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The next ten years will be crucial ones with respect to our ability to conduct amphibious warfare. Decisions made and implemented during this period will lead, eventually, to a turn-of-the-century capability that does one of the following: provides a versatile and responsive military instrument of national policy, fully abreast of technological developments; appears to be marginal but continues to lose ground steadily to potential adversaries and their developing capabilities; or ceases to exist, written off as “too hard.”
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amphibious force levels have been repeate arbitrarily lowered to such a point that a and mismatch now exists between strategic g° tjiepi. the amphibious forces available to Pursue,vers^ This momentum of deterioration must be re^j0uS if we are even to maintain our current afflP jy 3s capability, much less get well. As rece. co$' 1968—while the Marine Corps was he.aVyjetn^ll,1
mitted to an extended land campaign in
art1'
1 h
—the Navy operated and maintained en0 ^ft"0 phibious shipping to lift the assault echelons marine amphibious forces (MAFs), formerlW as division/wing teams. Four years later, lift capability had shrunk somewhat, but t one"’
Kri/j 1 vorl fKrA 11 rrVi tViP HpIiVPTV ^ I <1^$
had been modernized through the delivery
lasS
In amphibious force planning, three avenues must be explored in a coordinated manner: lift requirements; ship and craft design; and operational concepts. Obviously, these avenues must lead toward a common objective, which must be defined (and redefined, as one gets closer) as clearly as circumstances permit.
Force Levels: Whenever strategic and fiscal requirements have come into conflict during the past decade, the latter have consistently prevailed. Our
ships. Beyond that, the new Tarawa (LHA* je- of amphibious assault ships was in the wor^ ^(Ce signed to be the backbone of the amphibiou for the remainder of the century. ..jty\v3s
At that time, the decline in total lift capab1 of less concern than the deterioration of supP^ m forces (for example, the steady worsening ^ ol naval gunfire gap and the near-disappc^.^jtafl1 minesweeping forces). An accompanying ..:0i,s .... . . -mp*11 ■
was the Navy’s growing tendency to use a: . p,r shipping in non-amphibious roles (such aS. and sea control ship testing). The need f°r.irlC|f \V05
flpYihilitv—within a total Navv that jj§'
flexibility—within a total Navy that shrinking and modernizing—could not D‘ counted, but neither could this implicit threa
74
Proceedings / Septer!1
7
SiltOr eh‘ ------------ a" aillJJMlU
(Scnj. 'nare of shipbuilding and conversion aged i Unding' traditionally around 7%, has
■Navy
aver-
AqF«/° ILPD-ll], converted and redesignated Midd| ?,r service as flagships for the Commander degr. 5 ^ast Force) mission capabilities have been NaVyaed through shipyard alterations. As the sifj6s ? Problem of finding suitable flagships inten- to c ’11 becomes apparent that pressures will mount fCc°mmandeer additional ships (LPDs, LPHs, TV' °r even LHAs) for non-amphibious service, into h. Problem is compounded by a look ten years cijf y Mature. The drop in capability that will oc- sigJ-‘ 'his erosion continues unchecked, will be Igtij: Cant; Eight Thomaston (LSD-28)-class dock vjCea.g ships will reach the end of their 30-year ser- litjjjj IVes, beginning in 1984. This would severely f°rce^r ability to maintain forward-deployed afloat SiibjV ai?d would reduce our surge lift capability to estimUnl'ally less than a single MAF. (Such a surge Vt ate> 9^ course, is based on the shaky premise tr^j arriPhibious forces could and would be concen- d in one ocean in time to be useful.) The prob-
ln ,! y lhc amphibious force.
Pulled C Carly 1970s, the Marine Corps, which had ref0cus°ut the jungles of Vietnam and had begun ran jn|lng on 'ts traditional amphibious concerns, Deserju °PP°s‘tion that has dogged it since. itenCo °d °y some as a “Big Enchilada” mindset, Pai'tici|l|^^>aSSec^ a wide|y fixation on NATO (in fiment 3f ’ l^.e ^ATO center) defense, to the det- tingenc° ser'ous thought about other possible con- era|.p les- T*10 Secretary of Defense called forgen- Scenar'r^°Se ^?rces to s*zed against “worst case” studiesIOS',T^'S tr'Sgered a number of tracts and heavy. | *cfi showed that the marines were not land arJnd tactically m°h)'le enough to be a second foranvmmy;,And this’ in turn, produced a dilemma, Would ,rnoves to “heavy up” their force structure Phibi0lf addhional demands on a shrinking am- Ued^j-'s capability. Relentless pressure continue Defr0lT1 outs‘de and within the Department ^reatlyenSe ^or Marine Corps to abandon, or other wreduce’ amphibious role and to seek ays to justify the service’s existence, a re(j a('r or not the marines ever concur in such artlPhih"Cd r°*e’ can become a reality if existing viiie q).0Us capability is allowed to wither on the decade ( • sh‘Phu'ld'ng starts funded over the past On (L 'since the LHAs), only one, LSD-41 (shown gator ®PP°site page), has been an amphib. The
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c((tA,l | _ ^ . , _ 7___________ _
At dCSS t*1an per year dur'ng this period. aboUt ue^ent’ ag'ng amphibious force possesses lastsa" the lift capability that existed before the forCer^e °f modernization. The status of supporting itiajns ’ Part'cularly 'n the area °f naval gunfire, re- ipg_ q ISrr)ally low—with low priority for upgrad- Uesut'Of-mission use of amphibious ships contin- Co,o;lnd <n two cases (La Salle ILPD-3] and
lem of block obsolescence of amphibious warfare ships becomes nearly total during the following decade. In addition, all of today’s landing craft will reach the end of service life by 1991.
We are faced with both a problem and an opportunity. It is clear that new construction must begin immediately, if the problem is to be attacked in an orderly manner, ln one-for-one replacement terms, five new ships per year would have to be started—beginning now—to restore the 1968 lift level by fiscal year 2001. Just to maintain half that level (our current capability), wc would need three starts per year, also beginning now. Delay in getting the needed shipbuilding programs under way not only drives up costs but brings us closer to the inevitable day when we find ourselves in extremis, saddled with an overaged, inadequate force and too far behind to catch up. On the positive side, though, large shipbuilding programs bring the opportunity for substantial force modernization that stopgap programs cannot offer.
Against this background, our current national response to this problem can only be seen as underwhelming. Ships of the LSD-41 class, which will replace the lift lost by the eight retiring LSD-28- class ships, have yet to be fully funded. Described by some as a “yo-yo,” because of repeated conflict between the Congress (pro) and the Department of Defense (con), the LSD-41 program was most recently scuttled (again) in January 1981, as the fiscal year 1982 budget went into its final stages. This action left only a single ship, which had been funded in the previous year’s budget. Although more ships of the class do reappear in programming for future years, there are none in the budget for fiscal year 1982, despite strong congressional pressure. Instead of three ships per year, we now appear to be getting only one, or perhaps two, over a three-year period. The program for an air cushion landing craft (LCAC), subject to similar pulling and hauling, fared a bit better. A December 1980 decision by the Secretary of Defense to fund three starts each in fiscal years 1982 and 1983 has opened the door for lead production of this long-overdue craft. The 50-knot LCAC, with its 60-ton payload, provides a fourfold increase in the number of potential landing sites around the world. It may be the most revolutionary influence on amphibious warfare since the introduction of the helicopter.
The Requirements Avenue: To size and shape our objective force of amphibious warfare ships, we must begin by determining what those ships will be required to carry. In a M AF-sized assault, this translates into a tactical mobility requirement to land the assault elements of two regimental landing teams in 90 minutes over a ship-to-shore distance of 50 nautical miles, in either a two-thirds by air/one-third by
surface mode, or the reverse. After analyzing World War II amphibious operations in the Pacific, Marine Corps planners originally called for a 30-minute deadline, which still stands as the surface-borne requirement. This was subsequently extended in two 30-minute increments, primarily because of increased funding pressures, not relaxed tactical ones.
At first glance, it would seem that developing requirements would merely involve some rather straightforward number crunching, matching amphibious lift capacity to the structure of the landing force. The real problem, though, is not working in the present but working far into the future. Furthermore, a number of factors intervene to place those who develop requirements into the position of shooting at a perpetually moving target. Chief among these are continuous changes in tables of organization and equipment (and accompanying levels of required logistical support) of landing force units, and the shifting composition of the assault and assault follow-on echelons of the landing force.
Along this line, there has been a tendency among detractors of amphibious warfare to flay the Marine Corps for getting too heavy during the past decade, by piling additional lift requirements on an essentially unchanged (or barely changed) force structure, even while shipping availability has diminished. Under this form of logic, the Marine Corps is portrayed as its own worst enemy, growing like Topsy into a landing force that might eventually pack more fight than it can ferry. To date, this argument has not proved particularly valid. In the first place, it contains a good bit of tail-wags-dog. Tactical requirements, not shrinking lift capacity, should dictate the sizing and structuring of the landing force. And in the second place, an examination of amphibious lift fingerprints over the past decade reveals that requirements have remained reasonably constant, despite a fair amount of organizational change. This is borne out by nearly identical results of two independent analyses, conducted by the Marine Corps itself and by the Center for Naval Analyses. It appears that offsetting trends toward growth and shrinkage in different sectors of the landing force have generally cancelled each other out.
Nevertheless, a look into the coming decade brings the moving target syndrome to center stage. Significant changes in landing force structure loom ahead, as realization deepens that marines will require more tactical mobility than provided by the helicopter and their own fleet if they are to survive and win on the lethal battlefields of tomorrow. For example, the introduction of two ground mobility systems—the mobile protected weapon system and the light armored vehicle—could significantly increase the requirement for helicopter operating spots on amphibious assault ships, thus driving up the requirements for air-capable ships under current
methods of calculation. Such a situation rePJ^Sonl. an ambush waiting to happen, with the payonc ing when amphibious warfare proponents disc
that they have priced themselves out of busing
re trying bis poten
ambush, seeking affordable solutions to,1 ^(he
A number of studies and analyses are find a way out of the “killing zone” of this pot® ^
lemma. The possibility of shifting some partsj^ ^ is being explored. The ship-to-shore buildup
traditional assault echelon (carried in relatively'1
olio"'0
echelon (carried in less expensive commercials
pensive amphibious ships) to the assault ^J^jps)
_____ ^ ________________ uildup ti "
should also be questioned. In addition, the ‘ tinnal wnrkhnrsp role of the hp.licODter SHOU
be
tional workhorse role of the helicopter reviewed, in light of capabilities promised i ^
by
ind.
course, that substantial increases in ad-
air-cushion landing craft (keeping in mm
inui juojiuimui uivi »** ----
quirements would also drive a requirement ditional well-deck ship construction). . j 0f
Finally, it may be that the traditional met j
defining amphibious assault capability—m square, cube, helo spots, boat spaces, and the will serve our purposes less well in the futureunjts it has up to now. The theoretical landing f°rC^h- that are now plugged into a rather leaky "
'amp hit’ll
________ r___________ _ ____ _ .
lift model may have to give way to more sPeOI‘ ana- loadouts, designed for specific scenarios. ^ lyzing these in aggregate, we may find comm0 jjng tures that will provide the key to future sh*Pbljeaiing requirements. A false sense of precision in ^ with the unknown and the imponderable m avoided, but so also must an inflexible, alized approach that seems to be generating ^ questions than answers. Our inability-—01^ seeming inability—to keep our sights fixed ^ moving target has been and will be a prime c° j0V)S to adversaries who are willing to let amp ^ shipping wither on the vine. Until we can ^ clearly what we need, others will find reaso to build.
.fo'
The Design Avenue: Although some stopgaP sures (for example, service life extension Pr0 ^erve and returning ships to active duty from the x fleet) have been proposed to help offset par ^ block obsolescence problem, they merely mP teiy problem downstream, where it will u'|* emerge with even more severity. The problc^^v not be solved without a substantial amount ep construction. The allure of multipurpose infdri^; sists, despite their drawbacks. The opposing ^jpS perpetuated by those who would build mPr!Ur; for less cost, is for “analog” ships—essentia >^1 ivations of existing ones, with minimal tec .ot>5 risk. As the epitome of the multipurpose amp assault ship to date, the LHA has in som proved a mixed blessing. It may have been 0 I signed in some areas, with too much automat'
76
Proceedings
her'9*'
Septe0b
USS CORONADO (COURTESY J01 JEFFREY L. CURTIS)
Pr°gr”,c,lls for this conceptual ship, the LHDX, ntesSses’ *t becomes apparent that alternate 4 *®<*t be taken. One would be to construct ^alle* h ^HA. Another would be to stretch a deck „r auh" designing in both flight deck and well- ■phe aPabilities.
|echnCo|Uing decade carries the potential for a 'oUs j. logical breakthrough that could free amphib- Si°rces ^rom the shackles of their current 20- °f in,p11111 on speed of advance. After an initial surge Pr0gr.rest in the 1960s, the surface effect ship (SES) 111 has generally stayed on the back burner,
Who hUC^ tec^n'ca* capacity required of the people diSastave man it (usually shorthanded). To avoid ti°nsr°Us ‘'down time” during amphibious opera- rathe’r tvfre *s a growing tendency to go “manual” t°ma.. aan risk untimely failure of the LHA’s au- WeU-d'C ^sterns- 1° addition, the dual flight- and thine f caPat>ility of the LHA represents some- tanCes°, a contradiction in tactical terms. The dis- launch ^ Sea ^rom which helicopters are usually shore r~among other things, beyond the range of vehjci e^enses—are too far for amphibious assault knotsC| to traverse at their snappy rate of eight a||eVjatntroduction of the air-cushion LCAC will Under C t*1's Pr°hleiri> but the LHAs will have to c‘ent L r extens've ship alterations to become effi- p°Ses j'AC haulers. Such potential for crossed pur- deSjsshould provide a warning to those who would IftL muhiple capabilities into the new ships. ships ^ are built on schedule, the six LSD-41-class curre , ' * offset the loss of well-deck capability inclass J?y the scheduled retirement of the LSD-28 of he]j ae next problem to be dealt with is the loss ip the ?°Pter operating spots when the LPHs retire tipur ^Os. This gap could be covered with a mul- Lhp) °S? S^'P that incorporates features of both the
%irPana LPH. As the work of hammering out recent ‘
„ '8 r°utes
As if the Navy weren’t already woefully short of amphibious warfare ships, the problem is compounded when ships such as the La Salle (AGF-3) and Coronado (AGF-11) are converted to non-amphibious roles. These two alternate duty as flagship of the Middle East Force.
surviving from year to year on research and development funding. High costs and high technological risks associated with this proposed merger of aviation and shipbuilding technologies were enough to discourage Navy-wide support, despite the lure of having ships that could cross oceans in the 80- to 100-knot speed range. Nevertheless, the state of the art has advanced. Retaining most of their key engineering and support personnel, the SES proponents have worked with more than 40 naval laboratories and industrial organizations in 30 SES- related areas. They have accumulated more than 22,000 hours of model testing and more than 2,500 hours of manned testing (in ten manned testcraft), in an effort to drive down cost and risk factors.
Emerging from the SES development efforts has been the concept of a multipurpose ship, originally designed fora high-speed marine transport role, but with potential uses in amphibious assault operations. These could include air operations and a variety of resupply and maintenance functions. Application of these insights to the amphibious assault role has resulted in a conceptual 10,000-ton surface effect ship that, like her displacement hull counterpart, could constitute one-third of an amphibious ready group. This ship, however, would be able to cross 4,500 miles of ocean in 90 hours, carrying 24 LCACs and a load of helicopters or fixed-wing
—carried on a variety of platforms, from ■ g0vi
____ .. a a:*:____ «u ~ forms 0» tf
on up. In addition, the threat—in terms capabilities—to amphibious forces en rou <s si" objective area has increased vastly. Today veillance systems greatly reduce the c amphibious task force being able to loiter ^ b sively over the horizon. A transiting force ^111jd subject to missile attack—launched and by combinations of air, surface, and su sl)C" forces—from hundreds of miles away. W rpfi5 threats do not rule out strategic and tactica . e of under all conditions, they do tend to H1111 ^ 0fl*11 tions, for amphibious warfare remains the ‘ possible. rjSec*'
Some options and some elements of sU'P be restored through high-speed craft an
With both a flight deck and a well deck, an LHA such as the Tarawa is a contradiction tactically. When close enough to shore to launch helos, she is still too far away for slow landing craft. She will need extensive alteration to haul air-cushion landing craft efficiently.
aircraft. With a 50-knot wind-over-deck capability, conventional takeoff and landing aircraft could conceivably be operated without catapults. The ship would be able to conduct dry well operations with the LCACs, once she went “off cushion” at her destination, or—through ballasting—she could carry out wet well deck operations with other craft.
A good bit of bureaucratic inertia (and even outright resistance) must be overcome before the first SES enters the fleet, but the harbinger of high-speed amphibious operations, the LCAC, is quite a bit closer. However, joy at this development must be tempered with the realization that this decade will have passed into history before a true operational capability exists. To speed things along, and to minimize risk, participants in the design competition for LCAC were strictly enjoined from using other than proven technology. They had to use off-the-shelf components, wherever possible, because the LCAC was sold as a low-risk program.
The Operational Concepts Avenue: Much of the criticism of the amphibious warfare mission stems from perceptions of operational concepts that are stereotyped or outdated. In addition, it is difficult to control operational concepts because a number of decisions on future hardware will necessarily be made before the conceptual work is completed on how that hardware will be used. Thus, doctrine and concepts of operations will have to be adjusted to hardware that actually will be available.
Ear too many decision-makers, who should know better, still think of amphibious warfare in World War II terms: those of a formidable task force isolating a highly fortified island, pounding it for days, then sending marines wading ashore in water up to their armpits, to blast and burn their way through beach defenses. Added to this misperception is a vague awareness of the vulnerability of naval forces massed offshore to support the assault. Claims that amphibious operations were doomed generally started with the advent of nuclear weapons, even though an earlier harbinger existed. It was seldom noted that, during the Okinawa campaign, the Navy’s kamikaze-inflicted casualties exceeded those of the Army and the Marine Corps combined.
To counter new threats to the amphibious forces, the Navy and the Marine Corps developed sea echelon and vertical assault techniques. These assist in spreading out the forces to some degree, but the
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amphibious attacker is still faced with the Pra ^jps at some point in the operation, of bringing „ w in close enough to launch amphibious asS‘ gCe^ hides and landing craft, which in turn mus 1P ^e||- in straightforward, tidy waves to reasona ^Redefined, accessible beach areas—known ? ny, i1 fender as well as the attacker. Theore i would be possible to evade the problem ^oii total reliance on helicopters, but such h re. 'vit- could only envision a slow buildup as^°mg |i0"' nearly total reliance on footpower and so ^ tations on firepower, once the landing na
Place- . |ethal
Compounding this problem, an upward > n0n ral in weapons technology has posed a " $$
nuclear threat to amphibious forces. three dozen navies now possess precisio teiti> missiles and computerized fire control ^
the
78
Proceedings
tually h‘ k
been nnl8,speed amphibious shipping. A case has force tkStU ate<^ °* an LCAC-equipped amphibious ^arylanrf approacf|es ’he beaches of Ocean City, the f0r„ ’ on a 8iven evening. By the next morning, sPeed ai Coldd be sending LCACs ashore at high ^VrtleB01'0^ anywhere between Long Island and Underw faCa’ unhindered by beach gradients, tides, craft fan pbstacles, or other ills that conventional CePt of i flf t0‘ ^ucb a capability makes the con- ,enab|c feJease at ibe high water mark nearly un-
tacker ;„?r the defender. Similarly, it forces the at- f,.,, r*nto new»,a„o , ,
fully (kjt10 n.fw ways °f thinking, if he is to exploit t0 lines nfe?nological advanta8e- Tying the LCAC ar,dev»„ departure, boat lanes, colored beaches,
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sense as ??nv^ntional waves would make as much beer Wag nitch.in8 a Kentucky Derby winner to a c.Ushion hj- S'nce the craft actual|y flies on its air s‘°n of t’h e Icopter control measures, or some ver- d°c’rine .C?’ m^bt be more suitable. Questions of ■aiming of OWnership also arise. Since LCACs are force corn t*iey belong to the amphibious task office,, wmander and are sbippered by Navy petty Ending f aen’ eyer, would control shift to the never> wh^6 commander f°r operations inland? If °f lasted ^ Woujd be the opportunity cost in terms LU‘red to capabihty? During the lengthy period re- ')o\y (if ■ *C ,ace al1 conventional craft with LCACs, C°njuncr a migbt the 50-knot force be used in are not °n with the 8-knot force? Although LCACs Hile ,k°W c°nsidered assault vehicles—especially Missionare scarce—at what point might such Pr°blemc e?orne feasible? What logistic support s°lve? rnight the LCAC generate—or possibly
Having to deal with concepts that precede the introduction of hardware can have pitfalls. However, this is not a new situation for the Navy and the Marine Corps; the two services developed amphibious assault techniques before World War II ships and craft were available, and they developed the vertical assault concept before enough helicopters existed to put it into practice. Such conceptual work gives the operator a chance to state his requirements early. He does not have to adjust his operational concepts to equipment that may have been designed for other purposes, after that equipment has come off the production line.
The opportunity for a great jump in operational capability is here. As is often the case, though, it has come disguised as hard work.
Conclusion: The advance along the three avenues toward our objective of an affordable and capable amphibious force must be continuous and coordinated. It should always be remembered that the bedrock of rapid response to crises is a credible capability of forcible entry—which is almost by definition amphibious—when another’s shores must be crossed.
No matter what else we may try, we must start now to build amphibious warfare ships. Further delay assumes that time is on our side. The evidence, worldwide, suggests the contrary.
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bcgin sC(^ptLlal work is programmed, and needs to "dll arjSen on sucb questions and many others that CUshion c &S daV attaining an operational air a Carinaapability approaches. Such work will have pipping ,?n *3otb the LCAC and future amphibious *l0n °f SPs carr‘es and supports it. The introduc- ^niental ^ ^Uftber along will raise even more fun- sb°re Cr questions, as the new 50-knot ship-to- °he, vyj'jP3 . dy *s expanded into a transoceanic afeas significant repercussions in nearly all
A 1957 NROTC graduate of Yale University, Colonel Miller spent his early years of service in Marine infantry battalions in California and the Western Pacific. After a three-year tour at the Eighth and Eye Barracks in Washington, D.C., he attended the Army’s infantry and airborne schools at Fort Benning, Georgia, before going to Vietnam as a rifle company commander in 1965. He returned to serve on the staff of Commander in Chief Atlantic and then attended the Armed Forces Staff College. In 1970, he was back in Vietnam as advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps at battalion, brigade, and division level. He has subsequently served as speechwriter for three Commandants of the Marine Corps, attended the Naval War College, commanded a deployed battalion landing team in the Mediterranean, and now heads the Amphibious Ships Requirements Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps.
°k0 'nCldent recently occurred when the JDS Amatsukaze returned to her home port in,. _ a, after callino<->n nnrto in iniprnatinnal inint maneuvers
lr| ’he p a> after calling on American ports and participating in international joint
A U asClfic-
sPirjt 0f -' naval vessel was in Yokosuka as the Amatsukaze entered port; and in the true e*chan,nternati°nai friendship, flashed the following message: “Welcome home, wish to “f ’he c ensign-” S'nce it was the noon mealtime, the Officer of the Day thought only VaUstom of junior officers from different ships visiting each other’s wardrooms for a Lje,’ nd 'ntrnediately flashed back his reply: “We have no ensign on board. How about enant, J. g.?”
Captain Ryo Nozaki, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force aVal institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)