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lr>istry, senior staff personnel either were pro-Army pro-Air Force, and there appears to have been no
Today, the Indian Navy is the eighth largest in e world and is oriented toward the Soviet Union. le fleet consists of 1 aircraft carrier, 1 cruiser, 2 &u'ded missile destroyers, more than 20 frigates, 8 Patrol submarines, 3 guided missile corvettes, 16 ^'ssile patrol boats, as well as minesweepers, am-
during the early to mid-1960s, India fought against Pakistan over Kashmir and later over East Pakistan, and against China over the ^ksai Chin boundary. In none of these three Cr*ses did the Indian Navy, despite the Possession of the aircraft carrier Vikrant, play ei'en a nominal role. A typical budget of the Period gave 77.5% to the Army and only 4.7% tr> the Navy. But all that has changed today as Didia now knows that the enemy is as likely to c°uie from the sea as from the land.
VVyhen India gained independence from Great Britain in 1947, the former Royal Indian avy comprised 32 aging vessels suited primarily for c°astal patrol and approximately 11,000 officers and en- The top-echelon admirals, including the Chief Staff, were British officers on loan. At the Defence
fading advocate for turning the fleet into a coequal ranch of the armed services.
For nearly 20 years following independence, the man Navy was the country’s neglected service. It ar>nually received the smallest defense appropriations, 'Vas assigned the fewest men, and was allocated the Srr>allest percentage of the Defence Ministry’s capital e*Penditure funds. Little attention was given to the establishment of a naval infrastructure to support a Modern fleet.
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phibious warfare ships, and fleet auxiliaries. The more recently acquired Soviet-built ships are armed with either surface-to-air or surface-to-surface missiles. At least 46,000 officers and men are assigned to naval duty. In early 1977, a Coast Guard was established and placed under the Navy’s jurisdiction. The future of the fleet’s air arm appears to be promising now that it, rather than the Air Force, has been assigned the mission of sea reconnaissance.
The Indian Navy is battle-tested. Its successful campaign against the Pakistani Navy in 197 l in the Bay of Bengal, along with its simultaneous blockade and crippling strike against Karachi in the west, was an impressive display of high-caliber fighting skill, quality seamanship, and close interservice cooperation. Largely as a result of these sea victories which all but destroyed the Pakistani fleet, India for the first time since obtaining independence began to look upon its Navy as an essential component of a well-balanced defense posture.
The development and upgrading of India’s naval infrastructure in the last 15 years has been no less dynamic and impressive. In 1947, what passed for a naval infrastructure was hardly adequate even for the ships of the colonial Royal Indian Navy. Today, India has four major shipyards, of which three are under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence and concentrating on naval programs. Ports and naval logistical installations on both coasts have been enlarged or established. The old central naval headquarters at Bombay has been discontinued and replaced by three command centers (Bombay, Visha- khapatnam, and Cochin). Some 800 miles off India’s east coast, a major naval air facility is under construction at Fort Blair, South Andaman Island. A similar although less extensive program is in progress on one of the nearby Nicobar Islands. Across the subcontinent, Lakshadweep Territory (formerly Laccadive, Minicoy, and Amindivi Islands) lias been organized to help strengthen the Navy’s western and southwestern perimeter defense positions.
In short, the post-independence history of India
and its Navy presents a picture of a force that has expanded its size and power, broadened its activities, improved its image, and shifted its principal supplier state from Great Britain to the Soviet Union. It is the record of a developing nation that belatedly came to regret the neglect of seapower. Since March 1977, when the administration of Prime Minister Morarji Desai began to govern, the Indian Navy also is a service that has begun a program of reducing its naval dependency on the Soviet Union and of reestablishing ties with the West. Let us look at the pattern of development and growth. 1947-1965: The Years of Neglect and Disinterest: Between 1947 and the early 1960s, four main antinaval pressures or attitudes acted together to ensure that the Indian Navy was the poor stepchild of the Defence Ministry: ^ Newly independent India was complacent about the need to protect its extensive maritime frontiers (3,500 miles) from sea attack or invasion because of long dependence on the British. When independence came to India in 1947, the officials of the new government regarded appropriations to develop seapower as a luxury item in the defense budgets. | resulted from cultural prejudices. Throughout the subcontinent’s long history, Hindus, particularly the upper castes from the north, have avoided deep-sea travel. Apart from fiscal neglect and low public repute, the outstanding feature of the Indian Navy between 1947 and 1965 was its pronounced British character and professional linkages to the Royal Navy. The fleet was almost an exclusively “made in U.K- force. The Indian crews manning the warships were also “made in U.K.” Many officers had received part of their naval training in the United Kingdom or hah served under British officers in the Royal Indian Navy during World War II. Most senior personnel were graduates of at least one of the Royal Navys staff colleges. Even among noncommissioned personnel, training and schooling in the United Kingdom were reasonably common for the more promising rat' ings. The Indian Navy for nearly the first 20 years ot lts existence was thus a service that was tolerated but not admired, poorly financed, and badly equipPe<J because the country’s leaders saw no strategic reason for more generous support. |
^ India’s military engagements with Pakistan in Kashmir, the 1962 war with the People’s Republic of China concerning the Aksai Chin boundary, and the 1965 conflict with Pakistan over East Pakistan (Bangladesh) were land-air engagements. In none of these three crises did the Indian Navy play even a nominal role in the outcome. The need to acquire (or locally manufacture) tanks, rifles, artillery guns, and aircraft was obvious, while large expenditures for the Navy seemed to be inappropriate. The 1962-1963 budget, prepared prior to the outbreak of the conflict with China, is typical for the period. The Army received 77.5% of the total appropriation, the Air Force 17.8 %, and the Navy 4.7%. ^ Many in and out of the government believed that the most efficient way to help alleviate the country’s massive poverty and general industrial backwardness was to concentrate on the nonmilitary sector of the economy simultaneously with a massive program to modernize agriculture. Quite regularly throughout the 1947-1965 period, the anti-militarists argued that the government’s proposed defense budget was needlessly large, possibly immoral, and at the very least shamelessly unwarranted because the country was without territorial ambitions and followed a nonaligned foreign policy. Such extreme positions became less prominent following India’s defeat by the Chinese. ^ The nation’s lack of support for its Navy may have | 1965-1977: The Indian Navy Under Soviet Sponsorship: Immediately following the war with Chma> India undertook an in-depth analysis of the countrys need for increased military power. Guided by new Minister of Defence, Y. B. Chavan, a Mihtar^ Affairs Committee eventually agreed on a five-yeil|. program of expansion and modernization for each 0 the three services. Insofar as the Navy was concerne , the committee recommended a far-reaching program of reconstruction and reorganization. The 1964-19’ Defence Plan directed the Naval Chief of Staff t0 begin replacing the fleet’s aging, less efficient vesse with faster, more lethal ones. The Navy was also 4' rected to initiate a program of acquiring submarir>eS and developing the country’s submarine service. The Chavan ministry, firmly supported by the 4e fense chiefs, spent much of 1964 exploring the feaSI bility of acquiring the desired naval equipment from the West. When preliminary inquiries were made 1 Washington, the Johnson administration coolly re ceived India’s naval shopping list. The United Stare5’ and India did not share similar views concern*11# either the probability of a renewed Chinese attack 0 India’s need for greater naval power. Rebuffed by 1 American Government, Chavan and his aides turne to the United Kingdom, but the Wilson governrr>eri^ was almost as negative as Johnson’s. Chavan w'arne Prime Minister Harold Wilson that if the British not support the program for an upgraded Navy, |
-70 | „________ 19®1 |
adrninistration of Jawaharlal Nehru would look to rke Soviet Union for the required ships. The British declined to be pressured, and the Chavan-Wilson talks failed.
When the Soviet Union was approached for support of India’s program of naval expansion, the Kremlin responded promptly and positively. The Indians’ overture came at a propitious time. According to Moscow’s geostrategic analysis of South Asia following China’s decisive victory in the Himalayas— an evaluation reinforced when Peking began its sharp Stacks on Soviet foreign policy in the Indian Ocean Senerally—a more powerful Indian Navy that was associated with the Soviet fleet could help contain a hostile China. It also would be better able to deal Wlth whatever future expansionist plans the Chinese Navy might undertake in the region.
Upon his return to New Delhi, Chavan reported that the Soviets would permit India to purchase submarines, frigates, missile boats, logistic support Vessels, and precision guided weapon systems. The Soviets also agreed to help train Indian submarine
crews at naval stations in the Soviet Union. The Soviet offer of naval assistance was duly negotiated and a bilateral agreement signed in 1965. While the financial arrangements remain undisclosed, the government announced that it was paying for its purchases in rupees or Indian goods over a ten-year period and at 2% annual interest.
During the next 12 years, 1965-1977, India was the Soviet Union’s principal beneficiary of naval assistance. As more and more Soviet warships and armament were transferred and became operative, the Indian Navy became better balanced and more powerful. Its British influence and composition declined precipitously.
To this observer, India has reason to be well pleased with the naval program negotiated with the Soviets. Today, the Navy is small but has begun to acquire the mobility and power needed to guard its frontiers in the region. But the record indicates that New Delhi treated the program as a stopgap measure and not as a suitable permanent arrangement for a country of India’s potential power and regional aspirations. Even as it was commissioning Soviet-built units into its fleet, the government generously supported a program to build warships in local yards so that India could eventually end its dependency on foreign-built vessels.
Most significantly, the expansion and upgrading of the Indian Navy has not been accompanied by debilitating political-military concessions to the Soviet Union and its Indian Ocean strategy. All rumors and press reports to the contrary, there is no evidence in the unclassified literature that India has leased any of its ports to the Soviet Union. Soviet naval advisers do not appear to have pervaded the Navy’s command structure, a condition that did prevail in the Egyptian Navy during the 1950s when Russo-Egyptian naval cooperation was at its zenith. New Delhi officials have successfully turned aside the Soviets’ call for a regional collective security arrangement and consequently have avoided the possibility that the Navy would become less independent.
The benefits the Soviet Union realized from its naval collaboration are less apparent than those for India. If the “genuine nonalignment” policy of the Desai government continues under his successor,
One holdover from the days when the Royal Navy was India's patron is the light cruiser Mysore (ex-HMS Nigeria). She was completed in 1940 and sold to India in I9‘>4. Another old cruiser, Delhi, was disposed of in 1978, so the Mysore probably isn't far behind.
The INS Karanj is a former Soviet “Foxtrot”-class submarine. There have been reports that the Soviets are willing to convert the Indian “Foxtrots" to nuclear propulsion.
Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the arrangement may be far less permanent than Moscow originally contemplated. The Soviet Union’s aid did end the Indian Navy’s traditional relationship with the Royal Navy. Second, linkages with India gave Moscow a potential strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the period following Great Britain s withdrawal. Third, it complemented the Soviets’ policy of containing the People’s Republic of China in South Asia. On the other hand, a joint Soviet-Indian maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean has not emerged. While there has been widespread acclaim for the Soviet naval aid, it appears to be of diminishing importance. India’s naval policies today are not invariably those favored by the Soviets; New Delhi has not become an echo of Moscow. Under the leadership of the Junata Party, the government began to follow a more evenhanded policy toward the West and appears to be more tolerant than previously of the American base at Diego Garcia. It also has begun high-level discussions with the Chinese to resolve their political-military differences. If these talks succeed, India may become somewhat less anxious about eventual Chinese penetration of the Indian Ocean. Finally, the Soviet naval aid program did little to advance the fortunes of Communism in the country. As the 1977 election demonstrated, India remains determined to continue its own mixed economic system and doggedly to favor Western-type democratic forms and procedures.
1965-1977: The Leander Frigate Program: Attaining the highest degree of self-sufficiency in military equipment was an early goal of India’s poSt' independence government. When Western countries' most notably the United States, cut off military a‘^ to both sides in 1965 after Pakistan attacked IndiaNew Delhi officials were more determined than ever to push for local ordnance development. Among the most successful ventures to date is India’s naval craft program.
In 1964, Great Britain granted a special defense credit of £4.7 million. According to the agreement negotiated by the two governments, these funds were restricted to covering the initial costs of setting UP facilities at Mazagon Docks, Bombay, to produce the British designed Leander-class frigate. In October 1966, the keel of the first of the series, the INS N^" girt, was laid. She was commissioned in June 197*> becoming the first Indian warship locally built *n modern times. At present, India is one of only r"° Third World countries constructing frigate-destroyer type vessels in its own shipyards. In 1980, the sixt and final Leander frigate, the INS Vindhyagiri, v'aS completed.
In evaluating the Leander production record, what has impressed observers are the adaptations, altera tions, and design improvements that Indian person nel incorporated into later ships of the series. Fun damental changes in guns, radar, and fire-contr equipment were added to the last three vessels, tbe Dunagiri, Taragirt, and Vindhyagiri. Beginning wit the Dunagiri, for example, two Sea Cat surface-to-a'r missiles replaced the original single missile. On th® negative side, Indians acknowledge that the pace 0 production did proceed more slowly than original y
expected. They maintain that because working crews 'Vere unfamiliar with ship construction and also beCause of the qualitative changes that required experimentation, extra weeks had to be added to proaction sched ides. The overall experience, they be- ''eve, makes local shipyards well prepared to begin ^le next, as yet unannounced class of locally designed ngates to be built in India. Indian defense leaders particularly proud of the fact that the Leander r'gates were built at a cost of approximately 209?
Ss than if they had been built in European yards.
India's Post-1977 Naval Problems: Ind ia’s leaders, deluding its senior naval officers, are unable to agree °n rhe precise mission the Navy should be prepared t() Perform in the coming quarter century. Until this c°ntroversy is resolved by the Defence Ministry and approved by elected officials, the Indian Navy will the requisite set of operating objectives to shape lts future. There are two pro-Navy factions, both of "^‘ch agree that India needs a fleet of sufficient P°Wer to protect the country’s ports, harbors, and c°astal installations from seaborne attack, invasion, ^ acts of sabotage. They further agree that the . avy has to secure incoming and outgoing commerce tJ* ^oth peacetime and wartime periods. Finally, ttre is agreement that it is the Navy’s responsibility j Protect India’s offshore economic zone programs 0|^ platforms and pipelines) from all forms of interbacked by defensive units responsible for protecting the maritime approaches and contiguous waters around India.
At the opposite pole are those who favor a fleet that would have a different mission and force composition. In their view, India needs a navy only to defend its coastlines and protect its offshore installations and island perimeter defenses. They favor a fleet made up of small ships, armed with missiles, and capable of attaining fast speeds. What they challenge are plans to build up a navy to include hunter-killer units capable of striking enemy ships thousands of miles from the subcontinent. They discount any need for such offensive striking power.
The latter position lias been supported in an essay by R. R. Chari, Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis. He calls attention to the fact that the government increased the Navy’s share of the defense budget from 4% in 1971-1972 to 7% in 1977-1978. He writes:
rUpt
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‘°n. Beyond such common goals, the pro-Navy
uPs split.
^*e first group speaks up for men-of-war such as carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and
aircraft
an
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expanded naval air arm with long-range reconnais- Ce units. The blue water, hunter-killer component
W°uld be
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able to patrol deep into the Indian Ocean
and in wartime destroy hostile ships far from s littoral. This offensive capability would be
“The navy has, therefore, received its due share of defence expenditures and has added to its strength over the ’seventies, although the external naval threat has not increased. . . . Naval procurements with blue ocean capabilities are likely to cause alarm to some of India’s neighbours. It would lead to concern in the Indian Ocean littoral countries, and militate against proposals that the Indian Ocean be converted into a zone of peace.”
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The disagreement over the Navy’s role and composition is far from being resolved. Until India decides with finality whether or not to acquire a deep-sea fleet with offensive power, its Navy will be a service without a clear idea of its mission. This ambiguity must have a deleterious effect on any long-range war planning that naval headquarters prepares, and it is bound to exacerbate whatever inter-service tensions and rivalry exist. An immediate but temporary resolution of the issue is almost certainly tied to the future of the INS Vikrant.
India’s only aircraft carrier (formerly HMS Hercules) was purchased from Great Britain in 1957. After extensive refitting and modernization, she was commissioned in 1961. Of the other littoral Indian Ocean states, Australia is the only one to have an aircraft carrier in service. The Vikrant is a light carrier of 18,000-20,000 tons displacement and carries a complement of approximately 1,400 officers and men, including flying personnel. In the 1971 Indo- Pakistani War, the Vikrant, operating off the east coast, was active and significantly helped in achieving victory in the Bay of Bengal. In 1973-1974, the Vikrant underwent extensive overhaul which extended her capability for active operations. While modernization was proceeding, the Navy began pressuring the government to replace the ship’s aging and inefficient Sea Hawk jets. Since the British had terminated Sea Hawk production, a substitute plane was needed.
Even as the experts debated the merits and disabilities of British, American, and Soviet planes, public discussion got under way on whether India was better advised to decommission the Vikrant rather than finance a very costly plane acquisition program. As the differing positions were expressed, it became obvious that the Vikrant issue was fundamentally a variation on the question of whether India needed a navy with offensive striking power.
One reason which received frequent emphasis in debates on the subject related to India’s foreign policy goals. Only a prestigious vessel, such as an aircraft carrier, could "show the flag” in foreign ports and thereby help implement the country’s political- economic problems. The Vikrant issue was resolved on 10 October 1977, when the Desai government announced that the Navy had been given authorization to purchase British Sea Harrier V/STOL planes, whose vertical and short takeoff and landing capabilities are well suited for the aircraft carrier. Negotiations between naval headquarters and the British Admiralty got under way later that year and continued after Mrs. Gandhi returned to power. According to recent press reports, India has agreed to purchase six Sea Harriers and two trainers for the Vikrant, thus extending her life span at least until the mid- 1980s.
Soviet Dependency or Western Diversification? One diversification initiative which is central to this article concerns the Indian Navy and its long awaited submarine expansion program. At least since the early 1960s, there have been press reports that India was about to set up a local facility to manufacture a foreign-designed submarine. While India did pur" chase eight Soviet-built “Foxtrots” between 19^8 and 1975, an indigenous submarine program did not get started. Within months after taking office, d’e Desai administration invited representatives of five European states to open negotiations concerning die setting up of a local facility for the manufacture 0 submarines'. According to press reports, India told the representatives of France, Sweden, West Ger' many, Holland, and Italy that it wished to purchase one foreign-built submarine in the 1,400-2,000-ton range. When she resumed leadership of the government, including retaining the defense portfolio, Mrs- Gandhi authorized the Navy to continue examin|n^ European-made submarines as part of her administra tion’s policy of not being dependent on any single country for arms supplies. In April 1980, a senior naval official announced that the Defence Ministry had narrowed the choice to either a West German °r Swedish vessel, because the alternatives were we^ suited to the “new environment of sophisticate underwater warfare” that India might have to face 1(1 the future. In November, New Delhi announced that India would purchase two of the West German sub marines.
Soviet displeasure with India’s plans to diversi ) its naval suppliers and establish close ties with Western European submarine builder appears to beyond dispute. According to International Defe,,se Review (February 1978), Rear Admiral Yasenkov dur ing a courtesy visit to Bombay revealed Moscow willingness to convert India’s “Foxtrots” to nudeaf propulsion. He also is reported to have said t1 Soviets were prepared to share with India their expe rience in the field of nuclear propulsion.
The government’s diversification programs niL cause some unhappiness within the Indian Navy- Soviet Union since the mid-1960s has been Ind1*1^ sole supplier of warships, and without Mosco" backing, it is questionable whether the Indian Aee would have the striking power it possesses today Some level of professional identification and perhaP_ comradeship must have developed during the last years between Indian and Soviet naval personn1
sD‘te the Soviet policy of discouraging easy relation- diips between their nationals and those of another state. Possibly the closest Indo-Russian links exist among Indian submarine crews and their Soviet counterparts. Not only are all the fleet’s submarines Russian construction, but prior to the setting up °flocal facilities and training schools, the first crews Were trained in the Soviet Union. Even at the present hrrie, service facilities on the subcontinent are so lim- ,ted that Indian “Foxtrots” needing repair are sent to t le Soviet Union. | glected service in the future. The United States, along with Western Europe and Japan, should welcome the growth of Indian seapower and the modernization of its fleet. Dependent as we are on the petroleum resources of the Persian Gulf-Arabian Peninsula, our respective national interests require a militarily secure subcontinent and an Indian Ocean not plagued by chronic regional tensions. A strong, balanced Indian Navy, manned by well-trained, seasoned officers and seamen, and equipped with modern armament should be regarded, therefore, as an essential component of In- |
Conclusion: India’s naval expansion policies must be regarded as an atypical case history of how a develop- ln8 state, burdened by widespread poverty, a narrow lndustrial base, and severe internal problems, can ac- jjLure seapower and for the first time in modern times e8'n to ensure the integrity of its maritime frontier. *e record is today’s leading example of how a re- U°nal power accepted sizeable amounts of naval as- Slstance from the Soviet Union but without com- l’r°rnising its sovereignty or lessening its indepen- er*ce of action. It also shows that a policy of self- SL|ificiency can result in an impressive record of war- Sl|P construction. Until government and defense leaders conclude ^'e,t debate concerning the several issues cited in ls article, the Navy’s precise strategic role in the wnse of the country and its unit composition will ^fnain in doubt. There is no question, however, that le Indian Navy is not going to be the country’s ne- | dia’s military posture. Only if the Navy is commensurate with India’s regional preeminence can it hope to defend the nation from its enemies. Further, unless India continues to build up its naval strength, it may remain dependent on the Soviet Union for its future maritime security. It would appear advantageous, consequently, for the West to look upon India’s plans for improving the fleet and adding to local shipbuilding capabilities with greater sympathy than in the past. Dr. Larus is professor of politics, New York Uni- y* versity. He was educated at Harvard College, Y~ A*” ■ University of Virginia, University of Michigan 1 Law School, and Columbia University, where he took his Ph.D. in I960. His most recent publica- 9 tion is Culture am! Political-Military Behavior: the IBS Hindus in Premodern India. Currently he is working on an analysis of the failed Indian Ocean disarmament talks. |
___________________________________ Female Mail -------------------------------------------
It had been over a month since our daughter Kristi had written. When her letter finally arrived, I ripped it open to read her latest news.
She wrote the way she talked. She enthusiastically related news about her husband—his car needed repair, he’d gone hang-gliding for the first time, and he’d recently bought her an electric Wok. She had gotten new leather boots and a letter from her cousin, whose housework was piling up, and, to our surprise, Kristi had started taking guitar lessons. News of our eight-month-old granddaughter, Amanda, was reported with excitement and love.
Finally, I sensed a touch of homesickness when she wrote, “Miss you and Dad.” But, the letter quickly went on to close with a bright, “Must run—it’s time for my Rifle Class. Love, Kristi.”
My daughter, the Marine!
Barbara A. Lenards