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h
‘stop
sia
deal with Marxist-Leninist
sPec
etn
°ught and the differences
*F»
I'fic
B»»k
Understanding the Soviet Navy: Handbook
^Xrt B. Bathurst. Newport, RI.: Naval ar College Press, 1979. 173 pp.
Ppend- Bib. $5.00 ($4.50) paper.
R ■
eviewed by Captain Thomas A. °r°oks, U. S. Navy
^Ptain Brooks graduated from Fordham
and obtained his Master's Degree • . ^“trleigh Dickinson University. He *ed the Navy in 1958 and served tours of u.'\'!n Var‘ous ships, staffs, in Vietnam, and p ,n OpNav. A frequent contributor to the c °teedings, he is currently serving as a th ",‘an^'nS officer of a Navy field activity in “shington. D.C. area.
For his latest book, Alexander I.
. enitsyn uses as a subtitle “How ^ Conceptions about Russia imperil ^nnericaDr. Bathurst, a retired Vd officer, Soviet scholar at Harvard ^Diversity, and former naval attache ^ Moscow, might have subtitled his th°^ How lack of understanding of Soviet mind imperils Western ^itary and naval planning.” n order to understand the Soviet 0p cl hfi indeed, any of us are capable doing so), it is necessary to under- n<a those things which shape it: arxist-Leninist doctrine, Russian
y, and the overall Soviet (Rus- philosophy ol war, which, in n> derives from Marxism-Leninism 11 from Russ ian history. It is in pre- ey this way that the author has or- ^lr>ized his book. His first three chaps> which are the best in the book and
among the best written on the
Object, in per-
t,ve between the Soviet and West- mind. One of the observations retails on ordering books and special * see the Book Order Service note in the s of Interest department.
which is particularly cogent is that the Soviet Union has a grand strategy— political and military—and the West does not. Their navy, as well as its warfighting missions, is charged with assisting in the furtherance of Soviet strategic goals, primary among which is the defeat of the capitalist system by all means available. Dr. Bathurst expresses concern throughout his book that one of these means will be to cut off the West from its raw materials, many if not most of which come from Third World nations where Soviet activity is high and where Soviet naval activity is likely to be on the increase in the future. He points out that, according to the open statements of the Soviet leadership, there are likely to be many more Angolas, and in the next Chile, the Soviets might not allow the trend toward socialism to be reversed. Here the Soviet fleet could play an obvious role.
The principal value of Understanding the Soviet Navy ... is that it does not attempt to explain the Soviet Navy in isolation from these Marxist-Leninist principles. Instead, Dr. Bathurst goes to great pains to explain to the uninitiated reader the structure of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic which drives all Soviet strategic and military (to include naval) thought. To attempt to understand the development of the Soviet Navy without understanding the backdrop of Marxism-Leninism and the mentality of a great continental power is rather like attempting to understand the development of the Royal Navy without understanding the background of colonialism and the mentality of an island nation.
The danger, of course, is when the Western mind, operating from a Mahanian “sea power” frame of reference, attempts to understand the Soviet Navy in these basically Western and, to the Soviets, quite foreign and sometimes even incomprehensible terms. The result is that the Soviet Navy just does not fit. It makes little sense. It does not have the weapon systems or the capabilities “it should have.” It doesn’t look or act like a navy should. And since it isn’t understood, all manners of mirror-image capabilities and intentions are attributed to it. Of equal danger, the judgment is made that the Soviet Navy is inherently inferior because it does not possess capabilities which Western navies consider important or because its orientation is “defensive” (which, to us, is a curiously pejorative term). In Marxist-Leninist terms, the navy (as well as the remainder of the huge military establishment) must be defensive because socialism is “peace- loving.” But among those things which are to be defended are the gains of socialism abroad, and as the correlation of forces is perceived to continue in its swing toward the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership is likely to employ its forces ever more aggressively in “defense” of the expansion of socialism abroad.
In the second part of the book, Dr. Bathurst treats briefly but perceptively Russian history and its impact on modern Soviet naval thought. Russians are uniquely captive to their history since they have been, throughout their entire history, isolated from contact with foreigners or wdth Western ideas. It is not an overstatement that the Russian mind is still impacted by the occupation by the Golden Horde some seven centuries ago. Russia has had maritime traditions but they involved the inland waterways and the landlocked seas (Baltic and Black) which provided Russian access to Western markets and products. Russia made several abortive attempts to
build a large oceangoing navy and compete as a world naval power, but events appeared to conspire to turn the attention of the Tsar elsewhere and the navy was left to decay or, worse yet, to litter the bottom at the Straits of Tsushima. Dr. Bathurst points out that the current Soviet Navy preoccupation with readiness stems directly from its history: every time it was required, it was found wanting. The naval leadership, having obtained yet another government commitment to build a high-seas navy, is determined that this time it will be ready to support what Gorshkov calls the interests — both wartime and
peacetime—of the state.
The final part of the book deals with the formulation of Soviet military thought which is, in the author’s words, a national science. There has been no period in the history of Communist Russia when building up military might has not been a primary occupation. It has been done at the great expense of the Russian people, and it is probably the only thing which the Soviet Government can count as a successful accomplishment in an otherwise bankrupt system. Dr. Bathurst points out that, in Moscow, war is considered a probability and that the Soviet planner thinks in terms of fighting and winning a nuclear war; while the West contents itself that war is "unthinkable” and concentrates on "deterrence.” He looks for increasingly aggressive Soviet behavior as the Soviets perceive the shift in the correlation of forces to continue in their favor and anticipates more widespread forward deployment as the Soviets acquire the ships to support a more aggressive naval posture. He provides an excellent listing of the operational doctrine governing the development of Soviet naval tactics and an enumeration of the major modern Soviet naval tactical concepts. Dr. Bathurst also provides a superb analysis of Soviet writings and the pitfalls they can provide for the uninitiated.
There have been many books written on the Soviet Navy in recent times, but few authors can claim the experience and insight of Dr. Bathurst. His views surely do not always parrot the conventional wisdom
and, to the dedicated Pollyanna, may seem a bit strident. But his observations are made from a firm grounding in Marxist-Leninst doctrine and several years of observation of the Soviet Union. He has a grasp of the Soviet mentality that eludes most of us on active naval service. His book should be read for this reason alone.
From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Arthur D. Radford
Stephen Jurika, Jr., Editor. Stanford,
CA.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. 488 pp. lllus. Ind. Append. $15.00 ($13.50).
Reviewed by Hanson W. Baldwin
Air. Baldwin, a 1924 graduate of the Naval Academy, resigned from the Navy in 1927. Prior to his retirement, he was the Military Editor of The New York Times. He reviewed Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King in the November Proceedings.
Despite its title, Admiral Radford did not really record his memoirs, nor is this a conventional autobiography. The book is based on Radford's personal recollections, fortified by his diaries, memoranda, papers, and official and unofficial records of the time, heavily supplemented—long after the events he experienced—by many subsequently published primary and secondary sources. The book is, in other words, history as well as biography. The volume provides intimate details of the development of naval aviation and is almost boringly thorough in its extremely detailed treatment of the unification struggle, the B-36 inquiry, and the origins of the Vietnam War. It is a measured accounting which deals primarily with events, with the author only as an incidental observer.
Radford was a man of great personal charm, strong convictions, and an outstanding mind. He was graduated from the Naval Academy in the famous class of 1916, was designated a naval aviator in 1920, and from then on his career was intimately associated with the development of naval aviation—particularly during and just after World War II when he commanded carrier divisions and task
forces with distinction and was in strumental in the development night fighter operations from carrR^ In the postwar years, he headed t Navy’s so-called unification task °r in the long, bitter struggle betwee the services in the media and in C°n gress about how the armed serv should be organized and who sho do what. He was Commander-inPacific from 1949 to 1953, a Perl°s_
which bracketed Communist aS^reS sions in Asia—in Korea, and in nam against the French (backed by c United States). President Eisenh0'
of
and he
served during Dien Bien Phu, the ^ phase of the Vietnam crisis, an _ development of the “massive reta tion” concept of John Foster Dulles- From this rich tapestry of first a experience, Admiral Radford ^°ve^.s a clear straightforward style, ^ combination history-biography- ^ wrote mostly in longhand, s ^ sequently transcribed to some 2, manuscript pages. From this tnass^ material, Stephen Jurika, Jr., a Pr0 ^ sor (and retired naval officer) at ^ Naval Postgraduate School has tilled with great skill the PreS^ book, providing footnotes, sour ^ and other material and vouching accuracy. t
But Admiral Radford did not to write until 1969 (12 years aft&
appointed Radford Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1953,
iod °f “es
heaval, frustration, and at 1:1 mutinies, riots, and chaos 10 ,
the Vn‘ . .
ofthe
the
country; our venture into Vietnam h^ soured, and for a second time m ford’s lifetime, we had become volved in a “no-win” war.
retirement) during a peric
and at
1
armed services and in States. The revolution in values late 1950s and 1960s had swept
This book is, in some sense, post facto justification of our
in-
an
e*
iniw a:
an"
policies and actions in Vietnam those of the French. Unfortunat
neve
Radford’s memoirs were
tely-
ok
finished; he died in 1973- ^lSrH • c 1054 Wit" ume ends in the spring or
the Dien Bien Phu crisis
and
the
the
Geneva Conference, which led t0 partition of Vietnam. There is not ^
about the Nationalist-Communist ^
sions and incidents in the t(
hinS
ggO
des
this
There
entional forces that “ massive re- atton and the “New Look"
arional action supported by our al-
as in Korea, full freedom for In-
na. etc.) was the correct one. ere are some considerable omis-
S'Otl;
th,
in ^nplays the Navy’s role in bring- »- 3 '°ut that investigation. The role, Ind of agent provocateur, of one- fewspaper man Cedric Worth, "as a special assistant to Under
0 ,
o^its> n°thing about the Suez Crisis
1 nothing about developments h ,fletnarn during the last two and a
a years of Radford’s tenure as
chairman.
are, too, omissions and— P‘te the detail—generalizations in account. Some are perhaps be- nfu*Se t*1e book’s truncated nature, ers less explicable.
Radford never emphasizes the some- a n*es bitter disagreements of the time out the so-called “New Look” r° lcies within the Joint Chiefs. This r *^wer heard the famous “massive j ta jation ’ speech of John Foster Dul- ^7 blew York and later asked Ad- Radford why such a doctrine keen propounded in view of our ^ erience in Korea and our obvious Stance to use nuclear weapons any- o re' The admiral responded with “b6 W°r<^—"dollars.” This was the ^’gger-bang-for-a-buck” theory that ]Cn®ne<^ so briefly. But one would not R- ,W’ ‘ram this account, that General str anc^ later General Taylor
rnR y opposed the de-emphasis of conve--■ - -
tali;
Plied the °f *S t*lere any real reflection of
Wi hSplit *n C^e JCS ab°ut Vietnam,
^ General Ridgway in a vocal
A,n°rity against U. S. intervention.
tiiT)11*1^ ^ac^or<T weH known at the
as a strong interventionist, writes
0f anusome postscript to his feelings
t- ^ years ago. He thought at the
e he wrote, that we “should intervene l
add' ■ ^ ourselves if we could not get
|ate|tl0na^ help,” but—writing years
r be concluded that President
int en^°wer s P05*1'00 non-
tn. rvent‘°n without conditions (in- Cernr''
hes
‘lochi
Th,
'S t0 tbe very detailed account of f°rd Ufnif'tatlon/B-36 controversy. Rad- test- °Cuses correctly on the technical at t|imony °f Navy and other witnesses be d e COn8ressional investigation, but
Secretary of the Navy Dan Kimball, is described. But there is no mention of the endless secret telephone calls of Captain Crommelin and others to the press and no indication of the intense rumor-mongering and propagandizing of the time by many in the Navy as well as many in the Air Force. Nor does Radford’s book reflect adequately the unending pressure by naval aviators on Admiral Denfeld, then CNO, to take what he knew would be interpreted as an anti-administration position. After Denfeld’s testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, “reprisal” was swift; he was, with brutal inconsideration, fired. This action increased the breach between the services which—ultimately—only the Korean War and new personalities started to heal.
Radford’s treatment of this highly heated and very emotional period in Washington is calm and even- tempered and extremely detailed and fair. But he never really identifies some of the chief political culprits, or the political wheels within wheels that had led to Forrestal’s downfall, and that would ultimately lead to dismissal of MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs’ full involvement in politics. He pays high and deserved tribute to Forrestal.
Occasionally, Radford has interjected some generalized—and, to this reviewer, erroneous—judgments, not only in discussing what actually occurred, but in speculating about the might-have-beens of history. Nevertheless, this thick volume provides many new insights and some new material, particularly for those periods when Radford was in high command.
Yet, one finishes this book with a feeling of frustration. The B-36 hearings were historical milestones in the evolution of defense organization and policies, and the massive retaliation doctrine and the limited wars in Korea and Vietnam marked even more major milestones. The right, indeed, the obligation of military professionals to testify frankly before Congress whether or not their testimony supports administration positions was both weakened and strengthened by the B-36 hearings. But, today, more than three decades later, that right has
to
of af4
and there is little possibility
book5
the
as the Admiralty and the ne"
of naval a»
fought
Ministry fought for control of n»v‘l ^ power while the Treasury f°u£
World
I with the most advanced nav
battle fleet. Its aircraft were to
the enemy fleet, shadow it to rnaljovVn contact, and strike it to slow it c.j so that the British battle finc CjsjVe bring it under fire. In the ee
the nav
the
to
the air ... e while pr°V>
and,
ol-
rupt the enemy’s formation
The
enforced a belief that the fleet
become almost irrelevant. The subsequent evolution of the Defense Department over the years has spawned a bureaucrats’ paradise in the Pentagon, and the original concept in the 1940s-50s of civilian control of policy has become a complex nightmare of too many chiefs and too few Indians, of civilians without responsibility exercising authority for operations, of management too often substituted for command.
We are still impaled, after almost 25 years of warning, on the horns of the same dilemma. None of these strategic concepts or theories— massive retaliation, mutual assured destruction, counterforce, warwinning capabilities, limited wars— which have successively governed Washington’s politico-military thinking since the days of Radford—are meaningful without the means and the will to implement them. Yet today, we are clearly lacking the means—and the national will is very much in question.
Les Porte-Avions Francais: Des Origines (1911) A Nos Jours (The French Carriers: From the Beginning [1911] to the Present)
Francis Dousset. Paris: Editions de la Cite, 1978. 159 pp. 120 Francs (Approx. $28.70).
Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914-1945: A Historical Survey
Geoffrey Till. London: Jane’s Publishing Co., 1979. 224 pp. t'9.50 (Approx. $22.61).
Reviewed by Norman Friedman
Dr. Friedman is a theoretical physicist currently concentrating on naval problems at the Hudson Institute. A Columbia University graduate, he has authored and coauthored articles and papers on the U. S.-Soviet naval balance, Soviet naval missile systems and tactics, and warship design. He has uritten an official Naval Sea Systems Command History of American Carrier Design, and a book to be published in 1981 entitled Carrier Air Power.
These two books portray ways of using carriers quite foreign to the U. S. Navy, and therefore are deserving of study, if only to provide alternative models of carrier employment which may be applicable to other navies, such as the Soviet Navy of the latter part of the current decade. Like the Royal Navy of the interwar period, the Soviet Navy may well be a navy dominated by surface-to-surface missiles (cruise missiles rather than the guns of the British battle line, to be sure), looking to naval aircraft to support the surface combatants rather than as an entirely new form of seapower. Again, like the Royal Navy, the Soviet Navy will have to obtain its aircraft from a ministry charged with production of all aircraft, land- and sea-based, and consequently heavily biased in favor of the longer production runs of the land-based types. French carrier experience may also be relevant to the Soviet Navy. The French Navy always had to operate small numbers of carrier aircraft and hence could never benefit from the size of the production runs achieved in the United States and, before 1945, in Japan.
Francis Dousset’s book is the first full account of French naval aviation; it includes not merely the carriers but also the seaplane support ships. Indeed, the extent to which programs and abortive designs are described indicates the extent to which Dousset had access to official sources. His work is a revelation, given the paucity of authoritative accounts of recent, particularly postwar, French naval development. A reader can only be gratified by the promise of further volumes in this series, which are to describe not only different classes of ships, but also their weapons and tactics. One might wish, however, for more technical detail, particularly as it seems unlikely that anyone will soon follow in Dousset’s footsteps. He is particularly weak in describing some of the prewar carrier projects, and it was not clear to this reviewer why a French Navy which adduced cogent arguments against new carrier construction (given large land-based naval air forces and the tactical limits of French carriers) was willing, late in the 1930s, to lay down two new and expensive carriers, the J off re and Painleve—not to mention a host of specialized carrier aircraft. However, the subsequent a ^
count of wartime efforts to keep rier design alive is fascinating- would also appear that after the the French Navy decided to follnw 1 U. S. example and make the carr^ the center of a strategic strike 0 ^ Dousset is the first to publish bot sketch design of the 45,000 c French strike carrier and of its ^in* IV-size nuclear bomber. These Pr ^ ects died with the French decision^ buy missiles and nuclear submar>n further conventional carrier constrn tion in France. The pr°j e^-er nuclear-powered helicopter ca (PH-75) is described, however.
His book is a magnificent heg ning to what one can only hope
be a continuing series covering such postwar subjects aS ^ ASW escorts will be eagerly a"alt ^ The French language should ProV£jc(J great barrier, as Dousset has Pr°vl plenty of tables and illustrations^^ eluding the plans of many of the interesting aborted projects.
Dr. Geoffrey Till focuses on the ^ ficult development of the British ^ Air Arm during the interwar Per .
cut all military expenditures- f
Admiralty emerged from Worl ^ ^ arm in the world, but in some tant ways, it appears that British ^ g air doctrine was arrested m thinking. Thus, the carrier f°rcC isted almost entirely to supp°rt
ta‘n gunnery engagements craft would deny enemy’s spotters, friendly forces with spotting would permit effective gunnery yond the horizon. Torpedo attaC . jjS- ing a gunnery engagement wou ^ rectly, his long-range fire contr • British equivalent of the gun
be
°u*d be used only to escort strikes neutralize enemy carriers by a
can
until
ng-
at is most striking to an Ameri- reader is that the Royal Navy,
J^uately defended by its antiair- a c fire, and therefore that fighters
and to
nibination of strafing and light
bombir,
Wh;
entl t'Ulte *ate ‘n tbe 1930s, appar- tQ 7 d'd not intend its carrier fighters tje n^end e'cher the carrier or the bat- ex eet a£a*nst a‘r attack. Repeated Periments showed that, without 5»0rne fn r •
Pa r0rm °‘ ear*y wafning, fighter
dilu°s Were useless and instead were a gro^'°n °f already very limited air 0p Ps' Apparently it took the advent
d r‘ldar t0 change matters for the Hal Navy.
g ■ r' "bill makes extensive use of I s archival material to dissect the Ad • acnmonious debate between Air Ministry, and Treas- Usef i 0 tde Process, he gives many U °bject lessons in the futility of ‘n ^ ^eS °f paper studies, as well as Sou.e effects of arms limitation g t for fiscal purposes. The treaty
experience of the 1920s and 1930s was frequently cited in the period immediately after 1945, but appears to have been largely forgotten in the era of SALT. It seems due for a revival, and Dr. Till’s account of the behavior of the British bureaucracy of the interwar period brings to mind many uncomfortable current parallels.
Perhaps the most interesting part of Dr. Till’s book is his account of the development of Fleet Air Arm tactics as reflected in fleet exercises of the interwar period. Although he points out that there was no agreed doctrine, the exercises do show a certain consistency and explained many of the characteristics of British interwar naval aircraft development. It seems unfortunate, then, that Dr. Till does not proceed from the exercise evidence to some connected account of aircraft and ship development.
Such flaws would be of little moment were it not for the exceptional care which evidently went into Dr. Till’s book, and the mass of research he clearly undertook. The British carrier force still deserves a definitive account, but until then, Dr. Till’s book is certainly the best available. Perhaps it is only fair to admit that, as far as this reviewer knows, there is no existing study of any type of military aircraft in which the connection among policy, tactics, and aircraft development proper is laid out in any serious way. The criticism of Dr. Till’s book is more a matter of sadness that an excellent book did not go a few steps further than an attack on work well done. Indeed, the U. S. Navy of the interwar period could do with a similarly careful study.
These are both excellent books, quite different but well worth the attention not only of the historian but also of the naval analyst looking for models other than the standard one of the U. S. Navy. Each is clearly written and carefully researched, and each might well serve as a starting point for further exploration of the technology and policy of naval aviation.
>s fully illustrated guide “ American naval badges d service medals is with] question the most com- t>e^’ uP-to-date, and au- oritative reference on the fdbject ever published.
the medals and ' °b°ns are shown in full ° or with a brief history of design and award tteria for each. From the congressional Medal of ?nor to the Diving Media Technician Badge, Un- onunon Valor covers roem all.
1980/88 pages! 113 color na black and white illustrations
p Naval Institute J"oss Book hlst Price: $12.95 Amber’s price: $10.36
(Pi
q e®se use order form in °°ks of Interest section.)
Books of Interest
Compiled by Professor Craig L. Symonds, Associate Editor
Iial-
Sons, 1979. 246 pp. Ulus. Maps. Append $14.95 ($13.46). ._
The Battle of Britain has an almost rW cal role in histories of World War II- ^ ^ Day is a popular account first publ's ^ years ago and which now appears m edition. It is composed primarily 0 tographs and vignettes of how the air impacted on the daily lives of p‘l°ts’ . a
that
and civilians. The Hardest Hay
NAVAL AFFAIRS
pfcl Chiefs of Naval Operations
Robert William Love, Jr., Editor. Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1980. 379 pp. lllus. $28.95 ($23.16).
This anthology of biographies of the 19 Chiefs of Naval Operations from William S. Benson to Elmo Zumwalt is both a valuable administrative history of the Navy in the twentieth century as well as an important reference work. Each CNO is examined within the context of the principal issues and strategies of his era. The essays can be read individually for insight to a particular CNO, or collectively to appreciate the changing role of the CNO and of America’s naval strategies and policies since 1915.
The Crudest Night
Christopher Dobson, John Miller, and Ronald Payne. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. 223 pp. Ulus. Bib. Ind. $9.95 ($8.96).
In January 1945, the advancing Red Army forced the German High Command in East Prussia to attempt a desperate sea lift of civilian refugees from Danzig. Between January and May, more than two million were transported from the path of the oncoming Soviets. As part of this effort, the liner Wilhelm Gustloff left Danzig on 30 January with more than 8,000 refugees on board—6,000 more than her official peacetime capacity. The next night the ship was sunk by a Russian submarine and 7,000 of those passengers were lost. The authors of this account claim that in terms of the number of lives lost, this was the worst sea disaster in history.
B The Death of the Tirpitz
Ludovic Kennedy. Boston: Little, Brown,
1979. 176 pp. Ulus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $14.95 ($11.96).
Kennedy’s account of the several British attempts to sink the Tirpitz is unique primarily because it takes into account the “Ultra” intercepts which kept the British apprised of the whereabouts of the Tirpitz. Well over half the volume consists of photos and facsimile reproductions of “Ultra” decrypted signals. Early assaults on the Tirpitz involved gimmicks like midget submarines and “X-craft,” but it
was finally dispatched by a six-ton bomb dropped by the Royal Air Force.
Die Schleswig-Holsteinische Marine 1848-1852 (The Schleswig-Holstein Navy 1848-1852)
Gerd Stolz. Heide in Holstein, West Germany: Westholsteinische Verlagsanstalt Boyens & Co., 1978. 118 pp. Ulus. Map. Append. Bib. Ind. 24,80 DM (Approx. $13-90).
The largely German-populated duchies of Schleswig-Holstein revolted against the Danish crown in 1848 and maintained a precarious independence until 1850, when the Concert of Europe arranged for their return to Denmark. The provisional government finally wound up its affairs in 1852. Among the institutions of the short-lived state was a navy, which fought several actions with the Danes and undertook the construction of the first German U-boat, Wilhelm Bauer’s Brandtaucher. Gerd Stolz’s fine monograph presents a definitive history of this little-known sea service.
The Ship that Would Not Die
RAdm. F. Julian Becton, USN, (Ret.), and Joseph Morschauser, 111. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1980. 288 pp. Ulus. Append. $11.95 ($10.76).
During the landings on Okinawa in April 1945, the Japanese launched the full fury of their kamikaze attacks on the covering American fleet. The target for 21 of these attacks was the destroyer USS Laffey (DD-724) commanded by then- Commander F. Julian Becton. [EDITOR'S NOTE: Now decommissioned, the Laffey was acquired by the Patriots Point Development Authority, Charleston, S.C., and will be placed on exhibition in the spring of 1981.]
MARITIME AFFAIRS Our Seamen, An Appeal
Samuel Plimsoll. London: Virtue (distributed by New York: Sheridan House), 1980. 117 pp. Ulus. Maps. $16.50 ($14.85).
This volume was first published in 1873 by a member of Parliament in order to expose the unscrupulous activities of shipowners and insurance agents that led to unnecessary disasters at sea: undermanning
and overloading, poor stowage, an cient engines. Plimsoll’s subtitle in 1 ,
his concern that the government esc standards to protect the British seaman- ^ his book, he includes pages from B°jr Trade reports, account books of merc-m firms, insurance policies, and phoWs physical evidence.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
Eagle Day: The Battle of Britain
Richard Collier. New York: E. P- Dutton- 1980. 256 pp. Ulus. Ind. $12.95 (I11-6 h
Battle of Britain: The Hardest Day
Alfred Price. New York: Charles Scribner more detailed and scholarly offering ^ focuses on a single day—18 August f By a painstaking search of the docum^ and interviews with survivors, ^r’j|(,ngeS has compiled an account that cha many of the myths that have gr0^ ^as concerning the Battle of Britain. also examined the records and ‘nterV^je to the survivors of the Luftwaffe to be a ^ tell the story of the battle from both s
. nf Waf
The Camera at War: A History 1t Photography from 1848 to the Pre
Day
Jorge Lewinski. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978. 240 pp. Ulus. Bib- Ind' $17.95 ($16.16). lfa
The author of this account is *1‘rnS(;on- photographer and as such is more ^ cerned with photography as an art than with the military history whtc ^ lustrates. Perhaps as a result of t*1lSate phasis, there is more than one unto ^ historical error and Lewinski’s accou _
fers from his inference that the as
tographer’s primary function is to the conscience of society. Ironically- ^ ever, he draws no moral distinction
It was written spe-
book
prj^eS enclosed by parentheses are member ,es‘ Members may order most books of other
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requested, actual postage and handling
Books
Marked B°oks Sele,
marked
,Ween the intentional victims of the 0 °caust and the accidental victims of |j*Palm in Vietnam. The photographs frnselves are excellent, though they tend 0 the tragic rather than the heroic.
applied ECM, Vol. I
g f0y Van Brunt. Dunn Loring, VA.: EW Hg'neering, Inc., 1978. 973 pp. Ulus. Ind. *39.95
Th
ls lengthy volume is a virtual encyclo- e la of electronic countermeasures (ECM) nh includes detailed descriptions of more thatl 240 ECM tactics. It
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cifically for use by radar-missile specialists though a glossary of terms helps make it a useful reference to professionals in related fields.
The Enigma War
Jozef Garlinski. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980. 219 pp. Ulus. Map. Append. Bib. Ind. $14.95 ($13.46).
Recent volumes based on newly declassified information have exposed the tremendous significance of decrypted intelligence information in World War II. The real story of “Ultra," however, began a full decade before 1939 when Polish agents came across an early model of the German Enigma coding machine. For many years, the Poles struggled to assemble a machine capable of decyphering coded messages. With the fall of Poland, many of their intelligence officers escaped to England where they contributed significantly to the “Ultra” coup at Bletchley Park. In this book, Garlinski traces this “Polish connection” as well as the impact of “Ultra” on the Allied War effort.
The P-80 Shooting Star: Evolution of a Jet Fighter
E. T. Wooldridge, Jr. Washington, D. C.: The Smithsonian Institution Press, 1979. 111 pp. Illus. Appen. Bib. $5.95 ($5.36).
This is the third in a series of illustrated histories of aircraft from the National Air and Space Museum. Earlier volumes concerned the P-51 Mustang and the Aeronca C-2. This volume chronicles the history of America's first operational jet fighter. Authorized in 194.3 in response to intelligence that Nazi Germany was readying a jet fighter of its own (the Me 262, subject of a future volume in this series), the P-80 Shooting Star first flew successfully in January 1944 though it never saw' combat in World War II. Later versions of this handsome aircraft included the Navy’s TV-2 Seastar which saw service in the 1950s.
Strategy and the MX
Colin S. Gray. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1980. 66 pp. $2.00 ($ 1.80) paper.
The Director of the Hudson Institute herein argues that it is time for the proponents of the MX missile system to stop squabbling about the details of several “acceptable basing modes” and for the United States to go ahead with implementation. The MX system, he argues, will enhance America’s credibility because it will improve the nation's real war-fighting capability. Too long, he asserts, has America’s nuclear planning been dictated by arms control experts rather than with an eye to nuclear war fighting, a characteristic not applicable to Soviet planning.
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