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in r[“‘n ^reen ^as served as Defense Attache
,n Ro.
leadi
ern Eu
and
Co C°Unt‘ng and rationalizing the ;np ete Soviet dedication of achiev- an overwhelming political- on/1^ PreP°n<^erance- Be points de(^ ^0r example, “that once again °cracies seek sanctuary in the
‘Pi. u .
prjCesueta‘*s on ordering books and special
»p'n§^orris of the Blind: How e Great Democracies Have burned The Follies That So ^ early Cost Them Their Life
^ fold W. Rood, Durham, NC.: Carolina iJZC Press- ‘980- 294 pp. Append.
d’ *14.95 ($13.46).
R ■
Viewed by Captain William C. een> U. S. Navy
^ 'mf Italy, and as Assistant Naval Jn>nhi m Moscow’ U S.S.R. He is currently at r ed ln a political science graduate program ‘ e University of California at Berkeley.
b \iS 3pt t^lat Tis work is sponsored don 6 '^nston S- Churchill Associa- n> honoring a man who, during the ^tedude called peace between World frars ^ and II, cried out like a voice perj[ t^le w'lderness about the mortal In i ^az* Germany’s rearmament. (j0ls WeH-researched and thoroughly curjjgnted book, the author builds a
10g(ca]
"of ar8utnent to prove his thesis Cf ie dangerous inclination demo- lilt v peoP*es have of discounting the . 1 ood of war.” The circumstances
J'S to Nazi domination of West- r°pe in 1940 are reexamined Co feanalyzed as a benchmark for the tj()n 'aris°n of present-day Soviet ac- to S Pr°hessor Rood states that “his- ^ '^oes not repeat itself, it is only reellavior of democracies that seems dj et'tious.” He sees the United States
°r details
see the Book Order Service note in the
Interest department.
hopes of peace; once again dictatorships arm.” By Rood’s recapitulation of past Western follies, the reader is reminded of the directions such follies can take in a world in which “democratic good intentions are no match for totalitarian ambition.”
The conclusion that emanates from Rood’s comprehensive comparison between the 1930s and the present is that “military policy cannot be based on sentiments for peace however lofty those sentiments may seem. Military policy must fit the requirements for successful strategy and successful strategy does not derive from the notion that war is impossible.” In reviewing the past 15 years of U. S. military posture, one can see that it has been essentially defensive in nature—designed to deter or prevent the defeat of the United States and its NATO allies. The missing dimension in a purely defensive posture is the ability to influence the behavior of other nations and support allies. A look at the U. S. Navy’s current inventory of carrier-centered battle groups and air wings will readily attest to the fact that the U. S. Navy’s ability to project military power is diminishing.
This reviewer concurs with Rood that our leaders must not let their professional judgment be unduly influenced by a reliance on war deterrence. Rather, they must invest their confidence in weapons which have a demonstrated capability to prevail in battle. The Navy must rethink its warfighting doctrine, taking into consideration the fiscal restraints and strategic policies of the political leadership. It must not fall into the trap of believing that quality rather than weight of firepower can prevail, and that a few “smart” weapon systems can fight outnumbered and win. At the time of Pearl Harbor, the Imperial Japanese Navy possessed the best navy, ship for ship, then afloat. The Japanese soon learned, however, that they could not keep up with the United States’ industrial production. Their superbattleships and supercarriers were no match for the vast armadas joining the U. S. Pacific Fleet after 1943. One lesson from the Pacific War again proves the old axiom that in the uncertainties of war there is no substitute for quantity in both weapons and options. The Soviets understand this and are deterred by nothing less.
Rood ends by contending that: “concessions made to gain Soviet agreements on limited strategic arms are only a part of the strategic equation that would decide the outcome of a new world war. Increments of strategic advantage garnered so patiently here and there by the Soviet Union and its allies have reduced the West’s ability to resist Soviet ambitions. The modernization and expansion of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and its allies are not socialist eccentricities; they are preparations for war.” Kingdoms of the Blind is belabored with all of the quotations and citations that characterize the academic tradition. Although such style may discourage the more casual reader, it provides the underpinning necessary to Rood’s basic arguments and enhances the logic by which the author proves his points. It is not a book designed to be read at one sitting. Rather, it is one that should be reflected upon. It is strongly recommended to those Navy professionals who want to expand their horizons to encompass “the big picture.”
“Luxury Fleet”: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918
Holger H. Herwig. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980. 314 pp. Ulus. Maps. Append. Ind. $22.50 (120.25).
Reviewed by Norman Friedman
Dr. Friedman is a theoretical physicist currently concentrating on naval problems at the Hudson Institute. A Columbia University graduate, he has authored and coauthored articles and papers on the U. S.-Soviet naval balance, Soviet naval missile systems and tactics, and warship design. He is a frequent contributor to the Proceedings.
The Kaiser’s Navy continues to be a subject of great interest, even six decades after its demise. Indeed, there are those who would compare Admiral Gorshkov’s fleet to the “luxury fleet” of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz and his imperial patron. Dr. Herwig has written detailed accounts of the sociology of the imperial naval officer corps and of the development of German naval strategy up to 1941. In this book, he attempts to synthesize his and others’ recent archival research to paint the first full portrait of the Imperial German Navy from start to end: men, policies, ships, tactics, and wartime achievements. Unfortunately, he is not wholly successful, and the result is, at best, uneven. Dr. Herwig’s accounts of the political background of German naval development, including sharp rivalry with the army for scarce state revenue, are absorbing. His treatment of wartime strategy and operations is illuminating. Of particular interest is the extent to which some operations, such as the Baltic landings of 1917, were motivated by German internal political requirements, such as a need to overcome the idleness of the battle fleet.
However, it does not seem that Dr. Herwig is sufficiently aware of the general trend of naval strategy to be able to discern those specifically German elements from those more nearly universal. Similarly, he makes comparative conclusions which are often drawn from figures in isolation. For example, the case as to the exclusivity of the naval officer corps is partly based on the cost of a naval education, which was very high compared to the wages of the average working man. However, almost in the next breath Professor Herwig admits that such costs in the Royal Navy were several times higher. Was exclusivity a German phenomenon, or a very general feature of naval officer corps at the turn of the century?
These issues are particularly stark in Dr. Herwig’s treatment of the ships, their builders, and their equipment. Most of the data presented are incoherent, and it is by no means clear that Dr. Herwig has looked beyond secondary source material. Dr. Herwig’s problem is that he writes about design and characteristic motivations, which are almost never what they seem, without proper research. He would have been better off avoiding the subject. For example, he writes of armored cruisers as though they were a specifically German, rather than a nearly universal, phenomenon. Moreover, he fails to discuss some of the most interesting—and most prominent—wartime design developments: the super-destroyers of the SI 16 and similar classes, the coastal steam torpedo boats (“A” classes), and the small combat craft used in Flanders (e.g., remote-control explosive launches). This reviewer would understand their exclusion better were it not
for the excessive detail lavished on earlier types.
In the end, the story of the Imperil German Navy is not entirely cleat' even on the political level. At the turn of the century, navies were at the cutting edge of technology, and therefore particularly important to heavy industry. Herwig identifies the Krupp hfnl which became instrumental in Germany’s rearmament between the wafS as a navy booster, but it is not clear to what extent this firm was responsible for the flowering of what the British called the “luxury fleet.” On the surface, the Kaiser was the driving force’ with von Tirpitz close by, but that may well be an illusory view.
The basic questions remain relevant, however. To what extent is the modern Soviet Navy the hothouse ation of one man, Admiral Gorshkov- To what extent did funds spent on the Imperial Navy preclude a land victory in 1914 by starving the Gerruaf Army? Are the Soviets in a similar p° sition in 1980? One could draw a pat^ lei between Krupp et al and the Sov‘et defense procurement establishment.
There is a great deal of value in th|S book, but confusing writing (or P°°r editing) makes that material some what difficult to recognize. Moreover there are enough errors, at least 10 materiel issues, to render the rest 0 the work suspect.
The Decline of U. S. Power (and what we can do about it)
The Business Week Team. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1980. 2-fo pp. Illus. Ind. $9.95 ($8.96).
Reviewed by Captain Paul B. Ryan,
U. S. Navy (Retired)
A 1936 graduate of the Naval Academy• Captain Ryan holds two masters' degrees a"*1 has held three commands at sea. He is present 1 a research fellow at the Hoover Institution 0 War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University. California. His book. First L'nC of Defense, The U. S. Navy Since 1945 (Hoover Institute Press) was published in January 1981.
To write by committee is to ru*se suspicions that there are too rn^ny cooks in the kitchen. Happily for readers of this coherent little b°° ’
Ifected tk 7 6 ?
. ■ lf>e evidence is apparent in
tnal personnel retention rate at- chiefly to a relatively low rate
Pay> but also to a lack of sufficient s Jt0 carry out long deployment in » U eS> shortened operational traintime, and 12-hour working days, j ^'d the Navy and the nation get 0 this ominous slump?
th,
In
ors
> fa,led U- S.
natj tCOnom'c base is as important to security as military and naval
D, '
lies
f e seven coauthors are innocent of such a charge. As long-time editorial Co leagues and international jjconomists of the journal Business they have taken a hard look at c e events of the past 15 years and Produced a cogent survey of why ™erica s economy, defense posture, 'nternational status have sharply ec ined. And they offer possible ac- • ‘°ns tllat could reverse this frighten- m8 slide.
^ is their message that the U. S. 7 em industrial machine (upon lc‘1 depends the economic survival merica) is a function of the suc- ^ ssful conduct of U. S. international Usmess backed by a supportive gov- ent and a strong naval presence. eren even one of these vital links not CS ^ecause neglect, conscious or chen, suggest the authors, the n*ted States becomes a helpless, de- oralized giant floundering in the in- ernational arena.
^ ad the sectors of American soci- j/ which have felt the decline of , ' P°wer, both in their paychecks *n a material sense, the U. S. ™ust he among the most sorely
the disn
tr‘huted
of
sh
answering this question, the au- gi . survey the era of 1960-79, be- dtni.n® vvhh Lyndon Johnson’s fateful doch'°n C° a no-win war in In
hill' *na anc^’ simultaneously, spend l0ns at home on no-win social pro- ertrtl^' Poverty won the War on Pov- 'Ve- U *nev*table result was a badly ftorn ned dollar and soaring inflation cove t^le natI°n has yet to re-
d(1r' Washington policymakers n through the Carter Administra- to comprehend that the
Ur'ng the 1950-70 era, NATO al- (j (,and Japan continued to rely on forces abroad, particularly the and Seventh fleets, to protect
their burgeoning industries and trade. The United States, in its self-imposed role as world policeman, took on too large a share of the collective security of the world. Like ancient Rome, Washington learned slowly the high cost of defending its perimeters, especially boundaries without any immediate economic benefit to the “mother country.”
Watching from the sidelines, other nations shifted their business tactics radically. OPEC created an energy cartel. Japan and European nations subsidized their multinational firms abroad and, everywhere, hindered investment by U. S. firms. They manipulated their currencies and aided their international businessmen by supportive diplomacy within foreign countries. Pertinent is the case of Japan discouraging U. S. investments, but flooding America with cars and televisions while buying up U. S. enterprises.
As the Business Week team tells it, Washington finally woke up to the fact that Europe and Japan were no longer cooperative (and dependent) wards of the United States. Instead, they had become aggressive commercial competitors around the world. Western European governments were making business alliances with OPEC nations and with Third World suppliers of vital raw materials. NATO members traded heavily with Russia and Eastern Europe while Washington held back. In Latin America, especially in Brazil, West Germany replaced the United States in nuclear power plant deals. Many Japanese, French, and Italian autos outsold American gas-guzzlers. Obsolescent American steel mills were outbid on contracts by Japanese firms. The list goes on and on.
What are the choices facing the American people? To begin with, the authors recommend that Washington avoid the mistake of focusing solely on the U.S.S.R. as the enemy while ignoring the fact that other nations are chewing away at the economic heart of America. OPEC, not Moscow, puts a damper on the oil flow to the United States. Japan and Western Europe (not Moscow) are fighting (and frequently outselling) the United States in overseas markets and competing for the purchase of the world’s raw materials. America desperately needs to make up its mind to get the nation back into the international marketplace.
Government representatives, the authors contend, should encourage U. S. business to return to the pragmatism of the Yankee traders of the 19th century. Their ventures were protected, early on, by U. S. naval squadrons and marines in China, the Mediterranean, and Southeast Asia. These hardy souls benefited from an aggressive foreign policy, exemplified by the Open Door, by fisheries treaties with Britain, by reciprocity treaties with Latin American countries, and by U. S. insistence on freedom of the seas. As the authors see it, the Yankee trader, who cared less for ideology than for dollars, helped to create a favorable balance of trade that made the United States the industrial giant of the world. They conclude that
if it ever were proper for the United States to assume the role of a missionary spreading democracy around the world, the nation is no longer strong enough to even consider taking on such a mission.
Such bare-knuckles talk will offend many Americans who rightly argue that this nation was founded on ideals of justice for all (in the world—not just America). Good Samaritans say that Americans cannot turn away the boat people of Southeast Asia (or Cuba and Haiti). Nor will Americans willingly let their own citizens starve or suffer neglect. The authors might reply that these conditions may well require generous U. S. aid, but the stark fact remains that America’s economic survival and its military defense are in jeopardy. Fewer dollars must be spent on social programs and more on ships, aircraft, weaponry, and the merchant marine. Tax policies must be altered to encourage investment in American industry (witness the present inadequacies of U. S. shipyards to respond to a war crisis). And U. S.
foreign policy must be modified to emphasize U. S. interests, not necessarily international desires voiced in the United Nations and other forums.
More recommended actions to reverse the downward trend include: increased domestic production so that the United States can fight for a larger share of the world’s market; a partnership of the federal government with U. S. industries—a “United States, Inc.” to compete with “Japan, Inc.” and “West Germany, Inc.;” a reduction in certain costly but unproductive social programs; a buildup of the armed forces to give substance to U. S. diplomacy and to protect the sea lines to our allies and suppliers of raw material; an expanded nuclear energy program (if the U. S. Navy can successfully operate nuclear power plants afloat for years without a Three-Mile- Island incident, then so can private industry with proper supervision and standards); a better understanding by government officials of the crucial role represented by exports in the wellbeing of the nation. Yet, if Washington continues to peck away at U. S- multinational firms to the point where they are so weakened that the nation cannot pay the $100 billion a year (estimated for 1981) for OPEC oil, then, the authors conclude, the consequences for the U. S. political process will be grave indeed. Because their book was published before the Reagan victory, the authors, no doubt, no'*' look for a reversal of the damaging trend.
Many readers undoubtedly agree with the book’s conclusion that the U. S. people can pull the nation out of this serious crisis only if tighten their belts, modernize their plants, accept a more rigorous standard of living, strengthen their defenses, and step up production. A unified people, the authors predict, ca(1 unleash the national psychic forceS that won World War II and placed a man on the moon. These same f°rceS must be harnessed by inspired Wash ington leadership if Americans are t0 win this critical fight for their future-
By Lisle A. Rose
of Antarctica, 1946
ASSAULT ON ETERNITY
Here in rich and colorful detail are the excitement, tedium, triumphs, and tragedies of the first of the major postwar American explorations of Antarctica: Operation Highjump, 1946-47. The author also provides a summary of the important international Antarctic explorations undertaken prior to Operation Highjump, and a synopsis of the significant activities that have taken place since in this remote, hauntingly beautiful, yet often harsh and terrifying land. The true personalities of Admiral Richard E. Byrd and other key figures are deftly revealed as never before. This fascinating account, illustrated with photographs of many of the ships, people, and places involved, will have considerable appeal to anyone with an interest in the White Continent and how men conquer adversity to achieve difficult goals.
19801352 pagesl25 illustrations A Naval Institute Press Book List price: $19.95 Member's price: $15.96
(Please use order form in Books of Interest section.)
Books of Interest
Compiled by Professor Craig L. Symonds, Associate Editor
Naval affairs
Q British Cruisers of World War Two
MD* ^3Ven anc-i John Roberts. Annapolis, jj. " ^aval Institute Press, 1980. 444 pp. us- Append. Ind. $39.95 ($31.95).
lc Bie last British cruiser being de- tj)|Tlm'ss‘one<J this year, the appearance of ls book at this time is appropriate.
an<J Roberts, authors of British Bat- °f^‘/°r^ lVar Two, trace changes in 0f g . Sl8n and performance characteristics j_arrit'sh cruisers from 1911 to the 1950s. jn double-page photos and line draw- gs suPplement the text.
D ^°Bern Warship, Design and Ve«>pment
Ni
Bont"11 ^rittirnan. New York: Mayflower
’ '979. 192 p 1 Friedmar
tecL°n s foremost authority on naval h0 . l08y- In this American edition of a
Sllor'ginally published in Britain, he ^ l!-S ^es'8n chang es and innovations in CessS 'fs since World War II. In the pro- njvai explaining the new armaments of We|f ')rces' Friedman discusses tactics as mu, 'e result is an excellent survey of desi > navaI warfare as well as warship
_0°kS, 1979. 192
rnan Friedman is rapidly becoming the
Oat
pp. Ulus. $22.50 ($18.00).
S3 Naval
LaPt.
Science 1
Wilbur
A. Sundt, USN, (Ret.).
296 F°i's, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1980. b pp. nius.
^his
book
Maps. Bib. Ind $7.50 ($6.00). was written to serve as a text for
NJROTC students in high schools across the country. It includes sections on leadership, health, naval tradition and history, organization, navigation, and basic seamanship. There are study questions at the end of each chapter.
To the Marianas
Edwin P. Hoyt. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1980. 292 pp. Illus. Maps. Bib.
Ind. $12.95 ($11.66).
Continuing to be a prolific storyteller of the Pacific war, Edwin Hoyt offers this account of the central Pacific drive through the Marshalls and Marianas. There is nothing new here, but as usual, Hoyt tells the story in a readable and engaging prose style.
MARITIME AFFAIRS The Book of Whales
Richard Ellis. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980. 202 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. Ind. $25.00 ($22.50).
An important tour de force in the literature of cetaceans, this volume presents the whale as he is in the sea, complete with bibliographical references and footnotes. Thirty-three of the most prevalent whales are described in meticulous detail, but more important, they are graphically portrayed, with many beautiful double-page spreads in color showing morphological and salient characteristics, and species in their native habitats. Even the incredible communication between specimens in the deep is given analysis. A separate section is devoted to similar data on beaked whales. The book also discusses present widespread efforts to save whales from extinction from the scientific viewpoint of a dedicated conservationist who knows his subject firsthand.
The Ship in the Medieval Economy, 600-1600
Richard W. Unger. London: Croom Helm Limited and Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1980. 304 pp. Illus. Bib. $32.95 ($29.66).
Richard Unger lifts the ship out of the romanticized atmosphere of the nautical
enthusiast and the technical confines of the naval architectural purist and places her in the practical environment of an economic world in which she must make a profit. He presents an integrated picture of developments in ship design and the European economy during the Middle Ages and Renaissance, exploring the interrelationships between changes in hull construction, hull form, and rig, and such economic factors as regional economic integration and specialization, the effects of plague and population variation, urbanization, and the development of oceanic trade with areas outside Europe. The line drawings are especially useful in making clear the meaning of the text.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
The Campaign for North Africa
Jack Coggins. New York: Doubleday, 1980. 208 pp. Illus. Maps. Append. Bib. Ind.
$15.00 ($13.50).
The great value of this volume, as with most of Jack Coggins’ works, lies in the superb maps and hand-drawn illustrations. More than 250 of these trace the pendulum-like progress of the Allied and Axis powers back and forth across North Africa from the first Italian offensive in the fall of 1940 to the collapse of German-Italian resistance in the spring of 1943. There is also a chapter on the defense of Malta.
Goodbye Darkness, A Memoir of the Pacific War
William Manchester. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980. 401 pp. Illus. Maps. $14.95 ($13.46).
The idea of a combination novel, memoir, and history of the U. S. Marines in the Pacific theater of World War II sounds at first a bit unfocused. But in this compelling book, Manchester carries it off splendidly. He evokes the spirit of an age when 20-year-olds left their Ivy League colleges to fight in the swamps of Guadalcanal and the sulphurous sands of I wo Jima. The reader follows the 56-year-old Manchester on a pilgrimage back to the islands where he fought and relives the sometimes funny, and often tragic events that took place there.
FICTION
The Lords of Discipline
Pat Conroy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980. 499 pp. 512.95 (511.66).
The author offers a semi-autobiographical account of his four years at a military academy (thinly disguised as the Carolina Military Institute in the novel, but clearly intended to represent Conroy’s alma mater, The Citadel). It is a gripping, powerful, and bitter account which exposes the author’s curious love-hate relationship
BOOK ORDER SERVICE
Prices enclosed by parentheses are member prices. Members may order most books of other publishers through the Naval Institute at a 10% discount off list price. (Prices quoted in this column are subject to change and will be reflected in our billing.) Please allow for delays when ordering non-Naval Institute titles. The postage and handling fee for each such special order book of a U. S. publisher will be 51.75; the fee for a book from a foreign publisher will be $2.50. When air mail or other special handling is requested, actual postage and handling cost will be billed to the member. Books marked [5] art‘ Naval Institute Press B(x>ks. Books marked Q are Naval Institute Book Selections. Use the order blank in this section.
with his college. Though the plot involves the admission of the first black cadet at this tradition-bound institution, the book is really an expose of the practices and attitudes of The Citadel.
Raid on the Bremerton
Irv Eachus. New York: The Viking Press,
1980. 244 pp. 512.95(511.66).
A group of amateur terrorists take over the power plant of a nuclear-powered cruiser moored at Long Beach. Being a former nuclear technician in the Navy, Eachus’ novel is crafted with an eye to accurate detail. The heart of the novel concerns the varying motives of the terrorists, the crewmen, and the naval station security officers who have to manage the crisis.
REPRINTS
Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean War at Sea in the Sixteenth Century.
Lr. Col. John F. Guilmartin, USAF. London: Cambridge University Press, 1980(1975). Approx. $42.87 (538.59).
Guilmartin’s book on war at sea in the Medieval Era was a seminal work when it first appeared six years ago, and it is already becoming a classic. Not only does this volume shed light on the 16th century, but in its analysis of warfare, helps illuminate the 20th century as well.
History of the Great War (4 Vols.)
John Buchan. Annapolis, MD.: Nautical & Aviation Press, 1980 (1922). 2,269 PP- llluSl Maps. Append. Ind. 5160.00 (5144.00)
Buchan’s history of World War I has been a standard reference and a classic history since it was first published. This repr|nt includes the large foldout maps that at' companied the original edition.
OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED
The Royal Naval College Dartmouth,
Seventy-five Years in Pictures
E. L. Davies and E. J. Grove. Portsmouth, England: Gieves & Hawkes, 1980. 96 pp- Ilius. £ 5 (Approx. 512.25) ($1 1.03).
Flashing Blades Over the Sea, the Development & History of HelicoptefS in the Royal Navy
Lt. Cdr. J. M. Milne, RN. Cornwall, Engbn‘|' Maritime Books, 1980. 104 pp. Illus. Apptnd' £ 1.80 (Approx. 54.41) ($3.97).
Military Retirement, the Administration’s Plan and Related Proposals
96th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 198h- 86 pp. Append. $3.75 (53.38).
The Supercarriers
George Sullivan. New York: Dodd, Mead. 1980. 160 pp. Illus. Maps. Ind. $8.95 ($8.06).
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