The Strait of Malacca1 lies between Sumatra (Indonesia) and the Malay Peninsula, with the Strait of Singapore at the eastern entrance. The Malacca Strait- Singapore Strait waterway is the critical section of the shipping route linking the Far East with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. The two straits are usually referred to as one, or the Malacca Strait(s).
The Strait of Malacca is about 500 miles in length from abeam Acheh Head and Ko Phuket at the northwesterly end to Tanjong Piai and the Karimon Islands where it joins Singapore Strait.
Singapore Strait is 60 miles long and is bounded on the west by the southern end of the Malay Peninsula and the Island of Singapore, and on the east by numerous islands of the Riouw Archipelago of Indonesia. The width of the western entrance is about 10 miles; at the eastern entrance about 20 miles; and at its narrowest, between St. John Island and Pulau Berhanti, 2½ miles. The narrowest portion of the channel that can be safely navigated by supertankers drawing 65 feet of water is one mile wide south of Raffles Light. Singapore Strait may be entered from the west either through Main Strait, now used by most ships, or by the less congested but slightly longer route through Phillip Channel.
The governing depth of water naturally available in the Straits is about 12 fathoms, found in the vicinity of One Fathom Bank, and between Raffles Light and Buffalo Rock, south of Singapore. Numerous shoals of lesser depth, generally unmarked, are scattered throughout the Straits. From a navigational standpoint the only favorable thing the Straits have, which other waterways do not have, is that there is no fog.
As ships of deeper and deeper draft make their appearance in the Straits, shoals that were previously of no consequence become significant hazards. Present day ships of extreme draft, approaching the governing depth of water in the Straits, must exercise the greatest care and navigate with precision to make the passage safely. To avoid "squat” when there is little bottom clearance, ships must reduce speed, which cuts down their maneuvering capability.
It can be said that it would not be prudent for ships drawing over 65 feet to use the Straits. This means that supertankers 250,000 tons or larger should use Lombok or Sunda Straits which add about 1,200 miles to the voyage from the Persian Gulf to Japan.
Although Indonesia has not issued any proclamation that ships larger than 200,000 tons should not use the Straits, various government officials have been quoted in the press as suggesting that ships larger than 200,000 tons use Lombok or Sunda.
There are four difficult navigational areas in the Straits. The most dangerous in the Malacca portion is off One Fathom Bank (H. O. 3740, Pulau Berhala to Cape Rachado) where one lighthouse and one buoy stand guard over four unmarked shoals all less than six fathoms. Supertankers have only a two-mile-wide channel for passing which is bounded by two unmarked shoals. To complicate navigation, vessels heading for the Persian Gulf must change course to starboard in the vicinity of the lighthouse and vessels bound in the opposite direction must make a corresponding turn. They are thus required to show first a green light to opposing traffic and then a red light.
The second area is in the vicinity of Cape Rachado Lighthouse (H.0.72160, Cape Rachado to The Brothers) where five unmarked shoals less than eight fathoms line the channel.
The third area is in the vicinity of Pulau Pisang Lighthouse (H .0.71260, Cape Rachado to The Brothers) where there are five unmarked shoals of less than six fathoms.
The fourth area and most dangerous one in the Strait of Singapore is south of Raffles Light. The area is normally congested with coastal traffic and numerous fishing vessels bound in and out of Singapore. Deep draft vessels have a two-mile-wide channel, which has several unmarked shoals of nine fathoms, in which to pass and negotiate a 90-degree turn. This also requires them to show first a green and then a red light.
The Straits first became important to the shipping world in the early 19th century when Sir Thomas Stanford Raffles arrived in Singapore with the British East India Company. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 launched an era of prosperity for Singapore and increased the traffic in the Straits. However, the Straits were not known outside of the maritime world until the advent of the supertanker in 1967 and the notoriety of the Torrey Canyon disaster in the English Channel. One event led to another and the eyes of the world began to focus on the Straits. Shortly after the Torrey Canyon debacle the 150,000-ton Idemitsu Maru drawing 55 feet of water touched bottom in the Straits and touched exposed nerves in Tokyo.
Japan immediately launched a survey of the Straits to ensure that its fleet of supertankers could safety navigate the shallow waterway. This unilateral act of Japan, plus the sudden realization that a collision two supertankers in the narrow shallow channel would be an ecological nightmare, prompted Malaysia in July 1969 to claim a territorial sea width of 12 miles. Priorto this, in 1957 and reiterated in 1960 by the promulgation of a National Regulation, Indonesia proclaimed that its territorial sea was measured from straight baselines drawn from island to island under the Archipelago Doctrine. Indonesia further claimed that there was no innocent passage on its inland seas but that it would permit ships to transit those waters at its discretion.2
Although the United States and most of the maritime world filed formal protests with Indonesia in which they refused to recognize its claims, the international character of the Straits was not seriously question until the claim by Malaysia. Further to confirm their claim that the Strait of Malacca was subjectto their control, the two littoral states in 1970 entered into a treaty in which they divided the seabed of the Strait down the middle.
By this time the Malacca Straits were front page news and two questions remained to be answered: First would the increasing congestion of ship traffic in the Straits, which are shallower and at one point narrower than the English Channel, and which are poorly marked with aids to navigation, result in another Torrey Canyon disaster? And, secondly, would there be a naval confrontation if one of the littoral states tried to stop a U.S. or Russian man-of-war from innocent passage over newly-claimed territorial waters?
Military and Economic Importance. Connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, the Malacca Straits are strategically important to the world’s naval powers in that they remain an international waterway with law of the sea rights to free transit. This importance was well publicized in December 1971 when the nuclear carrier USS Enterprise and task force sailed through the Straits en route to standby duty in the Bay of Bengal luring the Indo-Pakistani War. Following the movement of the Enterprise and her entourage through the Straits, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, told reporters that all foreign warships wanting to pass through the Straits must give advance notice to Malaysia and Indonesia and stated that the Commander of the U. S. Seventh Fleet had given advance notice. He also said that he was sure Russian ships would conform with the Indonesian requirement.
The U. S. Navy’s interest in maintaining the international character of the Strait was set forth clearly in April 1972 when Admiral Thomas L. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that "We should hive and must have the freedom to go through, under, and over the Malacca Strait.”
Soon after Admiral Moorer’s statement, the Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral R. Sudomo, was Quoted in the press as saying that "Our armed forces Mil attack any foreign submarine entering territorial Waters without permit, because it means a violation of Indonesia’s sovereignty.”
While U. S. and Russian chief interests in preserving the international character of the Straits of Malacca are to ensure the right of free passage for men-of-war, Japan has an increasing commercial interest. As the world’s largest petroleum importer, Japan is dependent on the uninterrupted movement of a large tanker fleet from the middle east oil fields. Tokyo’s objection to control of the Straits by the littoral nations is the fear of bilateral regulations and the possibility that Indonesia "tight, someday, under its Archipelago Declaration, choose to exercise its "discretion” to prohibit foreign ’hipping through its internal waters.
Charts and Surveys. The nautical charts covering the traits were compiled from soundings made by the British Admiralty and the Dutch in the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, ships passing through the traits today have much greater drafts than in years past, and in some cases this allows only a very small margin for error. Unmarked wrecks line the channel and shifting underwater sand dunes add to the navigational hazards.
Hydrographic surveys in recent years include those by HMS Dumpier in 1967 and by the Japanese survey ship Koyo Maru in 1969. The Japanese vessel carried out a sounding program traversing the Straits on four Mallei tracks, one kilometer apart following the route generally preferred by deep-draft tankers. The preliminary survey disclosed 21 shoal areas not recorded on charts which were considered to be hazards to loaded tankers.
In 1970, there was conducted a four-nation survey which was funded by Japan. This survey concentrated on an area southwest of Singapore where the main channel is only one mile wide and currents are dangerous. At the same time, the British oceanographic vessel, HMS Hydra, conducted a detailed survey of a 185-mile long, nine-mile wide section of the Malacca portion.
Navigational Aids. The few navigational aids that are established in the Malacca portion are maintained by Malaysia. The most important is One Fathom Bank Lighthouse which is beyond the limits of Malaysia’s claimed territorial waters, but is maintained as a moral obligation to international shipping. In addition, there are nine manned lights on the Malay Peninsula and approximately 50 buoys, most of which mark only harbor entrance channels along the mainland. When compared to the English Channel, with its dozens of lightships, and hundreds of buoys, and a traffic separation system, the need for additional aids and/or a traffic separation scheme is readily apparent.
In 1968, the littoral states bordering the Straits requested the U. S. government to conduct a feasibility study of the need for navigational aids in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. A three-man study team which included a U. S. Coast Guard aids-to-navigation specialist and a U. S. Navy legal specialist conducted a study for one year. The study was performed under contract with the Agency for International Development and in cooperation with the U. S. Coast Guard. A definitive report setting forth the benefits and costs of undertaking an aids-to-navigation improvement project was completed in 1970 and copies of the report were made available to the three coastal states.
Since that time, however, nothing has been done to establish an improved system of navigation, primarily because of political considerations and the unresolved problem of who would pay for the project. The study estimated that the cost to establish the necessary aids would be $1.4 million and, over a 20-year period, the cost, including operation and maintenance, would be $4.1 million dollars.
It is understandable that the littoral states, which are developing countries with limited resources and no merchant marine, have reservations about assuming the cost. Unfortunately, Indonesia and Malaysia also have reservations about allowing another state or an international agency to fund such a project as they fear that this might weaken their position that the Strait of Malacca is not an international waterway. As a result there is an impasse.
Traffic Density. Despite the lack of aids to navigation an increasing number of vessels including many supertankers are navigating the Straits. In a traffic density survey conducted by the Singapore Marine Department, it was ascertained that 171 vessels of over 30,000 tons moved through the Straits during October 1969. This statistic projects to 2,000 large vessels a year. In 1970, there were 37,000 ships of all sizes reported passing through the Straits, an increase of 5,000 in 12 months. Another survey showed that every day there are 30 close passages of meeting ships. A Japanese traffic study indicated that, in a 16-hour passage through the Straits, a large supertanker encountered 40 other vessels of more than 2,000 tons. It is estimated that 35 supertankers of the 200,000-ton class regularly use the Straits.
Today, 4,000 tankers criss-cross the seas hauling 11,000 million barrels of oil each year around the world. The growing need for oil and gas is such that it is estimated that tanker traffic will increase another 40% in the next five years, or by 1977 there will be over 5,500 tankers on the oceans. Projections of tanker tonnage indicate that by the end of the decade, tanker traffic might be such that a tanker would enter the Straits on the average of once every 2% hours.
Traffic Separation Scheme. The need for a traffic separation scheme in the Straits, similar to that used in the Dover and Gibraltar Straits, has been recognized by the world’s maritime authorities. There are already 75 separation schemes developed by the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) in effect in areas of heavy ship traffic throughout the world. They are designed to reduce the risk of collisions in congested areas by separating surface traffic into designated lanes.
Besides the topography of the Straits which makes imperative the need for buoyed channels, the increasing traffic and the presence of large numbers of small fishing vessels in narrow portions of the channel aggravate the need. The desirability of a traffic separation scheme was raised at an IMCO meeting in London in July 1971. However, when a proposal was made to have the record show that the body recommended that a traffic separation scheme be established, representatives from Indonesia and Malaysia were opposed to any international control of a system in which they might not have the last word. They were successful in having the recommendation deleted from the record. Their rationale was that any scheme that might strengthen the international character of the Straits and thereby take away the rights of the coastal states to control and supervise traffic was unacceptable.
Nevertheless, it is inevitable that a traffic separation scheme will be established in the future. The question is when and how many Torrey Canyons will occur before the system is established. In view of the increasing traffic and the resultant potential for a marine disaster, it is hoped that such a system will be established soon.
Conflict with Freedoms of the Sea. The claims by Malaysia and Indonesia that the waters of the Straits of Malacca are territorial and not high seas has created two separate but closely related problems.
The first problem is the impasse that arises because of the conflict such a claim makes with customary international law of the sea which provides for "free passage” over high seas waters in international straits, and "innocent passage” over territorial waters in international straits.
The second problem is the fact that the claims have effectively stopped any international attempt to improve aids to navigation in the Straits, which is further aggravated by the fact that the littoral nations involved are unable to fund such a project.
Since 1793, when the United States adopted a three- mile territorial sea, it has opposed unilateral claims of other governments which purport to extend their territorial seas beyond three miles, and has maintained that there is no obligation on the part of states which claim a three-mile territorial sea to recognize claims to a greater breadth of the territorial sea.
The Strait of Malacca, 9 miles in breadth at its narrowest point, contains no point at which the 3-mile territorial sea limits recognized by the U. S. overlap Thus, it contains a corridor of international "high seas’ for its entire length.
Where the waters of the strait are "high seas” there is, among other rights, an unrestricted right of "free passage” for all vessels, subject only to reasonable regard for the interests of other states in their exercise of freedom of the high seas. In addition, there is an unfettered right of aircraft overflight over such "high seas” straits.3
Since the Singapore Strait is less than six miles wide at its narrowest point, the United States recognizes that there is no continuous "high seas” corridor and that Indonesia and Singapore’s three-mile territorial sea limits overlap.
Where the waters of a strait are part of the "territorial waters” of a coastal state, there is only a right of innocent passage for all vessels under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Although not all the coastal countries have become parties of this Convention, it expresses customary international law on this matter. In the Corfu Channel Case, International Court of Justice Reports, 1949 the Court stated:
"It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance with international custom that States in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a coastal State, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless otherwise prescribed in an international convention, there is no right for a coastal State to prohibit such passage through straits in time of peace.”
There are differences between a right of free passage tough the high seas and a right of innocent passage tough territorial waters. Specific limitations which in lawfully restrict the right of innocent passage cannot legally be applied to limit the right of free passage. For example, the right of innocent passage may temporarily suspended by a coastal country in specified areas of its territorial waters provided those areas of waters are not a part of an international strait, and submarines, exercising their right of innocent passage territorial waters, must navigate on the surface and ow their flag.4 However, no country can validly airport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty by suspending the right of free passage on high seas, nor are submarines, exercising their right free passage on the high seas, required to navigate ’on the surface.5
Possibly the most significant practical difference between the right of free passage and the right of innocent passage lies in the greater opportunity a coastal Wintry has to interfere with passage through its territorial waters because of the ambiguity of the term “innocent.” Article 14(4) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone says that passage is innocent "so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State,” and Article 16(1) of this Convention allows a coastal state to prevent passage in its territorial waters which fails to satisfy this somewhat imprecise definition of "innocent passage.”
Obstacles to Aids-to-Navigation Improvement Project. The second, but perhaps more important problem in of the ever-increasing danger of collision or funding as congestion increases is that international efforts to improve the safety of navigation in the Strait, which would include the establishment of additional buoys, ranges, lighthouses, and/or the establishment of a traffic separation scheme, have been effectively stopped. As previously stated, the littoral status regard the intervention of IMCO as being tantamount to internationalization of the Straits and therefore contrary to their interests.
Unofficially, Indonesia and Malaysia have let the maritime world speculate on the possibility of setting up a user fee system whereby all vessels transitting the Straits would pay a fee based on tonnage which in turn would pay for the establishment and maintenance of an improved aids to navigation system. Unfortunately, such a transit fee system is contrary to the customary law of the sea.
Although there are differences between the right of "free passage” and the right of "innocent passage” in international straits, there is no difference between them as far as the acceptability of compulsory payments for passage through international straits is concerned. Although a transit fee solution sounds practicable it would be unacceptable to the world’s maritime nations. Such payments have not been successfully imposed on passage through international straits heretofore, and any arrangement which compels any vessel to pay for passage would be an unacceptable limitation on the rights of "free passage” and "innocent passage.”
It can be argued that a mandatory payment from vessels is not a payment for passage but is instead a payment for services rendered in the form of aids to navigation which is authorized by Article 18(2) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
While Article 18(1) of the Convention prohibits levying a charge "upon foreign (merchant) ships by reasons of their passage through the territorial sea,” Article 18(2) allows charges to be levied "upon a foreign (merchant) ship passing through the territorial sea as payment only for specific services rendered to the ship.”
These services have generally been interpreted to refer to pilotage and towing. Unlike pilotage and towing, aids to navigation are generally used by all passing vessels without a specific request for these services. Thus, to read Article 18(2) to include aids to navigation would be to allow a charge to be levied on all merchant ships passing through the territorial sea. The effect would be the same as a charge for passage, which is unacceptable.
Even if the above interpretation of Article 18(2) is incorrect, a charge for aids to navigation is not a satisfactory solution to the problem of financing. Article 18(2) applies only to the territorial sea, and the additional aids recommended for the Straits are not confined to the territorial seas claimed by the coastal states but are also to be located on the high seas.
Solution to Conflict with Freedom of the Sea. On 28 July 1972, in Geneva, the long-awaited U. S. approach and possible solution to the impasse created by the claims that the Strait of Malacca was not a part of the high seas was propounded by the Honorable John R. Stevenson, U. S. Representative to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.
Although no reference was made to the Strait of Malacca, there is no doubt that the U. S. proposals had their genesis in the claims by Malaysia and Indonesia.
To those familiar with the ambiguities and imprecise definitions inherent in the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions, the proposals showed considerable thought and a great deal of world statesmanship and forebearance, which is all the more creditable in view of the fact the United States is a major maritime power. Time will tell whether the proposals will be adopted in full or in part at the next Law of the Sea Conference, but it is safe to say that when a treaty for international straits is adopted it will be based on the U. S. proposals.
Since 1970, when Malaysia and Indonesia entered into a treaty dividing the Strait of Malacca seabed, the basic U. S. policy has been to push for a world Law of the Sea Conference in 1973 and not enter into a debate with the littoral states in the world’s press. Such a Conference was proposed by the U.N. General Assembly in 1972; however, the Conference date and agenda has not been set. The U. S. position is that rather than treat the Strait of Malacca separately the issue of "free passage” through international straits and corollary problems should be a matter of general discussion and resolution by treaty.
Accordingly, Stevenson stated that the United States wanted the right of "free passage” in international straits incorporated into a law of the sea treaty. Notwithstanding Admiral Moorer’s statement made three months earlier, Stevenson said, "In order to achieve this treaty right the United States is willing to forego the other high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight which we consider to exist now in straits wider than six miles.”
In effect, the present U. S. position is that there should be a "free passage” treaty without waiting for the deliberations and decision of the International Court of Justice as to whether the territorial claims of the coastal states are valid. Such deliberations could extend over a decade. The United States in turn is willing to agree to abide by reasonable traffic safety regulations which are consistent with the basic transit right, as long as such safety standards are established by international agreement and are not unilaterally imposed by the coastal state(s). Stevenson also recommended that IMCO be designated as the international agency to establish the necessary international standards.
Solution to Obstacles to Aids to Navigation Improvement Project. The U. S. position also attempts to resolve in part the problem of the need for improved aids to navigation in the Straits by officially recognizing the need for traffic separation schemes in international straits. Although again not referring directly to the Malacca Straits, Stevenson said, "We propose that the law of the sea treaty provide that all surface ship of sign proceeding through areas for which international traffic separation schemes have been developed shall be obliged to respect such schemes in accordance with the rules and procedures established by IMCO and in inshore International Regulations for Preventing Collisions and Sea.”
Recognizing the desire of the coastal states to have enforcement rights over vessels transiting territorial waters so as to prevent pollution, the United States conceded that a coastal state should have enforcement rights with respect to violations of its laws and regulations over ships exercising their right of free transit through territorial seas in straits. This concession did not in itself recognize the claims of Indonesia and Malaysia as valid, but merely the right with respect to violations in their territorial waters. Stevenson said, “In serious cases the coastal state may find it necessary to arrest the ship or, in the case of a warship, to require it to depart. Similarly, coastal states would have the right to enforce mandatory internationally agreed traffic safety schemes in the territorial seas in straits against any ship that does not comply with those schemes.
The fears of coastal states of environmental pollution by a marine disaster were also recognized and met by a U. S. proposal that the Law of the Sea Convention should provide for strict liability for all vessels, including warships, for accidents caused by deviations from traffic separation schemes established by IMCO. believe the proposals we have outlined on transit by surface ships ... if adopted by the Law of the Sea Conference and widely observed, will substantially alleviate the possibility of accidents with resultant loss of life, property damage, and environmental pollution which some fear. We recognize that should accidents occur, however, States damaged thereby should be compensated. We also believe that users of straits should have a strong incentive to observe scrupulously the safety rules which we have proposed.”
Although Stevenson alluded to the second problem caused by the Strait of Malacca impasse, i.e., the immediate need for improved aids to navigation and/or a traffic separation scheme, by proposing that a treaty be adopted to require all surface ships to respect traffic separation schemes established by IMCO, the U. S. position gives a broad solution that at the earliest could result in the commencement of an aids to navigation project only by 1975.
The specter of a maritime disaster, with resulting ecological havoc to the coastlines of Malaysia and Sumatra, does not allow the maritime world to world to wait for the presently unscheduled Law of the Sea Conference to convene and then wait an additional time for the convention to be ratified by the required number signatory nations.6
First, it must be accepted as a fact that the littoral Nations are rightly concerned over questions of international boundaries and the manner in which their offshore waters will be used, and that they will remain addamant in their opposition to an international body such as IMCO taking the leadership in improving safety of navigation in the Straits.
The increasing traffic in the Straits, however, dictates that some alternative to IMCO be found. Such an alternative would be to have a new organizational instrument initiate the project with it being funded by the major oil and shipping companies or their governments who would be among the beneficiaries of such a navigation improvement project.7
For example, the World Bank, or the Asian Development Bank, or a new body to be established by the United Nations, could manage the project in behalf of, and upon the request of, the three coastal countries. One of the banks might offer the best solution, inasmuch as it could both advance the construction funds while at the same time receive grants for the contributing parties.
Specifically, the following steps should be taken to vitiate a project to improve safety of navigation in the Straits:
►The oil/shipping companies meet to consider the Project, agree to raise the necessary funds, and establish a consortium to speak for the contributors.
►The littoral states and the consortium appoint a management funding agent to assist in arranging the financing and to manage the project.
►Enlarge and conclude present survey operations.
►The littoral states and the consortium agree (based upon the survey results) upon the best technical solution to safe navigation, i.e., a traffic separation scheme and/or channels for deep-draft vessels.
►IMCO experts examine and endorse the survey results and the recommended channels.
►The management funding agent contract for the installation and administration of the safe navigation system through international competitive bidding.
►IMCO provide technical assistance to the management Ending agent.
►The contributors continue to pay the annual costs of maintenance.
This proposed alternative solution does not appear to present a legal problem and should not conflict with the position of the littoral states that the waterway is territorial, or the position of the maritime powers with respect to rights of passage under international law through international straits, provided: (1) The grants to the management funding agent are entirely voluntary, and, (2) non-contributing governments and companies are accorded the same rights of passage through the Straits for their vessels as are enjoyed by contributing governments and companies.
There is also precedence in the maritime world for financing aids to navigation in territorial waters and the high seas. In the Middle East there is an "International Agreement Regarding the Maintenance of Certain Lights in the Red Sea.” This "agreement” provides for financing aids to navigation by contributions from governments who subscribe to the "agreement.” At the present time, there are 12 signatories: Liberia, Norway, Italy, U.S.S.R., Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, United States, Pakistan, United Arab Republic, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany.
It is a truism that by improving the aids to navigation the risk of collision or grounding can be reduced. When the estimated $4.1 million cost of establishing and operating a system of aids for 20 years is compared with the cost of the Torrey Canyon disaster of $28 million, it is apparent that the price is right.
It is not unreasonable to state another truism: it will be more costly to the coastal states and to the world not to improve navigational aids in the Straits than it will be to make the improvements. Time is running out. The world’s maritime community should give high priority to improving the safety of navigation in the Malacca Straits.
1. See also "Bypassing Malacca," pp. 105-107, this issue.
2. See R. A. Miller, "Indonesia’s Archipelago Doctrine and Japan’s Jugular." U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1972, pp. 27-33.
3. Article 2 of 1958 Convention on the High Seas.
4. Articles 14(6), 16(3), and 16(4) of 1958 Convention on the Territorial Contiguous Zone.
5. Article 2 of 1958 Convention on the High Seas.
6. The 1958 Law of the Sea Convention did not take effect until 1962.
7. Such a proposal was set forth in the unpublicized report made by the sponsored study team which was issued in 1970 and entitled "A Cost and Benefit Analysis for Aids to Navigation in the Malacca Straits.”