. A coach requires leadership on his team to attain the performance he seeks. The responsibility for the team however, remains with the coach. (Must we continue in the military to use the sports analogy?) TACCOs have proven their value and necessity on the ASW team, yet they continue to leave the service in too large numbers, and this situation does require remedial action. A suitable career program is still lacking, and command opportunities are still too few. But I believe progress has been and will continue to be made in what I’m sure Lieutenant Marshall feels is the Navy’s inexorable way. Some statistics may be in order at this point to clarify. On 26 February 1970, Naval Flight Officers were authorized to take command of operational squadrons. Despite the fact that screening boards consisted of pilots (for they were the only ones who had had previous command), a significant number of NFO commanders have been screened for command. In year groups 55 through 61, the number of NFOs who screened for command was 5, 15, 21, 21, 19, 13, and 10, respectively—unthinkable a decade ago.
The article surfaces what must be by now the traditional professional schism between pilots and Naval Flight Officers, but I would suggest caution in trying to exacerbate that division. I prefer to believe that the Navy will reward those who perform no matter what
their specialty—at least to the extent that any large organization will do so. I can sympathize to a certain extent with the anguish of unrequited TACCOs but would leave them with this thought: in the dramatic arts, there are no small parts—only small actors.
Lieutenant Marc T. After, U. S. Naval Reserve— Lieutenant Marshall’s article could have been written about a surface destroyer with a change in applicable schools and requirements.
Today’s destroyers and destroyer escorts are experiencing a problem identical to the P-3 community’s. This includes a Tactical Action Officer (TAO) who should function just as aTACCO does in the P-3.
Unless a program similar to Lieutenant Marshall’s is developed for both P-3/TACCOs and surface destroyer/TAOs soon, the readiness of our Fleet will continue to decline. Then we will be a second-class power, no matter how many new ships are built.
Lieutenant Commander G. A. Wells, U. S. Navy, Naval War College— Lieutenant Marshall’s fine article on the selection, care, and feeding of the ASW tactical coordinator contains a curious dichotomy as regards the "Mission Commander Concept.” While the thrust of his article is to point out the importance of the TACCO to P-3 mission effectiveness, Marshall denounces the Mission
Commander as "a naive concept, one which is not applicable to the P-3. . . it has developed because, up to this point, the VP community has not adopted and believed in a meaningful concept of the functions of the P-3 crew members.”
The Mission Commander is a reality, not a concept; OPNAVINST 3710.7G delineates the Mission Commander’s command authority. The Mission Commander was the fruition of Naval Flight Officer community-wide efforts to enhance the position of the NFO and to grant legitimate authority and responsibility with its rewards and perils. This was thought to be superior to a system of implicit responsibility without explicit authority.
The ASW/TACCO, like all line officers, competes for command at sea. Mission Commander time is a measure of command experience rather than advisor experience. Potential squadron commanders need to have the weight of responsibility not on their mind, but on their shoulders. Mission Commander allows the TACCO to compete evenly against his pilot contemporary for a command position. Without a Mission Commander designator, the NFO would come up to his Aviation Command Screen Board with the disadvantage of having never commanded.
Mr. Marshall’s recommendations regarding promotion and pay for the ASW Tactical Coordinator imply a preferential treatment the TACCO does not need. The young TACCO does need to learn accountability and responsibility while having the opportunity to compete for promotion and command on a best- qualified basis.
Lieutenant Commander Al. R. Carpenter, U. S. Navy, P-3C Tactics Instructor, VP-30—Lieutenant Marshall’s comment concerning a TACCO unable to sleep the night prior to a mission because he felt that the success of the mission depended "on him alone” is absurd. A truly professional P-3 crewmember, whether officer or enlisted, realizes that his crew is only as strong as its weakest member. Each person is vital to the success of the mission. It will do no good for the TACCO to plan relevant tactics and then
85
Comment and Discussion
have the flight abort due to a Flight Engineer’s failure to properly secure a propeller oil filler cap after pre-flight. Lieutenant Marshall states that the amount of acoustic signal recognition training given TACCOs should be reduced or eliminated and that his should be a decision-making function. Surely he must realize that if his sensor station operators fail to evaluate data correctly, the entire mission must fail. The concept of the interdependence of each crewmember on the others is the foundation upon which any crew of any type aircraft is built.
The author’s contention concerning the need for stability of crews is certainly valid. One need only look as far as the 333 Squadron of the Norwegian Air Force—stationed at Andoya, Norway- flying P-3B aircraft to see the results of stable crews. These crews remain together for years, not months, and the results they achieve are impressive. With unlimited assets, our Navy would be able to significantly increase tour lengths for all personnel. However, the very process of elimination of all but the best flight crew personnel that Lieutenant Marshall supports, coupled with decreased inputs at the start of the pipeline due to the end of the draft and other factors, requires the frequent rotation of available talent. His desire for increased crew effectiveness would be better served by an attitude of doing the best we can with what we have rather than by proposing sweeping changes in policy, at least on the individual crew level. Type commanders are acutely aware of the limitations of available resources. What they need, on a daily basis, is the maximum utilization of what resources are available now.
The idea that the Mission Commander concept is naive seems strange, especially coming from a Naval Flight Officer. As I understand it, the Mission Commander concept is one way to evaluate a TACCO with regard to his mission effectiveness—which Lieutenant Marshall says is necessary. The Mission Commander concept is one that recognizes that the days of the pilot being the only person on a crew who possesses the intelligence, skill, and leadership qualities vital to the successful completion of a mission are forever gone. By the TACCO responsible for the
success or failure of a mission, a commanding officer has the very tool for evaluation Lieutenant Marshall desires. The Mission Commander does not have to be the TACCO in all cases. If the PPC is the more experienced and knowledga- ble ASW officer in the crew, he should be responsible for the results obtained. Seniority is now, and should continue to be, an important factor in determining responsibility. It would be hard to convince a squadron commanding officer who happens to be an NFO that he is not responsible for the success or failure of a particular mission flown by his crew, especially if the PPC is a first- tour Lt (j.g.). Lieutenant Marshall should be thankful that mission responsibility is now based on experience, knowledge, leadership, and seniority rather than the type wings worn by the officer.
The need for improvement in fleet exercises expressed in the article, is valid. Coordination of the various forces, as he stated, is the key. However, the ability of a crew to detect and localize an evasive U. S. nuclear submarine in close proximity to surface forces is not always equal to the same crew’s ability to do likewise with a foreign nuclear submarine in water isolated from surface generated noise. A U. S. nuclear submarine whose skipper makes a maximum effort to avoid detection will not be detected. This fact should be a source of satisfaction to all who are knowledga- ble in ASW. The ability of a crew to gain passive attack criteria on a loitering foreign nuclear submarine is a much more valid yardstick of crew effectiveness. The need for real-time tactical data by OPCONs has long been recognized. Witness the continuing development of the data link capabilities of both the P-3 and S-3. The very title of Lieutenant Marshall’s article is misleading. The P-3 is not now, and never will be, an airborne destroyer. Nor will the responsibilities of a P-3 Mission Commander ever equal those of a destroyer commanding officer, although there are some parallels. The P-3 is best suited for independent search, localization, and destruction of enemy submarines in open ocean, while the S-3 and destroyers are best suited for the same mission in proximity to high value surface forces.
The P-3’s prime target is the ballistic missile submarine, while the S-3 and
destroyer’s prime target is the attack submarine.
In summary, P-3 crew effectiveness would be better served by an appreciation of the actual mission of the aircraft, with emphasis on the training of personnel in that mission, rather than by recommending major changes in policy. Maximum use of available assets, both of material and personnel, is the key.
"The Lost Sheep: Our Navy in
the World of Good Intentions”
(See R. L. Schreadley, pp. 110-113, February
1974 Proceedings)
Lieutenant John F. Ebersole, U. S. Coast Guard— With the poor, the disadvantaged, and the black playing a larger and larger part in the new volunteer armed force, we must reconcile ourselves to the fact that these newcomers, with their problems of adjustment, lack of education and differing mores, will demand a much larger amount of our time as leaders and personnel managers than did the typical sailor of a few years ago.
Commander Schreadley believes that these "lost sheep” are "not worth the powder to blow them to hell.” I prefer to take the position of Vice Admiral R. E. Adamson, Deputy CNO, who recently stated that "the sailor is the most valuable and expensive part of the Navy.” I believe this valuable sailor (Navy and Coast Guard) is worth a great deal of "maintenance” effort. The military does not immediately junk a piece of equipment if it malfunctions. It works to correct the problem. This work continues until such time as it is shown that the repairs will cost more than the equipment is worth (sometimes we don’t even stop then). We can do no less for our personnel, especially during these times of acute manpower shortages. Guidance counseling and rehabilitation programs are the "repairs” we must offer.
I do agree with the commander’s opinion that the "new Navy,” like the "new Coast Guard,” is going to have trouble attracting and holding quality personnel. But, the fault lies more with Congress than the Armed Services in my estimation. Recent attacks on commissary and exchange privileges, Congressional abolishment of the Armed Forces Institute and its in-service educa-
tion programs, the House Appropriations Committee’s attacks on the Postgraduate School and the off-duty education tuition assistance program, and rumors of an unattractive new retirement program are demoralizing enough to those of us who are career military. These actions can do little to attract the good people needed or hold the good people we have. Congress must realize that it too has a responsibility in making the volunteer force idea work. In the meantime, we in the Service must strive to realize the full potentials of those we do recruit.
The "new Navy” under Admiral Zumwalt has not made an error "in catering to the transitory mores and morals of the 'now generation’.” Instead, it has evidenced a realization that it must compete for personnel in the "volunteer climate.” To do this it must have appeal to present day youth and the character of society as a whole. The Navy, to its credit, has been in the vanguard in designing a Service with youthful appeal.
We must respond to the dictates of
our society in matters of race relations as well. In 1948, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981 to bring about the desegregation of the Armed Forces. To accomplish this in the Navy, along with establishing an equal opportunity program, it has taken some ten other implementing directives over the years. This might indicate that there was indeed some heel-dragging going on, and that the CNO’s 1972 reading of the riot act, referred to by Schreadley, was in order.
The equal opportunity program has had its abuses to be sure, and Commander Schreadley is probably correct in calling for a review of present programs. However, with an increasing number of minority personnel entering the service, we cannot permit race relations programs to be shoved on to a back burner as some might wish. Continuous review and updating of these programs is needed to insure that they are fulfilling the needs of both the Service and the groups involved.
It is interesting to note that Commander Schreadley does not feel that the
extensive efforts he describes in behalf of race relations can "achieve racial harmony by changing attitudes ingrained through a lifetime.” Yet he contends that the relatively modest efforts of the Gay Liberation have "... removed much of the stigma attached to perversion, homosexuality . . . .”
I have witnessed racial harmony on board southern-based Coast Guard vessels with mixed crews. This harmony was achieved not because of any particular race program but because of a general commitment to equal opportunity on the part of the Service and society. This commitment is represented by these ongoing programs and, in my opinion, has had an effect on life-long prejudices.
Drug abuse, of course, has become a serious problem. There have been recent reports, for instance, that drug abuse has become so widespread among the Gls in Germany as to endanger the state of our military readiness in Europe. The Navy, Coast Guard, and other Services have also experienced serious drug problems.
International rivalries, headlined events, behind-the-scene machinations, and controversial personalities, such as Billy Mitchell, are all elements in the little-known drama which surrounded the rise of the aircraft carrier. TWO-BLOCK FOX is a thoroughly researched, highly readable account of the 18-year struggle which changed the shape of the world’s navies.
It is the customary view that during the 1920’s the Navy sought to bridge the gap between national commitment in the Pacific and the force necessary to underwrite that commitment by plunging single-mindedly into programs of cruiser construction and battleship modernization. Only in this way, it was thought, could a favorable strategic balance be restored.
The author, a retired naval officer and scholar, does not agree. He advances the view that by 1922 the U. S. strategic position in the Pacific had eroded to the point where it could not be corrected by conventional measures. Dr. Melhorn also holds that this state of affairs was recognized by a small, but far-sighted and influential group of naval officers who saw no remedy short of a revolutionary advance in weaponry and tactical concepts. Their solution—was the aircraft carrier.
1974. 192 Pages. Bibliography. Index.
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There are no easy solutions apparent.
Comment and Discussion 87
Commander Schreadley’s proposal of limiting the Navy’s efforts to "identification, prosecution, and expulsion” is no solution at all. His plan would have the Navy dumping its drug problem into the lap of the civilian community for others to solve.
We must take steps to identify and rehabilitate the drug abuser in the Service. As Commander Woolley and Lieutenant Commander Beecher pointed out in "Drug Abuse: Out in the Open” (November 1971 Proceedings), "There is no reason to believe that drug abuse in the Navy will decrease unless there are innovative rehabilitative efforts. . . .The Navy policy of mandatory processing for drug abuse has not been practical or effective. The expense of this program to the Navy (neither the Army nor Air Force has mandatory administrative processing for drug abuse) has been excessive.” In short, the Navy has already found that what Commander Schreadley is proposing doesn’t work.
The drug exemption program has been a first step in identifying the drug abuser who can benefit from rehabilitation. This program allows the member to come forward and identify himself as a drug user without fear of punitive action. The alternative to a voluntary program such as this would be to search out the abusers using an extensive detection system that would entail considerable cost, and the end result would be a compounded loss of manpower (the abusers and the detection personnel).
Commander Schreadley considers the Navy’s exemption program ineffective at best. I am in no position to say otherwise, but I can point to the fact that drug abuse grew as a problem in the Navy and Coast Guard during the period before the drug exemption program and the current interest in rehabilitation. Rather than encouraging experimental drug use, I suspect that these programs and the "Christian forgiveness,” which the commander disdains, offer our best options for the present.
In listing the personnel problems before us today, I am surprised that Commander Schreadley did not mention the subject of alcohol. Alcohol has perhaps led more of our sheep astray than drugs, yet I doubt that the commander
would have the Services "identify, prosecute and expel” all those who have a drinking problem. According to Woolley and Beecher, 86% of Navy personnel drink, and 34% drink frequently.
The heavy use of alcohol is known to be a factor in crimes of violence, lost productivity, absenteeism, and traffic accidents. Yet the clubs, package stores, and cocktail social functions continue to be a part of our life in the Service. We do not prosecute and expel the alcoholic serviceman, we attempt to rehabilitate. There would appear to be a degree of hypocrisy in a philosophy that has us "throwing out” the young pot smokers, but merely shaking our heads at the alcoholic CPO or lieutenant commander who spends his days in the club.
Not everyone can be rehabilitated; not everyone can be transformed into a productive member of the Service. There are those whom no amount of guidance and counselling can help, and there are those who will require a greater amount of effort than the Service can afford. However, we who are in positions of leadership, owe it to all our personnel and to our respective Services to work like hell to learn which of our "lost sheep” can be helped and which cannot. Many can be rehabilitated now, and with greater effort perhaps we can develop the methods to help an even greater number in the future.
Lieutenant (junior grade) Richard M. Hohlfeld, U. S. Naval Reserve—Those of us who are tasked with the implementation and administration of the Navy’s Race Relations Program do not, by and large, view this as an attempt to change the world. The isolated case of the facilitators with whom Commander Schreadley had contact is patently unfair, as any generalization runs the risk of being. I was touched by the statement of their individual backgrounds as minority group members within the American society. However, most of the people I have met who are actively engaged in the Human Resources "package” wish only to assist all Navy personnel in their personal assessment and understanding of other persons. We are fully cognizant that our task does not
involve attitude change per se; we are not equipped by education, experience or time allotted to even tackle this onerous role. What we do hope to accomplish—and I do not feel we are being Pollyannas in attempting this—is for all men to be treated as men. And the best way to relate to men as men is to have some basic knowledge of their hopes, fears, and frailties; some understanding of their personal environment.
The matter of drug abuse in the Navy is inherited from the larger society from which the Navy obtains its personnel. There was a time, not too far past and for which Commander Schreadley seems to mourn, when all drug abusers were summarily dismissed from the Service as soon as possible after identification. What is wrong with the Navy providing care and treatment for these men? If they can be rehabilitated and remain on duty the Navy benefits directly; if they can be rehabilitated and, at some later time they return to civilian life, the Navy benefits as well as the society at large.
There is a great difference between sacrificing the commonweal for total, unilateral commitment to the "sick” and showing "concern” for the "well” and the "sick” alike and attempting to redeem or cure the latter. I was not aware that we are a less than humanitarian country and that the Navy was exempt from any responsibility for its people. Additionally, by what measure are drug abusers "sick?” I do not have the professional qualifications to pass judgment on any man’s character strengths and weaknesses. I have an "agreement” with the psychologists/ psychiatrists: they don’t sail ships and I don’t "cure” behavioral disorders. It works extremely well.
Let us focus our attention on maintaining maximum operational readiness by providing, within established parameters, concern and care for our men. Whatever happened to the naval officer’s admonition, "Take care of your men!”? Ships will not run by themselves regardless of material condition. Trained, loyal, disciplined sailors will do better with marginal equipment than brand-new ships will do with demoralized sailors who realize that they do not "count” as men, especially those who have transgressed against the system.
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1974
"Operation End Sweep”
(See B. McCauley, pp. 18-25, March 1974
Proceedings)
Captain Charles G. Mcllwraith, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—As one of the planners for the clearance of mines in Japanese waters in 1945-46, Admiral McCauley’s description of the corresponding problem in Vietnam strikes a familiar note with me. However, the problem in Vietnam, despite foot-dragging and obstruction by the North Vietnamese, seems to have been quite simple and straightforward. The number of mines was known and relatively small, their sweep characteristics were well known, they were all fitted with sterilizers, and their locations were known within reasonable limits.
The Japanese clearance problem was quite different. The numbers were much larger, many had been so modified that their sweep characteristics could only be guessed at, some were laid without sterilizers and a considerable fraction were laid in positions reported as plus or minus ten miles. Incidentally, a number of the most highly classified types were recovered by the Japanese on a moun- taintop miles from salt water.
It should be axiomatic that planners of a mine campaign, expecting to win the war, should anticipate that they might have to sweep their own mines, and do it without losses. In the Vietnam case this was done; in Japan the prospect was ignored. However, Admiral McCauley notes that in 1973, as in 1946, the mine countermeasures force is being allowed to decay. It seems we cannot learn by hard experience.
"Let Pass Safely the Awa Maru”
(See R. T. Speer, pp. 69-76, April 1974, Proceedings)
Rear Admiral H. C. Bruton, U. S. Navy (Retired)— Commander Speer’s article regarding this most interesting and unusual incident is by far the most thoroughly researched, best written, and best balanced of the several accounts I have read. When Rear Admiral Voge’s article* appeared in the Proceedings in
* Richard G. Voge "Too Much Accuracy,” Proceed- ings, March 1950.
1950, I felt it was so incomplete and unbalanced that I prepared a draft of comments for submission to the Proceedings. But in view of Rear Admiral Voge’s sudden and untimely death soon thereafter, and the fact that Commander Loughlin was still on active duty and that my comments might possibly be harmful to his career, I remained silent at that time.
As Defense Counsel for Commander Loughlin at the General Court Martial following the sinking, I now believe I can appropriately add some additional information and explanation which may be of interest and value. In addition, I have a few comments on certain of Commander Speer’s statements. I write without notes or records, but I believe my memory to be sufficiently clear, even after the passage of almost thirty years, to make accurate remarks.
Commander Speer ably describes a "weird chain of events” preceding the sinking, "the absence of any one link could have prevented the incident from happening.” I would like to add a missing link, the presence of which might have caused Commander Loughlin to break off his attack. The attack took place in a dense fog and the Awa Maru, though brilliantly illuminated, was never seen by the Queenfish. The prescribed illumination, white crosses and previously reported track were intended to clearly identify the Awa Maru and her safe conduct status. The illumination and white crosses were worthless for this purpose in the existing conditions of visibility. What then could the Awa Maru have done to call attention to her special character? The most obvious action would have been to sound fog signals. All evidence brought out at the trial indicated clearly that she did not do so. If the Awa Maru had made fog signals they undoubtedly would have been heard by the Queenfish's bridge personnel less than a mile away. This alone very probably would have alerted the Queenfish's commanding officer that there was something strange about this target (for it was virtually unheard of for a ship proceeding alone on the high seas in wartime to sound fog signals), and might have caused him (or one of his officers) to recall one or more of the messages regarding the Awa Maru.
As regards Commander Speer’s state
ments concerning the tactics and conduct of the defense:
► Defense Counsel considered that the facts would not support a conviction on Charge II: Disobeying the Lawful Order of his Superior Officer; consequently, most effort was devoted to a defense to the remaining two charges.
► The Defense specified (admitted) that the warning messages concerning the Awa Maru had been received by the Queenfish. This was not a damaging admission since copies of these messages were in fact found in the Queenfish’s communications files; this evidence was well known to the prosecution and could readily have been introduced in open court.
► Commander Loughlin initially expressed a natural desire to take the stand in his own defense. Since, if he did so, he would be subjected to cross-examination which might bring out evidence harmful to his defense, particularly to Charge I, Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty, Counsel advised him not to voluntarily take the stand. Commander Loughlin had the good judgment to accept and abide by this advice. In view of his subsequent acquittal on all Specifications of Charge I, the wisdom of this advice of counsel was confirmed.
The author states, in referring to the court, "By finding Loughlin guilty, they cast a stigma not only on him but on the entire Submarine Force; whereas, by the lightness of the sentence, they had nullified their own finding.” Here Commander Speer and I part company. The court found Loughlin guilty of one specification of one charge because a majority of its members considered that the evidence produced at the trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of this specification and charge. The six distinguished officers who served on the court had a disagreeable task to perform, and they carried out this duty in accordance with their oath and their conscience. In imposing so lenient a sentence, they undoubtedly considered Commander Loughlin’s outstanding performance as a wartime submarine commanding officer and other evidence of his good character and fine Service reputation produced at the trial.
I do not know, but it could well be that
the members of the court were aware that in imposing so light a sentence, they were exposing themselves to possible censure by the convening and reviewing authorities, but they accepted this risk in the interest of overall justice and the morale of the submarine service.
Nor do I agree with Commander Speer that the conviction of Commander Loughlin cast a stigma on the entire submarine force. I rather feel that the trial and its result had a converse effect. The submarine service was not on trial before this court, nor was any attempt made by defense counsel to defend it at the trial. The overall performance of the submarine service in World War II was already so well known, so effective, and so vital to the success of the Navy, that its defense would have been a privilege and a pleasant, easy task, but such would not have been relevant at this trial.
Did Commander Loughlin have a fair trial? I am convinced that he did. Subsequent events proved that his conviction by the court did not hurt him professionally, for he was later selected for
captain and for flag rank. The sinking of the Awa Maru, although by mistake, cost the Japanese one of the largest merchant ships they had left, and her cargo of scarce war materials, critically needed in early 1945. In this respect, the sinking was a significant contribution to the war effort.
"Personality Disorders:
The Walking Wounded”
(See W. E. Piper, pp. 50-55, January 1974
Proceedings)
Captain Terrell T. Kelley, U. S. Marine Corps—As a Marine infantry company commander, a greatly disproportionate amount of my officers’, non-commissioned officers,’ and my own time is devoted to those Marines displaying "problem behavior.” These "ten percenters,” as the Corps refers to them, can quite literally bring the forward progress of a line company to a standstill by absorbing so much of the unit’s organic leadership resources.
This problem is far more serious than
is generally believed. Many young officers, bright-eyed, and hard-charging right out of the basic school, get burned out from doing psychological combat, day-in and day-out, with these problem Marines. It is also extremely difficult to develop good non-commissioned officers within this atmosphere, because the platoon commander is left with little or no time to devote to his "good Marines”—the other 90%. This is the real tragedy, because the vast majority of this group are motivated and do want to be Marines.
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The ubiquitous destroyer, the Navy’s maid of all work, is so familiar, so distinctive among small ships, that it is surprising how confusing are its origins. The idea behind its genesis was that it should meet the threat of the torpedo—which really began to look like a practical weapon of war in the 1860s. From the early idea of the torpedo boat destroyer, evolved the destroyer itself—soon armed with torpedoes and ultimately with 4-inch guns, making the destroyer a formidable ship with considerable range and endurance.
In those difficult years the Destroyer Service was born. The torpedo itself was perfected and grew in size; the unreliable locomotive boilers of the early days gave way to oil-firing and turbines; speeds rose as the “30-knotters” replaced the “27-knotters”; and the hard-lying money, paid because of the acute discomfort of the early destroyers, became a thing of the past. These were the proud forebears of a long series of successful destroyers and their rakish lines, so dashing in the first years of the century, are still recognizable in the modern destroyer of today.
176 Pages. Illustrated. Appendices.
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Comment and Discussion 89
Thus, even the simplest military evolution can easily become a catastrophe when the officers’/non-commissioned officers’ time can be so totally consumed with the problems of so few. Every minute detail, from personal hygiene to clean and serviceable weapons, must be checked, double-checked, and checked again to ensure that the troublesome few are properly turned out. Rather than concentrating on unit tactics, the commander finds himself forced to concentrate upon keeping his pas- si ve/aggressives, etc., in line. This, obvi-
ously, impacts directly upon combat readiness.
It is in the light of all this that Lieutenant Piper’s article is so valuable. Upon initially reading it, I subconsciously found the names and faces of my "ten per centers” popping into focus. (I am certain other commanders experienced the same, or a similar sensation). The lieutenant performed a great service by translating the clinical psychological jargon into "nuts and bolts” terms the company gunnery sergeant can understand, and by listing valid, common sense approaches to handling the "problem” individuals with a minimum investment of time and frustration.
"Some Heretical Thoughts on a Sea Control Weapon System”
(See J. W. Stephan, Jr., p. 93, March 1974; and A. W. Sear, Jr., pp. 114-116, August 1973 Proceedings)
A. W. Sear, Jr.— Mr. Stephan advanced two principal objections to my recommendation for a cruiser-size warship
deploying remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) as an alternative sea control ship:
► Such a ship would not fit a 15,000-ton hull and would be as costly as the ship she would replace, and
► It would be better to use a number of smaller, less-specialized ships rather than a single, large, multipurpose ship.
Let me begin by saying that, were I to have written my paper on the "heretical” sea control ship today, I would opt for nuclear propulsion rather than fossil fuels. One consequence of the Yom Kippur war and its aftermath has been a re-thinking of the economics and limitations of oil-burning warships. I suspect that a cost-effectiveness study of a nuclear-powered versus (say) a gas- turbine-powered frigate over a 10-year operational period, taking into account the new costs of fossil fuels, will be decisively in favor of nuclear propulsion without taking into account the operational advantages of nuclear power (e.g., the ability to deploy from home port to the theater of operations at high speed). It seems to me that for the
United States to consider the further construction of naval ships of greater than 2,000 tons displacement that are not nuclear propelled is short-sighted, dangerous, and (in the long run) is sure to be wasteful.
However, to return to Mr. Stephan’s objections:
► It is possible that the 15,000-ton displacement I suggested was too small, but even if a larger ship were necessary to carry out the sea-control mission, the RPV-deploying cruiser would still be cheaper as a system because of the greater expense of high-performance man-carrying aircraft as weapon delivery systems, as well as the expense of the sea-control ship and her consort of escorts compared to a single cruiser-size RPV-carrier.
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► For certain types of operations, a relatively large ship is necessary as a platform to carry out the mission. (In passing, please note that the carrier-type sea control ship has grown to be a 25,000-ton ship.) If you disperse various functions of the RPV-missile system (RPV launching and recovery to a frigate-size warship, and the weapons
Comment and Discussion 91
delivery system to other ships), you have not gained much in the way of survivability. If the missile launcher is sunk, the RPV-carrier ceases to be effective as a weapons system; similarly, a carrier task force without a carrier becomes a collection of small, relatively impotent ASW and AAW specialist ships.
Perhaps it is better to assume that, during a war, ships will be lost (after all, all warships are expendable under some conditions), and that putting your eggs in many little baskets may inhibit you from even being able to deliver enough "eggs” to be effective.
Mr. Stephan’s letter touched on another point. He expressed concern that the proposed RPV-cruiser sea control ship would be restricted in effectiveness, mentioning (among other things) the expansion of habitability requirements over the years. The way to lick the habitability problem in the long run is to automate and reduce the size of the crew. In the short run, we may have to reduce our sacrifices to the fetish of habitability, and think more in terms of fighting ability. The amount of punch the Soviet naval designers have packed into a small hull [as evidenced by the 10,000-ton Kara-class light cruiser described by E. C. Fisher, Jr. (on pp. 116-118) in the issue in which Mr. Stephan’s letter appeared] indicates that our possible future adversaries are thinking more in terms of fighting ability than comfort. No ship is comfortable when filled with water, a condition which is all too likely to prevail postcombat on many of the lightly armed, highly habitable cream puffs we have been building in recent years.
The Unrestricted Line PhD:
An Assessment”
(See N. E. Hoehlcr, III, pp 108-110,
February 1974 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J Deex, U. S. Air Force—Commander Hoehler’s Professional Note on the Navy use of Ph.D.s struck a familiar note to Air Force ears. The Officer Development Division of the Military Personnel Center at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, recognizing the holders of doctorates to be a "valuable resource,” expressed a
"vital . . . concern . . . with the effective utilization of [these] talents.” Project Ph.D. was organized in 1968 to insure that Ph.D. positions were precisely identified and effectively manned while affording Air Force officer holders of doctorates more definitive information about future positions and what they could expect in terms of career development.
After an enthusiastic and promising beginning, Project Ph.D.—without fanfare—was disbanded and Air Force officers holding doctorates were relegated to inauspicious status. The Air Force has, since then, met the philosophical and practical problems posed by Commander Hoehler squarely by the simple expedient of failing to promote this "valuable resource,” thus forcing Air Force Ph.D.s into the civilian sector of the military-industrial complex where their talents are bought at a very dear price by defense dollars.
"The Mothball Fleet is Obsolete”
(See R. Mark Heilinday, February 1974 Proceedings, pp. 87-88)
Robert Bartell—Today’s mothball fleet cannot increase the Navy’s strength to any great extent. Of the ten reserve fleet aircraft carriers, six are on the disposal list, with the remainder to follow shortly. Without carriers, the mothball fleet has little offensive capability; it can only provide additional escorts for the already-active task forces.
Because of the ultimate disposal of the inactive CVA/CVS type ships, a sort of "domino effect” develops. There will be practically no large ships left for the decommissioned cruiser and destroyer types to escort, assuming that the active-fleet carriers are already adequately protected.
The next "domino” to fall would be the auxiliaries in the reserve fleet. If there were fewer destroyers in mothballs, there would be less need for extra destroyer tenders and repair ships. This sort of reasoning would also apply to the submarine tenders and other repair and maintenance ships now in mothballs.
All in all, the Navy could raise per
haps $25 million from selling the present inactive ships for scrap value and closing down the inactive fleet maintenance facilities. But the economic advantages of scrapping the mothball fleet are somewhat less important than the long-term benefits the Navy could get by not maintaining an inactive fleet as a crutch to use in emergencies. The active Navy would have to be larger and stronger because there would be no "spare” ships tucked away for possible wartime use. But a larger Navy with no reserve fleet would be definitely superior to the present fleet system, since a quick (less than the time it takes to reactivate mothballed ships), devastating war is much more likely than a long war similar to World War II.
Another advantage in not keeping a Reserve Fleet can be attributed to the fleet’s constant misuse since the end of World War II. The Navy is now in an embarrassing predicament because of the pressing (and expensive) need to replace its large number of over-age warships. There were those, as we shall see, who foresaw this "block obsolescence” problem as soon as World War II ended. The logical cure to the problem would have been to build a few new ships every year to gradually replace the war-built vessels on a one-to-one basis before they all became completely obsolete or worn out. This method of ship replacement was demonstrated successfully with the submarine fleet. But with other ship types, especially the destroyers, the Navy chose the cheaper alternative of modernizing and/or recommissioning many of its inactive ships to replace the aging active fleet ships—of the same vintage as their replacements—rather than building new warships. This false economy has caused today’s—and probably tomorrow’s—Navy to be inferior in both quantity and in general wear-and- tear to the Navy of any year since about 1935.
The Navy should have seen this block obsolescence problem many years ago, and it should have known that the modernization conversions of the 1950s and 1960s would only delay dealing with this problem. The Navy can no longer count on the Mothball Fleet to provide suitable hulls to replace the weary active fleet ships. They are too old for that.
The failure of the U. S. Navy to come
92
to grips with the realities of the approaching block obsolescence of its ships is based to a large extent on the strong desire to maintain a Reserve Fleet. This desire is not new; nor is opposition to it. In August 1947, Rear Admiral Henry Williams wrote in this same "Comment and Discussion” section:
Each war we have waged has found the Navy with outmoded ships of the previous war, which for lack of better ones it was forced to use. During the war with Spain, Civil War monitors . . . were placed in service for coast defense.
World War I found us with ships in active service antedating the Spanish War. Numbers of old small destroyers were fitted out and commisioned, some for overseas service.
World War II found our Navy to a considerable extent dependent for operations on ships built prior to and during World War I. These ships, particularly the destroyers, rendered invaluable service, for lack of better ones.
The availability of old ships in reserve unquestionably has discouraged the construction of new ships for the Navy.
It is impossible to say how many ships were not built or planned because of the existence of the large Reserve Fleet.
Finally, once again quoting Admiral Williams, "Unfortunately there can be no method of preventing obsolescence, and an obsolete man-of-war ... is good only for bluffing purposes.” It is unfortunate that the foresight of Admiral Williams has gone unheeded.
"Don’t Fall in the Radar Hole”
(5« R. C. Sherar and J. Rosenthal, pp. 55-66, December 1973 Proceedings)
Commander John Monsarrat, U. S. Naval Reserve {Retired)—The authors correctly observe that the importance of refraction was recognized as early as World War II. Had they wished to do so, they might have gone on to cite a number of World War II radar problems which have their counterparts today.
► Abnormally long ranges: In 1943, many new ships were transiting the Panama Canal and heading up the West Coast prior to joining the Pacific Fleet. Several reported surface-search radar ranges which were unaccountably long—up to 10 times longer than the normal maxi
mum. These generally occurred off the Guatemalan or Mexican coasts, and may well be explained, as the authors suggest, by the seaward flow of dry air, as in the case of the Santa Ana winds of Southern California.
On 19 June 1944, hours after the massive Japanese air attack on the fast carrier task force had been crushed off the Marianas, the light carrier Langley (CVL-27) detected what appeared to be a large bogey at a distance of 150 miles, a full 50 miles farther away than any previous target it had ever discerned. As the Combat Air Patrol was vectored out to intercept, general quarters was sounded throughout the force and additional fighters launched. The interception was completed at a distance of 75 miles from the task force, and the bogey proved to be a single, multi-engined enemy airplane. No explanation for the range of the initial contact or for its consistent appearance as a large group of planes was ever apparent.
In April of 1945, the Langley was again able to detect, track, and relay plots on an enemy raid off Okinawa at a range of 135 miles when the raid did not appear on the screens of ships nearly 50 miles closer on its line of bearing. On the basis of the relayed plots, this raid also was successfully intercepted.
► Ghosts: During the preinvasion strikes on Okinawa in early 1945, there was a persistent and often recurring ghost less than a hundred miles southeast of the island. It was sighted by the radarmen on many different ships and was often investigated to no avail by the Combat Air Patrols of the carriers. While it was a clear indication on the PPI, its outlines
were somewhat fuzzy, and it seemed sometimes to be slowly moving and at other times stationary. The fighter directors ultimately dubbed it "The Galloping Ghost of Nansei Shoto.”
► Radar Holes: While the holes discussed in the article are presumed to be atmospherically induced, the air-search radars of World War II had holes of their own, attributable to the characteristics of the sets themselves. These holes in their patterns of detection were called nulls, and each set had its own theoretical pattern of nulls in which a target in level flight simply disappeared for lengths of time which varied with its altitude as well as with its speed. While this caused the same kinds of problems as are encountered with the holes today, it could also be used to advantage in determining the target’s altitude. Before height-finding radar was issued to the Fleet, there were really only two clues to the altitude of a long-range target: the range at which it was first acquired (the longer, the higher), and its pattern of fading and reappearing as it crossed the radar’s nulls. With the SC and SK sets then in use, it was possible to construct a "Fade Chart” showing the shape of the nulls at various altitudes, based on the theoretical performance of the set. If this rather crude chart were then corrected by long and patient observation of planes flying at known heights from sea level up to their operational ceilings, and from the ship out to the radar horizon, a fairly accurate estimate of a target’s altitude could be made by comparing its track with the empirically corrected chart. A few ships became so expert at this procedure that their esti-
mates were very close to those of the first ships to receive height-finding radar.
► Variation among ships: It was only natural that there should have been a wide variation in the effectiveness of the radar operations on different ships of the same class in World War II. Radar officers were trained by different instructors at different schools: St. Simon’s on the East Coast and Camp Catlin in the Pacific. Radarmen, too, received elementary training at different points in the shore establishment, and many were trained almost entirely at sea. In extended operations, such as those of the fast carrier task force, there was often more than a year’s difference in the time since two ships of the same class had had any yard time at all, much less a major overhaul and modernization.
But other variations were more difficult to explain. Why, for example, were the radars on the CVLs so often able to outperform those on the larger CVs? Both in range of initial acquisition and in continuity of track, CVLs such as the
Langley, Princeton, and Cabot often were superior to their bigger sisters of the Essex class operating in the same task groups. Perhaps there was no logical explanation.
Perhaps, even today, with all the sophistication of the modern gear, a highly motivated, good little man may occasionally beat a good big man!
"The All-Volunteer Army:
Too High a Price?”
(See R. H. Kohn, pp. 35-42, March 1974 Proceedings)
Raymond A. Young—Professor Kohn’s article neglects to mention that— contrary to his quotations of President Nixon and Admiral Zumwalt—the United States also had a draftless period from late 1949 until July 1950. While the Selective Service Act of 1948 remained on the books, the Army not only did not draft in early 1950, but released selectees by February.
On the eve of the Korean conflict, the Army was at the volunteer force
stage, with a total strength of 591,487, or almost 40,000 less than authorized strength. Even before that, desire to cut costs had led to deactivation of one of the five U. S. divisions in the Far East, following the end of the postwar occupation of Korea.
Dr. Kohn also tends to oversimplify in his critique of the draft ("unfair . . . tax upon the young . . . until the lottery young men lived for five or seven years in limbo. . . .”) The draft became notoriously unpopular with youth mainly as a result of the Vietnam war— particularly as the conflict dragged along with no apparent resolution possible. Until then, it was generally accepted as a fact of life in the relatively peaceful years from 1954 to I960. Even during the early years of the Vietnam involvement, most college students (except the hopeless cases who flunked out) were exempt until graduation. For years, marriage was tantamount to deferment, and the individual who reached age 26 without being drafted was henceforth free of worry.
(Please use book order form in Professional Reading section) A Naval Institute Book Selection
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Comment and Discussion 93
A point that deserves more attention
These selected books are available at special prices to Naval Institute members only, through September 15. Only orders postmarked on or before that date will qualify for the special reductions. Offered at 50% off the list price, this special sale collection is representative of the wide variety of fine texts, histories, reference works and biographies published by the Press.
Whatever your interests, there’s a book here for you! Need an apt quotation? Choose from hundreds in the Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations. (Example: “If any of us are virtuous 51 per cent of the time in life, it’s a good record, and in politics an amazing record.”—Arthur Sylvester.) Need to check an important date? Fuzzy on a fact or name? The Almanac of Naval Facts is sure to have it. (Example: December 1910—First naval aviator, Lt. T. G. Ellyson, ordered to flight training.) Are you interested in back-packing or hiking? How to Survive on Land and Sea has answers and advice for the outdoorsman. (Example: Rappelling lS a technique of using the friction of a rope against the body in making a steep or vertical descent. If you’re too weak to climb down a rope, you can still rappell down, rest on the way, and save the rope for future use.) Or do you want a significant book, but one so elegant that it demands a place on the coffee table and not on the bookshelf? The Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy, lavishly produced in two-colors throughout and illustrated with four color plates, is a triumph of the book-maker’s art. Or if you want the finest available reference book of its type, Weyer’s Warships of the \Vod(t 1973 with its fleet lists, copious drawings and photograph is a rare buy at $15.00.
a Ait in:
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This special, once a year event offers a unique opportunity to add to your personal library, but remember, supplies are limited, so order now!
Please send me the books I have checked:
□ ABOARD THE USS MONITOR: 1862
By William F. Keeler
□ ALMANAC OF NAVAL FACTS
By Arnold S. Lott
□ AMERICAN VOYAGES TO THE ORIENT
By Charles Oscar Paullin
□ AMERIKA SAMOA: A History of American Samoa and its United States Naval Administration
By J. A. C. Gray
□ BATHYMETRIC NAVIGATION
By Philip M. Cohen
□ BENJAMIN FRANKLIN ISHERWOOD, NAVAL ENGINEER: The Years as Engineer in Chief, 1861-1869
By Edward W. Sloan, III
□ COMMAND AT SEA
By Harley F. Cope. Revised by Howard Bucknell, III
□ COMMODORE JOHN RODGERS, 1773-1838
By Charles Oscar Paullin
□ DER SEEKRIEG: The German Navy’s Story, 1939-1945
By Friedrich Ruge
□ DESTINATION CORREGIDOR
By Robert L. Underbrink
□ DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND NAVAL QUOTATIONS
Compiled and edited by Robert D. Heinl, Jr.
□ DICTIONARY OF NAVAL ABBREVIATIONS
Compiled and edited by Bill Wedertz
□ EDWARD PREBLE: A Naval Biography
By Christopher McKee
□ FROM THE FRESH WATER NAVY: 1861-64
By John D. Milligan
□ FUNDAMENTALS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
Prepared by Roger A. Garrett and J. Phillip London
□ GARDE D’HAITI, 1915-1934: Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the United States Marine Corps
Compiled by J. H. McCrocklin
□ GREEK AND ROMAN NAVAL WARFARE
By William Ledyard Rodgers
□ GUNBOATS DOWN THE MISSISSIPPI
By John D. Milligan
□ HOW TO SURVIVE ON LAND AND SEA
By Frank C. Craighead, Jr. and John J. Craighead
□ THE HUNTERS AND THE HUNTED
By Aldo Cocchia
□ THE IMPERIAL AND ROYAL AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY
By A. E. Sokol
□ THE ITALIAN NAVY IN WORLD WAR II
By Marc’Antonio Bragadin
□ JOHN ROACH, MARITIME ENTREPRENEUR:
The Years as Naval Contractor, 1862-1886
By Leonard A. Swann, Jr.
□ THE LANDINQ AT VERACRUZ: 1914
By Jack Sweetman
□ MARINE FOULING AND ITS PREVENTION
Prepared by Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
□ MARINE HOVERCRAFT TECHNOLOGY
By R. L. Trillo
□ NAVAL AND MARITIME CHRONOLOGY
□ NOTHING TOO DARING: A Biography of Commodore David Porter, 1780-1843
By David F. Long
□ OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTRUMENTATION
By Jerome Williams
□ OPTICAL PROPERTIES OF THE SEA
By Jerome Williams
□ POLAR OPERATIONS
By Edwin A. MacDonald
□ REAR ADMIRAL JOHN RODGERS, 1812-1882
By Robert E. Johnson [ | SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice By Robert Waring Herrick
□ SURFBOATS AND HORSE MARINES
By K. Jack Bauer
□ WEYER’S WARSHIPS OF THE WORLD 1973
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Compiled by Gerhard Albrecht
is Dr. Kohn’s comment about a shrinking reserve force. The principal influx of men into the Army in the early summer of 1950 was in the form of individual inactive reservists—men not members of units—called up as fillers for regular Army outfits in the crucial period before selectees could be trained. Morale of those men tended to be low. All that this writer met were bitter about being called from civilian life while most of the National Guard and organized reservists in units, drawing drill pay, stayed home. However, in the year that most served (to mid-1951 before being released), they did their jobs well until enough Korean conflict draftees were available to replace them.
Should another Korea-type emergency develop, lack of a similar reserve would create the politically unpalatable need to federalize the National Guard on a large scale.
Another oversimplification occurs in the statement that "only in World War II and the Cold War has [the draft] actually been able to function effectively.” If this is so, how was the bulk of America’s World War I Army raised, if not by Selective Service or draft- encouraged enlistments?
Similarly, the fact that "the government fought pitched battles with evaders in some parts of the South and Appalachia” should be considered in light of the peculiar characteristics of certain remote areas, rather than as typical of the entire country. Considering that registration for the World War I draft extended to all citizens from 18 to 45, that many of those eligible were aliens (many not understanding English), and that Selective Service was a brand-new concept to those living in 1917, the fact that 150,000 refused to register reflects a remarkable acceptance of conscription.
It is true that the draft did not immediately produce a large Army in World War I, but this was due to lack of existing facilities in which to train selectees. Hence, drafting did not get underway on a large scale until late 1917 and 1918. By the fall of 1918, at a time when it was expected the war would last until 1920, Selective Service was made the only means of obtaining manpower for the Army.
Dr. Kohn’s questioning about the viability of an all-volunteer army in an
affluent society is well taken. But the argument would have been better with fewer cliches derived from the "Hell-no- we-won’t-go” fringe.
Finally, I was somewhat amused by the professor’s story about the recruit who couldn’t do 25 pushups because he couldn’t count above 17. He attributes it to a Rutgers grad student who served in Kentucky, but I think it is apocryphal. I first heard the story, told as a joke, in 1949, during basic training; and again three years later in Korea. My first source claimed he heard it in World War II. Maybe things are looking up. In the versions I heard, the recruit couldn’t count above 12.
"Communications and
Command Prerogative”
(See D. J. Marshall pp. 28-33, January 1974
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander J. S. Hurlburt, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Marshall has raised two issues that must be faced and resolved in the near term. First, technology exists that would enable a commander to control not only Fleets but individual units from afar. Second, historically we have insisted on using the technology available regardless of its consequences. His point that this could lead to a derogation of the desirability of command as a professional goal is well taken. However, it strikes me that there exists within these two issues a greater danger to the nation as a whole— that is the removal of a "reviewing authority” from the aftermath of the action. In other words, if the action is initiated and/or controlled from the highest level of government then the whole country must live with the repercussions. There is no room left for diplomatic or political maneuver, no opportunity to respond to world reaction, no opportunity to adjust direction without national embarrassment. This problem began to emerge with some clarity as the Vietnam conflict progressed. As it became common knowledge that the White House was closely directing the war, in some instances down as far as the tactical level, then each escalation of the conflict became a national commitment rather than a military operation. Thus, national pres
tige was put on the line instead of the military commanders’ judgment and ability, resulting in a tightening of the Gordian knot and insuring the inexorability of escalation.
Traditionally, the prestige and authority of the military commander has derived from the responsibility of his position. Individual initiative and action were desired and required, but always with the knowledge that the commander would be held accountable for his actions. It was this accountability that provided the national leaders room for maneuver if things went awry. In the worst case they were afforded an "out” in the form of disciplinary action for "exceeding his authority.” Certainly no military commander relishes the prospect of becoming a "scapegoat;” yet his availability for such a role provided the national leader with considerable flexibility in crisis management. But where is the flexibility when the action is controlled from Washington? It doesn’t exist, and this may yet be the greatest disadvantage to real-time communications.
There is little question that the need for such a capability exists for the tactical control of forces, for strategic control of nuclear weapons, and for the battlefield commander to keep his seniors informed. However, there exists an equally pressing need for the development and implementation of a doctrine for the use of this capability which returns initiative to the military commander not just for his own morale but for the good of the nation.
"A Look at the Nikolaev”
(See E. C. Fisher, pp. 116-118, March 1974
Proceedings)
Edward C. Fisher, Jr., Editor, Warship International—In re-checking the information in my earlier article, I have discovered some possible errors. The excellent Italian journal Aviazone E Marina stated that the Karas carried the SS-N-9 missile. I find that Jane’s Fighting Ships, Flottes de Combat, etc. state SS-N-io. 1 also tend now to agree with them, as the SS-N-9 appears on the small Soviet Nanuchka missile boats. The SS-N-io is found on the Kresta II and Krivak.
There is also some question whether
(he Nikolaev mounts 30-mm. guns or Gatling guns. I would tend to stick "'ith my description of these guns as Wing of a rapid, automatic 30-mm. type. There is, of course, a good possibility !hat the Soviets have developed a "Gatling” system along the lines of our own Tulcan/Phalanx which is going to be Eventually mounted on our new bD-963 class multi-purpose destroyers.
£ W. Hanson—The excellent Siegfried Breyer line drawing of the Nikolaev on Page 118 purports to be reproduced to ':500 scale. Not bloody likely. Judging from the dimensions of features in the ship which have appeared in other Soviet warships (the missile launchers and %-mm. gunhouses, for instance) and for 'vhich a comparative measure of scale fan be established from sources such as 1Beyer’s and Jane’s, the correct scale of (he drawing appears to be about 1:1200, and the overall length of the ship about 595 to 600 feet.
Carrier Curiosities”
(See pictorial, pp. 73-82, February 1974 Proceedings)
Captain Edgar Frank 1Vest, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—While an ensign and first lieutenant during World War II, I was attached to the USS 1ST 776, operating in the Pacific theater with the U. S. Marines and the U. S. Field Artillery. Basically, this "carrier” launched and retrieved spotter planes by suspending and catching the aircraft under a cable that extended over the water on the port side of the ship. The LST was known Unofficially as the "Brodie” since the
launch-recovery system was devised by 1st Lieutenant James H. Brodie, U. S. Army. This unusual method was described in a 24 November 1945 Saturday Evening Post article, "How to Land an Airplane on a Wire.”
One afternoon, after leaving the west coast and sighting the USS Ranger and her escorts, planes were launched for drills. A message was received saying, "We see it, but don’t believe it.”
The ship launched planes in the invasion of Iwo Jima and proceded to prepare for the invasion of Okinawa. One week prior to D-day on Okinawa, planes were launched early in the morning of the invasion of Kerama Retto. One day prior to D-day, the ship, along with a few others invaded Keise Shima in order to establish a base for the field artillery guns. The planes were launched about dawn on D-day and were reported to be the first planes over the island. Numerous launchings and landings were made for the next few days.
The planes were fitted with a hook which was above the pilot and wing. After a system of being moved from trolley to trolley, the plane was drawn aft while hanging below the cable and attached to a trolley. The ship would head into the wind and gave the pilot the signal to take control. When he felt he was ready, he signaled to be released in order to move down the cable. When sufficient flying speed had been reached, the pilot was able to release himself by pulling a release cord. The plane was immediately in flight.
Landing was really beautiful to observe. The plane had to fly parallel to the ship and below the booms which held the cable. Extended below the aft boom was a spread nylon net which was attached to a trolley. The trolley had a
small cable attached to a glider brake located on the ship. The pilot would fly below the net allowing the hook above to be caught. The brake would gradually increase tension, slowing the plane down as it went down and under, moving forward along the wire. The air officer would make sure the plane stopped before it reached the forward boom.
Except for the Post article, the ship and crew have never received any type of special recognition for their accomplishments in training and operations, although the original and well-deserving Army officers involved in inventing and proving the system were recognized and awarded the Legion of Merit.
"Counterforce or Countervalue”
(See R. L. Beavers, April 1974 Proceedings.)
Lieutenant Colonel David R. Mets, U. S. Air Force—Commander Beavers’ Prize Essay is a fine piece of work, and his main ideas have great appeal. He neglected one historical analogy which is so close that it is sure to be discussed.
The counterforce/countervalue argument is very similar to that which went on in the 1930s and during the Second World War between those who thought civilian morale was a legitimate and decisive strategic bombing target and those who were convinced that the best approach was precision bombing against the enemy’s means (as opposed to will) to resist. Briefly, Douhet and, to some extent, Trenchard favored the assault on the will (civilian morale) and Mitchell, along with most of his successors in the U. S. Army Air Corps, developed the precision theory calling for the destruction of the enemy means (war industries.)
As it happened, the coming of radar and the unexpected effectiveness of air defense caused both sides of the argument to be given a good test. The British reaction to excessive daylight losses was to go over to a night offensive. Since the technology of the time dictated area bombing in darkness, such an offensive constituted the counter- value strategy. On the other hand, the USAAF felt that the "lessons” of the Battle of Britain and the early daylight operations of the RAF Bomber Command were inapplicable to its own problems. The B-17 was much stronger defensively than either the German or the British bombers, and it was thought that it could take care of itself in daylight. Mitchell and his intellectual heirs felt that American moral standards would not accept countervalue area bombing. Consequently, the leaders of the Eighth Air Force thought they had to conduct a daylight counterforce campaign so that the Norden bombsight could do its precision work. What were the results?
The countervalue offensive of the
British Bomber Command created all kinds of mayhem from the Hamburg firestorm onwards. Yet, to the bitter end, the German worker daily returned to his lathe; his morale did not crack.
The American counterforce (here, I am stretching the contemporary definition of the term to equate it with the Eighth Air Force’s precision attack on German War industry) campaign against the German means to make war was also disappointing to its most avid proponents, but not as much so as was the British attack on the German will. The Strategic Bombing Survey and Albert Speer’s Inside the Third Reich agree that the counterforce operations had brought the German economy to the point of collapse, that it was one of the decisive factors in the defeat of Germany and that it was much more effective than the "city busting” of the RAF.
As for the experience of the B-29s against Japan, both the countervalue and the counterforce theories again received a kind of a test. The campaign out of the Marianas began in November of 1944 using a high altitude, precision
attack against the Japanese means to make war. These tactics were not immediately productive (they could hardly have been so since they were aimed at an industrial system already brought low by U. S. submarines) and Curtis LeMay was brought in to change things. He soon switched to night, low altitude, area, incendiary attacks—a countervalue assault with spectacular results. Tokyo and most of the other cities were soon burned down. According to the Strategic Bombing Survey, though the B-29s did not kill the Japanese means to make war, the effect on the enemy will was greater than it had been in Germany. There was a greater tendency towards absenteeism and evacuation in Japan than in Germany, and the people of Nippon might not have been as ready to accept the surrender decision peacefully had it not been for the tangible evidence of defeat provided by the bombing.
Raymond Ames Spruance—gifted and thoughtful, cautious and remote—was an unlikely hero who commanded one of the greatest and most powerful fleets in the history of the world.
His battleground was the Pacific Ocean, where he fought the sweeping campaigns of World War II, beginning the war as an undistinguished rear admiral and ending it as a naval legend.
The fast-paced narrative takes the reader through the Admiral’s searing childhood, covers his years as a midshipman and his duty with the Great White Fleet, details the great naval campaigns fought over millions of square miles of ocean, outlines his post-war revitalization of the Naval War College and includes Spruance's second controversial career as Ambassador to the Philippines. Rich in naval and political detail drawn from many unpublished sources, THE QUIET WARRIOR is a carefully researched, well-documented biography—full of human drama—set against the tapestry of recent history which changed the face of the world.
1974. 512 Pages. Illustrated. Appendices.
Bibliography. Index.
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What does the historical experience of World War II mean for Commander Beavers’ thesis: that the adoption of the counterforce strategy will be destabilizing and it will weaken deterrence of war
Comment and Discussion 99
and increase the political utility of Russian nuclear power? Does the conclusion that the precision attack was more effective than the area bombing support the counterforce theory? I think not. What was true about German psychology in 1944-45 need not be true about Russian attitudes in the 1980s. One explanation for the greater effect of bombing on Japanese than on German morale has been that the assault on Japan was much ■Bore compressed in time. This idea has been used to explain some of the disappointments of the gradualist bombing of North Vietnam. If that is true, what could be more compressed in time than a nuclear missile countervalue assault? But that is not the ultimate issue of the counterforce/ countervalue argument.
Commander Beavers, rightly I think, questions the counterforce theory that American ethics will not permit a countervalue attack in response to a U.S.S.R. assault limited to our military facilities.
This handsome scene, by R. G. Smith, the latest addition to the Naval Institute’s Color Print Gallery, depicts the U.S.S. Windham County (LST 1170) at Danang, South Vietnam. The gathering clouds, painted in subtle shades of gold, pink, and grey, hint at the violence of the approaching storm, while the Windham County still reflects the last rays of bright sunlight, set against the background of grey-green mountains. The overall size is 19" x 16".
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Beavers is probably too restrained in his arguments against the proposition that our ethics undermine the credibility of our countervalue deterrent. In addition to developing the idea that the victim will probably have a difficult time distinguishing between a counterforce and a countervalue attack, he might have marshalled a good deal of American history to show that the Soviet leadership likely believes that there is a huge gap between our humanitarian professions and our military conduct. No doubt the ethics are there and are sincere. However, we have collectively been a bit snobbish to assume that we are superior to the rest of the world in this regard, and the heat of battle has sometimes caused us to depart from strict adherence to the standards. Large segments of European opinion hold that Americans are very much prone to violent solutions to foreign and domestic problems. We are the people, after all, who "solved” the Indian problem by killing most of them, "solved” the slavery problem with a first-class Civil War and, whatever our strategic bombing theories, helped "solve” the Nazi problem by setting not a few of the fires ''which devastated Berlin and Dresden. Then there was LeMay who, despite the precision bombing theory, created one of the greatest holocausts in history with the incendiary attack on Tokyo-
greater even than the subsequent nuclear attacks. The idealistic professions of the present American generation notwithstanding, the historical evidence of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could hardly be comforting to the Russian leaders. Thus, it seems hard to suppose that any rational adversary would launch any sort of a nuclear attack against our mans while counting on either our ethics or our logic to prevent a countervalue response.
Commander Beavers cites a piece by Colonel William C. Moore (USAF, Ret.) as one example of counterforce thinking. In a later article ["Counterforce: Facts and Fantasies,” Air Force (April, 1974), pp. 49-52] Colonel Moore brings in an idea worthy of addition to Beavers’ thoughts. Moore argues that our countervalue strategy from Eisenhower onward has never been that pure. Even before that, it might be added, in World War II, a good many workers’ homes were burned as a result of not-so-precise attacks on German war industry. Moore holds that all through "Massive Retaliation” and beyond, the majority of our
weapons must have been targeted against counterforce objectives. Thus, the two sides are really not that far apart, and the question is really one of emphasis.
Whatever the merits of the present case, it can hardly be argued that history gives unequivocal support to the counterforce idea. Technology since World War II has undermined those vague conclusions on morale which might have been drawn from the bombing data of the 1940s. Clearly, the ethical restraints have not prevented some pretty violent acts on the parts of Americans—military and civilian alike.
"Know Your Men . . .
Know Your Business . . .
Know Yourself”
(See C. A. Bach, pp. 42-45, April 1974 Proceedings)
Eugene H. Buttle—While the consequences of leadership in civilian endeavors may not relate to a life-or-death situation (although under emergency
100 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1974
conditions, this is a strong possibility), nevertheless civilian leaders in business do control to a great extent the working life and future for individual human beings and, therefore, their whole families. The consequences both good and bad can be far-reaching and long-lasting.
The fundamentals of good leadership so well explained in Major Bach’s speech pertain wherever groups of people are working as a unit, no matter how small or large, and have a leader to direct their efforts.
Destroyer Memorial
Robert S. Kaplan—Battleships and submarines of the United States Navy that participated in World War II are proudly preserved as naval memorials. I believe a destroyer that played an active role during World War II should now join the memorial fleet of the United States. The ship selected should be a Fletcher-class destroyer—that epitome of power, grace, and speed.
During World War II more Fletchers were completed for our Navy than any other class of war-built destroyers. These intrepid ships fought Japanese battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft and emerged from the war laden with honors and covered with glory.
Perhaps the Naval Institute and the Navy League could form a committee chaired by a distinguished destroyerman such as retired Admiral Arleigh Burke. This committee would raise the necessary funds to make the preservation of a Fletcher-chss destroyer a reality. Accomplishment of this objective would save a valuable part of this nation’s maritime heritage.
Synthetic Flight Simulators
Ensign Gregory A. Papin, U. S. Navy— Synthetic flight simulators have long been an integral part of aviation training. Today, with more stringent budgets, fuel shortages, and declining aircraft availability, flight simulation has grown in importance. Furthermore, tomorrow’s naval aviation community will undoubtedly see even more simulators. The inevitable growth of flight simulation is an accepted probability. Con
versely, the question of its value is quite debatable.
For emergency procedures and instrument training aid, flight simulators in general are good. Flying "under the bag” or flying in a trainer equally accomplish the goals of the training syllabus. A pilot can shoot an instrument approach to NAS Alameda on the ground and possibly even worry about getting his feet wet. As a student naval aviator in VT-22 it is my contention that, trained exclusively in the TA-4 simulator during basic instruments, radio instruments, and airways navigation stages, I could fly as well as my classmates trained strictly in the aircraft.
More controversial is visual simulation. At NAS Kingsville, the system consists of three movie screens positioned around the TA-4 trainer and linked to various computers. The still- experimental visual simulator is being tested as a means to enhance the familiarization, formation, weapons, and carrier qualification syllabi. Early developmental progress has yet to prove its efficacy to any significant degree. A pilot can not really appreciate landing on a pitching deck at night, or any landing, in a simulator. Moreover, flying straight-and-level in a trainer does not produce the same sensation as being at 10,000 feet in a TA-4. Visual simulation’s present state of the art is a poor substitute for actual flight time and of little value other than as a procedures trainer.
Even though the training command is committed to visual simulation, I suggest a halt, or at least a slower pace, in this endeavor. We ought to use the Kingsville simulator for extensive studies in all phases of the flight syllabus; then, hopefully, determine its real value. Meanwhile and additionally, let’s perfect the instrument trainer and aim at maximizing its usage, i.e., in all instrument hops.
Deep Selection—A Caution
Rear AdmiralJ. D. H. Kane, U. S. Navy (Retired)—We read that the Navy "is seeking legislation to permanently increase below the zone selection for the regular Navy.” The carrot is out for "outstanding officers who have demon
strated that they can progress rapidly to positions of greater responsibility.” Fair enough, but how do we spot this paragon and what can we expect from this policy over the long term?
In days gone by, we had a very limited authorization for early selection, 5# or less. But even so, there was anything but unanimity on who should be singled out to become the front-runners.
What about these front-runners who are the point-of-aim of the deep selection concept? What, if any, are the common denominators they share?
First of all, as a group they most likely won’t have the breadth of experience earned by due-course officers. Depending on how early on the nod came, they are almost bound to have missed a share or shares of experience at the two and one-half or three rung level In the surface community, it is not unusual to see flag selectees without the trial-by-fire of a major command. It goes without saying that, in a shortened course, somebody doesn’t make all the jumps.
Secondly, they are very apt, willing or not, to be the product of the detailing system—first-rate young men,
blessed by lucky timing, who are trotted out by the detailer to fill a fashionable E-ring billet or the like. Indeed, it must be an exhilarating experience to be tabbed for this sort of job—even if 'c suggests a channelized career around and about the Pentagon. For what happens is this: this sort of detail tends to become repetitive at progressive ranks and those selected tend to become even more the dependable organization men with high-level visibility, than they were before their selection.
Note, parenthetically, the instructions to the president of a recent Flag Selection Board to seek out the officer "who marches to the beat of a different drum.” There are exceptions but, generally, the front runner is seldom out of step with the company band.
No one can deny that the "front office” jobs are man-killers in terms of sheer hard work—work that has to be done and done well. But it just isn’t the same sort of effort as that demanded by the decisions that have to be faced up to in command at sea. Seagoing judgment, experience, and courage are to be treasured in the Sea Service, and
therefore these qualities should be rewarded as a first priority.
Yet, the hard evidence seems to suggest that shore and staff duty are the accepted exercise yard for front-runners.
What about sea jobs—particularly command-at-sea? Regrettably, it must be recognized that, in a great majority of cases, seagoing officers have their fitness reports submitted by a far less imposing cast of seniors than do those who serve ashore or on staffs. Hence, the spawning ground for the hot shots tends most of the time to be in the Washington arena.
So the detailer becomes very important in this process. It is really he who separates the thoroughbred from the herd and gets him off and running. Unfortunately, years later, when the frontrunner approaches the stretch, he rarely looks quite as good as he did in the pad- dock—especially to his contemporaries.
No, as he labors down the stretch, his brother officers are likely simply to see a man with reduced experience—now senior—an officer with a reduced exposure to the workaday Navy and its attending pitfalls.
The ultimate horror story, of course, is that this sort of a system carried to its conclusion can only produce an eminence of horseholders at the power center of the Navy—officers whose only common denominator is that all have benefited from a system that seems to be made up of equal parts of visibility and favoritism.
Is there another or better way to go? The old system, which worked for years, bad a fixed zone. No matter how the breaks of the detailing game went, an officer could count on his equal chance °f selection along with his contemporaries. Nobody had to jockey for position and, generally speaking, everybody got a chance to compete with performance in similar jobs. In this environment
the old adage "never look back, someone might be gaining on you,” just didn’t apply.
But we should not walk back the cat. We need to modify the new—which does meet the aspirations of young officers as well as the good of the Service— with a spray of salt water from the old.
Let’s ensure that our deep selection system rewards and promotes the right people—the sailors. This can be accomplished by directions to each selection board that deep selection should only be made by consideration of operational fitness reports after determining that other periods of service are satisfactory.
Not only will such a procedure bring along our sailormen at a faster pace, but it will support and encourage the desire, before all else, of our most professional officers to "go down to the sea in ships.”
The Navy’s Unwelcome Visitors
Yvon Antoine Milre— Much is often written on the subject of the advantages of naval courtesy visits; one sees little, however, on their disadvantages. As an American citizen, living much of the year in Venice, I feel I might be able to fill that gap partially by offering an eyewitness account of some of the disadvantages, with particular reference to Venice.
Anchorage in Venice is quite limited; it is therefore necessary to moor the large ships in the Bacino. This presents an appalling spectacle, as these ships (e.g. Irn Jima, Guadalcanal, etc.) dwarf all the proportions of the city. Additionally, their placement prevents large numbers of tourists, who have paid a good deal for their holidays, from seeing Venice in perspective. This is the more oppressive according to the length of the ship’s stay in port. Admittedly, the
captains have little choice of mooring, since these are assigned by the Italian authorities.
The ships themselves often appear to be in a state of considerable dilapidation, at least externally. Rust, dents, and sundry hull blemishes make them look rather like hulks waiting for the wrecker. It should be remembered that these ships are seen by many thousands at a few hundred yards, essentially at sea level. Many are not impressed by American might as a result.
While many of the crew members are well behaved, a larger number appear not to be; there is a lack of the tight discipline which seems to be apparent in other navies which visit Venice. Generally, the U. S. crews demonstrate an astounding ethnocentricity combined with an unbelievable ignorance of where they are.
The practice of allowing liberty in civilian clothes should end; the crews coming ashore offer the spectator an unrelieved panorama of untidiness and odd costumes. It is well known that wearing a uniform tends to promote a sense of group identity and discipline. Perhaps the obligatory wearing of the uniform would tend to reduce both the number and effect of the more numbing excesses of sailors ashore. The permission to use civilian clothes must stem from a misunderstanding or a sense of undue diffidence on the part of the naval authorities. Indeed, if it is the desire to avoid giving offense to the local inhabitants, then let it be quite clear who is in the Navy and who is not—especially in cities with large tourist populations.
Venice is essentially a small town; the act of releasing large numbers of men upon it can, therefore, have rather suffocating consequences which hardly redound to the credit of the Fleet. Bad behavior becomes more, rather than less,
conspicuous. Further, Venice has very little evening activity beyond 11:00 p.m.-12:00 midnight; it thus must be a port of little appeal.
Finally, a goodwill visit probably should not have too many casualties resulting from it. It is said that a visit last year cost two dead and one seriously injured (by stabbing), at least. The local newspaper suggested that in each case the cause could be traced to a surfeit of drink.
These Dirty Ships of Ours
Captain D. E. Cummins, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff, U. S. Naval Forces Southern Command— I have seen so many dirty U. S. Navy ships in the past year and a half passing through the Panama Canal that I believe the knowledge of how and why we keep ships clean has become lost. The best way to discuss this subject is to tell a first-person story that explains how to change what is fast becoming commonplace in the Navy back to a condition that once was a standard naval requirement, that is, a clean ship. We want smart ships, but ships get smart after they first get clean.
Once upon a time, when I reported to an overseas homeported ship for duty as XO, I immediately got the impression that the people in the ship thought that they had two missions: to show the flag and go ashore. The ship was dirty and rather run-down, except in one place. The only really clean area in the ship was from the spot where the admiral came on board to where he went in his door.
After several "let’s-clean-up-the-ole- gal” meetings with the department heads, it became obvious and not a little disconcerting to discover that they weren’t much interested in cleaning up the flagship and, furthermore, resented any interference in their way of life.
After two weeks of nice-guy type discussions, I informed them that I had taken the job of cleaning up the ship out of their hands and, as of that moment, I was officer in charge of cleaning up the ship. Also, they had better right fast get on my team because I did not like theirs.
I told them I was going to have the ship man cleaning stations. I explained
what naval cleaning stations were all about, that I wanted cleaning stations to start at 0800 and to cease at 0900, Monday through Friday, and that turn-to for ship’s work would not commence until 0900. I followed this up with a note in the plan of the day explaining how cleaning stations would work. Each man would have a place that he would be responsible for keeping clean, and he would clean with no more than soap and water and rags and brushes. In addition, I made a strong point that no paint would be issued, no nuts would be turned, no tools, other than those used for cleaning, would be in hand. In short, the whole ship’s company would be involved in cleaning stations. No other work, other than watch standing, was going to be permitted. This was read to each man at quarters.
The next day, when the word was passed for cleaning stations, I went around and noted the ship was moored as before. Paint and other material had been issued, gear was being taken apart, and it was another routine morning. Again I called the department heads to my cabin and again explained in great detail that their men were to clean from 0800 to 0900—not to do normal ship’s work. Next day when the word for cleaning stations was passed, I went about the ship and no division officers, no leading petty officers, and no department heads were in their spaces. The ship, again, was moored as before.
I must admit, it was a comfort to me that the ship was in port. That afternoon when the department heads came to request permission to leave the ship, they did not leave. And, before supper, they had an opportunity to listen to some new words. Next day, that ship’s company manned cleaning stations with a vigor not normal to their routine. Division officers, leading petty officers, and department heads were in evidence—every place.
From that time on, cleaning stations were faithfully manned and supervised five days a week at sea and in port. I followed cleaning stations with weekly routine lower deck inspections every Friday, both at sea and in port. If, due to the ship’s visit schedule, Friday was an unavailable day, another day was substituted. The ship was always in
spected each week. To aid in a rapid inspection, the ship was divided into a number of inspecting zones so that the inspection always took less than one hour. Depending on our operational load, anybody could be a zone senior inspector. Some of our second and third class petty officers turned out to be among the toughest to please. Meanwhile, real efforts were made to put the inspection reports in the hands of the decision makers by 1700 the same day.
Once the department heads started to cooperate with the program, the results were astounding. Within two months, the ship began to look pretty good, and then the nicest things started to happen. People from other ships would comment on how shipshape our ship looked, and then our sailors began to be proud of their accomplishments and their ship. When that happened, the rest was automatic.
There were problems. The biggest involved finding and solving ownership of orphan spaces, i.e., areas not claimed by any division. (The next time I did it, I would attempt to locate all of the orphan spaces first.) The next big problem was teaching the young sailor how best to use his cleaning time, that is, how to go over his area day by day so that at the end of the five-day cycle, he had cleaned it all, at least once. A related problem, of course, was to teach the petty officer and junior officer supervisors to not be fooled by a shiny deck. It took time to teach them to put their eyes and hands into the overhead stiffeners, behind things, to look into wireways, and at various pieces of equipment that were in the area that are part of a cleaning station program. It also took time to teach the young sailors to stay away from, or out of, equipment that was not a part of their cleaning program. On the other hand, an apparently simple problem of abandoned spaces caused by people on leave or transferred, or who were sick, that should have been solved on the scene at leading petty officer level, plagued me until I departed. Perhaps my relief solved that one.
An hour a day, dedicated to nothing but cleaning, works. Indeed, we have too many ships that require an hour a day, and thus I recommend this method to you all. No, I beg you to try it.
Spanning the Leadership Gap:
A Dual-Track Pay Scale
Lieutenant {junior grade) M. H. Hoskins, Fleet Training Center, Mayport, Florida— Over the years the Navy has attempted to meet the retention problem in a number of ways. The most common are direct increases in pay, additional fringe benefits, proficiency pay, and accelerated promotions.
For years, even with pro-pay and fringe benefits added, military pay scales were significantly less than those of comparable civilian occupations. One way to combat this, without being able to squeeze any more from a reluctant Congress, was to advance men into higher pay grades as quickly as possible. The result is the present top-heavy nature of our rate structure and, more importantly, the lack of experienced leadership at petty officer levels. To cover for this we increased the number of officers assigned, increasing costs and further degrading the responsibility and leadership opportunities available for petty officers, creating a counter incentive, requiring more promotions to retain technicians and still more officers to fill the leadership gap.
On any ship today you can find more than enough POis and CPOs to supervise a job; but it is extremely difficult to get a seaman or P03 to hold maintenance on a piece of equipment. To expect the average P03 to exercise leadership is beyond credulity.
Under the present system, a sailor takes an examination based almost entirely upon his technical knowledge and can expect to be advanced. We are, thus, advancing a man to a leadership position based almost solely upon his technical performance. There is no reason to expect a superior technician to be even an adequate leader or administrator.
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To alleviate this, I propose a dualtrack pay system that would replace pro-pay and enhance professional (technical, administrative and leadership) development of the naval petty officer. Present basic pay would be divided into two equal halves. One half would be the military basic pay schedule (M-Scale) and the other would be the Technical development pay schedule (T-Scale).
Under the dual pay system a man Would advance up each track based upon
Comment and Discussion 103
his performance in that area. The M-level would be the controlling or primary track. An individual would wear the crow, receive the privileges and, primarily, accept the leadership responsibilities of his M-level. He could not attain an M-rating above his T-rating and, conversely, could not hold a T-level more than two steps above his M-level.
Under this system a man could receive compensation for technical ability, without discrimination due to rate, and without being required to assume a leadership position above his training or experience. Obviously, the rate of advancement up the promotion ladder would be considerably slower than it is now.
For example, an ETRSA completes A and B schools and, instead of becoming a push-button third class, he becomes an ETRSA/T3. After serving with the fleet for a year, he may take the E-3 or the ETR3 examination or both. Based upon his performance on those tests he could become an ETRSA/T4 or an ETRSN/T3 or an ETRSN/T4. In any case, he would still be a seaman. At this time he would have gained some experience as a technician, and still be a neophyte leader. Upon completion of another year of service he would be eligible for the P03 examination and, if promoted, receive the appropriate added responsibility, including minor divisional personnel administrative duties and fuller responsibility for juniors. The slower rate of advancement
MAIL TO:
combined with the universal availability of technical achievement pay would cause little or no financial change for the average serviceman, and none at all for the Navy.
This system is the first step in utilizing the full potential of our young men. It doesn’t take much observation to realize that they are energetic, idealistic, eager, and unfortunately, easily disappointed. Under the present organization, one of the Navy’s most difficult assignments, the division officer, is given to one of the men least qualified to handle it, an untrained junior officer. A chief petty officer, with proven leadership, administrative, and technical abilities and more general naval experience—especially as developed under the proposed system—would be much more qualified to be the primary interface between the department head and the division. Junior officer allowances could then be reduced (at a considerable saving to the Navy) and those remaining assigned as assistant department heads for training. Lastly, the performance of the division should show a marked improvement under the leadership of a man who has spent years preparing himself for the job. This allows us to offer the exceptional petty officer a really challenging job, stressing his abilities more fully and returning to the CPO or petty officer the responsibility he deserves and the prestige and respect earned by a good leader.