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They no longer march to the beat of the U. S. drum. The era of U. S. preeminence in the Southern Hemisphere has ended; the era of Latin American self-confidence has begun.
Prior to World War II, the Navy of the United States and those of European nations competed for influence within the fleets of Latin America. Training missions and warship sales were the prime measure of success. The Brazilian and Peruvian navies were guided by U. S. officers, and the Chilean Navy was strongly influenced by the Royal Navy. The Argentine Navy looked toward Europe for help, primarily Great Britain and Italy. The competition to sell warships to Latin American navies was keen. As a result, Latin American navies were able to purchase the best money could buy. In 1910, U. S. journals enviously compared the U. S.-built Rivadavia with the USS Arkansas (BB-33), speculating that the Argentines “got a better deal” than the U. S. Navy did.
After World War II, the “era of U. S. preeminence” was the new reality. U. S. naval missions dominated all of the major southern fleets. Relatively new, but yet obsolescent U. S.-built warships became the mainstays of Latin American navies. And the United States’ perception of the future role of Latin American navies determined the tactics exercised during joint operations. This era lasted from 1945 until the early 1970s.
The end.of the era began in the late 1960s for many reasons. First, U. S. political influence decreased in the area. Second, the U. S. supply of World War II warships was becoming exhausted. Third, these warships were progressing from new and obsolescent to old and obsolete. Fourth, the traditional European arms competitors were recovering from World War II. Fifth, the more powerful Latin American nations were developing indigenous shipbuilding, albeit still a fledgling industry.
In this new era of self-confidence, Latin American naval officers believe they have a better understanding of their needs than do their former U. S. advisors.
The issue confronting most Latin American navies is national survival. Communism is perceived to be the threat by nations other than Cuba and the growing number of leftist governments in the Caribbean and Central America. To the non-Communist governments, the threat takes one of two forms. The first is traditional warfare. Most Latin American navies believe their responsibility in such a conflict will be antisubmarine patrol or warfare, depending upon whether they are a neutral or a participant. Latin America is vulnerable to a war on commerce. Ninety-five percent of all trade is carried by ships. This includes oil; only Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela can meet their petroleum needs through domestic production. The second form has been unconventional warfare. Most Latin American nations have been at war against terrorists; assassinations, bombings, highjackings, and kidnappings have been widespread. When possible, the navies have had to adapt their resources to aid the other services in combating this unconventional enemy. Cuba’s persistence in exporting revolution has contributed to this violence. Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador are now being threatened; many South
American nations appreciate how dangerously close this unsettling activity is to the Panama Canal, a waterway more critical to their lifelines than to those of the United States.
Secondary concerns are enforcing national maritime law, the impbca" tions of current U. S. foreign policy’ and disputes with neighboring countries.
To many Latin American nations, the resources of the sea are the economic hope of the future. Today- sophisticated fishing fleets prowl the seas and vacuum-clean resources haltway around the world from their ov'n shores. They often disregard territorial boundaries. Russia and its allies have been the primary poachers. Argentine Navy has used strong force against this encroachment and may have caused the Soviets to reconsider such activities, particularly off the coasts of the major Latin America0 countries. In late 1977, Argentine sailors forcibly boarded Russian a° Bulgarian fishing trawlers and captured a factory ship. During 0°e melee, a Bulgarian trawler was hit three times by 5-inch ordnance; °ne crew member was killed and seven1* injured. The navies of Argentina’ Brazil, Chile, and Peru seem to I16’ just the correct size for dealing w‘t*1 poaching. They are not so small that the Soviets can ignore or bully them- and they are not so large that a con frontation might escalate into a maj°r conflict.
U. S. foreign policy worries Latin American leaders and directly impaCtS on their navies. Many of these leaders believe that the United States has a*3 dicated its role as the leader of the Free World. It is suspected that the
Many territorial disputes persist llmong the Latin American nations, during colonial times, Spain owned Cst of the New World’s Southern hemisphere and was never concerned Ch establishing precise boundaries t'tween sparsely populated provinces, categories of disputes must be of c°ncern: those causing current ten- ^'°ns and those having the potential to ead to a major conflict.
The current flash point is a territo- r‘al dispute between Argentina and f-hile over an area at the tip of the c°ntinent. This area has become more 'mportant with the projections that oil ^'ght be present there.
The interamerican dispute with esuvius’ potential is the tension be-
once mighty bulwark against Communism has gone soft. They see ter- forists destroying parts of Central America, and the United States does nothing. Russian troops parade in Cuba, and the United States finds this unacceptable—but no more so than Ae Berlin Wall. Latin American leaders are confused. They defeat Marxist terrorists in a life-and-death struggle m their own countries, and the United States chastises them for human rights Vlolations. They are then punished. Parts for U. S. -supplied S-2A Tracker Asw aircraft are embargoed; as a re- suk, submarines go undetected in the South Atlantic. Spares for U. S.- supplied Fletcher-class destroyers are cut off; poaching trawlers fish instead of being fished.
The United States has tried to use dependence on its hardware to influence Latin American internal affairs. This has added anger to Latin AmeriCans’ worry and confusion. Many be- '*eve that the United States uses a dif- krent human rights yardstick in the Middle East than in Latin America. If, lr> the opinion of Latin American leaders> U. S. leadership continues to decorate, non-Communist countries HO'ght well abandon traditional treaty c°mmitments, such as the Rio Defense Treaty (1947), and unite in a re- &l0nal defense pact, which might ex- elude the United States. Admittedly, this move is still a long way off, and ^et> many Latin Americans believe that the United States has started to travel this road.
tween Chile and Peru. Chile crushed Peru in the War of the Pacific (187983). The war reshaped the politics, economics, and geography of the west coast of South America. Peru has often threatened justice or revenge, depending on one’s point of view. Today, Peru finds the naval balance to be the most favorable it has been since the war took place. The Peruvian Navy has grown impressively since the 1960s. The Chilean Navy has largely stagnated since the 1973 removal of the Allende Government.
Territorial claims in the Antarctic have the potential to cause a major conflict. Many in Argentina and Chile see the frozen continent as a source of vast wealth. South of the border the Antarctic Treaty of 1961 is perceived to be more fragile than it is in the
U. S. State Department.
The strongest navies in Latin America are those of Argentina and Brazil. Each has a balanced fleet, including a light carrier. They are supported by a growing ability to produce military hardware and munitions. Chile and Peru have substantial navies. But their fleets lack adequate naval aviation and amphibious warfare capabilities. The Venezuelan Navy has made some significant acquisitions during the last few years. Once logistics and training programs are carried through, this navy will become the most important in the Caribbean. Other Latin American navies have made impressive acquisitions recently, but still need much development in order to be more than limited forces. Cuba is expanding the scope of its
The French-built “A-69"-class Exocet missile-equipped corvette appeals to a number of international navies. Pictured is the commissioning of one of the three Argentine "A-69s” in Argentina.
“gunboat navy” with the acquisition of submarines. Ecuador is purchasing Italian-built corvettes. The remaining countries have minor navies; even though quite small, some of these forces are very professionally run.
Navies in Latin America receive less attention than do armies; but the disparity between the services is decreasing. As a navy’s ability to project its power ashore increases, so does its importance. The primary vehicles for projection are aircraft and amphibians. The status of naval air arms and marine corps is a more accurate gauge of the national significance of Latin American navies than is the size of their budgets or the number of their people.
Argentina: Two immediate challenges confront the Argentine Navy. Claims to disputed territory at the tip of the continent need to be supported, and the 200-mile fishing zone requires constant vigil. These tasks share a similar solution. First, high visibility is needed. In the southern waters, this is best accomplished by minor combatants, such as the German-built Intrepida-class first patrol craft. The fishing zone is best patrolled by submarines and the French-built “A-69” corvettes. Second, the fleet must be maintained in a high state of readiness. Third, there must be the resolve to use force, if necessary. The recent confrontation with the Communist trawlers should cause a potential opponent to think twice before challenging Argentina. A long-term goal is a continuing presence in the Antarctic in order to strengthen national claims. The deployment of the new icebreaker Almirante Irizar and the ordering of a 9,200-ton Antarctic supply ship are the keys to accomplishing this.
The future of the Argentine Navy is bright. Many nagging equipment problems are on their way to being solved. French Super Etendard attack aircraft are on order and will replace the A-4Q Skyhawks on board 25 De Mayo in 1981-82. This will give the Argentine Navy a degree of power unmatched in Latin America. U. S.- built replacement aircraft could not be obtained for political reasons. Four
MADA ARGENTA
West German “Meko-360” frigates and six "Meko-140” corvettes have been contracted. The frigates will be fitted with British Rolls Royce gas turbines rather than a U. S. General Electric powerplant for obvious reasons. These ships should become operational between 1982 and 1986. This program will relieve the aging and spareless U. S.-built destroyers which are, despite -this, now armed with antiship missiles. Four "TR-1700 and two “TR-1400” submarines are
on order from Thyssen Nordseewerke, Germany, most to be assembled m Argentina. A third “A-69” corvette has been ordered from France, and new research ships and transports are being built in Argentina. This is a growth in traditional fleet strength.
The Argentine naval leaders should be pleased with current performance, recent acquisitions, and building progress. The immediate future should hold no internally initiated surprises. However, one should not be surprised if the Argentine Navy acts boldly against any challenge.
Brazil: Brazil’s short- and longterm naval strategies are identical: the protection of sea-lanes. Like most Latin American nations, Brazil carries almost all of its foreign trade by ships- The bulk of the Brazilian Navy 's antisubmarine warfare oriented. This emphasis is understandable. The Brazilian Navy played an important antisubmarine role in World Wars I and II. The U. S. Navy’s influence is stronger in Brazil than elsewhere >n Latin America, and the United States has always emphasized ASW in lts training missions. Brazil is strategi' tally located at the narrowest point on the Atlantic. Also, Brazil does not have any major disputes with neigh' bors possessing strong navies; therefore, its antiair and antisurface warfare programs have not had to receive a much attention.
The navy’s building program is 111 jeopardy. The explosion in oil priceS has ruined Brazil’s foreign exchange balance. Brazil imports most of its °^’ and in recent years, this has cost ha the value of all exports. The rebuild ing of the navy began when oil cheap and now cannot be afforded-
Gei-c
>ats will have to serve well into the
gains in new construction,
tr0|
th °^t*le md'genous capacity to main- Un,ts. The size of a continuing
must be tempered with the real-
Pecifically, there will be no new submarines beyond the three Oberons n°w operational. There may not be a seventh Niteroi-class frigate, as has ten projected in many publications. *le recently overhauled carrier Minas
l^Os without a projected successor.
e Brazilian Navy will consolidate recent
r°ugh improved training, and will ?ot follow through on the extensive Gilding program begun in the 1960s.
Brazil plans to supplement its fleet ''■th a new class of 12 guided missile n&ates of about 1,600 tons displace- rtlent. It will seek a bi-national fireernent similar to the one it had the British under which the I ,ter°i class was built and has stipu- atcd that U. S. equipment is not de- Slred for the frigates, which are to be '’mpleted in Brazil beginning in 5- This program, too, will depend UB°n the balance of payments.
(-bile; Imminent danger weighs eavi|y The Q-|j|ean Navy must be Prepared to be besieged at both ends ^ a very long coast. To the south, ^c‘re is the territorial dispute with the r8entines. To the north, relations TV]1.’ ^erU are PotentiaIIy volatile.
n'ng the fleet in a high state of 'ness. Ships which have outlived e technology of their systems com- 0j. ents must be maintained in spite P Poor cost-effectiveness ratings. ton^?term 80als must be subordinated (bis immediate concern. Fishery pa-
Antarctic program must be weighed against current operational needs. Beyond the immediate, the Chilean Navy believes its mission is to protect its sea-lanes and those of its allies during an East-West conflict.
The problem for the Chilean Navy is the acquisition of new units. Chile has been politically isolated since 1973, and until this changes, its strength relative to its neighbors will deteriorate. In 1979, Chile did obtain the first of three Israeli Reshef-c\ass guided missile boats, armed with Gabriel missiles, as well as four Israeli Dt'ora-class patrol boats and the first of ten Anchora-class, patrol boats from Brazil. There are also reports that West Germany will build two submarines for Chile. This is a breakthrough, but much more is needed. The acquisition problem is further complicated by a trade deficit; Chile imports most of its oil. Most other major Latin American navies have substantial building programs under way. These are based on bi-national agreements with developed European shipbuilders. The Chilean Navy needs such programs. Undoubtedly, negotiations for frigates are in progress.
Chile was not invited to participate in the UNITAS XXI (1980) exercise, underscoring the Get that the United States is not relaxing its policies to isolate that country. Out of this adversity, there is a bright spot for the navy. Its strength has always rested more in its quality than quantity. The current crisis appears to have strengthened the resolve of its personnel to be among the best prepared in the world. The Chilean Navy could be overwhelmed, but it could not be caught off guard.
Cuba: The Cuban Navy’s immediate goal is to prevent counterinsurgents from landing or raiding the island. An efficient ‘‘gunboat navy” has been developed, equipped with the Soviets’ more sophisticated exports.
The protective force has three elements. Large patrol boats cruise territorial waters. Fast attack craft dart out from Mariel and other bases on irregularly scheduled patrols. Missile attack boats remain in their bases, rarely seen at sea; these missile boats are well maintained and are the elite of the navy. The 18 “Komar” boats, first introduced in Cuba during 1962, were
the initial missile-armed boats in the Western Hemisphere. This force was forged in the early and mid-1960s. Beginning in the 1970s, Cuba began to replace its fast attack craft and the missile attack boats with newer, more sophisticated units. Ten Soviet “Zhuk” patrol boats and four “Turya” hydrofoil torpedo boats were transferred in 1975-76 and 1979-80 respectively. A dozen “Osa I” and “Osa II” missile attack boats have been transferred, beginning in 1972 and continuing to date. In 1980, two “Son- ya”-class coastal minesweepers were delivered from the U.S.S.R., supplementing four “Yevgenya”-class inshore minesweepers which arrived in Cuba in 1978-79. The Cuban Navy, supported by a substantial air force, is capable of defeating any effort short of a major attack by a powerful navy.
Cuba exports revolution. The merchant and fishing fleets have been used to export unrest. Cuba’s involvement in Africa is publicly acknowledged. Cuban ships smuggled Communist- manufactured arms to Allende’s supporters in Chile in the early 1970s.
The Cuban gunboat navy is too shortlegged to play a role in this endeavor. However, this might be changing. If one knew why the Cuban Navy has now begun to obtain submarines, the mid-term future could be predicted. In February 1979 and March 1980, the Cuban Navy acquired two new Soviet “Foxtrot” submarines. The “Foxtrot” class, a very successful diesel design, has been produced by the U.S.S.R. for export at the rate of one per year since 1968.
A third “Foxtrot” can be expected to join the Cuban Navy this year, as happened with Libya, in order to ensure one that one boat is available for patrol at all times. Also, the Cuban Navy obtained a nonoperational “Whiskey” submanne which was towed from the U.S.S.R- in May 1979; since her systems ar^ not compatible with the “Foxtrots, she is probably intended as a station ary battery-charging barge.
These submarines could serve a number of purposes. They c°u hardly be training boats, providing the Cuban Navy with realistic exercises, as Cuba has only a few age craft capable of ASW. These su marines might be a justification, °r excuse, for building the submarine base at Cienfuegos which could also be used by Soviet submarines. They might have been acquired to annoy the United States. The United States is working hard to close Soviet su marines out of the Atlantic in time 0 war. This makes just one more kef’ the United States must watc1' Although ominous, none of these re* sons would indicate that the character of the Cuban Navy is changing.
There are other possibilities, submarines might have been acqu're to clandestinely export revolution The Cuban Navy, having secured t homeland, might see as a secon* mission the destruction of marit> commerce in a traditional war.
Pen/: The problem for the Peru'1,1 Navy—perhaps immediate or perhap^ distant—is its role in a potential with Chile. If a war did occur, country which could gain contn the sea would dictate the offense
rr,ng in amphibious forces and at- naval aircraft. tenez,tela: The immediate concern to Venezuelan Navy is the threat jCaJlat'°nal security posed by the polit- n1. ‘testability in the Caribbean. Any '°n which exports oil is threatened, lit! : C current trend in the navy is so- ymg the material gains that it has sj* e ‘n the last decades. In 1975-76, qX ast attack craft (three armed with tye°mat surface-to-surface missiles) tw 6 a^lu'red- During the next year,
thi
fle,
Most population centers are within easy access of the sea and transportation corridors run east and west. So it Was in 1879.
Today, the Peruvian Navy is a formidable force. For the first time since the War of the Pacific (1879-83), Peru s navy is numerically superior to Chile s. For decades, the Peruvian Navy had struggled day by day for its existence. While neighbors were uilding fleets around dreadnoughts, and later Brooklyn-class cruisers, the eruvian Navy had to be content with the frugal man’s solution: the submarine. This austerity may have been d 'disguised blessing for Peru. From this tradition, the navy has forged a otrnidable submarine force, now l°‘ned by a strong surface fleet.
The recent acquisitions of the Peru- Vlan Navy are “more, of the same,” Particularly if judged within the Premise that the U. S. preeminence as ended. For example, the cruiser gnirre (ex-Dutch De Zeven Provincien) replaced an ex-British “Colony’’-class ttniser. Four former Dutch destroyers ave replaced two ex-U. S. Fletchers, nd join another ex-Dutch destroyer and two former British Darings. Two "Po-class missile frigates were delivered from Italy in 1979 and two more building in Peru. Four additional ^ype-209” class submarines from . est Germany are joining two already ^ service plus six older U. S.-built °ats> and the first two of six new j ,Ssile corvettes arrived from France " *e summer of 1980. If the Peru- lan Navy planned aggression, how-
Ver> the strength buildup would be °ccu ■ tack
Type-209” submarines joined
frj '"et- Currently, six Litpo-class e> es are under construction. Two ‘tigates have been rebuilt. These
acquisitions are now being complemented by logistic support and personnel training. Historically, the Venezuelan Navy has not had continuing national support.
Venezuela is one of the strongest democracies in Latin America. In the immediate future, the amphibious capability of the marine corps will be significantly improved in order to be prepared for unconventional warfare.
The immediate direction of the non-Communist Latin American navies is awaiting the tone of the new U. S. administration. These navies are not looking to be led as during the days of U. S. preeminence. Rather, they want to see if, in their opinion, the United States once again will assume the leadership of the Free World. If the United States does show this leadership, Latin American navies will exhibit a new enthusiasm for interamerican cooperation, but now as full partners. If the United States does not, the slide from U. S. dependence, particularly from its hardware, will accelerate. The year 1981 will not be one of new direction for Latin America, but it may be for the United States. If so, this could arrest the small, but growing Latin American attitude of “going it alone.”
Cuban submarines have the potential to add a new dimension to that navy. The worst scenario for world peace is these boats being used to transport and supply revolutionaries. If employed against major Latin American navies, the risk of such an undertaking would be too great. Most would not hesitate to forcibly deal with the problem. If employed against weaker Latin American navies, this would show utter contempt for the U. S. Navy. Cuba is not that bold or foolhardy. The introduction of these submarines into Cuba is illustrative of the tried-and-true Soviet practice of taking what you can, when and where you can.
U. S. NAVY (NOCCIOLO)
Three major building programs will be contracted for in 198 1. Mexico will begin to modernize its navy. Currently, its major naval vessels are obsolete. Mexico has announced a binational shipbuilding agreement, similar to those negotiated by Argentina, Brazil, and Peru. The growing importance of Mexican oil is forcing that nation to reassess its military needs. Chile will acquire a long sought after agreement for new frigates or submarines. Finally, Venezuela will contract for some modern amphibious warfare units.