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JL he adversary relationship that exists between the military and the media was put in sharp focus by Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, the Naval War College President, at the college’s first academic convocation held in August 1972. In his opening speech to the student body, he acknowledged that the military establishment was ineffective in answering the questions and criticisms, and in dispelling doubts raised about it in recent years. He stated that the persistent skepticism and questioning suggests that the military is not providing convincing responses or taking positions that are credible to the media and others not in uniform.
Since that August 1972 speech, he has undertaken some significant innovations in the War College’s curriculum and other programs. He has also stressed to his mid-career officer/students that it is their responsibility to understand the fourth estate and to accommodate its legitimate requirements.
Shortly after the 1972 Class began its academic endeavors, the students saw the correlation between their studies and the admiral’s convocation remarks. After digging into more than 1,000 pages of routine weekly reading, they discovered that the prejudices many of them harbored against the media were neither new nor did the resentment seem to be merely a direct manifestation of a long and unpopular war in Southeast Asia. The conflict between the men who make the news and those who report it, they learned, appears to be almost as old as warfare itself.
They found themselves nodding approvingly at James Reston’s words: "In the old days, as far back as the Greeks and probably earlier, the reporters or couriers of bad news were often put to the gallows or killed on the spot; now they are given the Pulitzer Prize—but the conflict goes on.” And, Alfred Vagts, the noted military historian, gave them more food for thought: "The officers’ dislike of contradiction has made journalists, as the producers of written public criticism, particularly obnoxious to the military in peace as well as in war.”1
While the newspapers, radio, and television were filled with the last days of the U. S. participation in the Vietnam War, the students continued to read in Vagt’s A History of Militarism, how their predecessors "considered the hated ink slingers without bureaucratic or other restraints as thoroughly venal, irresponsible, and ignorant.” In their assigned readings, they learned how a defeated Austrian archduke condemned the press as subversive; how Civil War reporters were judged as self-styled Bohemians known for their impetuous and sometimes irresponsible action; how they were barred
'Vagts, Alfred. A History of Militarism. (New York: Macmillan, 1959). p. 30}.
from sieges and other operations because any reporting was unwholesome in any form; how, during World War II, reporters were indispensable morale builders who had to be suffered—if not respected—and, when necessary, censored; and how, in Vietnam, the military’s attitude toward the media generally consisted of suspicion, distrust, and, sometimes, outright animosity.”2
Finally, and probably with mixed emotions, they read Alfred Vagt’s opinion that through the years the military "feared the printed word and hating even a hint of criticism, officers were unprepared for the task when the hour struck to make use of the press or other publications for positive purposes.” Thus, they learned that the present ambiance, the military-media malevolence, is not a new one—only the intensity of criticism is greater and the journalistic trend to personalized reporting more disquieting.
As the historical parallels became clearer and their own roles in the military-media relationship assumed a clearer perspective for them, the students concluded there were some obvious shortcomings in the military’s interaction with the media. They came to see some of the shortcomings which have contributed little to harmony between the military and the fourth estate over the years. For example:
► There has been a clear-cut record of military public affairs mismanagement. Potentially negative stories have been deliberately concealed. Blunder, intentional of unwitting, has made the media suspicious of the mib' tary’s reliability.
► There is often no communication between the two professions, although both are talking. As Sidney Schanberg observes, "Naturally each believes the other is not addressing reality. Actually both are wrong: they are simply dealing in different realities. Many of the military men still cannot grasp why the rules of war have been changed for them between World War H and Vietnam.”3
► The military has applied the full force of its energies and initiatives toward strategy, new weapons systems, the budget, and operational matters—but only a modicum of effort has gone to getting the public to respect and understand what it is doing and why it is important to the public.
► There are people in military public affairs jobs who aren’t qualified.
► Military seniors ignore the public affairs officer in the management decision-making process.
2 Excerpts from assigned readings in the Strategy Trimester at the War College, 1972-73.
3Schanberg, Sydney. "The Saigon Follies, or, Trying to Head Them Off' the Credibility Gap,” Tht New York Times Magazine, 12 November bisection 6.
^ Too many military officers let the pursuit of a career intrude upon crisp, objective thinking and decision making.
y The military has not always been truthful in dealing with the media.
^ Many senior officers continue to believe that rank has a monopoly on ideas, i.e. "The lieutenant couldn’t know anything about public relations, he’s too young.” ^ The military has stressed the importance of semantic accuracy in the conduct of military discussion; these semantic problems have caused friction between the military and the media. The military has come under repeated attack by the media for habitual use of cliches, acronyms, and militarese.
The evidence of a deterioration in military-media relations indicated to Admiral Turner and the students that something had to be done to better prepare the students for the day when they would be thrust under the hot lights of public scrutiny and debate.
The Military and the Media 49
Conversely, it also was obvious that much of the officers’ dislike for the media had been nurtured by half-truths and inexperience. The admiral believed that one way to overcome the ill will was to bring the students into direct contact with the media, a plan he considered soon after the school year had begun. While the conflict between the military and the media may be inevitable, he stated, it is possible to remain adversative while maintaining understanding and trust.
The first significant step was taken in November of 1972 when the Naval War College hosted the first conference. Called "The Military and the Media: Toward an Understanding,” more than 50 well-known national and regional media representatives along with the Service chiefs of information and other key civilian guests came to the campus for that initial two-day session.
The conference, and subsequent developments which grew out of it, proved to be so successful that another session was scheduled and held in November 1973. This second conference, "The Military and the Media: Mutual Responsibilities,” attracted a wider variety and a larger number of members of the media. Several media guests admitted they came to satisfy their curiosity after hearing glowing reports from colleagues who had attended the 1972 meeting.
The conferences provided a forum in which both the military and the media could put aside their visceral reactions and engage in a productive and intelligent discussion of their respective professions. The meetings proved that a constructive dialogue can be established and continued between the military and the media. The format of the conferences revolved around seven speeches by prominent media personalities, panel discussions of media representatives with questions from
the student audience, and a series of seminar meetings in which groups of 10 to 12 students met for about two hours with two media representatives. Disparate views and suspicious restraint marked the opening day of the two meetings but, by the second day, the students and media were deep into philosophical, remarkably candid discussions. Both professions gave and got criticism and praise. Both sessions were marked by spirited exchanges between guests and hosts which served as a catalyst for further discussions. The students learned, many for the first time, that the media is critical of itself and does attempt to police its ranks. The officers found themselves re-examining their image as others see it, and, at the same time, putting themselves in proper perspective with the whole—and not being paranoid about it.
In the end, the conferences may not have produced many converts but, in assessing the long-term results, it appears there is some tangible movement away from an antagonistic relationship to one of respect. At a
minimum, the meetings have eased tension and created a climate upon which further understanding and mutual cooperation could grow. The fact that one largely military audience gave author David Halberstam, an outspoken critic of the Armed Forces, a standing ovation is evidence that intelligent, professional, and objective men and women can resolve differences and misunderstandings.
The two conferences also built up momentum which spilled over into the balance of the academic year.
Stimulated to learn more about the media first-hand, the students had the opportunity to host two-to-three day visits by individual members of the media. Well- known newsmen and broadcasters came to the campus to sit in on the academic program and to talk with small groups of students. Besides observing the academic program, the media guests talked with students in great depth, often well into the evening, about the military-media milieu.
At the end of each of the school years, the continu-
ing program was tied together by outlining what the students should have learned from the interface with the media and from their studies. Seven suggestions were offered:
► Understand the media. Don’t view the press as antagonists. Don’t think the media can be used as a transmission belt for publicity.
► Level with the media. There cannot be a gap between reality and words.
► Take the initiative. Communications today are instant
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The Military and the Media
and comprehensive; the military must take the initiative in communicating with the public through the media. Moreover, release an unfavorable story immediately or it will crop up later in the worst possible manner and in the most damaging form. Don’t fret about the past, what’s done is done.
► Expect the worst. Prepare for problems rather than reacting after it’s too late. When such crises occur, handle them with objectivity and balance.
► Watch your language. Start talking to the media and the public in a language familiar to them. Semantics, cliches, and acronyms stifle the flow of communications.
^ Don’t over-react. The result of the media member’s j labors often cause the military man to over-react when bad news appears. We shouldn’t let ourselves become paranoid when some bad news appears, or when some reporter gets our good news wrong. We must continue to strive for a reasonable relationship from which we can expect reasonable results.
The 1973 and 1974 graduates of the Naval War College left with a more responsible and involved attitude toward their role in working with the media. From a year of intensive discussions, studies, and readings, it has been made clear to them that without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people. This goes to the heart of the democratic theory, the proposition that self-government requires an electorate that knows what is going on in the corridors of power.
Admiral Turner has summed up the efforts of the past two years: "At this particular time our country needs a national sense of direction. Part of the challenge
of finding it is a responsibility the military has to redefine in this era of detente the purpose and objective of having a military force. We cannot do that in a vacuum. We must watch as the media helps to shape the sense of national purpose which will rise in our country. Only from it can we derive our purpose in the military.
"I leave you with the thought that the military has much to do, you, and I, to earn the respect of our journalistic compatriots. We must earn it by our deeds and performance. Our ability to do so may well determine how successfully we make the contribution that we have to make to our country in the years ahead.”
The effort being made by the Naval War College to improve military-media relations may not have a significant impact for some time to come. But the initial efforts have already started to chip away at the traditional mistrust and misunderstanding that have characterized the relationship. The basis of that relationship must be mutual respect and candor.
Commander White holds a Ph D. in mass communications from Michigan State University. Following graduation from Officers Candidate School, Newport, R.I., in September 1954, he was commissioned in the U. S. Naval Reserve. He then served two years’ active duty attached to the Naval Radio Station, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. After his release, Commander White spent the next eight years in educational public relations before returning to active duty in 1964, when he received a direct appointment as lieutenant commander. During the next eight years he served as a Public Affairs Officer at various stations, including the Seventh Fleet and for Commander Naval Forces Vietnam. He was assigned to the staff of Commandant, Ninth Naval District, Great Lakes, Illinois in June 1970 where he served for two years before reporting to the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., as a student in the College of Naval Warfare with collateral duty as the Public Affairs Officer. In August 1973 he became Director of Program Planning for the Chief of Navy Information in Washington, D C.
Aping His Master
In World War I, while serving in a British cruiser in tropical waters, a Royal Marine reservist bought a monkey. After training him, he made him a red Marine’s uniform coat and peakless cap and requested permission for him to attend Sunday morning Divisions and Captain’s Inspection. Permission was granted.
He was standing at ease in the front line, holding his master’s hand when the captain approached. The division came to attention, including the monkey. At the order,"off caps,” for the captain to inspect the men’s hair, off came the monkey’s cap.
The captain stopped in front of the monkey as he stood rigidly to attention. Looking very serious but hardly able to control his mirth, the captain, in a stern voice ordered. "Haircut.”
As the entourage passed on, the monkey’s master growled in a broad cockney accent. "Blimey, ye let me dahn agine.”
—Contributed by Cdr. Francis Poole, RCdNR, (Ret.) (The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)