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Jhe Coast Guard: Still
^aworthv?”
is *
• ^ctober 1980 Proceedings)
Inspection role taken from us. State and national maritime offi-
rperit,Cense exam is only an impedi- get ^c^°°lboys have to climb over to degrfcat subsidized four-year college ' 6' N° longer do they train men
Merchant officer’s ticket by con- lriS on shipboard management years. The diploma mills Censes by the ream for jobs that :ist.
"’hat’s the use? I’ve fought
this battle for 40 years. My colleagues are all gone, and I am getting weary. But I hate to admit that I’m defeated, that the pride of profession that sustained me for so long is ebbing away. One last time, let me shout it: “Give us back our Marine Inspection and our maritime officer schools!”
Does New U. S. Strategic Policy Mean an End to MAD?
Lieutenant Miles B. Wachendorf. U. S. Navy—Dr. Gerald Burke and several others have made a very strong case in recent issues for maintaining or increasing American dependence on the sea-based portion of our strategic triad. One of their basic arguments in favor of the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) system, as opposed to other strategic systems, is the high security or survivability of the U. S. SLBM force during a Soviet first strike. This survivability is unique in at least one respect, in that the survivability of SLBM forces is not reduced by increasing numbers of Soviet strategic warheads.
An increased reliance on the SLBM portion of the strategic triad is a stabilizing influence on the competition for strategic power between the superpowers. Unlike the MX ICBM system (particularly without SALT II limitations) or renewed interest in an anti-ballistic missile system, an increased deployment of SLBM forces does not encourage the Soviets to expand their own strategic launching systems.
It is important to note, however, that our SLBM launching platforms, particularly the 24-missile Ohio-class SSBN, could incur a significant, if not prohibitive, loss in survivability in a prolonged nuclear conflict. This type of conflict has recently received much publicity in connection with Presiden-
Contents:
The Coast Guard: Still Seaworthy?
Does New U. S. Strategic Policy Mean an End to MAD?
The U. S. Marine Corps: Strategy for the Future
Is Parity Possible in Female Billets?
Draft: Men and Women
North to Alaska
The State of the Navy
Soviet Expansion and Control of the Sea-Lanes
Torpedoing the Coast Guard s Good-Guy Image
The Reasons They Give . . . and the REAL Reason
Another Reason for Leaving
Soviet Navy Gets Its First Hospital Ships
Battleship Bismarck Retention: The Pressure Is On Assault on the Liberty
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
L1tgs / December 1980
21
to both the writer and the reader. A careful reading will serve to highlight the numerous assumptions, both explicit and implied, and the frequently unsupported leaps from assumption to assertion. And through it shines the OSD principle of scenario dependence. God help us all if our precise structuring of the future is not accurate.
Krulak fails to make his case for a mission change for three basic reasons. First, he fails to establish that the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) belongs solely to the Corps, or that the Corps, by itself, would be able to handle the job. Second, he fails to discredit the functional approach to warfighting that currently serves as the basis for the responsibilities assigned to the three service secretaries. Greatly simplified, the services provide forces possessing specific functional capabilities required in the waging of war; the JCS allocates these forces to regional commanders in chief (CinCs); and the CinCs meld the separate forces into a combined arms force able to meet, within its inherent limits, operational requirements. This flexible ap- roach is diametrically opposed to Kru- lak’s “give Europe to the Army and the rest of the world to the Corps.” The latter approach is easy to brief or to diagram, but incredibly difficult, inefficient, and cost-/«effective to organize, equip, train, deploy, and employ.
Finally, Krulak fails to convince us that the level of amphibious capability today is so satisfactory that we can afford to turn our attention elsewhere, to “. . . restructure to provide a credible, instantaneous crisis management force wherever needed throughout the world . . presumably ready to do whatever is necessary. He asserts, and then denies, that amphibious operations are a thing of the past. He provides no evidence that geography, or our maritime nature, or our global interests, or the sizeable Soviet challenge to our use of the seas has changed. Nor does he mention that the service chiefs, the JCS, and the operational CinCs have consistently, and increasingly, called for levels of amphibious shipping and capabilities well beyond those available today. These calls are based not only on the
utility of their assault role, but in recognition of the peacetime presence and deterrent value they provide daily, and their general warfighting capability so clearly demonstrated in World War II and Korea, and so badly misused in Vietnam.
It is irresponsible, as well as illogical, to suggest that the Corps abandon, or even slight, its primary mission until either the mission is proved irrelevant and the responsibility to execute it is cancelled, or until a case can be made that we have a surplus of resources that are available for a secondary mission.
“Is Parity Possible in Female Billets?”
(See M. R. Schaefer, pp. 103-106, September 1980 Proceedings)
“Draft: Men and Women”
(Sir D. M. Fuller, pp. 95-96, October 1980
Proceedings)
Lieutenant William A. Weronko, U. S. Navy—The points brought up by Lieutenant Schaefer and Ensign Fuller about the women’s role in the military, like most comments written on the subject, completely miss the real issues involved. Two main issues must be resolved before the military makes radical organizational changes that no civilized country has previously instituted. First, determine if this society is able to withstand sending its daughters to war without the complete demoralization of the country. Second, determine if women are mentally and physically capable of withstanding and functioning during the rigors of war.
The morale of a society at a time of armed conflict must not be disregarded. The attitude of the civilian populace rapidly infects military personnel as our unfortunate Vietnam experience demonstrated. It is hard enough on a society to send its sons to war, but the historical experience and cultural tolerance enable it to do so. It is questionable whether the civilian community would be able to send young women into battle and then experience seeing some of them coming back in body bags, or perhaps worse,
. r>A bv th6
having female soldiers capture :
hated enemy and knowing the dation such a capture would cer entail. Even the most muffle P e would likely leak stories on m»ss ^ and torture of female prisi°ners enemy would surely use its cap female prisoners as a strong ^ aganda tool. The effects of suC^ ^ tions on society are unknown- 0 military is to change its or®an |, in and assignment policies, reseafate£j. this critical area must be ir" ^ [0 War is much too serious a bus'0^ ty hazard the military’s effectively^ jS doing what is chic rather than workable. atid
The differences between 11160 women are significantly great^ought the minor physical variances ^ research ^
by some. Recent rese ^ ^
neurobiologists, psychobiologlS ^
geneticists has shown that jo
female brains are quite diss1111 ^
organization, methods of PerC ^e
and strengths and weaknesses^ ^ differences between the sexes lfl necessarily preclude using 'en^j0gists battle, though some anthrop and sociobiologists believe ^en What the dissimilarities bet"ee^ and women mean is that a
soC‘ety, ioflS 0
should not rashly make ^eClSjted of ultimate importance on l|rn
Dtionally derived informal0
date
se
lf the government is to h100^^ be cial change in the military, |C ^ based on facts and reality rat veS emotion and false ideals, n t not not to happen, we may fin ^ only are we in an underfun overaged Navy but also 'n ‘ c(l3fe- which is flawed in its basic str
“North to Alaska”
(See A. W. Radford, pp. 78-83, Scp 1980 Proceedings)
—As a
ten1
,ber
sequ'
rick'
elk
in
Edward A. Tomasiewicz Admiral A. W. Radford’s art^ js which the seaplane tender ^pe frequently mentioned, I w°Ut ship5 that someone would tell t . th*s
i _. a u*
wartime story. The torpe ^^jle ofl useful ship on 7 June 19 »
a rescue mission off Bermu ^ 0((ic& even mentioned in Moris°n ^aVy.
World War II history
(Continu
of the
ed on
page
7 9)
26
Proceedings / Decei«b
United States after any use of nu- Weapons by the enemy, toward
'mproved capability to conduct
lear
cli
Th.
l«nt
^sk
taPid
ofd;
th,
ays.
^°re accurate
U programmed for six SSBNs in a next Bve years, is very good evi-
the
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k‘a Directive 59. This document has j-een reported to shift emphasis away h*111 3 mutual assured destruction ise ^ deterrence policy, which prom- a massive nuclear retaliation by
dea an
Uolonged nuclear exchanges against, ^ast initially, military targets, f r- Burke suggests that our SLBM l already has a limited military, -target or counter-force capabil- 1^; Dr. Burke predicts that this capa- i y could be greatly increased by an Proved accuracy program and/or a ^cond-generation Trident missile.
°Wever, even with an excellent f0^t'ter-force capability, the SLBM
War.
Porti.
accuracy of this solution is depen-
()|^ upon the accuracy of trajectory
a„LServations, but Soviet capability to achieve
tc.r'tr°l problem can only be expected teHi;
would be most difficult with a tyi . successive launch of 16 missiles j ch Would be associated with a MAD Sj terrence policy, but would be greatly j Pufied by an intermittent launch- °* 24 missiles spaced over a period
information about
,snewly announced strategic policy 0r)^eede‘d to evaluate its merits. But Pow °^servat'on that may be made |js^ ’ ln contradiction to some pub** reports, is that the simultane- aPd ^eveI°pment of this new policy t^le multi-billion dollar Trident ^Pterine program, which is cur-
q ** » — J —
tQCe that the United States has not
h ,a^y abandoned the MAD deterence H0licy.
ce NOTE: Next month, the Pro-
^a'n8s will publish a professional note lc*° examines Presidential Directive 59.
“The U. S. Marine Corps: Strategy for the Future”
(See W. M. Krulak, pp. 94-105, May 1980; R. W. Mixon, pp. 20-21, June 1980; T. Terry, p. 74, July 1980; J. G. Miller, pp. 9-18, September 1980; J. J. Stewart, pp. 81-86, November 1980 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Batcheller, U. S. Marine Corps—It takes no Sherlock Holmes to determine that Colonel Kurlak works in the Office of the
D *
360 Franklin Street/Worcester, Massachusetts 01604 Tel. (617) 756-6216 Telex 920482
CLARK CO. INC
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation. Although “we” and "our” appear throughout discussions of the Corps, the intellectual thumbprint on his article is that of an OSD staffer, not of a soldier of the sea. It is tempting to take on the article paragraph by paragraph, assertion by assertion, and assumption by assumption. But that would be a lengthy chore, frustrating
Comment and Discussion
{Continued from page 26)
State of the Navy”
,* ■ S. Hoffman, pp. 14-59, September
Proceeding
^Wv'et Expansion and Control t^le Sea-Lanes”
1 H, Edwards, pp. 46-51, September 1980 Pr°«'Jhgs)
^Plain Carlos E. Zartmann, Argentine avy (Retired)—Commander Hoffman
r]t0 Se commended for drawing a picture of the two problems that e the U. S. Navy today and pre-
dear r'ddl
,^nt it from building up the seapower needs to achieve singlehandedly a (I ar superiority over the Red Fleet: sh' n0t enouR^ money to build the *PS that are necessary, and (2) not in Personnel to man those ships n the event they were available, f Any situation which adversely af- Cts cEe U. S. Navy is of serious con- to the entire Western World in
tern
5o«ht of the
j Vlet seapower. The size, power, and ^ePloyment of the U. S. Navy should matters of paramount interest to Verybody in the Free World and not Ust internal U. S. affairs on which fitters are not entitled to express
growing menace
of
fi
orei
3n opinion.
It* addressing what should be done, v-0~* - °
all
t°Ses to start cutting back on tradi- ^onal U. S. commitments. The logic k t^1‘s argument is clear and valid, Ut there are a few points deserving
ommander Hoffman calls on U. S. Ies to make a larger effort and pro-
^fsideration. In three decades, the I ' S. Navy has gone from being arfier than the rest of the world's a* forces put together to seeing a ^ e when it will be second to one of cern- Once the U. S. Navy’s strength ^°ulci solve all U. S. problems at sea ^ W,H without regard to allies. From ^jls position of preeminence, the n‘ted States is sliding toward a posi-
n ieading a partnership in which Partners are becoming more impor
ts
tant, demand a better consideration of their points of view, and grow more critical of U. S. actions every day, with large errors in U. S. policies contributing substantially to this criticism.
Even with the situation in the Indian Ocean area being as it is, it would not be wise to reinforce U. S. seapower there by withdrawing, for instance, large U. S. naval forces permanently from the Atlantic and Mediterranean. This would invite the Soviets to start a crisis in the European area which, so far, has distinguished itself by the relative stability of the political East-West front because of the existence of a credible capability of defense represented by NATO.
While the Soviets use brute force to obtain political objectives, they are realistic in their appraisals and have shown that they do not like to accept great risks. Instead, they seek action only where they think the odds are almost completely in their favor. Therefore, any weakening of the present force status through a large and continuous withdrawal of U. S. naval forces from the North Atlantic area could result in a loss in credibility of the already inferior defense capability of NATO. It might cause the Soviets to consider that they would have a good opportunity to push their area of domination further by, lets say, taking Yugoslavia back under its grip through an Afghanistan-type operation. Such a weakening of NATO would definitely make it difficult for Spain to join or Greece to rejoin NATO in the face of strong internal opposition from the left.
Even among the present members of the alliance, political forces which want to blow it apart would have a field day if they could make the populations which live on the probable path of the Russian armored divisions feel insecure about the extent and the quality of U. S. support to their de
fense. The argument would be very simple: IfU. S. seapower, which must ensure the arrival of U. S. reinforcements to the common defense, is committed elsewhere and European naval power is impotent against such a tremendous enemy, then the Americans will not be able to come across the ocean. What, then, is the purpose in trying to defend Europe? Let the Russians march in unopposed; save at least the lives and goods. It’s better to be red than dead! That these left-wing forces are quite formidable is shown dearly by the recent congress of the British Labor Party and the halfhearted attitudes by some countries towards the stationing of U. S. cruise missiles in Europe.
To build up their seapower to take over traditional U. S. commitments, the partners of the United States, not only in NATO but all over the world, need what the United States needs: lots of money and many qualified people, and they do not have an excess of either. Of course, each individual case differs from the other. There are
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of the planet. Russia must be i®* aware that it cannot challenge N outside its present defense perlIT1 and get away with it. ^
the
sibilities by just a declaration backfire into a humiliation of die ^ fiance (and the West ought to _ had enough of that), if the RusSI‘^_ should choose to challenge it, ^ stance, in the vast expanses or ^ South Atlantic, a void since ^ British Navy left it long ago. So, only thing to do, besides beefing
look
ith
wi
of his aP
of S'
praisal of the consequences
com'
fete
countries that have been selecte showcases by iubujik r— ^e. Forgetting about what happenS
and look‘d
is evi'
ident
very
situation in a lot of countries the status of these rights is a
— i ” Sau° from “acceptable standards. r(
Arabia has received AWACS
protection in spite of the me
type of rule present there; South
was not cut off from U. S. milbaD
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countries which could do more and do not, and there are countries which would like to do more but cannot. Putting pressure on the first ones might help to convince them that the privileges of liberty are only assured by accepting the burden of being prepared to fight for them. The second ones are those to be looked after in terms of supporting their efforts to build up naval forces able to stand and fight against the Russian naval weaponry. This is important, because there are many countries which could, and some actually do, build naval vessels which can be usefully employed in local conflicts but which are probably inferior to what the Red Fleet could muster against them. U. S. help in providing them with first-line weapons, training, spares, maintenance, and repair through easy credits or even on a fond perdu basis could achieve the creation of respectable forces, even in the Soviet view, at a fraction of the cost of raising, manning, and maintaining such forces under the U. S. flag. It looks like a fair tradeoff: assist allies in building up forces exceeding national requirements or capabilities and ask them to contribute more forces to NATO or to the defense of the remote ocean areas where Western naval power does not currently measure up. This approach does not need to generate into an arms race with the Soviets to match them on a ship-by-ship basis. Just the building up of NATO naval forces enough to put an unacceptably high price on a Russian military adventure, direct or by proxy, would be what is required. _
Then, there is the problem of the self-imposed boundary of NATO’s naval area of responsibility. In facing a global naval power, one cannot set up a defensive organization for only half an ocean. Admiral Sir Peter Hill- Norton put the issue into clear perspective when he said that the Tropic of Cancer was a boundary traced on the charts of NATO naval staffs—but not on those of the Soviet Union. NATO must define the seaborne lifelines of the alliance and accept responsibility for their defense right down to the oil terminals or the raw materials loading ports at the bottom
ide
Unfortunately, the problem w°u not be solved just by declaring will to defend those lifelines, there are not enough naval forces the alliance to establish credible Pr0 tection for all Western shipping °n the oceans against the Soviet menaC ^
The extension of NATO’s naval res pc'1
coUN
NATO forces to their limit, is t0 for new allies or to renew ties long-forgotten, neglected, or *nsU former friends who could contribute ^ Western naval defense. This calls 0 more pragmatic sense of values <n ^ appreciation of who are real tfie^sS and natural allies, and for putting weight on political theory and m on the everyday hard facts of b^'
In the same issue of Congressman Edwards makes a point about this, showing the s tion of South Africa and of the ^ American countries. He is to be c mended for the sincerity
U. S. policies. To improve this slt tion would require the U. S. Uo ^ ment to face the reality that the • democracy and way of life are not port articles that are in desperate mand abroad. Nor are they modifies to be forced upon
ians-
hind the Iron Curtain ar only at this side of it, it — g( that the United States does nothing^ little about the human r‘j^re
far
d<
Sreatei
growing concern for the United 3tes- When the militaries took
ere
Wi u aS ln Angola? The partiality which the United States pursues
the hu; Unreal
hies
tary de:
or Third World coun- and their return to parliamen-
^'stance because of the recent actions ^ lts government; nor has Turkey 6en expelled from NATO because its j^rals decided to throw out an inca- e c*v*han government to reestab-
s l&w and order in their country. And It c „ ■ ■ . .
o. positions in these cases are
Ulte right in the face of a much
that •tiocn
O
^ ’ what purpose is there in
east-beating over what happens in Africa, a unique country, with ^ue social structures and problems s .Icb call for unique, South African hisUt*°nS^ '^ou^ anyone like to have a °Wri country ruled in the way of o^V°ne of the several different models ^government existing now all over j riCa> ^ not, why then would anyone cj ^0se such a rule upon highly jjVl. '2e<I South Africa? Or, why is the tited States so rough toward some American military govern- j s' When Marxist terrorists mur- 0v;td at will and were about to take ^er these countries, this was a matter
St,
en avoid this, the U. S. concern grew
^Ofrnously more. What would the
th lte<^ States have preferred? To see
th countr*cs go down the drain in
tc Way Central America is going
, Se days? Or, would it be better to navg r k ■ i
thr ^UC)an mercenaries stationed man rights issue makes it look Th lstIC’ unfair, and hypocritical.
are not traits normally as- ^,1 la*red with an altruistic nation he ’ t0 its eternal credit, helped a fee 0 ^ermany and Japan to their 'after World War II. be °body asks the United States to ssatisfied with what happe ns in °Uth Africa goal ernocracy should be a long-term fjg^ ob Cl. S. foreign policy. But to l them with embargoes and
stacl ttS 'S Putt*ng one more large ob- flri^ e ln the way of their governments sit ^ 3 way out their present crea^‘°n and back into normalcy, is O?. anti-American feelings where tlid not exist before, and even worse, is alienating them from giving any thought of contributing to a common defense goal against Soviet imperialism. The South American response to the U. S. request for a grain embargo and for the boycott of Olympics in response to Soviet action in Afghanistan are examples of the harvest the United States is reaping from the policies it has sown. Basically, these are countries which belong to Western civilization, believe in a democratic way of life, have a deeply rooted Christian faith, are proud of their long-standing history and traditions, exhibit a fairly high level of development, possess enormous natural resources, and in which, right now, exist human rights unheard of in other countries which the United States has decided it better not put in its line of fire.
Take a look, for instance, at the South African, Brazilian, and Argentinian navies. Watch the present status of disrepair of the old ex-U. S. ships the South Americans hold because of the U. S. boycott of spare parts and the growing potential of these navies through the purchase in Western countries of a lot of fine, modern, non-U. S. men-of-war. Notice their capabilities and organization for Naval Control of Shipping, see their splendid naval bases and overhaul facilities, be aware of their unique strategic locations, and ask yourself if it is not suicidal for the defense of the Western World to neglect such a potential and a paradox to be crying wolf about the Soviet naval menace on one side and to be kicking around potential allies with important naval forces on the other. Remember, too, that these potential allies have proven in the past, when U. S. foreign policies were based more on the definition of politics as “the art of the possible” than in the present limited, partial, unjust, and stubborn prosecution of idealistic and unrealistic goals, that they will and can stand decidedly on the side of the Free World.
Individual consideration for each country’s problems could help the United States a great deal in solving the naval dilemma it now faces.
“Torpedoing the Coast Guard’s Good-Guy Image”
(See M. R. Adams, pp. 137-139, October 1980 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William D. Kline, U. S. Coast Guard. Commanding Officer. USCGC Redwood (WLM-685)— Image apparently stands at the head of Commander Adams’ priorities for our service. It’s quite natural, of course; everyone would like to be the good guy. But the very basis of our organization is one of serving the needs of our country. If those needs include an unpleasant mission or task, should we ignore or down play the role because it doesn’t fit our “image?”
The suggestion that the surface search and rescue (SAR) mission is now a thing of the past is ludicrous. Certainly, aviation has improved response time and our ability to save lives. But we’re out here to protect property as well. We have yet to perfect a means
Table 1 Current vs Recommended Pay Scales for E-9 and W-4
|
| 18 | Years of Service 20 | 22 | 26 | _28_ |
E-9 | Current New | 1,546 1,600 | 1,576 1,759 | 1,659 1,959 | 1,820 2,259 | 2,459 |
W-4 | Current New | 1,847 1,900 | 1,907 2,000 | 1,971 2,250 | 2,124 2,650 | 2,850 |
to the 30-year mark, but retention
this area hasn’t been good lately- tention of these and other personne at an all time low, and even the Ocf0 ber 1980 pay is not going to change the person’s mind with 20 years
serv-
offet
of towing a vessel with a helicopter. What has occurred is the shift from offshore to almost exclusively inshore SAR. We still get plenty of public affairs mileage (and a boost to our “image”) out of our SAR mission.
The revival of law enforcement is, after all, a return to a traditional role. A training deficiency certainly does exist. There are on-going efforts to close the gap, however. Premier among them is the Maritime Law Enforcement School. It is essentially a maritime police academy, and its staff does an outstanding job. It includes extensive weapons training and personal defense, as well as classroom time devoted to rights, rules of evidence, jurisdiction, etc. (Moreover, people fail the course, and thereby are not certified as boarding officers. The school, you see, is serious about the mission.)
Yes, sooner or later, someone will get killed. But, sooner or later, a routine safety boarding by unarmed “good guys” would stumble onto a smuggling operation. The threat exists in our working environment. Our crews must be armed because they will operate in a potentially dangerous arena. The onus is on the brass to ensure that our people get adequate training. That is within our control.
What are we trying to do with our Law Enforcement Policy? Only our job. If done in a professional manner,
I doubt that our “image” will suffer greatly.
"The Reasons They Give. . . and the REAL Reason”
(See M. T. Brown, pp. 86-87, June 1980;
J. L. MacMichael, pp. 21-22, July 1980;
D. P. Mozgala, pp. 23-24, August 1980;
R. H. Purnell, p. 33, September 1980;
R. W. Jewell, p. 127, November 1980 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Gary R. Geithmann. U. S. Navy—Commander Mozgala makes many excellent points regarding personnel going to sea—especially good is the one dealing with officer versus enlisted basic allowance for subsistence (BAS) and sea pay. On the new class ships—FFG-7s and DD-963S—everyone subsists from the same mess. When the ship is under way, the officer must pay the full enlisted BAS, although he doesn’t receive that much. I’ve never understood the Navy’s reasoning behind the differences in BAS between enlisted and officers; we all must eat. The officer receives his BAS at all times ashore or afloat (in port or at sea); whereas the enlisted loses his upon being assigned sea duty—an extremely sore point for the enlisted. I recommend that BAS be the same for officer and enlisted. This will create additional management problems for supply officers, but it should eliminate an inequality of the pay system.
Commander Mozgala’s sea pay recommendations for officers are excellent and long overdue. As a former warrant officer, 1 must, however, join Chief Fire Control Technician Jewell in taking exception to placing CWOs in the same category as E-l to E-3s and O-ls. W-is no longer exist, and all new warrants come up from the ranks of E-7, 8, or 9 and have served considerable time at sea or they would never have made warrant. Some officers still have the tendency to treat warrants as junior officers. Warrants are specialists in their areas with vast experience. The warrants should be at least on the same scale as the E-7s, as should other officers with more than four years enlisted service. The daily rate of days under way would be an improvement over the current monthly (in port or under way) rate based on years at sea. A combination of the two, rank and time at sea, should be considered. In either case, officers should receive sea pay as they will spend as much or more time at sea during their careers than most enlisted rates.
While on the subject of various types of pay, let’s talk about w'hat we offer the senior enlisted E-9 and W-4 warrants to stay beyond 20 years. The goal is to keep these experienced men
in
Re-
ice. The latest change has been to <
E-9 promotion to W-3 if selected, not all E-9s want to be officers, an W-5 doesn’t.exist for the W-4 with - years. Table 1 shows the Oct° er 1980 scale for E-9s and W-4s and a ne* recommended pay scale that won improve this situation. t
Note, there is very little curren • . , 1 mu.4 to
monetary jump for the E-9 ana w
look forward to in longevity betv- 20-30 years. A significant jump ^ this area could have the desired e on these critical managers and exp The hard-charging E-9 or W-4 now ge out after 20 years’ service and goeS work for a civilian contractor, m f cases starting at $30,000 and d°in work for the Navy. The change in could add significant cost in retl^_ ment depending on the numbers ^ tained. Another option would be offer a bonus for each year served yond 20 years. Finally, the ^ should consider providing education^
programs for at least an asssociatcs gree, possibly even postgtadu school for the warrant/LDO.
Another Reason For Leaving
G. J. Chester—Our enemy’s we systems are superior in quality quantity.
We lack the proper weapon fight our most likely adversary- We lack educated personnel. We lack motivated personnel- We lack support.
82
108°
As a staff sergeant in the M Corps, I believe all this to be
ar,d, thus, am getting out while the Setting is good. Despite six years in e Corps, I, like many others, am eaving active duty for reserve duty.
y reason for leaving is not pay, or er°sion of benefits, or family Separation—it is the desire to go into c°rnbat with a chance of surviving.
Many Marines of all ranks believe strongly that in today’s Marine Corps will be suicidal to be in the first 'Vave. Tarawa will be nothing com- Puared to any landing we may make in e near future. In the reserve, by the tlrne we get to the front either the ^nemy’s advance will have been unted, or we will have strong defen- SlVe Positions prepared and the slaughter will have ended.
P The Marine Corps is first and ^rernost a combat unit that is to land y amphibious craft or vertical envelopment. But we do not have the SuPport necessary to land, let alone survive. We do not have enough gun- mPs (air and naval) to soften the eaches and to sustain us in our drive UP from the beach. We do not have Enough high-speed landing vehicles plr ar>d naval) to move us quickly, ef- ^'tntly, and as safely as possible from ”lPs positioned over the horizon to he beach. We do not have enough light artillery pieces that we can move quickly and easily across the beach by land or air to support our drives against the enemy. We do not have enough simple, effective weapon systems that can be maintained in combat by light units typical in the Marine Corps.
The Army believes bigger is better. Therefore, the Marine Corps must also think the same way in the name of effectiveness. What is needed is a return to the Victory ship and Sherman tank mentality of World War II. The Germans and Japanese were not overwhelmed by quality; rather it was by quantity: several Sherman tanks against a Tiger; several Corsairs against a Zero; more transport ships and destroyer escorts than the German U-boats could sink.
Fortress America had a chance to gear up, giving our men a chance to survive on the landing beaches. We do not have that luxury today. We may have superior technology, but we will fall beneath the enemy’s mass, which will be magnified by the inability of the common Marine to repair a piece of equipment on the battlefield.
KISS—Keep It Simple, Stupid— should be the watchword. The dub, it has been said, is the ultimate weapon because it has the fewest moving parts. If a piece of gear cannot be kept in working condition during peacetime, how can we expect it to be kept working in wartime? Of course, I almost forgot: in war, we are told, everything we need will be there. Why wasn’t it at Desert One?
I am prepared to give my life for my country, but I prefer to have odds that are slightly more favorable than they now are.
So, w'hen someone says he is leaving the service and cites pay, benefits, etc., ask again. Check to see if it really is those reasons or if it might not be something else. It might just be that he has the desire to fight for his country, but desires it to be in a manner less reminiscent of banzai charges.
“Soviet Navy Gets Its First
Hospital Ships”
CSee Notebook, p. 140, November 1980
Proceedings)
Samuel L. Morison, Editor. LJ. S. Section. Jane’s Fighting Ships—Now that the Soviet Navy is adding hospital ships to its inventory, there seems to be renewed support to have such ships in the U. S. Navy. Reportedly, the Navy Department, over its objections, was ordered by Secretary of Defense Harold G. Brown to draw up plans to convert the former passenger liner SS United States to a hospital ship (AH) for employment with the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and for other emergencies. Cost feasibility studies have determined that for between $275 and $300 million and a period of 18 months, the United States can be converted to a 2,000-bed capacity AH. This price, of course, does not include the some $12 million that would have to be paid to the United States Cruise Lines Inc. for seizing its ship and the some $200,000 for the feasibility study. This brings the total to a maximum of $312.2 million.
One must ask at this point, what is wrong with bringing back the Sanctuary (AH-17), currently residing in the Maritime Administration Reserve Fleet at James River, Virginia? The Navy Department had originally
"dis
and
ids
wanted to use this ship fox the RDF. After Sanctuary's Vietnam service, she was converted to a “Dependents Support Ship” and modernized at Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, San Francisco, between 15 December 1971 and 18 November 1972. She was also completely overhauled. At that time, her 300-bed capacity hospital was reduced to 74, and her other facilities enlarged. She was to have been stationed in Greece, but the project was cancelled, and she was decommissioned in March 1974. Between November 1972 and March 1974, she spent most of the time tied up to the pier. Navy sources have indicated that for between $26 and 42 million and a period of six months the Sanctuary could be converted back to a 300-bed capacity hospital ship with all the associated facilities.
A $312 million investment in the United States seems excessive given the current state of the U. S. Navy. If the U. S. Navy needs a hospital ship, bring back the Sanctuary. The Sanctuary is some 4.5 meters longer than the new Soviet “OB”-class hospital ships which have 400- to 500-bed capacities.
"Battleship Bismarck”
(See p. 101, September 1980 Proceedings)
Commissioned Warrant Officer Joseph A. Morgan. U. S. Navy (Retired)—In the second paragraph of the advertisement for the Battleship Bismarck: A Survivor’s Story, there is the following sentence: “As the author lists what seemed to him to be needless security breeches, the reader begins to get caught up in the tension of the Bismarck’s first and only mission.”
I am puzzled about these security breeches, and who they were worn by. Were they an article of special clothing worn under hazardous conditions, or by those who had clearance for Secret and Classified matter? What did they look like, and why did the author seem to think that they were needless? Etc., etc., etc.
EDITOR’S NOTE: Actually, what happened was that we had a tipo.
“Retention: The Pressure Is On”
(See J. F. Kelly, pp. 40-45, April 1980; D. P. Van Ort, p. 20, June 1980; D. R. Putnam, p. 22, July 1980; B. D. Cole, pp. 75-76, August 1980; B. H. Putnam, pp. 125-126, September 1980 Proceedings)
Senior Chief Yeoman James F. Downs, U. S. Naval Reserve—In his comments on Captain Kelly’s article, Commander Cole raises the questions of the state of recruit training and its relation to retention. Although he does not develop the issue in great detail, he makes a very telling point: You can't retain a person you don't have on board in the first place. In the current all volunteer force (AVF) environment, successful recruiting does not bring a young man or woman on board. It only provides us with the opportunity to make a sailor. Our current training policies, procedures, and practices simply do not seize this opportunity.
Recruit training suffers from the “cost-effective” whittling away of time until it is literally impossible to teach successfully all that is required.
The ultimate goal of recruit (and apprentice and “A” school) training is, in Commander Cole’s words, “to make sailors.” Anthropologists would say it is to acculturate, that is to produce people who accept Navy values, behavior, and attitudes as their own. This goal has been lost in a maze created by instructional systems development specialists who apparently believe one can learn to fight fires, save a shipmate’s life, or handle small arms safely by listening to lectures and answering questions. Old, and not so old, hands would be dismayed to
know how much time Navy recruit spend in classrooms sitting at des identical to those they thought they were escaping when they enlisted (°r an “adventure.”
Lectures and tests are at best methods for teaching about a subject, but they are a woefully ineffeet*ve means of teaching behavior or skills or impacting on values and attitudes, worst, they are simply boring wastes of time. .
If you ask most recent RecfUlt Training Center graduates what they thought of boot camp, the answers will almost always include:
appointing,” “unchallenging ^ “boring.” I would not suggest that boot training I received in 1944 as model for training in the 1980s- ®ut know that whatever else it might have been, it was never boring.
Today’s recruits do not join t Navy in order to garner life-l°n^ post-service benefits. They enlist b^ cause they are seeking some person, challenge; they want to acquire skills, and they want to travel. In short-
their needs and desires are exactly c . Is it
same as the Navy’s requirements. [1] so difficult, then, to devise a training system which increases rather than dampens enthusiasm? j
Youngsters seeking challenge nee a physical conditioning progtarj1 which is at least as strenuous as hig school physical education and which lS relevant to the life one will lead atsea- where two-mile runs are hard to come
i 1 paf H
by. Youngsters who want to skills need hands-on experiences^ Their enthusiasm for this type training is positive and vocal. And ye few of them have even touched ‘ sound-powered phone, done rn°Ij than demonstrate their ability to trea water, or fired more than five room through a .22. j
A young person who wants to trav may want to know about ships, l“e a sea, and foreign ports. Few of thern- in fact, have a grasp of ship types an ^ classes. The fear engendered by lack 0 knowledge has made them wary of sca duty. They find themselves subjects a vast “data dump” which meets aIJ. organizational need to satisfy a host requirements and to say "well, we to them about that.”
D|t of does v‘dua]
prose in a curriculum which
c°me
bai
Pro,
C(>na
Sivi
CUt;
now
Missioned and enlisted, must be tn full weight in designing a new
ha
ands-,
tePla,
sPhere ma,
He
ice lectures. The school atmo-
ecruits are, first of all, individual Pe°ple. We have spent thousands of ars convincing them, as individ- thc' ^IHnora^)^e serv>ce will meet ^ eir feeds. They do not expect, nor they deserve, to be treated like ‘Sets in a manpower model, no ter how sophisticated or how con- *ent it is f0r administrators. We Ust begin to understand that the SHnal transformation we desire is a function of curricula alone but
er a product of a total environment.
Today s recruit soon learns that out- fding behavior begets little re-
ch°nse an<^ t^lat C^e on‘y way to
atlge the course set by a preplanned Personal classification and assign- 0,etlt system is to break rather than .. Serve a rule. Even in the benighted d Navy,” the company honor man htaS allowcd to choose any "A” school th Wls^ecT A program as simple as * encouraged striving for excellence er than the acceptance of minimal ®ndards ... or worse. The credo r. ‘ch begins “I am an American . t‘n8 man . . .” which recruits [y fujfy memorize is a meaningless not teach how to fight as an indi- u or how the Navy fights as an
°r8anization.
T)ur present system fails to ap- aeh the goal of acculturating re- 'tS- That job is left to providence vj|. c"e next commanding officer. Ci- r„latls become recruits, recruits be- sailors, sailors reenlist. Recruit
mng
is a critical element of that :ln<jUSS ^Ut to death by bookkeepers it r, t*10rouRhly confused by “experts,” as lost its effectiveness.
, "e experience, initiative, and 8>nation of career personnel,
r‘culum. The ponderous procedures ln use must be simplified so re- “l[ training can be modified to , ‘ a*lcl operational conditions. Actual °n training or simulation must
rnust be changed. Above all, the ny goals and objectives must be t.ir'iSUre<-f against the single clearcut 8et set by Commander Cole: to make 5a'lors.
“Assault on the Liberty”
(Set D. Blalock, pp. 108-109, March 1980; D. E. Keough, p. 85, June 1980; V. L. Brownfield, S. White, G. D. Oldham, E. H. Katz, pp. 24-33, September 1980 Proceedings)
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, U. S. Navy (Retired), Chief of Naval Operations. 1967 (after Six-Day War)-1970. and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1970-1974—Every American should read Assault on the Liberty, which is told so well by James Ennes. Not only does his account set forth the bravery and dedication to duty of many fine young Americans caught in a most difficult position not of their own making, but it also tells a story of political intrigue and explains to a large degree why the facts in this very sad case have not been fully passed on to the American people.
The attack on the Liberty by Israeli aircraft and ships could not possibly have been a case of mistaken identity. The ship was savagely strafed and fired upon as well as torpedoed in good visibility while she was flying the American flag at a clear silhouette that could not possibly have been mistaken for a ship operated by the Egyptian forces. While it is too late to correct the suppression of this information insofar as its impact on the events of the time, nevertheless this book sets forth in clear terms the story of a very sad event in our history. Why did the press, which has been so active in exploring other events in greatest detail, give this matter such perfunctory attention? [2] I print before I could complement the information I’d received from other sources with Ennes’s eyewitness story. I have, nonetheless, disclosed other aspects of this sordid affair that explain why the Liberty cover-up continues.
Every American should know about Israel’s attempt to sink the Liberty. We are outraged because Iranians violated our embassy and seized hostages; the White House called their capture an act of war. They are alive and presumably well, but Iranian assets have been sequestered to ensure that compensation will be paid. Were the Liberty’s dead, wounded, and survivors any less entitled to these reactions? Was Israel’s attack on the Liberty not an act of war?
The Camp David frameworks would have been unnecessary had not Israel’s threats to expose America’s tacit agreement to a 1967 attack on Egypt (only!) not rendered President Johnson impotent to insist that Israel immediately withdraw to its 1949 borders.
Mr. Katz’s disclaimer of a cover-up in the September issue cannot revise history.
This brings me to Mr. Oldham’s letter in the same issue. I was in Cairo in November 1954 to fulfill President Eisenhower’s promise of military aid for Egypt, in return for its prior agreement that the Suez Base would be available if Turkey (a NATO member) or any Arab state were attacked by Russia. Israel’s firebombers had by then strained Egyptian-American relations. Unprovoked Israeli attacks on Egyptian troops in Gaza and Sinai soon left Nasser with no alternative but to accept Russia’s arms offer or risk a revolt by his own officers. Israel’s 1956 invasion of Egypt denied us base rights for 24 years.
My report of Egypt's pledge to use American arms for defensive purposes only was somehow “lost” in the Pentagon—no copy can be found. Those were the days when our definition of “defensive purposes” would have terminated arms aid to Israel for its (still-continuing) invasions of defenseless Lebanon. Secret deals, cover-ups, and political blackmail continue!
[1] denounce the attack on the Liberty in my book, Ropes of Sand: America’s Failure in the Middle East (New York: W. W. Norton, 1980), but it was in
VC. C. Eveland-—Mr. Ennes’s documented account of the Liberty’s tragedy exposed another skeleton in America’s closet. Details of this and other still-unpublished aspects of Israel’s 1967 invasion of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria are not available under the Freedom of Information Act. Obtaining Ennes’s book is not easy: weeks passed before I located a bookstore willing to sell an “under-the-counter" copy.