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Commander J. M. Preston, V. S. Navy— Ensign Edelstein doesn’t seem to have examined the possibilities of any position but his own. He observes a widening rift between what he identifies as "military” and "civilian” societies, and assumes that the rift is increasing because the military society is drifting away. All of us have, from time to time, been taken by the illusion that the pier is moving away from the ship, but a sweep of the eyes which includes more of the background usually enables us to see the true situation. At least it is a possibility, is it not? And the intellectually curious should consider it; maybe it’s Ensign Edelstein’s friends who are drifting away, and not he.
This young officer has had it drummed into his head for so long that the military is bad, wrong, bloodthirsty, reactionary, inhuman, and unimaginative, that he has come to believe a little of it. When one hears senators and other public spokesmen contemptuously putting down the military profession, it helps to remember that our first President was an ex-general, and that just about every citizen during the first days of our Republic was a veteran. If the formation of free and independent societies were left to anti-military types, I fear that there would be few such in the world.
Perhaps it would assist Ensign Edelstein in resolving his dilemma to suggest that he consider all sides of the issue; that he question even his own
assumptions—always, however, knowing that a decision must eventually be reached. Where the so-called liberal is content to discuss endless possibilities, the so-called conservative—military or civilian—realizes that in the end all action requires a yes or no decision for which one is accountable. This characteristic is what separates them, not their attitude toward change.
The Ensign deserves a lot of credit for so clearly presenting his views. His heart is in the right place, and, if he can beat his way out of the swamps of sociological jargon, his obviously superior mind will be a valuable asset to our society. In learning the difference between jargon and reality, the sea has for thousands of years been a most effective teacher, and Ensign Edelstein should count himself lucky to be able to go there to complete his education.
Aviation Ordnanceman Second Class Patrick J. O’Mahony, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—The article gives me the impression that this officer is not sure of himself, not confident of the Navy, and definitely in the wrong profession.
Lieutenant (J.g.) Charles E. Bane/lis, U. S. Navy— Ensign Edelstein states that the military is withdrawing more from the current civilian world. In fact, the contrary is true. It is the civilian world which is withdrawing from the military. Change is not necessarily good. A civilian world of hijackings, assassinations,
and V.D. epidemics is not good either.
Ensign Edelstein states that the "liberals;” those characterized by shabby appearances, unkempt hair, and sloppy life styles, are absent from the military ranks. He forgets to add that the greatest concentration of misfits are found in this sector of society. No nation can afford to recruit misfits to serve in its military forces.
A certain percentage of each Naval Academy class has had prior college experience. I attended a civilian university for one year before entry to the Academy and am a 1971 graduate. I found that the Naval Academy offered me more individualism, evoked more intellectual curiosity than my civilian university. The author ignores mention of the Academy’s 50% civilian facility, low student-to-teacher ratio, new multi- million-dollar academic buildings, and unique training. Each midshipman is guaranteed the opportunity of visiting foreign countries every other year. I cannot think of any civilian university that guarantees travel abroad to each student.
He implies that a conservative environment frustrates progress and crea-
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.
tivity. The strict regulations of the Naval Academy have successfully kept the Brigade of Midshipmen virtually free of the drug culture—a culture which is destroying the nation’s youth. One must make note of how many men of stature are the product of conservative schools.
Edelstein asserts that the "military mind” expects to survive by playing power politics. General Douglas MacArthur’s "military mind” states:
This does not mean that you are warmongers. On the contrary, the soldier, above all other people, prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war.
The words of Vice Admiral James Calvert, U. S. Navy (Retired), who was Superintendent during my midshipman career, fortify my dedication to the Service: "Hard Times are coming to the military.” The hard times today will be unchallenged by some, for others it will be a summons to greatness.
Lieutenant Commander John 0. Witt, U. S. Naval Reserve— Ensign Edelstein really hit his mark in relating the numerous situations and instances which aid in dividing our "two worlds.” As a former Regular Navy officer, now a Reservist, I can, from personal experience, vouch for the conditions he pointed out. I recall vividly the reaction of the civilian populace toward the military when I was assigned to our Midwest Public Affairs Office in downtown Chicago (1967 to 1969). Public sentiment at that time resulted in our not wearing uniform and rank down the streets of this major city because of the heckling, raw comments, and, in some cases, a general transmittal of the feeling that we, as officers in the United States Navy, were nothing more than "trash.”
Lieutenant Commander B. E. A rcher, U. S. Navy (Retired)—As a retired officer, I can no longer tolerate the editorial policy of the Proceedings. The drivel being published in this publication is so repugnant that I am no longer able to support this endeavor. The points made in Ensign Edelstein’s article and Z-grams
are not valid—as someone said earlier, "Let me see the quality of the troops”—I doubt that we at this time could allow ourselves this luxury. Cancel my membership.
Lieutenant Philip J. Katauskas, U. S. Navy—My own point of contention with Ensign Edelstein is his statement that ". . . the best way a liberal can reach the top is to keep his mouth shut until he gets there, at least as far as political and social considerations are concerned.” I maintain that the military man who suppresses his liberal political and social ideals in order to "reach the top” will arrive at the summit only to find that on the way up he lost these same ideals.
Reform in the military cannot wait to be introduced by some superman figure who springs dramatically onto the scene after shedding his clever disguise of conformism. Reform in the military must be gradual and continuous, and, to be this, a critical, articulate, and vocal corps of officers is needed. It would indeed be tragic for the officers corps to accept the idea that thoughtful criticism is not career-enhancing.
time after time to be futile indeed, even more futile for the career man who’s not thoroughly convinced of the legitimacy of his role. Remember the character in Herman Wouk’s Winds of War, who says something to the effect that a Navy career officer and a patriot are not necessarily one and the same? How true! Certainly a large percentage of careerists are just that and nothing more, men who view their profession as a secure livelihood, patriotism being an ethereal or non-existent motive. These people are ill-equipped to defend the military role against the chronic onslaught of the bleeding-heart liberals. (I suppose we could call them the "coagulated-heart conservatives.”) It is, therefore, no wonder that the more intelligent of the left can’t understand the reluctance and/ or inability of this sector, the military stereotype, to defend itself—unpopular war notwithstanding!
What we need to counteract the image of the military stereotype in civil’ ian society are more Renaissance men (like Ensign Edelstein?), humanities majors, who also do well at Nudea< Power School.
Lieutenant Commander W. R. Co/thursh U. S. Navy—Discipline is mandator)'1,1 a military organization especially whef an order to be carried out inherently risks one’s own life or that of friend5 (or those not perceived as enemies.) I[1][2] is a well known fact that, other thing* aside, the efficacy of an Armed Force 15 gauged by its degree of discipline. Th>5 discipline is a direct result of in tell1' gently imposed authority. In this era reducing forces, it is mandatory tha[ those men and women remaining be tl>£ best possible for the expenditure of od precious resources.
The "Modern” Navy
Commander J. A. Byrne, Jr., U.S. Nap Commanding Officer, USS Pat terse[3]
(DE-1061) —The "Modern” Navy ha* produced some rather unusual phenol*1' ena. Most are familiar to the majon1! of readers and need no elaboration There is, however, one that is notic£<j by relatively few people within the nav3 establishment. I am referring to tha1
Comment and Discussion 83
form of communication[4] entitled, "Personal For Unit Commanders, Commanding Officers, and Officers-in- Charge” or, alternately, depending upon the height in the chain of command from which the communication flows, "Personal for Flag Officers, Unit Commanders, and Commanding Officers.” There are several other variations, but they all are commonly headed "Personal For” and always include "Commanding Officers,” regardless of other addressees.
Not too many years ago, the v/riter commanded a small ship, an LST of the 542-class. The so-called "Personal” file, numbered very few of these communications and receipt of one made a person take notice. They normally dealt with semi-confidential matters, such as problems of naval personnel receiving vasectomies in Japan or with certain persons of ill-repute or of dubious loyalties one might meet socially or in the course of business. They usually maintained their information value over long periods of time and were appropriate for inclusion in turn-over files. There was never any question of their timeliness, because they were always signed by the fleet admiral or someone of equal importance and generally, sounded like the man himself and not simply an industrious staff officer.
One can’t be certain that the volume was small because the ship was small, but if such was not the case, then truly today’s "personals” are a modern phenomenon. In just a little over a year, the writer has received and filed some 70 of these peculiar communications. They come in letter form, newsletter form, and messages. Some days, as many as three arrive. Most are mailed by ad- dressograph leading one to believe that maybe this information form isn’t so very "personal” at all.
There is no specific subject area to which the "Personals” are limited. Engineering matters, uniforms, racial consid- eratives; a wide variety of personnel concerns and actions; all are fair game. Very few, if any, have a really personal touch, although the initiator may deign to scrawl a few words at the end of the
prepared text along with his "Warm regards.”
The high volume of this communication form is not, of itself, necessarily bad. It is, however, extremely symptomatic of a serious problem with communications, in general, and lack of confidence in one’s juniors, in particular. Over the years, throughout the naval establishment, the quantum improvements in the means of communications, have bred only quantity—not quality. The overall volume of communications to a unit is beyond all measure of reasonableness, ability to absorb, and keep in mind. The impact of the "Personals,” to me, at least, is, with rare exceptions, negligible to nearly negative. An occasional one, transmitted with full consideration of its content and interest to the majority of individuals in receipt, can compete successfully with the tremendous volume of "normal” or "routine” communications. Two or three a week, however, receive a lot less attention than their authors hope for. The overall barrage; 4-and-5-page messages, correspondence from Systems Commands, Bureaus, Fleet, type, flotilla and squadron headquarters, not to mention directives and information from those and higher echelons in magazines, newsletters, and other means, tend to leave the "Personal” as just another piece of paper and strong candidate for the circular file. It must be admitted, though, that the attention paid to any given one is directly related to the closeness of the originator to the recipient in the chain of command.
Is there a way, then, of restoring this form of communication to its former meaningfulness and importance, or are we too far gone into the "communi- cations-for-its-own-sake” syndrome? Pessimistically, the answer is probably no. What is needed is the confidence and trust in subordinates that would preclude expounding on the obvious. In other words, give the ships back to their captains. Restrain "Personal” to infrequent, broad (and brief) policy statements and guidance. Give the commanding officers a chance (and some credit) to originate policies and statements of their own, or simply, let them get their work done. No matter how rapid a reader, no captain can begin to do justice to the volume of words that
flow so easily, and still go about the government’s business as he is so effectively charged and accountable by law and regulation.
I hope this discussion will give many pause to think before they write another "Personal For.” The point, I think, has been made. If not, one could begin another essay concerning those other equally unnecessary words "Command attention is directed.”—yet another area of verbal over-kill and absurdity.
NROTC Unit Leaves Stanford
Editor’s Note: On 30 June 1973, the NROTC Unit of Stanford University was officially decommissioned, and with its departure there was ended the organized program of maintaining contact with graduated midshipmen. Consequently, the commanding officer of the Unit, Major H. C. Stackpole, U. S. Marine Corps, is especially proud to have received the following letter, which was written to the staff and members of the Unit by a graduate who is now serving in the USS Cleveland (LPD-7).
Ensign Anthony Bollen, U. S. Navy— I’m delighted to be able to say that everything so far is at least as good and usually better than I’d expected. The ship, the crew, my job, what’s expected of me, what’s not expected of me—in every aspect of this new life I’m leading, there’s something to be glad about, and something to find rewards in.
The ship herself, the Steamin’ Cleve, couldn’t be better physically. LPDs, for any of the remaining midshipmen who aren’t so excited about the relationship between heavy seas and destroyer-types, are big and comfortable, and very roomy. The regular ship’s company consists of about 28 officers and 400 crew, plus the occasional embarked contingent of Marine Corps personnel, so, unless there are a lot of Marines on board, there’s always plenty of elbowroom and storage space for all the fantastic stereo buys in WestPac. Amphibs are fairly flat-bottomed, so they aren’t as stable in a storm as, say, a fully-loaded oiler, but, what the hell, who wants to be greasy and oily all the time, anyway? Also, the air conditioning and hot water work— usually.
Forgive me if I keep sounding like I’m giving unsolicited advice, but a lot
of things keep occurring to me. First of all, don’t count on a schedule—any schedule. I got to Coronado, fully expecting to be there three weeks, go across the Bay to the Cleveland, and stay in San Diego until October. Well, spring offensives have a way of affecting the U. S. Seventh Fleet Employment Schedule, and when I called the Cleve after the first two weeks at the Phib School, I was told that, well, no, we won’t exactly be getting underway in October, we’ll sort of be getting underway Monday. Monday? You mean four days from now? Ye gods! Anyway, after a bit of haggling, the powers that govern such things decided to let me finish out my last week at Coronado, following which I flew Western Airlines (with a reserved commercial seat, in civvies, complete with great quantities of champagne and the "French Connection” en route) direct to Honolulu. Not bad. I kept saying to myself, "Hmm, this Navy life is okay.” All I’d seen of it was Coronado and the San Diego Airport, but that didn’t dampen my enthusiasm.
Okay, so don’t count on schedules. The second point is that, when in doubt, you should do the simplest thing that makes sense. When I got to Pearl Harbor (thanks to a friendly Japanese/ Hawaiian with an air-conditioned Dat- sun 240Z), I didn’t know what to do until the Cleve showed up (nor did I know when that would be, for that matter), so I went over to the BOQ and haggled my way into a room for the night. One word to those who aren’t clear on such things: Usually BOQ rooms are free. This was a great revelation to me.
The Cleve arrived the next morning, and I hauled my stuff on board. Lesson number three: When you are a new ensign, reporting aboard for the first time, carrying with you the bulk of your worldly possessions, there is simply no way to arrive gracefully. Don’t worry about it. The harder you try to make an impressive entrance, the harder time you’ll have of it.
Since that fateful day, things have been picking up more or less constantly, levelling off now and then, sometimes dipping a bit when the days get monotonous or strenuous but, in general, the flow of the months has been positive. At first, I felt like a "new guy,” a real
outsider—as if I were the only one who was not a part of the Wardroom Group, of the inpenetrable circle of officers who all knew each other and who had little use for another ensign, and a new one at that. Well, that feeling persisted for a week or two, until I began to realize that "breaking in” is only a matter of time, and even the biggest jerk in the world will be accepted if he’s only a bit patient about it. Now, I know virtually all the officers well, a couple are best friends, and I’ve only been here three months. That was the hardest part of all—trying to feel a part of the ship. I do now, completely, and it’s a good feeling.
I think the most satisfying aspect of all so far, though, is the relationship an officer can have with the crew. Being in the Navy, for me, at any rate, is a tremendous opportunity to deal with dozens of different types of individuals, from the college graduates to the semiliterate, the guys who can build computers and the guys who can barely master a mop. (Swab—sorry.) You get a chance to talk with these guys about things, and I don’t mean about their personal lives necessarily, but just about things—the war, their hometown, drugs, the Navy, their jobs, their ambitions— just relaxed and general talk about all sorts of things. You walk through the mess decks at meal times and people say hello to you or give you a good-natured bad time about something, and you joke with them for a minute or two— somehow, although it’s hard to pinpoint exactly, there’s a rapport there that I truly enjoy and didn’t expect to find.
My job is assistant CIC officer and assistant OI Division officer, which, considering that operations is what I requested, isn’t too shabby. I find that there’s an incredible amount to learn about operations on any ship, especially one the size of the Cleve. Also, our mission the past three months has been a good one for finding out about the facets of operations—we’ve been flying helos off our flight deck, Marine Cobras, in support of the blockade. We spend about three-to-four weeks on the line at a time, followed by a couple of weeks off—first it was eight days in Subic for upkeep, then ten days in Sasebo which we just completed a week or so ago. After this next line period, along about
the end of November (1972), we’re scheduled for Kaohsiung and Singapore before the end of December, but, like I said, don’t put your faith in schedules. I do hope we go to Singapore, though, since being a pollywog among shellbacks is starting to give me a complex, and I’d dearly love to get it over with.
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Still, no matter what, the Cleve will probably be over here until early spring Christmas in Singapore? We’re probably going to ditch the helos in a month or so and join the Ready Group, which should give the ops-types a bit more free time, what with our monthly amphibious landing in the Philippines or whatever as our major operational commitment.
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By the way, one strong suggestion: teach maneuvering board! There is no way you can over-emphasize it, no matter what specialty the guys may wind up in. We have engineering officers occasionally standing watch in CIC, and i little foreknowledge really helps, take my word for it.
Also, please tell the guys not to worry because they feel like they don’t kno"' anything when they get commissioned Ensigns aren’t supposed to know anything, seriously, so there’s nothing tfl sweat. (I really worried about that, incidentally.)
Comment and Discussion 85
requirements of a bachelor’s degree. This is one complaint cited by many military instructors—namely, that they do not get ample time to work with the future ensign or second lieutenant. In many respects, NROTC falls in between the officer candidate school (OCS) program and that of the Naval Academy. OCS has a relatively short period of time to teach the midshipman a great deal. On the other hand, the Naval Academy affords a midshipman the best environment to cultivate the knowledge relating to a naval career. The NROTC has an ample period of time to expose a midshipman to the necessary subjects by virtue of the four-year time frame. Because of the small amount of actual hours allotted to military instruction, however, the depth of instruction is severely limited.
There is a marked conflict between the university and the NROTC. The student midshipman must take the necessary courses to obtain his bachelor’s degree, he must fulfill the breadth requirements of the university in order to "round out” his education, and he must take the naval science courses. At Land Grant universities, where NROTC is the result of an official contract between the Federal government and the university, academic credit is given for naval science classes, but unfortunately, naval science courses do not fulfill university breadth requirements. Hence, a mathematics major, for example, will have to take a naval science course on international relations or seapower, as well as some university electives in history. The midshipman’s naval science classes are not deemed adequate by the university to fulfill its history breadth requirements. This places an undue burden on the student-midshipman. Because of this redundancy, he has to take proportionally more classes than the typical student, and in order to complete his schooling in four years, he must, therefore, take a greater course load each semester or quarter. It is not too diffi- eult to comprehend, why midshipmen majoring in scientific fields often have to go on leave of absence after their senior year in order to complete all of their university requirements.
The academic communities at several Universities and colleges have made extensive studies into the NROTC program.
It should be pointed out that NROTC has been investigated more often and in greater depth than any of the other university departments. The resultant action has produced essentially four options available to the university: (1) retain NROTC; allow the Navy to administer the program; (2) retain NROTC; place restrictions on the curriculum; (3) retain NROTC; remove the military influence from the program by offering university courses which would substitute for courses conducted by the military; (4) remove NROTC from the campus.
Relatively few institutions exercise the first option; several have chosen the fourth option, but most have employed the second and third options. The university which prides itself on the pursuit and fulfillment of academic freedom has instructed the NROTC departments that naval science courses must be "worthy” of the university. Supposedly, trade- school-oriented courses are not permitted. Many universities have asked that war-related courses such as weapons systems be discontinued. Since the determination of whether a course is "worthy” or not is a somewhat subjective assessment, however, option number two is losing favor among many college administrations.
It is the third option that presents a clear and present danger to the NROTC program. It has been proposed that civilian university classes be substituted for classes formerly taught by military instructors. For example, the political science department would provide a suitable class to be used to fulfill a naval science history class, or the astronomy department would teach a course in navigation. This so-called academic flexibility would afford the midshipman with "top quality” education by instructors with "outstanding academic qualifications.” Indeed, a professor of meteorology would probably be more qualified to teach about weather forecasting, but there are two inherent problems with the principle of academic flexibility. Firstly, most university academicians have vast theoretical experience, but only limited practical experience to convey the kind of knowledge which would be of most use to the future officer. Secondly, but more significantly, is the fact that removing the military
influence from the naval science program is inconsistent with the basic tenets of the program. As noted earlier, the total time spent by the student- midshipman in a "military atmosphere” while at the university is already small. Why then decrease that time even further?
The arguments for the retention of military instructors are many. The exposure to the military man affords the midshipman with a better opportunity to learn about the environment in which he is about to live. The military man would probably be better qualified to impart practical knowledge on the subject under study. For example, a university professor of engineering could explain the operation of a naval boiler. On the other hand, he may not be able to warn the midshipman of the potential hazards present when working on the intake suction valve of the main condenser. (The possibility of an explosion or asphyxiation exists, because of explosive and toxic fumes produced by decayed sealife sucked into the valve.)
Irrespective of his academic qualifications, the military man is still the best qualified to teach naval science courses. This statement is not extended to just officers, but also to the many CPOs and gunnery sergeants. These men, despite little or no college education, possess a "world of knowledge,” and can contribute significantly to the education of the midshipman. Moreover, the Navy has recently sought to counteract the objections of college administrators by appointing officers with higher academic qualifications to NROTC billets.
One suggestion which has resulted from the intensive studies of the NROTC has been to strengthen the program with additional courses to be taken in addition to the naval science courses. These courses are based upon the needs of the Navy rather than the needs of the university. Included are courses in calculus, physics, psychology, and international relations. It is here that the principle of academic flexibility can be best applied since university professors are better qualified to teach these subjects. Although these additional breadth requirements compound the course load problem of the midshipman, it is generally believed that, since the Navy of the future will be more scientifically
oriented, so the future officer must be.
As the result of the various crises involving its academic composition, the NROTC is now a potentially stronger, more dynamic program. The application of academic flexibility in teaching the naval science breadth requirements brings to bear the finest resources of the university and adds depth to the NROTC program. The use of military instructors for naval science courses, however, must remain undiminished. Without the infusion of military influence into the program, the NROTC would cease to fulfill its mission—the training and commissioning of ensigns and second lieutenants for the Fleet.
The Continuing Challenge: The Navy and Change in Modern America
John A. Lorelli— An American writer, recently describing his boyhood, wrote, "I may not know who I am, but I know where I am from ... 1 am a product of the American earth. . .
What qualities do we Americans possess that make us American? How are we somehow different from the people of Europe? What transformed us from immigrants into Americans? Child-like, many American men continue to see themselves as buckskin-clad mountain men, gunslinging cowboys, hardy forty-niners, or industrious Yankee traders. Americans are against revolutionaries and revolution, and become uncomfortable when reminded that their country began with a revolution led by some eloquent but desperate revolutionaries. They venerate their flag and become very angry when they see someone burning it.
Americans fought a long and bloody civil war because they couldn’t decide who among them was interpreting the Constitution correctly. Americans have been Whigs, Federalists, Free Soilers, Greenbacks, Anacondas, Know Nothings, Populists, Bull Moose, Progressives, Prohibitionists, Socialists, American Independents, Democrats, and Republicans. They have condemned and fought against imperialism, Fascism, and Communism, yet they have been imperialists, isolationists, internationalists, and have supported Fascists.
Since 1965, America has been polarized, its people either totally committed, or militantly opposed, to such new folk heroes as Hardhats, Weathermen, and Black Panthers. Nor can any description of modern polarization’s causes fail to omit the most controversial—Vietnam.
Still, through all our recurring national agony, we have maintained the same form of government, the same flag, and the same name in an unbroken line spanning 197 years.
Yet, we still don’t know who we are in the same sense that an Englishman knows he is an Englishman. On the other hand, we have always been aware of exactly where we came from. We take pride in our own particular roots, all of which are firmly embedded in American soil.
The Puritans, whose roots were elsewhere, first came to the New World, bringing with them a complete load of European cultural baggage. Their institutions and ideas were European. The society they envisioned was as rigidly structured and regimented as any in Europe. The American frontier experience changed all that.
Out there, beyond the Appalachians, a limitless future was there for all, and nothing but his own shortcomings could prevent a man from succeeding in whatever endeavor he chose.
As the religious zeal that had brought the first settlers to America dimmed, the image of opportunity presented by the seemingly boundless land grew brighter. After the Revolution, we pushed Westward at an ever-accelerating pace. Our population increased from three million to more than 63 million in the century between 1790 and 1890, mostly as a result of the influx of masses of European immigrants. That most of them got no further than the cities on the eastern seaboard made no difference. The American frontier had provided a vision, and merely reaching America was a triumph of sorts.
The goal of the majority of immigrants was land into which one could put his labor and out of which would come sustenance and a future. The government cooperated fully by making the public domain available at rates that nearly every man could afford. Nothing, not backbreaking labor, nor marauding Indians, not disease, nor an empty belly
could stop a determined settler. Giv<; him his work team, his wife, and hiSf Henry repeater, and nothing could stop a sodbuster. He and the cattleman and the cardsharp led civilization across the continent and put their brand on a<* entire nation. Hard work, guts, native shrewdness, and faith in the future be came the tenets of the American people
Industrialization did not change the agrarian-bred character of the American people. The opportunity that once carn( directly from the land now came from the mills, the foundries, and the facte ries wherein any man could become * tycoon—a "captain of industry.”
The words of Abraham Lincoln still ring true today: "We shall nobly save or meanly lose the last best hope o* earth.” This "last, best hope”—to reali^ man’s highest potential, this unbound^ faith in the future—is our legacy from all the strong, honest Americans who have preceded us.
Out of all that we were, then, have become what we are: a natiom primarily, of middle-class workers. Sorn: of us are satisfied, others are not, bu: all of us are free.
It is from "Middle America” that th( mass of men who are serving the Navy and who will yet serve, have come. I1 is also from the children of this middlt class that the strongest push for chantp has come. This great, amorphous, mid die class is where the dream of the fir ture lives most strongly. It is by th( unassuming, individual efforts of con1' mon men that the brightness of th< future is kept alive.
I think that any person in, or enter ing the military Service, ought to din* tenaciously to his faith in the future America is presently in a period whef the forces of change have put the rok of the military under close scrutiny Many soldiers and sailors feel naked and assailed by what to them is unreasonable and unwarranted criticism. What repb does the military Service give to any o1 its critics?
The most prevalent is to lash back-' to accuse the accusers of lack of patriot' ism, moral fiber, and direction; to cast* gate the "irresponsible” or "misguided students, newspaper editors, professors and young people in general.
The second reaction is to recall at*1* remind all those who will listen to u:
Comment and Discussion 87
of the images of the darkest days of Cold War confrontation and the inherent dangers of detente with our "implacable enemies,” Russia and China.
Both responses by the Services to their critics are wrong for a number of reasons.
First, it is difficult—and may it always be so—to envision an America where men do not ask questions. Asking why, questioning the status quo, is part of our frontier heritage and is an integral part of our American freedom.
Any state that perpetually attempts to maintain the status quo can only look forward to stagnation.
As a young student who has an honorable discharge from the Navy, I believe that many of the hard questions being asked of the military are very valid. It is neither misguided nor irresponsible to ask why we must have huge cost overruns, widely heralded weapons systems which perform miserably, expensive new ships that do not live up to expectations, black sailors rioting on board ships, and much more. On this last, my personal viewpoint, which may or may not be shared by all my former shipmates, is that racial troubles will eventually disappear when chances for fulfillment are the same for all sailors.
The old responses to all these troubling questions are based on political- social-military images that have lost their validity. While the policy of containment and confronting the "Red Menace” may have once worked, such views of the world are today as anachronistic as the wooden ship-of-the-line. The world has changed and no amount of wistful remembrances of the "old days” will bring them back. The Soviet Union has grown up, and the People’s Republic of China is growing and will continue to grow. Both states can be expected to attempt to exercise the same options on the international scene as we have. We are foolish if we expect them not to, or delude ourselves that we are capable of stopping them. It seems painfully obvious that knee-jerk reactions to outdated premises are what led us into the bitterly divisive and fruitless tangle of Vietnam. And there is no way of knowing how many capable young officers and petty officers have left the Navy simply because they could not cope with lock-step reactions based on
outmoded political-social values.
Each of us has his own interpretation of the realities of international politics and each of us thinks his own is the best. If the military, and the Navy in particular, takes an even strain they will ride the storm far more easily. The Navy is not a special, privileged elite; it stems from the people, and is an instrument of the will of the people of the United States of America, but it must stop clinging so desperately to the past. The Navy stopped flogging men’s backs over 100 years ago, but it is still trying to flog their minds into conforming with an ideal "Old Navy” that probably never existed.
Americans have never been content to live in the past. Our first settlers came here to escape a dead past. The Service must never despair because the country is changing. It is changing because it is alive and vigorous and it remains a country that all the Armed Forces should be proud to serve.
Some words by the late President Harry S. Truman, written in 1966, seem apt:
It all seems to have been in vain. Memories are short and appetites for power and glory are insatiable. Old tyrants depart. New ones take their place. Old allies become the foe. The recent enemy becomes the friend. It is all very baffling and trying, [but] we cannot lose hope, we cannot despair. For it is all too obvious that if we do not abolish war on this earth, then surely, one day war will abolish us from the earth.
"Oil Pollution—Carelessness or Crime?”
(See A. R. Butler, pp. 51-57, December 1972; pp. 83-84, April; and p. 95, June 1973 Proceedings)
Burlie A. Brunson, Physical Oceanographer, Naval Undersea Center—As an oceanographer, I recognize the perils to the ocean environment of unchecked oil pollution. This concern, however, does not warrant the use of scare tactics which are given the added credibility of a degree in oceanography.
Ensign Butler has oversimplified the world’s ocean circulation in order to substantiate his hypothesis that an oil spill in the North Atlantic could pollute
the entire world. Perhaps a few facts about the character of Ensign Butler’s transport mechanism might help to clarify my point.
The proposed spill of crude oil is composed of material which has a density less than that of the surrounding seawater (.977 vs. 1.025), and is notoriously insoluble in water. Given these two facts, the quantity of "soluble residues” which might enter the deep circulation of the Atlantic after such a spill would be necessarily small.
The volume of oil in a 120,000-ton spill is approximately 1 X 105 cubic meters (m3). When compared to the volume transport of North Atlantic Deep Water, at 8 to 27 X 106 m3 per second, it is easily seen that the dilution factor would be tremendous. Given a reasonable sinking time and a generous assumption that one-half the spilled oil enters the circulation, the concentration of crude oil constituents will approximate the naturally occurring concentrations as reported by various oceanographic sources. This concentration is very small, on the order of one part per billion.
Finally, we may look at the rate of decomposition of crude oil. It is estimated that a particle sinking in the North Atlantic would require a minimum of 32 years to traverse the ocean and emerge at the Antarctic Divergence. Since the rate of decomposition of crude oil is speeded up under conditions of high pressure and high oxygen concentration, and these conditions are representative of North Atlantic Deep Water (200 atmospheres pressure, oxygen maximum), it is reasonable to assume that during the 32-year transit, the crude oil will decompose to harmless substances before it reaches the surface in the South Atlantic.
This is not an attack on Ensign Butler, nor an attempt to question his credentials; it is merely a plea to all scientists to check their assertions against facts in order to assure the future credibility of the scientific community in matters of ecological concern. This is an obligation which is becoming increasingly important in light of the ever-mounting deluge of baseless claims which are flooding the media and being readily consumed by a concerned populace.
Oglala—"The Ship That Sank From Fright”
(See M. Feathcrman, pp. 84-86, December
1972; and pp. 97-98, July 1973 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John R. Shackleton, U. S. Naval Reserve-R— I read with great interest Maurice Featherman’s "Old Navy” article. I felt that perhaps the readers would be interested in her ultimate fate.
I first saw the USS Oglala while fishing near the Joffee Shipbreakers yard in Richmond, California, during October 1965. Her obviously antique lines stood out markedly among the war-built Liberties that were then in the process of being re-cycled.
After obtaining permission, I went on board the ship and wandered through the passageways and engineering spaces. The staterooms were intact. The wardroom was still equipped with the ubiquitous grey metal chairs. A dusty green felt table cloth lay in a corner.
In the pilot house, the wheel had been removed, but the rest of the fixtures seemed in place. Only one navigation publication was evident, H.O. No. 162, Malacca Strait and Sumatra—1952.
Determined to learn more about this ship, which, by the look of her, should have fallen under the breaker’s hammer decades ago, I checked her name through ship’s histories and was amazed at her long and varied existence.
From her commissioning, as the USS Shaumut, a fast minelayer, on 7 December 1917 (an anniversary that was to be celebrated in the mud of Pearl Harbor 24 years later) until her disposition by the Maritime Administration in 1965, her service covered 48 years.
Almost half a century of use, first as a commissioned ship and finally as a floating depot ship—certainly a cost- effective situation in anyone’s book. Stricken from the list after World War II, she was used as a depot ship in the Benicia reserve fleet. There she remained tied up at the small pier, a familiar sight to the cadets of the California Maritime Academy just down the bay at Vallejo and the fishermen of Suisun Bay. She was finally sold to Joffee and towed down the bay to his yard in Richmond. By Christmas of 1965, the ex-USS Oglala had vanished from the bay.
No doubt she still exists somewhere—a razor blade, a Toyota, a bronze fitting for a tug boat, or perhaps as copper pipe in a watercooler. Such was the unfortunate but inevitable end to a ship with a long, rich history.
Victor Beals— It was kind of Maurice Featherman to say that the USS Oglala, when afloat, looked ". . . like a droopy-eared mongrel pup surrounded by sleek greyhounds . . . yet somehow she became a legend along with the best of them.” To veterans of the North Sea Mine Force in World War I, however, the minelayers Shaumut (Oglala) and Aroostook were greyhounds of our Fleet. They were the only oil-burners and their 20-knot speed was a lot in those days. If the Oglala looked funny, you should have seen the rest of our minelayers— coal-burners all.
It was exactly 24 years before Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1917, that the Shaumut, to our distress later named Oglala, and her twin the Aroostook, were commissioned. They had been hastily reconstructed from two Eastern Steamship passenger liners (They were not Fall River liners as Mr. Featherman said.), the SS Massachusetts and the SS Bunker Hill, that maintained an overnight passenger service between Boston and New York.
They were amongst the eight hurriedly rebuilt minelayers, plus two old adapted cruisers, the USS San Francisco and the USS Baltimore. The only other oil-burner was the USS Black Hawk, flagship and repair ship, which was also to become a Navy legend. These ships constituted the North Sea Minelaying Squadron, based at Inverness and Inver- gordon in World War I, laying a minefield 230 miles long, between the Orkney Islands and Norway—a stupendous assignment.
The two ships were originally open- deck passenger liners designed for the sheltered waters of Cape Cod Canal and Long Island Sound. They had to be decked in to make them seaworthy, and although they were built in 1907, it was not their "vintage 1907 silhouette” but their World War I decked-in appearance that gave them that funny look.
In addition to being decked in, these
ships were completely gutted to make at least one deck clear the full length of the ship for the installation of four mine tracks. In those days, sailors slung their hammocks over and around the giant eggs, secure in the thought that if anything happened, they would be spared the details.
Statistically, the Shawmut displaced 3,800 tons, had a complement of 20 officers and a crew of 346, had a 352- mine capacity, and laid a total of 2,970 anchored mines as her contribution to the total of 56,571 mines laid by her mine squadron.
Captain Wat Tyler Cluverius, U. S. Navy, commanded the Shawmut. Cap tain Cluverius was beloved by all who knew him. He had been a midshipman in the USS Maine sunk at Havana harbor, on 15 February 1898, with 266 casualties. It was generally believed that Captain Cluverius, who died 28 October 1952, was the last living survivor of the Maine.
I was not a crewmember in the Shaw mut, but I was on Captain Cluverius’ publication staff back in 1918, and had numerous contacts with him in 191® and throughout the years.
If the Oglala suffered a major disaster, it was nothing compared to the shameful demise the Aroostook endured. In 1945-1946, the old ship was sold for junk. Somebody made an offer for the stripped-down hulk, which was then towed from Seattle to Long Beach, where it was refitted for an offshore gambling casino and renamed Lux. Veterans’ protests and police harassment finally terminated this ignominious enterprise.
Maurice Featherman further reveals that the Oglala ". . . fought in two wars and was active as a U. S. naval vessel for 30 years,” and that the ship after being raised from the depths of Pearl Harbor ". . . provided vital services in countless ways . . .” during the remaining years of the war.
Perhaps as the old Oglala was dozing at her Pearl Harbor berth, minding her own business, she was dreaming about her North Sea minelaying days. With 352 mines on board, when the Japanese torpedo and bomb struck only a few feet away, you can believe she was frightened—not just for herself, but for the Fleet and the whole harbor!
Oglala, ex-Shawmut, ex-Massachusetts The End of the Story
1944—"Slightly exaggerated" proved to be all the reports of her demise as the USS Oglala (ARG-l) displays her neat new attire of World War II camouflage after being raised and refitted.
Notebook Item—"Chile’s Strait Of Magellan Is Alive Again With Ships’’
(See Notebook, p. 117, January 1973 Proceedings)
Hugo Cabezas Videla, Contraalmirante,Jefe Estado Mayor General Armada, Chile— The Notebook item on Chile erred in the statement, "It narrows to 180 yards at rocky, shallow Kirke Canal, a graveyard for ships in the pre-radar era.”
Kirke Narrows and shallow Kirke Channel do not correspond to the Strait of Magellan. Kirke Channel is situated at 52°05'45" South Latitude, 73°03'30" West Longitude. It connects Chilean Patagonia Channels (Canal Smyth, Seno Union, Golfo Almirante Montt) with Puerto Natales in Chilean Continental Patagonia.
The Strait of Magellan, in its narrowest parts has the following widths: First Narrows, 1.7 nautical miles; Crooked Pass, 1.0 nautical miles. Both have enough depth to make possible the passage of deep-draft ships.
A correct description of the Strait of Magellan can be found in No. 24 publication, Sailing Direction for South America, Volume II, (U. S. Navy Hydrographic Office), Chapter 6, or Der- rotero de la Costa de Chile, Volume IV (Hydrographic Institute, Chilean Navy).
"Modern Realities in Naval and Foreign Affairs”
(See H. C. Bucknell, III, pp. 32-40, December 1972 Proceedings)
Consul General Theodore B. Dobbs, Department of State— I cannot agree with Captain Bucknell’s thesis that the traditional interdependence of the military and the State Department has become increasingly subject to barriers which threaten the vital rapport between them. Quite the contrary, it has been my observation that there is more of a rapport and unity of purpose today than there was in the past.
One reason for this has been the success of the Department of State- Department of Defense (DoD) officer exchange program which celebrated its tenth birthday in 1972. The exchange program is a natural outgrowth of
efforts by State and DoD to improve mutual understanding of foreign and military policy in our nation’s capital. It is aimed at creating for the future, a small corps of experienced personnel capable of assisting and advising in the formulation of national security policy.
Approximately 15 Foreign Service Officers serve in DoD and the Services for a two-year period. DoD officers serve in State in Political-Military, the Geographical Bureaus, and other offices within the Department. Today, it is a common sight to see a military officer behind a desk at "New State.”
Foreign Service Officers are assigned as faculty advisors and members to all of the War Colleges, the Naval, Military, and Air Force Academies, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Armed Forces Staff College and the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance. They are also assigned as political advisors to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command, the Chief of Naval Operations, and to Commander, Military Airlift Command.
Finally, a word about the War Colleges themselves. Foreign Service Officers are assigned as students to each of the various War Colleges just as military officers are assigned to the State Department’s Senior Seminar. This program has been in existence for several years, i.e., long enough for studies such as the one conducted by Murray B. Frazee, Jr., on "The Influence of the National War College and its Graduates on the Formulation of United States Foreign Policy” to be completed. To Mr. Frazee, ". . . the conclusion appears inescapable that the common educational experience of several hundred high and middle level decision makers is a significant element in the foreign policy formulation process.”
I have been fortunate enough to have been assigned to the exchange program (Navy-Op-61) and to the Air War College. Three years with those two Services, plus prior service in the Marine Corps have provided me with the belief that I have gained a fair knowledge of how the host agency operates, how it acts and thinks, and how it arrives at policy decisions. Returning to the State Department, I felt that I, and my colleagues, were better equipped to deal with political-military problems, had a
better understanding of how each department formulates national security policy, and were better officers after having benefited from a "transfer of knowledge.” If nothing else, we have learned that we are on the same team. [5][6]
Comment and Discussion 91
so. And I suspect strongly that the Department of State would enthusiastically support such efforts to make the attache system meaningful.
I wonder if Captain Bucknell is aware of the officer exchange program between the Departments of Defense and State? He does not mention it. Admittedly, it is small in scale, about 15 officers on each side. But the impact is considerable. The officers enter operational jobs in each other’s services. They learn firsthand about the other service’s responsibilities and problems. They transmit this understanding to many other members of their own service. And many more members of the host service come in contact with the exchange officer and gain an awareness of his views and his service’s attitudes. I, for instance, spent two years as Deputy Chief of the Global Plans Division of Air Force Headquarters; I can testify that it was a tremendous learning experience in many directions.
Specifically, under the exchange program there are FSOs on duty in the Navy and naval officers on duty in State. An FSO is on the personal staff of the Chief of Naval Operations as a political adviser. Two other FSOs serve elsewhere on the naval staff and another is an adviser to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. A Navy captain is the Deputy Director of International Security Operations in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department of State. Others serve elsewhere in the Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
On the captain’s basic substantive point regarding the need for close cooperation between State and Navy in national security matters, I am also in hearty agreement. Much can be done and we certainly need to identify our needs as accurately as possible and do all we can to attain them.
There is a real dilemma here, however. On the diplomat’s side of the problem much is outside the control of the United States. Within quite broad limits, what kind of Navy we are going to have—money, men, ships, weapons— is within the control of the United States. If we wish to award sufficient national priority we can have the kind of Navy we want. Foreign bases and facilities are not within the control of
the United States. As the world’s strongest power, we have a great deal of bargaining power. But, in the last analysis, if another nation does not want to give us the facilities or assistance we seek, we cannot get them. The ability of a small nation to "give the United States a hard time” is shown graphically by such examples as North Vietnam, Cuba, Chile, and India. A diplomat quickly becomes impressed with the fact that the interests of no other nation are identical with those of the United States. No other country is as similar to the United States as Canada, yet we have wide and important differences. The diplomat finds himself trying to get some measure of agreement out of these varying interests. He must search for areas of mutual or parallel concerns. But by their nature, they are limited and they must be made to serve the interests of both parties or they will not be viable. The situation is made even more difficult by the varying American interests. Virtually never is there one overriding American national interest. Two crucial interests of the United States in the Middle East are the vital concern of American Jews and others in the security of Israel and the growing, soon-to- be-great, reliance of the United States on oil in Arab hands. In fact, the Middle East is a good example of the difficulties in the kind of diplomatic/naval cooperation in meeting U. S. security needs posited by Captain Bucknell. He emphasizes United States dependence on overseas oil; the situation is probably even worse than he pictures. On the other hand, he approaches ASW from the viewpoint of American overseas base requirements. It is most improbable that any Middle Eastern or Mediterranean nation would give us facilities that we could count on. At the very best, the situation on the diplomatic side of the equation would be distinctly unsettled. In other areas of the world, perhaps there would be sufficient coincidence of U. S. and other national interests to enable us to get base facilities. Clearly, the worldwide trend is in the other direction. In short, the diplomat is largely unable to assure the Navy that he can get foreign facilities, no matter how much they seem to be needed to assure U. S. national security. As I said initially, we must try and get what we
can of what seems essential to us; but we must accept the fact that we may not be able to get any or all of what we want.
The diplomat, however, has three ways to make this problem manageable. I submit it is equally incumbent on naval (and other military) officers to accept and work with these realities too. Frankly, I find a distinct tendency to denigrate them. If I need to live with naval realities to discharge my sworn duty to my country, naval officers must learn to live with diplomatic realities. After all, our basic goal is a world of free and independent nations. That clearly means the right to disagree with the United States and for each nation to pursue its interests as it thinks best. Our influence is lessening and should be selective and respectful of others.
To get back to the three alternative approaches. One is to think in terms of very flexible naval (and military) force that can be selectively deployed from American territory. To the degree that we can retain or acquire overseas facilities, nothing is lost. If we lose them we can still fulfill our national requirements.
The second approach is active diplomacy to encourage the emerging multipower world. In short, varying national interests can be used positively to help us. Historically, this is the way that the United States has protected itself. A balance of powers makes it virtually impossible for any one of them to get an insuperable edge. Soviet submarine strength is great, but how likely are they to use it against the United States when they consider the dangerous unknowns of Western Europe, the Peoples Republic of China, Japan, and their Eastern European satellites, plus our strategic nuclear capabilities? In short, could the Soviets ever calculate the certainty of sufficient national advantage to outweigh all those possibilities for national ruin so as to make them confident enough to use their submarines against the United States? Active diplomacy can seek constantly for such a balance of unknowns and strength as to deter the use of Soviet naval strength. This does not say that the United States does not need formidable naval and other deterrents. But it does sharply reduce our need for foreign operational facilities
and makes our need for a flexible, effective Navy something which is within our national decision-making control.
The third element of the diplomat’s approach is to seek actively and realistically to strengthen the peacekeeping and peacemaking facilities of the international community. This is not a pie-in- the-sky proposal. It is hard-headed realism. Two-thirds of the world is developing socially and economically and prone to frustrations, violence, and instability. If we can find ways to "defuse” these episodes of instability, we can avoid their possible escalation and eruption into major problems, such as Vietnam. By the same token, most of these nations of the developing world have a practical interest in mitigating instabilities in ways not likely to make them areas of contention among the major powers. In short, there is enormous potential support for viable international peacekeeping. It should be in our interests too, to avoid our having to intervene in overseas situations to prevent our interests being pre-empted. There are indications that the Soviets
may be coming to a situation, because of their concerns about China and internal problems, in which they too would be amenable. Certainly we have little to lose and much to gain. Active, honest, and reasonably humble diplomacy in the United Nations, Organization of American States, and elsewhere is needed. If other nations (such as Canada or the Scandinavians) are willing to take the lead let us support them. On the military side of the house, we need to develop specific U. S. doctrine for peacekeeping operations, earmark specific American units, and use our military assistance programs to help our friends develop and earmark a variety of effective peacekeeping units. The U. S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines have a host of capabilities that would be highly useful in supporting peacekeeping operations.
Each of these approaches is meaningful even if they cannot be visualized as concretely as ships, men, weapons, and bases. I cite them to show that diplomats do consider these problems in quite realistic fashion and have some
thing to offer. I thus heartily endorse again Captain Bucknell’s call for closer cooperation between naval and foreign service officers. This kind of realistic assessment of problems and approaches cannot but advance our country’s interests, the overriding concern of all of us in the Navy and the Foreign Service.
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Commander Sidney E. Wood, Jr., U. S- Navy, Naval Attache, Defense Attache Office, Embassy of the United States, Helsinki, Finland— Captain Bucknell’s article reminded me of Commander Bowler’s invitation in the November 1972 issue of the Proceedings, for discussions on the need (or lack thereof) for a Baltic squadron. The Baltic is one of the seas most susceptible to the establishment of cordons as envisioned by Captain Buck- nell. It is also, of course, the home of one of the Soviet Union’s four fleets- For many reasons, it appears entirely unnecessary for the U. S. Navy to establish a Baltic Squadron. There are a multitude of problems which would be ex-
Comment and Discussion 93
traordinarily difficult to overcome in establishing a viable combat force in the Baltic. Basically, there are no interests of vital national importance to the United States in the area which could be protected by the establishment of a naval force of the modest size which could be afforded.
Where would such a squadron be based? Of the eight nations bordering the various arms of the Baltic, three are members of the Warsaw Pact, two are neutrals who currently are much at odds with the United States over its defense of South Vietnam, and two of the three NATO powers have long-standing policies of not allowing the establishment of foreign military forces on their territories during time of peace. That leaves only West Germany as a possible site for basing and the few miles of Baltic coastline available to Germany are extremely cramped.
What type squadron is proposed? The Baltic is hardly the place for a carrier task force. It is too shallow and hazardous for extensive submarine operations. Even the normal surface combatant, amphibious, and service force ships of the U. S. Navy would find the Baltic confining. The sea is ideal for mine warfare, but our mine force has all but disappeared. The U. S. Navy has no small, fast, surface-to-surface armed patrol ships with which to form a Baltic Squadron that might add some degree of effectiveness to NATO sea defenses. In short, the only purpose any foreseeable U. S. Navy force in the Baltic could serve is as an expendable "tripwire.”
Worse yet, where would the squadron operate? The Gulf of Finland is located between the Soviet Union and Finland which, although neutral in outlook, is tied to the U.S.S.R. by a mutual assistance treaty which specifically calls upon it to consult with the Soviet Union in the event of danger posed by "Germany or its allies.” U. S. naval operations in the Gulf would surely trigger Soviet demands for such consultations. Additionally, the Gulf is so narrow that there is little room for effective operations, and it is often iced in the winter. Similarly, the Gulf of Bothnia is located between Finland and another self- proclaimed neutral state which is the most vociferous Vietnam critic of the United States in the Western world.
The Gulf of Bothnia is also a bottle, stoppered by the demilitarized Aaland Islands, and frozen over in the winter.
Only a few months ago, a former Danish Defense Minister arbitrarily stated, even if unauthorized, that NATO naval maneuvers should not take place in the Baltic east of Bornholm. Recognizing the rights, by international law, of the U. S. or NATO ships to sail the Baltic as long as territorial seas are not violated, this statement is typical of the kinds of political pressures to which U. S. Navy operations in the Baltic would be subjected. Even the matter of port visits would pose great problems. Excluding the Pact nations, it is unlikely that Finland or Sweden would welcome any increase over the already rare visits by U. S. ships.
Captain Bucknell’s proposal of a cordon across the narrows is the most logical, reasonable, and inexpensive method of dealing with the Baltic in terms not only of men, ships, money, and* operational limitations, but from the aspect of international politics as well. The rights of the United States and NATO to use the Baltic and our friendship and interest in the freedom of Baltic states can be maintained through periodic exercises and port visits.
If the day comes when the cordon is necessary, it can be implemented with the help of our NATO allies through any combination of barriers, mines, submarine, surface, and aerial interdiction of the narrows between the North and Baltic seas. Perhaps, as a contribution to this force, what is needed is a North Sea Squadron.
"Blue Water Monitor”
(S# J. A. Knowles, Jr., pp. 78-79, March;
and p. 96, August 1973 Proceedings)
Commander E. C. Davis, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I believe that the article by Mr. Knowles contained three errors of some consequence. The first, that she had two 10.5-;nch propellers—and on those large engines.
The second, that the Russians fashioned a new towing cable, 13 inches in diameter and 165 fathoms long. That is about the size of the surge hawsers used at Fort Mason in San Francisco Bay for large ships, and certainly must have
presented quite a stowage problem.
The third, that when we bought Alaska for $7-million, we only got 580,107 acres. Now even Rhode Island, our smallest state has more than that.
Most likely what was intended in the first instance was feet in diameter; the second, inches in circumference; and in the third, square miles.
Editor’s Note: The author acknowledges that Commander Davis is correct on all three counts.
"Toward a Navy Second to One”
(See R. H. Smith, pp. 42-51, November 1972
Proceedings)
Dr. Nicholas Tracy—Captain Smith gets his priorities wrong when he suggests that the protection of merchant commerce ought to be the first aspect of naval defense to be abandoned, in the light of Soviet naval expansion, if U. S. forces must be limited.
As top priority, after the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent and coastal forces, he classes the capability for amphibious operations and bombardment which he considers to be the principal instruments of naval influence on international affairs. Undoubtedly, the present nuclear stability can be partially accounted for by the invulnerability of submarine-based ballistic missiles, and so it is apparent that the maintenance of the submarine-based deterrent is top priority for U. S. forces, and to a lesser extent for those of Britain. For the same reason, a very low priority ought to be placed on chasing Russian ballistic missile submarines. Not only is such activity unproductive, but if it were not it would have to be avoided by all parties as destructive of security by making the U. S. and Russian deterrents equally vulnerable. Coastal security is also obviously of high priority. But when it comes to evaluation of other naval activities, it is necessary to consider the capabilities of maritime forces to influence international affairs.
Naval forces can influence diplomatic affairs by their ability to destroy targets within range of their armaments. In this respect, naval air power and the power of long-range Air Force bombers are similar; the range is virtually unlimited
and the coercive power apparently very great. The threat of bombardment is such a barbaric mode of conducting international relations, however, that public opinion and government policy is unlikely to countenance it. Furthermore the coercive effect of bombardment proved singularly ineffective during World War II, and it is not noticeably greater today. Bombardment can really only be justified if it serves a vital military objective in connection with a more constructive military operation.
The amphibious power of naval forces gives them some power over littoral areas. But the intrinsic limitations of forces, supported by thousands of miles of sea communications, define the amount of force which can be deployed. Thus, if the conflict cannot be confined by the closing of enemy communications, the intervening amphibious force is unlikely to be able on its own to equal the locally-based force. In an open ended battlefield, the amphibious force can only be significant if it supports an already strong local force.
The strongest position for amphibious forces is in an insular context, and this is because the same naval forces which brought them to battle can close the sea communications of the enemy. This fact is so clear that it suggests that in many insular contexts the amphibious force is superfluous if the naval forces can control sea communications. The battle of the Atlantic made it clear that invasion of Great Britain was unnecessary if British sea communications were reduced below a sizeable minimum.
Consequently, it is apparent that the greatest influence the American Navy has is in its ability to protect the maritime commerce of friends. If a nation such as Japan were unable to count on American support to keep its sea lanes open, a threat of Russian blockade would force it to agree to almost any demands. Conversely, American pressure can be applied to unfriendly forces by its own blockade.
Far less obvious is the need to maintain large amphibious forces. Small, highly-trained forces which can operate in insular situations should suffice to assist friends in insular situations. But it is not clear that there is any value in maintaining large forces capable of
intervening on the littoral of continental countries—for how can they be large enough to compete with continental-based enemies?
What effect does the development of Soviet surface naval forces have upon the influence of U. S. naval forces? Basically, the answer does not lie in any assessment of the military capabilities of the Soviet ships. The first concern of the U. S. and Russian governments when maneuvering for influence is to avoid combat with each other’s forces. This means that even a token military presence by one power precludes the possibility of direct military pressure by the other. Presumably a single warship can constitute such a presence, although ground-based forces are more committing and so are a more convincing indication of national determination to protect any given area. But the growth of Soviet seapower does not affect the American ability to assist its friends: the Russian ships will not stand between American ships and the ports of an ally. Consequently, only unwelcome naval interference is made more difficult, and surely there are few occasions when the Americans are going to want to undertake aggressive action. The Soviet surface forces serve as an encouragement to various countries to develop closer connections with the Communist bloc, partially by suggesting that such action can safely be taken without American interference. But they cannot, because of the same restraint which restricts American freedom, force any country into the Communist empire, nor can they prevent defections. Thus the presence of ships of both powers encourages the independence and freedom of many nations. The influence of U. S. naval forces is reduced, but not to an important extent. If it encourages American reliance to a greater degree upon other forms of diplomatic influence, it may well be beneficial and strengthening for the Free World.
It is not impossible, however, that there may arise an issue of sufficient importance to incline either Russia or the United States to use force even if it requires military action against the regular Services of the other. As nothing but madness could persuade anyone to commit the greatest of all crimes against humanity, a nuclear suicide, it will obvi
ously be government policy to devise a strategy sufficient to coerce but limited in its threat. The Soviet surface forces in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean do not appear to be in a position to do more than hamper American naval operations. But the Soviet submarine forces and surface units would appear to be quite capable of seriously challenging the sea communications of the North Atlantic and North Pacific. Such a challenge would be "limited,” but unless it could be defeated by conventional means, it would be fatal to American influence. The Russians would only need to declare that operations inimical to their interests would lead to the imposition of a North Atlantic blockade for American policy to be defeated. The fact that the late President John F. Kennedy blockaded Cuba would suffice to justify to world opinion similar action on the part of Russia.
Control of sea communications remains the basic power of naval forces, and hence, the ability to defend the sea traffic vital to the United States and its friends remains the sine qua non of naval defense.
"Indonesia’s Archipelago
Doctrine and Japan’s Jugular”
(See R. A. Miller, pp. 26-33, October 1972
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Rodney Coffman, U. S. Navy— Captain Miller’s article points out the fact that the Indonesian Archipelago is a most important chain of islands from a strategic point of view. This fact has certainly not been lost to the Soviet Union whose diplomats have worked long and patiently to gain a dominant influence there. As far back as 1948, the Soviets triggered a Communist coup attempt against Dutch colonial rule.
After the failure of the 1965 Communist coup attempt, the Soviets chose to low-key the disaster and insisted that the Chinese were to blame. Economic assistance was resumed, a large $1.2-billion debt was rescheduled, shipments of spate parts for Soviet-manufactured military equipment were recommenced, and Russia refrained from blocking Indonesia’s entry into the United Nations- They have gone very easy on President
Comment and Discussion 95
Suharto and have not labeled him a Fascist, which is a common Communist phrase for an authoritarian anti- Communist government.
For the present, Moscow seems to be satisfied with keeping Indonesia out of the Western camp, but it would be folly to think that the Soviets, with their constant drive to develop a seapower strategy, will ever give up the dream of a friendly Communist government emerging there. Control of the Indonesian island chain would outflank both Japan and Red China, two of Russia’s biggest competitors in Asia and the Pacific. The spread of influence by these two potential giants could be inhibited. Even worse, the squeeze that would be put on Japan by a closing of the Straits could open more doors for Soviet opportunists. If the Kremlin could keep from being directly involved in such a closing, it would be no surprise to find them selling Siberian oil to Japan in exchange for money and trade agreements.
Though Soviet stock is low in Indonesia at the present, it must be remembered that, prior to 1948, they had little influence in the Middle East. Events opened doors to them there, however, and, as is well known, they moved in. Future events could well help them in Indonesia and that is why, for the present, Russia is content to wait in the wings.
A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea”
{See C. Margaritis, pp. 112-147, May 1973 Proceedings, Naval Review Issue)
Emil C. Oestreich—Vice Admiral Margaritis, in a very minor comment, overlooked the remarkable culture and maritime accomplishments of the Polynesians, when he made the statement that ", . . there has been only one maritime civilization, that of the Aegean, to which our Western civilization is indebted for the art and the science of the sea.”
The Polynesian art and skill of navigation, shiphandling, and ship construction were eye-openers to representation of Western culture who learned much from them.
"Japanese Naval Aviation”
{See T. Ohmae and R. Pineau, pp. 68-78,
December 1972 Proceedings)
R. D. Layman—The Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN) association with aeronautics began in the mid-1870s when officers of the fledgling Naval Academy constructed some hot-air and coal-gas balloons, one of which it was proposed to use against the Satsuma rebels in 1877. The first combat use of an aerial device by the IJN occurred on 9 August 1904, when a naval officer suspended in a balloon basket directed the fire of a land-based naval battery in a bombardment of the Russian battleships Peresviet and Retvizan during the siege of Port Arthur. Several damaging hits were scored on the latter ship in this first indirect offensive use of an aerial device against surface warships.
Three naval officers were among the members of a government Provisional Military Balloon Research Society established in 1907. Despite its name, this organization also guided Japan’s first ventures into heavier-than-air flying. Under its aegis, the first Army and Navy officers were assigned to European and American flight schools.
Like most navies of the pre-World War I period, the IJN was initially more interested in seaplanes than in land machines. This interest was first stimulated by a visiting American exhibition flier, William Atwater, who demonstrated a Curtiss seaplane in May 1911. His show included dropping a message to a naval vessel and flying with a Navy officer as passenger. The next month a Naval Aeronautical Research Committee was formed, marking the IJN’s official, formal entrance into the realm of aviation.
The Japanese Navy was the first in the world to make sustained use of shipboard aviation. Its first aviation vessel began life as the Glasgow-built British merchantman Lethington, launched in 1901. Trying to run the blockade to Russian territory, she was seized on 12 January 1905 off Okinoshima by the Japanese torpedo boat No. 72 and became a legitimate prize of war. She was taken into IJN auxiliary service and given the name Wakamiya Maru on 1 September 1905, serving under charter and manned by a civilian crew. First
used as a "carrier” in the fleet maneuvers of October-November 1913, she operated a single 70-h.p. Maurice Farman floatplane. It is highly unlikely that, as the authors state, she was "converted” for this role. Much more likely, the aircraft was simply stowed on a hatch cover and handled by cargo booms. Later, however, she was given canvas aircraft shelters fore and aft, and these were eventually replaced by more permanent aircraft quarters.
The Wakamiya Maru apparently reverted to her earlier prosaic cargo ship- transport duties after the 1913 maneuvers, but on 17 August 1914 she was officially designated an "aircraft mother ship” and arrived at Tsingtao on 1 September carrying four Maurice Farman floatplanes—two on deck and two disassembled below. The vessel and her little brood of seaplanes pioneered the concept of shipboard aviation during the siege of the German territory, months before similar work was undertaken by British and German aviation vessels. The Japanese Farmans bombed targets ashore and at sea, scouted enemy ships and troop positions, detected mines, and reconnoitered amphibious landing sites. It was the first time that much of such work had been carried out by shipborne aircraft, or indeed by naval aircraft of any kind. There was even aerial combat of sorts with the lone German airman defender of Tsingtao, Oberleutnant zur See Gunther Pliischow, who flew his Rumpler Taube monoplane armed with a pistol and bombs made of coffee cans filled with dynamite, horseshoe nails, and iron scraps.
Early in the campaign, however, the Wakamiya Maru was damaged by a mine and had to return to Japan for repair. Her seaplanes continued operations from a beach base. She was patched up in time to take them home in November after the fall of Tsingtao.
The vessel did not drop her mercantile-auxiliary suffix of Maru until mid-1915, when she was finally commissioned as a full-fledged naval unit. Her contributions continued after the war. In April 1920, she was fitted with a forecastle launching platform from which Lieutenant (later Vice Admiral) Torao Kuwabara made the first IJN shipboard flight, taking off in a British Sopwith Pup as the vessel steamed into
the wind at 12 knots. Subsequent flights by Kuwabara from the Wakamiya, plus takeoffs from the battleship Yamashiro and the light cruiser Kuma, provided valuable data on which future IJN shipboard flight techniques were based. The platform was removed from the Wakamiya after the 1920 experiments and she again became a seaplane carrier, finally being stricken from the Japanese Navy list on 1 April 1930.
The flight deck vessel entered the IJN via the Hosho, which as the article notes was the first ship in the world to be designed and built from the keel up as an aircraft carrier. She was designed by Lieutenant T. Taji, a naval constructor, who had studied in Britain in 1915 and 1916. The "pilot named Jordan” who made the first landing on the Hosho was Captain W. L. Jordan, a former Royal Naval Air Service and Royal Air Force fighter pilot with a distinguished war record, who was employed as an engineer and test pilot by Mitsubishi. An apparent typographical error in the article dates the first landing as occurring in 1922; actually, it was 22 February 1923. The second landing was made on the Hosho not by Lieutenant Shun-ichi Kira as the article states, but by Herbert G. Brackley, a member of the Sempill mission, piloting a Vickers Viking amphibian flying boat. Kira was the third man to land on the carrier; his plane went overboard on his second attempt but he was uninjured. His accident caused some red faces among members of the British mission responsible for training Japanese pilots. These landings were not made, as the article states, on a bare deck. The Hosho was equipped with a system of fore-and-aft arresting cables devised by Kuwabara and similar to those employed on the British Furious and Argus. Technical difficulties prevented installation of an athwartships system at that time, but such a system was fitted later.
The Mitsubishi Type 10 fighter flown by Jordan and Kira was designed by Herbert Smith, head of a British design team employed by Mitsubishi during the early 1920s. As chief designer for Sopwith Aircraft Company during World War I, Smith had produced many outstanding British warplanes. The carrier planes he designed for Mitsubishi were workhorses of the Imperial Japa
nese Navy air arm for several years.
The most influential factor in the development of Japanese naval aviation was the British advisory Mission of 1921 to 1923 headed by Captain the Master of Sempill (later the 19th Lord Sempill). This mission had been requested and arranged by Navy Minister Tomosaburo Kato, who had commanded the Japanese fleet at Tsingtao. That experience, it may be assumed, had shown him the value of aircraft, and Pliischow’s attacks had concerned him enough that he had exercised his ships in anti-aircraft protective measures.
The Sempill mission was responsible for the introduction of many British aircraft into Japan, either for operational service or evaluation. These included the Avro 504L and 504K trainers, Gloster Sparrowhawk and Martinsyde F-4 fighters, Parnall Panther carrier reconnaissance plane, Supermarine Seal and Vickers Viking amphibious flying boats, Blackburn Swift and Sopwith Cuckoo torpedo planes, Supermarine Channel and Felixstowe F-5 flying boats, and D.H.-9 reconnaissance-bomber. The Avros, Sparrowhawks, and F-5S were acquired in considerable number, some built in Japan under license. On 12 April 1922, a formation of F-5S, led by Brackley, met the British battle cruiser Renown, bearing the Prince of Wales (the late Duke of Windsor) on a visit to Japan, and escorted her to Tokyo Bay—a far friendlier reception than that accorded by Japanese naval aircraft to her sister, the Repulse, 19 years later.
The article notes that the second Japanese carrier was the Akagi, but it does not mention the genesis of a similar ship, the Kaga. Like the American Lexington and Saratoga, both were completed as carriers under a provision of the Washington Naval Treaty allowing such use of incomplete capital ship hulls. Originally, the Akagi was to have had a sister carrier, the Amagi, also laid down as a battle cruiser. But the Amagi's hull was so badly damaged by the great earthquake of September 1922 that work was abandoned and an incomplete battleship, the Kaga, was substituted. The Akagi and the Kaga were similar in many respects, but far from being sisters. Both were extensively remodeled and improved during the 1930s.
The article’s statement that battle
ships and cruisers of the Combined Fleet were equipped with catapults by 1927 is open to challenge. The 1920s light cruisers of the Nagara and Sendai classes and one ship of the Kuma class mounted fixed forward aircraft launching platforms similar to those that sprouted on a few British cruisers toward the end of World War I, and while catapults were later affixed to some of these, that ap parently did not occur until after 1927- (In the 1930s, these were replaced by turntable types mounted further aft.) According to Admiral Kuwabara, the first Japanese cruiser to mount a catapult was the Furutaka, on which in 1927, * compressed air type replaced a rotating launching platform. Catapults were later installed on her sister, the Kako, and their near-sisters, the Aoba and the Kinugasa. Catapults were an integral part of the design of subsequent heavy cruiser classes, but the first of these ship5 were not completed until 1929.
Although aircraft were carried by most if not all of the ten battleship5 which comprised the IJN battle line in 1927, none was equipped with a catapult until the BB reconstructions, completed between 1930 and 1937.
"The Post-Vietnam Navy:
The Rhetoric and the Realities’
(See J. K. Holloway, Jr., pp. 52-59, August;
and p. 87, December 1972 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander David J- McMunn, U. S. Naiy— Mr. Holloway’’5 remarks on the "chimera of Indian Ocean power” bear further analysis- First, one logically includes the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea in any consideration of the Indian Ocean’s strategy importance. Both extensions relate crim cally to the politically volatile, economically crucial Middle East. Second, the Soviet expansion is not necessarily seen as a direct challenge to the United State5 when cited to support a similar U. Impolicy, but rather as it manifests that area’s growing geopolitical impact.
In May 1967, President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the closing of tb£ Straits of Tiran by Egyptian guns a1 Sharm el Sheikh. The Israelis claimed that this blockage of their port at Eilaeb threatened their continued national e*' istence. In fact, the same effect could
Comment and Discussion 97
be achieved from the more remote narrows of the Red Sea mouth, the Bab el Mandeb at the Indian Ocean. A small band of Palestinian guerrillas demonstrated this vulnerability, when they fired on an Israel-bound Liberian merchant ship in that general vicinity. With the British out of Aden and the future of the costly and controversial French colony at Djibouti hardly assured, the replacement of those ill-equipped am- bushers by the armed forces of hostile governments is a distinct possibility. The effect of all this on Israel may well hinge upon the routine presence of the U. S. Navy in the area. In a larger context, one may also conclude that the heavy Soviet and Chinese investment in Yemen, Somalia, and South Yemen in recent years has been less than philanthropic.
By the same token, the intensifying significance of the Persian Gulf must also be acknowledged. Western European NATO nations import 90% of their most vital energy requirement, oil, and nearly half of it originates in the Gulf littoral. Japan’s reliance on the area approaches 90% of its total consumption. Moreover, the emerging energy crisis in the United States links this reservoir of 60% of the global petroleum reserve to steel mills in Pittsburgh and kitchens in Iowa.
While adapting to these new realities, the United States should search for solutions that accommodate the mutual self-interest of all concerned. Yet, it must contend with both the endemic political instability and the potential for economic or political blackmail. Clearly, U. S. seapower can contribute toward an equitable adjustment and guarantee America’s position not be compromised during the process. Article Nine of the Soviet-Iraqi 15-Year Treaty of Friendship calls specifically for the Soviet Navy’s use of Iraqi ports at the head of the Gulf.
Recognizing the tremendous commercial potential of the Indian Ocean area, the increasing integration and interdependency of world traders, and basic geographical fact that that sea links three continents, how can it be relegated to "basically a transit area?” The economically-motivated Soviet merchant marine assigns a major proportion of its limited shipping resources to tap and
develop its markets. They do this despite an expensive Suez closure that makes Bombay farther than Honolulu from the homeports of the Black Sea-based bottoms conducting the bulk of this activity. That they seek to employ their Navy in support of this investment classically demonstrates the "Fleet follows the Flag” principle discussed in Colonel Kendall’s article.* One need not indulge in what Mr. Holloway labels ". . . the zero-sum game mentality of Cold War warriers . . .” to see the economic advantage in developing American seapower in the Indian Ocean.
"I Remember Pearl Harbor”
(See J. K. Taussig, Jr., pp. 18-24, December
1972; p. 91, April; and p. 96, June 1973
Proceedings)
Vice Admiral L. S. Sabin, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Of personal interest to Captain Taussig as well as, perhaps, to some readers of the Proceedings, may be the following incidents which involved Captain Taussig’s own ship, the gallant Nevada. For several days prior to the attack, the battleships had been replacing their standard weight main battery projectiles with heavier than standard projectiles. This had been ordered by the Bureau of Ordnance which, although recognizing that the new projectiles would result in a slight loss of maximum range, since they would be fired with approximately the same muzzle energy as the standard projectiles, nevertheless accepted the loss of a mile or so in maximum range in exchange for a higher penetration factor and a larger and more powerful explosive charge. The new projectiles, of course, required new powder charges. At the time, I was type gunnery officer on the staff of Commander, Battleships, Rear Admiral W. S. Anderson. On Saturday afternoon, 6 December 1941, Lieutenant Commander Armand Robinson, gunnery officer of the Nevada reported to me that all old main battery projectiles and all old powder had been removed from the ship and all new projectiles loaded on board, leaving only the new powder charges to be loaded. Since his crew had
*See L. C. Kendall, "To Use the Sea,” December 1972 Proceedings, pp. 58-67.
been working around the clock and needed a rest, Robinson stated that unless I directed otherwise, he would arrange for the new powder to be barged from the ammunition depot at Lualualei to the Nevada early the following morning, Sunday, 7 December 1941. I agreed. On Sunday morning, that barge was en route to the Nevada loaded with enough 14-inch main battery powder to blow up half of Pearl Harbor when the attack started. Captain Scanlon was not on board when the attack began, but the command duty officer made the decision to get the Nevada underway. When the Japanese caught her in the channel, they gave her a terrible beating hoping to sink her and thus block the channel. They almost—but not quite—succeeded. The Nevada didn’t blow up and sink because there was no main battery powder in her magazines! By superb shiphandling and a valuable assist from a minesweeper, commanded by the late Commander Daniel B. Candler, the Nevada was kept from capsizing and later secured upright with anchors in the channel and wire hawsers secured ashore. That, Captain Taussig, was the Nevada.
During the afternoon following the attack, Admiral Anderson directed the type material officer, Commander E. P. Kranzfelder; the type damage control officer, Commander W. V. Hamilton, and me to accompany him on an inspection of the ships which had not been sunk. When we arrived on board the Nevada, we saw a scene of complete shambles, particularly so on the main deck, topside, and the upper structure. The grim effects of her punishment were everywhere. Twisted masses of metal and spidery steel were splattered with blood, while bodies and parts of bodies were being pulled from the debris. But the crew had already started to clear the debris on the main deck and bring some semblance of order out of the chaos. Topside it was worse. All 5-inch antiaircraft guns were out of commission, the ship had no power, wreckage and destruction was everywhere, and the decks and bulkheads were red with blood. Lieutenant Commander Robinson, his face drawn and gaunt from the strain, nevertheless, managed a smile. "Come back tomorrow,” he said.
I did just that and what I saw was a complete metamorphosis. Gone was the twisted metal, wreckage, and debris. Decks and bulkheads had been washed down and already repainting had started. All about were signs such as, "This is the 'Cheer-Up’ ship.” "We’ll fight again;” "Cheer-up the Cheer-up ship.” Topside was almost the same. In addition, all 5-inch guns had been repaired. Auxiliary generators from the beach supplied enough power to train and elevate the guns. "What,” I asked Robbie, "are you doing for air at the guns?” He took me over to a space and pointed to a torpedo airflask. "We scrounged that from the submariners,” he said. "We charged it up to its 1,500 pounds, put a reducer in the line to bring it down to the 450 pounds we need at the guns and connected them up.” Then he added: "Sabe, we have a commanding view of the channel entrance. Except for the main battery, all my guns are manned and ready to fire!” That, too, Captain Taussig, was your Nevada.
When the three battleships still afloat
and able to get underway (Maryland, Pennsylvania and Tennessee) were ordered to Bremerton for battle repairs to ease the load on the yard at Pearl, I guess the Nevada's crew thought we were going out to seek battle with the enemy. They lined the rail and, as each ship passed, they gave her a mighty cheer.
Finally, two-and-a-half years later during the Normandy invasion, I saw the heavy guns of the bombardment group open up on Omaha Beach. For me, there was a feeling of pride and emotion as the Nevada belched forth her big bullets amid flashes of fire and smoke. For a few seconds, my thoughts went back to Pearl Harbor and to that big ship floundering helplessly in the channel as she took a terrible mauling from Japanese bombs and torpedoes. But, there she was half-way round the world from the scene of that action with her battle ensign again flying proudly to the breeze while her guns roared in angry response to another challenge to our freedom. And that, Captain Taussig, was again your Nevada!
I never served in the Nevada, but I
can understand how proud of her are those who did, including some like Captain Taussig who were critically wounded, plus perhaps those whose spirits hovered over that ship. Certainly, the Nevada has earned a place in the glorious history of our Navy as one of our most gallant ships of the line.
Lieutenant Commander R. L. Kile, U. S. Navy (Retired) —The opening page of Captain Taussig’s article contains a photograph of the Nevada, but the insignificant "bucket” in the foreground was mine—the USS Avocet (AVP-4), credited with downing one enemy aircraft at Pearl.
THE ROYAL NAVY IN AMERICA,
1760-1775 by Neil R. Stout
In 1764, Captain James Hawker, R. N. reported on the difficulties of enforcing British Colonial Policy in America. The incident took place when a British officer boarded an American merchantman to check clearance papers.
“... the owner who was on board instead of giving the officer an Answer to the Questions of where the vessel came from, etc., and shewing her Papers, not only knocked him down, but, to use his own words, threatened to flog him, and toss him overboard, and that he would serve his Captain in the same manner.”
Page 75, The Royal Navy in America
British colonial policy after the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763 had three basic aims: (1) to defend the empire, (2) to place colonial government and trade under stricter central control, and (3) to raise a revenue in the colonies that would help defray defense expenditures and ease the debt burden at home. The British government counted on the Royal Navy to help achieve these aims, and the Americans, in resisting, came into direct conflict with the navy. The purpose of this book is to show what the North American Squadron of the Royal Navy did during the fifteen years before the battles of Lexington and Concord, how it enforced British colonial policy, how the American colonists challenged the navy, and how the navy dealt with colonial opposition.
216 Pages. Notes on sources. Bibliography. Index.
List Price $12.50 Member’s Price $10.00
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Hate to do this in the same breath, but I would prod Captain Taussig in ever so gently and friendly a fashion, on his description of the performance of the radar whose warning was ignored at Pearl. If memory serves me, this was an Army SCR-270, a radar which it was my pleasure (?) to nurse through the Solomon Islands as CPO-in-charge, later
Comment and Discussion 99
in the war while attached to an Argus Unit. (Anyone ever hear of Argus Units?). The 270 was perfectly capable of differentiating between single and multiple-plane targets, and for a perfectly good reason. It was totally incapable (generally) of detecting a single plane at any range over about 40 or 50 miles. Ergo—any target detected beyond 50 miles simply had to be a multiple- plane target. Seriously, a multiple-plane target showed up on the A-scope as a wide return pulse with a jagged, pulsating peak, where a single plane gave a narrower return pulse with a single peak. The 270 was a very capable early warning radar, even if it did have a fondness for displaying islands, occasionally even creating them where islands did not exist. Tilting the big bedspring antenna backward slightly would eliminate much ground return and many islands. Unfortunately, this also tended to eliminate aircraft targets—not a very popular thing to do in the Solomon Islands in 1943.
Radars aside, I must agree wholeheartedly with Captain Taussig on his main point. We weren’t asleep at Pearl Harbor—far from it. We were defeated because we lacked the weapons with which to defend ourselves.
"Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz: Reflections at 80”
{See R. M. Anccll, Jr., pp. 120-121, March 1973 Proceedings)
Captain Ellery H. Clark, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz and I have been corresponding frequently, and he has been most kind, sincere, and historically helpful in answering all of my questions, covering quite a range of German naval strategy and operations.
In the early summer of 1957, it was my good fortune to spend some time in Kiel interviewing Grand Admiral Erich Raeder and to receive his many comments and opinions on the German Navy of his lifetime. Thus, we have been able to receive first-hand professional judgment and observations from the two great leaders of the German Navy.
It is interesting to compare American Admiral Thomas C. Hart’s quotation in
Lieutenant Ancell’s published article that Doenitz ". . . made no mistakes . . .” with Samuel E. Morison’s criticism of Doenitz’ strategy in his 1963 book, The Two Ocean War:
... his "integral tonnage concept,” which he defends as sound strategy was a failure. . . . Doenitz’s [sic] idea that a ton of shipping lost to the Allies, no matter where or how employed, gained that much to Germany, was unsound; in order to make a score he (fortunately for us) sent to the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans U-boats which, to have decisive effect, should have been hurled at the transatlantic troop and merchant convoys.
It well may be that the fairest professional hindsight judgment lies midway between the Hart and Morison points of view. Morison, perhaps, is more of an historian than a professional naval officer; Hart was more of a professional naval officer than an historian. There is no doubt that the professional officer and/or historian continues to have ample opportunity to look over his own shoulder, when documentary sources are available, and see why naval strategists did what they did, on the basis of their own judgment, plus the effect, when applicable, of the judgments and orders of those in higher authority, including statesmen and other civilian leaders.
If Doenitz had had more U-boats and his own air arm during the battle of the Atlantic, particularly in 1942, and if in 1943, the production of German U-boats had been greater and Allied countermeasures less formidable, the North Atlantic crisis would have been much more protracted. The position of Doenitz, however, became hopeless.
We are most fortunate that Grand Admiral Doenitz is still alive—the last great surviving naval leader of World War II. He should be congratulated on his excellent memory and fairness of judgment in his recent evaluations and sometimes re-evaluations of German naval strategy and tactics. I am disappointed at the attitude of some of my U. S. Naval Academy graduate-friends, who raise an eyebrow at my correspondence with the Admiral, some who still think in a World War II attitude.
The following are two questions and answers which are typical of my exchange with Admiral Doenitz:
Were there some conferences, before
World War II, of leading German naval officers, in addition to Grossadmiral Raeder and yourself, at which representative officers from both the surface and submarine navy were present, in which they discussed German naval strategy and shipbuilding programs?
There were no conferences at all with leading naval officers about the shipbuilding program. With regard to the policy of the submarine construction, I could express my opinion only in written requests to the high command of the navy or orally to Grossadmiral Raeder when I met him. In 1938, Grossadmiral Raeder had formed a planning committee for ship construction at the high command in Berlin, which laid down a longterm shipbuilding program, the so-called Z Plan. I had no idea of the development of this plan, but got knowledge of it only after it was already decided.
Grossadmiral, do you think the necessary leadership qualities of combat submarine officers are more demanding and more uncommon than the leadership qualities for combat surface officers?
A commanding officer who is responsible for the operation of his man of war has to be fully professionally educated for this mission. On the other hand, he must have a corresponding psychical education, so that he is capable to make decisions to achieve victory in a combat situation, which always means a psychical burden. This education applies in the same way to all captains of warships.
In my opinion, Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz continues to make the professional student of naval history better educated and prepared to consider both the past and to face the future, with his keen insight into human nature, based on his many years of active, thoughtful, and reflective life.
"What’s In a Name?”
(See T. B. Grassey, pp. 40-47, February; and p. 88, June 1973 Proceedings)
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U. S. Navy— Lieutenant Grassey’s observation about the chaotic state of our system for naming naval units is all too true. It would appear that many of the "aberrations” have been engendered by political motives or under the expedient guise of the "now Navy.” The result
is kaleidoscopic or psychedelic in its lack of coherence.
The author’s proposal to name the LHAs after Marine generals is an admirable one—and one unfortunately even now overtaken by events. Apparently, it has been decided to name them after major Marine battles—Tarawa, Saipan, and Khe Sanh. But, on the other hand, we already have "exceptions” in Leyte Gulf and Philippine Sea. Three of the names formerly were borne by aircraft carriers (two CVs, one CVL), none of which subsequently served as LPHs or were otherwise associated with the amphibious forces.
As an alternative to Lieutenant Grassey’s proposal to name any future landing force support ships—the shore bombarders—using state nicknames, I recommend a continuance of the category begun with inshore fire support ship No. 1: the USS Carronade (LFR-i). To have a group of ships named Culverin, Rifle, Mortar, Rocket, Missile, and the like, would be both nautical and appropriate to their mission.
A major segment of our society, much in the news today and not considered in the article, is the distaff population. Early in World War II, a group of transports was named Dorothea L. Dix, Elizabeth C. Stanton, Florence Nightingale, (Mary) Lyon, and Susan B. Anthony. Near the war’s end, the ladies were recognized by the naming of a destroyer after one of their sex: the USS Higbee (DD-806). Lenah S. Higbee was the Chief of Navy Nurses during and after World War I, and was the recipient of a Navy Cross. This is the only (pardon the phrase) "man-of-war” in the U. S. Navy ever named for a woman. While I am not advocating any particular ship type be named for any particular group of women, what are we going to do about the "new” PFs?
The Nixon Doctrine and Naval Force
Captain IV. J. Ruhe, U. S. Navy (Retired)— It appears that a new military strategy is evolving which is responsive to the Nixon Doctrine—one which re
places the old containment strategy. The press labels this "... a strategy of realistic deterrence.” But, "realistic deterrence” appears to be only a part of the intended military strategy of the Nixon Doctrine.
In effect, the Doctrine calls for enough strength through burden sharing and close partnership with the allies of the United States to deter the use of armed force by potential enemies. And, it also calls for the military force to create a willingness to negotiate any differences which would otherwise tend to be resolved by conflict.
The United States seems to be, at the moment, holding its own from the standpoint of deterring nuclear and conventional war with the major powers. But the willingness to negotiate with the United States on the problems inherent to trouble areas, such as the Middle East, or Southeast Asia seems to call for something else in the way of military power.
Applying the Nixon Doctrine specifically to naval power, we find that the nature and quantity of naval forces necessary to provide a strategy of negotiations can be derived from principles involving interpersonal relationships. Just as deterrence is in the minds of men, a willingness to negotiate is a state of mind of the possible antagonists. This poses a somewhat different problem than that of containment, which was basically a physical strategy.
As to the nature of force which tends to encourage negotiations, it should be offensive in nature. Such force appears to be more conducive of negotiations than that applied defensively to ward off an enemy’s blows. It should be designed to capitalize on a potential antagonist’s weaknesses. It should be usable over a broad spectrum of conflict. Such force is far better oriented towards negotiations than the Sunday punch type, reserved for an irreversible, conclusive situation. It is particularly useful if it is innovative as to its tactical use so that the enemy can only guess at its actual effectiveness, thus confounding his planning (80-knot ships will tend to do this by their new dimension for tactical operations). Reducing the certainty of enemy planning is creative of negotia
tions. It should also offer a demonstration of technical excellence and innovation. This confirms in the minds of a potential enemy, the danger of his encountering more such unpredictable military power.
It would be advantageous for such force to be ubiquitous in nature. The possibility of its being anywhere at any time gives it more credit for power than it contains. It should not be provocative-tending to call for some form of military response (creating an armaments race, for example). It should be reliable and effective when used by normal, well-trained operating forces.
It should be readily maintained in a state of readiness for rapid use, and be of such nature that the resolve to use it exists and is readily evident. (Certain bacteriological warfare capabilities may have little negotiable power because of the credibility of their use in modern warfare.) Such force could minimize it* own weaknesses (as with a submarine replenishment AOR for surface ship re- supply).
Such force which contributes to 3 partnership with other allies is advantageous, if exportable to allies of less developed countries (as with the AX "free- dom fighter” program) a commonality of weapons systems is created, giving credibility to allies’ logistic strength. ln addition, if of low-cost, relative simplk' ity, and with reduced training and open ating requirements, the ready effective- ness of such a force is recognized by potential enemies. It should also be compatible with joint command and control systems. The visible sharing technologies with allies contributes t0 the appearance of total allied technology cal capability.
As for the numbers of forces required for a strategy of negotiations, the U. Navy and its Allies need enough um[> and systems to merely ensure the neces- sary sea lines of communications, while posing such a threat of overseas strike retaliation (the enemy’s weakness) t0 make negotiations plausible and attrac tive. Control of the high seas in the traditional sense (and necessary for 3 containment strategy) is hardly appllG' ble in the environment of nuclear sub'- long-range aircraft, and spy satellites-
Lieutenant Commander Robert A. Fliege I, U. S. Navy— Ensign Edelstein’s article reeks with the kind of frustration with which most all military careerists are saddled in having to defend their life ambition in the face of an unpopular war.
[2] remember an unpleasant experience a shipmate and I had in 1968, when we visited the little town of Mgarr, Gozo, near Malta. We were walking along one of the city’s desolate streets when suddenly confronted by one of the townfolk who not-so-politely queried, "Are you still murdering them in Vietnam?” While I don’t recall the substance of our awkward reply, I do remember discussing later what we at that time thought would have been "fun” to say: "Yes, and when we finish in Vietnam, we’re coming to Gozo!”
It’s damn tempting to react with this sort of Prussian rejoinder, especially when a more reasonable approach proves
[4]See C. A. Holcomb, "Command Attention: Cure-all or Crutch,” June 1973 Proceedings, pp. 85-87.
"A Navy Without Weapons?”
(See J. T. Bonner, Jr., pp. 113-115, February 19^
Proceedings)
Ensign Lawrence Af. Kryske, U. Navy— Dr. Bonner’s Professional No'c accurately describes one of the dilemm3’ which now confronts the NROTC pf0- gram. The elimination of the weapon* course from the NROTC curriculufl’' however, is merely one facet of a potentially more hazardous problem, the zci' demic destruction of the NROTC. Fur' thermore, at a time when variou- university administrations question tbc academic merit of NROTC, it is imper3' five that a strong viable program exb1. The NROTC program is intended i0 provide officers for the naval Servk£ by way of civilian universities and colleges. The time spent on military subjects during the typical four-year re51' dency at the university is indeed srus1 compared to that spent on fulfilling ^
Raymond J. Barrett, Department of State— The captain’s comments indicate a perceptive awareness of the mutual interests of American diplomats and naval officers in protecting the interests of our country. Perhaps my background as both a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) and a long-time member of the Naval Institute is an indication of reciprocal interest and concern (Editor’s Note: Mr. Barrett is the 1972 gold medal winner in the Naval Institute General Prize Essay Contest.).
[6] agree wholeheartedly with Captain Bucknell’s observations about the limited use of the naval attache. The attache should not be just an intelligence officer. He should be a political-military expert, with, as needed, a secondary capability in intelligence. No officer in American missions abroad is truly capable of giving ambassadors sound political-military advice from the viewpoint of the military professional. He can get such advice from the Foreign Service side of the mission, but not from the military. His attaches are intelligence-trained and his military assistance advisory group (MAAG) officers are training oriented. No military officers in our diplomatic missions are primarily trained as political-military men along with their military expertise. I appreciate the monumental bureaucratic problems in re-orienting the attache service to a primary political-military role. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) seem* to have an absolute lock on the attache systems and appears unable to conceive them as anything other than single- minded intelligence gatherers. Clearly- we need intelligence, but we are not doing badly in that area. On the other hand, we are consciously doing virtually nothing in the critical field of militarily- oriented political military expertise. Furthermore, the attache system wouM have to be sweepingly revitalized from the career dead end that it has become- All of these problems are difficult, bur all could be solved with a will to do