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A finely developed intellect is increasingly becoming a necessity for the naval officer, not only as a manager but also as an operator of weapons systems and as a tactician and strategist. Naval officers need to have the ability to gather evidence on how new systems work, to assess their impact on the naval environment and to determine for themselves the acceptance, rejection or modification of new naval arts and weapons.
While the lofty aim of elevating the educational level of naval officers, for its self-evident knowledge, skill, and behavorial benefits, would be sufficient reason to many to pursue such a course, undoubtedly there are others who would like more tangible evidence of the value of education to the Navy. No study in depth exists on the thousands of end items in terms of hardware, management or doctrine turned out by graduate- educated naval officers, but three recent student work efforts provide fairly convincing examples of real value.
First, a thesis completed by three students in the operations analysis curriculum was recently accepted as the basis for long-range budget planning for part of the logistic support requirement for the LM-2500 gas turbine main propulsion engine. By following the recommendations of this thesis, a savings of about $15 million in planned procurement of spare engines was realized. Second, an electrical engineering student working in conjunction with one of his professors, developed a method of processing sensor signals in the ocean surveillance system promising a dramatic improvement in performance capability. Third, another student, a candidate for the degree of Aeronautical Engineer, designed and developed an Aural Stall Warning System for high-performance aircraft which provides both optimum and hazardous operating angle of attack information to the pilot, enabling him to avoid a stall/spin situation while flying at increased maneuvering effectives. Results such as these make technical and managerial graduate education the most cost-effective undertaking in the Navy today.
Of the four Services, the Navy alone has a sustained,
historically maintained in-house capability for developing and shaping technical skills in its officer corps. To fail to exploit fully the Congressionally granted authority for in-house graduate education would be a serious blow to our officer corps and to our long-range capability to cope in a rapidly-changing technological world. For the Navy to remain static or to decline at a time when both the Air Force and the Army are taking steps to obtain or increase their capability to provide technical and managerial education for their officers would be a complete abdication of competitive capability in the joint arena.
For more than a decade, a policy of increasing the educational level for officers has existed in the Secretary of the Navy Instructions. The most recent of these, issued in 1971, clearly recognizes the value of advanced education and explicitly states its dual purpose. The first purpose is the acquisition of specific knowledge and skills to be applied in established or forecasted billets wherein the academic background is essential to the fulfillment of an assigned task. This Secretary of the Navy document, however, goes on to say that, as a second purpose, graduate education "even more importantly broadens the capacity for original thought, develops the analytical tools for problem solving, provides better perspective, strengthens mental discipline and improves the ability to communicate ideas, all of which enhance the officer’s value in whichever assignment he may have.”
The current decreased enrollment of officer students into graduate education programs may possibly be justified in order to meet short-term needs, but if we pursue this course, we are denying ourselves the opportunity to achieve the long-range objective whose attainment is essential to naval superiority.
On many occasions, current events diminish the availability of officers for educational tours. In recent years, for example, the need for aviators to fulfill Southeast Asia air combat requirements and the need for submarine officers to man the growing strategic
The slow, steady growth in the number of naval officers undergoing postgraduate study, which reached a peak in 1969, has become a slow, seemingly steady decline which must be reversed; for there has been an order of magnitude increase in the overall level of education in general, but particularly in fields of knowledge which once were, but no longer are, outside the Naiy’s ken.
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58 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1973
offensive capability of the submarine forces overrode all other considerations. In these instances, specific communities of naval officers have been denied the privilege of acquiring advanced education. There had been a slow, steady growth in the graduate student officer strength throughout the 1950s and 1960s, reaching a peak in 1969. For the last several years, however, and contrary to what one might have expected as the war in Southeast Asia came to a close, there was a noticeable decrease in officer assignments for graduate education. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that, even with the declining totals, there has been a growth in the area of "management” education, which means that the decline in "technical” education is even greater than the total reduction would indicate.
In the period just prior to World War II, 25% of the unrestricted line officers (URL) of the Navy had some graduate education. Although the significant change in the total composition of the officer corps makes comparison with the pre-World War II era difficult (an all-career corps versus career-plus-active-duty reserves), a comparable figure for today is on the order of 15% representing those who possess some graduate education. This decline in the educational level of the URL naval officer corps is strangely out of keeping with the advance of technology over the past 30 years.
In recent years, the Navy has developed a subspecialty system wherein officers achieve a qualification by various means in specifically designated areas, and criteria and procedures are established for identifying officer billets in these areas. These billets should be occupied by incumbents who have completed doctoral level, master’s level, or less than a master’s level education, or who have specialized experience and/or training. The term "subspecialty” defines an officer manpower classification category which requires specialized professional skills or knowledge in an operational, technical, or managerial field. Further, subspecialty codes have been devised to identify a subspecialty area and level of expertise. For instance, the P-code (the most widely used designation in the graduate-educated coding system) is assigned to those billets which require incumbents with at least a master’s level of education for optimum performance of duty.
The current numbers of P-coded billets reveal some interesting figures. There are, as of May 1973, 2,127 unrestricted line and 3,375 restricted line and staff corps billets designated in the P-code system. In fiscal year 1975, these numbers are now planned to be changed to 2,340 and 4,091 respectively. If the current trend of restricted line and staff corps predominance in the P-code system continues, the vast majority of significant shore assignment tasks, which control the direction of the Navy’s future, will be in their hands. This condi
tion will further weaken a significant linkage mechanism between the Fleet and shore establishments. In his normal assignment pattern, the URL officer with graduate education brings to his P-coded shore assignments a particular mix of knowledge and experience that is uniquely applicable to the vital Navy task of effectively adapting modern technology for Fleet utilization.
Finally, in this analysis of what is taking place in unrestricted line advanced education, an investigation was made of a Naval Postgraduate School URL year group which had recently completed ten years’ naval service since the end of their postgraduate schooling- Within this group, which averaged five years of seagoing duty in the ten-year period, 76% of their shipboard assignments were, by the most stringent standards, directly relevant to their academic attainments. For a number of years the calculation of the unrestricted line officers required to fill P-coded billets has used a factor of 2.5 times the number of P-coded billets to equal the total number of officers required to fill these billets. The extra numbers were, of course, required to allow these officers to go to sea. As a consequence of this type planning, the Fleet has for years had the benefit of graduate-educated officers without the need to state any requirement for them. The impact of these especially talented officers on performance at sea has not been measured. Despite the existence of this capability, the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force made the statement a few years ago that the forces afloat were obtaining only 15% of the capacity of current weapon system capability because of a lack of knowledge on the part of the operators. It is difficult to imagine what kind of operational capability would exist in the fleets if the small percentage provided by the non-Fleet-supported factor of 2.5 had not been available to the Fleet as a bonus. Furthermore, multiplying a declining number of URL P-coded billets by 2.5 can only result in a declining population of graduate-educated officers in the Fleet.
Turning now to the in-house institutions of higher learning in the Navy, it is worthwhile to take a brief look at each of them in relation to their influence on the total officer corps. The three permanent educational institutions for the development of the naval officer corps are the U. S. Naval Academy, the U. S. Naval War College, and the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School- The Naval Academy, with a congressional fixed ceiling, provides a small but important input into the total officer corps. While the figures vary with each year group, there is a sizable percentage of loss of these officers between their fifth and twentieth year. Consequently, as a typical example, the composition of the
officer corps at the 15-year point today is composed of 18% USNA, 11% NROTC, and 71% all others.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Naval War College, which has had relatively small student input over the past 20 years, has a plan for projected growth which may reach as high as 750 to 800 officers annually by the early 1980s. The vast majority of these officers are career-committed, but since they arrive at the Naval War College relatively late in their naval careers (in order to have the required background for strategic study), the years remaining for the application of the advanced education received will be somewhat limited except for those few who go on to flag rank.
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) gets its average officer in the sixth year of his career and thus has a much longer potential for practical application of acquired knowledge. With its present capacity, it can graduate about 1,200 officers a year. Available data indicates approximately 90% of graduate-educated officers remain on active duty for a full career. The curricula of the Postgraduate School are currently designed and are sufficiently flexible to remain in consonance with the newly developed operations technical managerial system of officer assignment. With this correlation between education and assignment philosophy, even longer-term direct application of academic attainments may be forecast. All of the in-house institutions are important to the Navy. The Postgraduate School in particular provides a unique opportunity for significantly improving the professional caliber of a large body of officers over a long period of time.
If there is relevance in tomorrow’s world for the graduate-level-educated officer, there is particular relevance in the use of the Naval Postgraduate School as the preponderant source for this education. This advocacy of the preponderance of graduate education at the Naval Postgraduate School should not be construed
as a lack of recognition of the advantages of and need for continuing graduate education in specialized fields at civilian universities.
Any number of alternatives to educating the bulk of our graduate school officer students at NPS have been proposed. But, all of them are more expensive than the process of educating them at NPS, and less likely to fulfill the needs of the Navy. For example, the principal fallacy in the belief that money can be saved by sending all of our officer students to civilian institutions stems from the fact that people are comparing tuition costs at civilian universities versus total education costs at NPS, and also by neglecting the difference in the average NPS student from the student in a civilian school.
The record shows NPS students are capable of earning degrees at quality civilian schools; however, under present admission standards and processing methods, about 80% of NPS students could not gain entrance for postgraduate study with their past academic background and performance. Of the remaining 20%, all but about one to 2% would require some make-up and refresher courses. Only immediate graduate educa-
60 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1973
tion program students, plus a very few others, could compete on an equal basis with civilian counterparts to earn a master’s degree in one academic year. All the rest could do the necessary work and earn a graduate degree, but additional time, effort, and money would be required, including a change in entrance procedures for the 80% group. One should not get the idea that the NPS gives graduate degrees to individuals who could not earn a similar degree in a civilian institution. The point is that special consideration is given to their prior academic backgrounds and the time that they have been out of school, and NPS has the flexibility and experience to accommodate efficiently to these student parameters. The NPS degree is as fully accredited as any and better than most. At civilian institutions, by the time the average naval officer student is brought up to speed for study at the full graduate level, and by the time the curricula and courses are adjusted to Navy needs on a continuing basis, the overall costs to the Navy will be greater than if those students were educated at NPS.
A fine example of what will happen is to be noted in the Operations Analysis curriculum which was conducted at a civilian university for a number of years. The cost-per-student year was approximately double NPS costs and is much more representative of the costs that the Navy would be paying if we sent all our officers to civilian schools. In this instance, the Navy was paying the full cost of education rather than the highly subsidized tuition cost which people usually think of as the cost of sending an officer to a civilian school.
An argument frequently advanced is that the process of obtaining graduate education at civilian schools has a broadening effect on our officers. This concept is basically non-substantive. The broadening effect in graduate education and graduate institutions stems from the quality of the faculty, and the faculty at NPS compares most favorably in depth and breadth with the most competent institutions in the country. In fact, since there is almost no inbreeding of faculty at NPS, as there is in most civilian institutions, the possibility of parochial views becoming prevalent is very remote. The NPS is constantly renewing, refreshing, and broadening the composition and outlook of its faculty.
All of the above considerations are, of course, separate from considerations of the flexibility of the NPS curricula. This flexibility results in a sensitive ability to respond to Navy needs and in making a continual orientation of course contents to reflect the current Navy environment.
An example of NPS capability to respond to Navy needs, to reflect environment, and to recognize the
growing requirements for graduate education for the operational officer is the new Operational Systems j Technology ASW curriculum. This interdisciplinary curriculum is designed to enhance an officer’s performance and capability in naval warfare operations, and I should be the forerunner of other programs to educate officers in other warfare sub-categories such as anti-air i warfare, electronic warfare, and so on, thus providing greater balance to the support given the Navy by its graduate education program.
For the future there are many foreseeable areas which will require an even greater degree of knowledge than exists in the Navy today. A half a dozen of these areas I can be listed as follows:
► Analysis of system choice
► Economics of operation
► Environmental impact
► Systems engineering
► Human factors
► Political, international and domestic factors.
In sum, the naval officer’s historical need for ad-: vanced education is greater today because of an order j of magnitude increase in the overall level of education ; and in fields of knowledge where naval requirements 1 previously did not exist.
Naval superiority is made up of many elements, not the least of which is the confidence of the officer corps founded on its professional knowledge and ability to bring this knowledge to bear on Navy tasks. To hasten the day when graduate education will be the rule rather than the exception in the officer corps, steps should be taken now:
(1) To elevate graduate education to a significantly I higher priority in peacetime officer assignment; I
(2) To recognize billet requirements at sea for graduate educated officers;
(3) To direct a significant portion of knowledge required in graduate education toward opera- j tional applications;
(4) To increase the correlation between shore billet duties and graduate curricula; and, finally,
(5) To prevent any further decrease in officer graduate education which will surely be reflected in operational limitations a decade from now.
A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1935, Rear t Admiral Freeman has spent 19 of his 38 years of commissioned service ; sea. The Superintendent of the Naval Postgraduate School since July 1972* > his in-service academic background includes the Naval Postgraduate School. 1 (Ordnance Engineering), the Naval War College, and the National W*r I College. His three-year command of the Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Pacific j was followed by a tour as Vice Director, and briefly, as Director of the | Joint StafF of the Joint Chiefs of Staff".