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In a major conflict, if we don’t control the seas—specifically the Soviet Submarine force—and allow the movement of NATO shipping, we don’t deliver. And if we don’t deliver, we lose.
T.
he experience of two World Wars
that an adequately escorted convoy is slow merchant ships when
has
she
the safest
they
way
are
in
tric
t^
to move slow merchant ships wucu \,eleC danger of attack from torpedo-firing ie submarines. But do the premises which tflie? convoy system effective in the past still 10 Captain Roland Bowling has argued that. ^ safelV
“. . . the best way we can move TiV envif011' across the seas of the world m a hos ment is by closely escorted man-o-war 0 ^
and mercantile convoys. For, although sen . je o> weapons have changed, pr*
concentration
the basic pr of force is still applicable-
!For footnotes, please turn to page 54.
Vi
satisfy immediate lift requirements, including attrition. The alliance also possesses sufficient sealift capability to meet the resupply demands of a prolonged NATO war.3 However, the efficacy of NATO’s conventional deterrent is sensitive to the rapid buildup of U. S. forces and the early delivery of their military equipment. Large losses in military equipment could not be replaced quickly, and the effectiveness of NATO defenses would suffer accordingly. Therefore, the principal consideration is protection of sufficient shipping to move war-essential military equipment rapidly to Europe. Implicit in this policy is protection of shipping levels significantly lower than those of peacetime economic trade, but sufficient to satisfy war requirements.
, ever,
as
Captain W. J. Ruhe points out:
is evjijeVeri these tactics were highly effective, it f’tovijg111 t^lat such tactical use of present forces Cetita >CS acNuate protection for only a small per-
• . • ‘ the shipping which would be required
■ ’ *n a ’
>'shir
sh
see;
‘Pping,
the economics of concentrated force . . .
'-crri i ^■vuauunv.a ui v.
^hat( tL °Se t0 bankruptcy.”2
^‘ctate ^etl’ fbe economics of shipping protection ^tisiq t0 tactics against nuclear submarines and
suffipcimissiles?
^tates a l^nt merchant hulls controlled by the United Ns at . 'ts NATO allies will be available to U. S.
e 0utbreak of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war to
The principal threat to sealift resupply of NATO is a Soviet submarine force, composed primarily of nuclear-powered submarines, approximately one third of which have an antiship missile capability. It is unlikely that they would all be deployed simultaneously in the Atlantic. It is not, however, unreasonable to assume 65% of the submarines of the North, Baltic, and Black seas fleets deployed. Such a force could conduct an extended antishipping campaign in any of the North Atlantic sea-lanes of interest to NATO resupply. It is potentially capable of denying sea control to NATO naval forces.
NATO antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces immediately available to counter the submarine threat would consist of active ships in the North Atlantic area of interest. Only a limited number will be available, and a decision must be made as to how best to employ them to protect NATO merchant shipping. In shipping defense, the primary mission is to prevent merchant ships from being sunk or damaged. Satisfying this objective does not require sinking Soviet submarines, even though this is probably the best method in the long run. What matters is the success or failure of enemy submarines in sinking our ships. In other words, if 65% of the Soviet submarine force is deployed to interdict NATO shipping, and the Soviets fail to sink any ships, then even if no submarines are sunk, the primary mission of protecting ships has been achieved.
Allocation of forces involves a trade-off between the limited objective of protecting shipping and the broader objective of destroying submarines. The basis for this trade-off can be found in a comparison of the effectiveness of the three tactical ASW systems which can be employed to protect shipping—antisubmarine barrier, area search, and convoy screen.
To protect NATO shipping, the obvious choice for an antisubmarine barrier is across the Greenland-
Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. Designed to interdict Soviet submarines in transit to and from resupply ports and Atlantic operating areas, such a barrier could be composed of maritime patrol aircraft, nuclear- and conventionally-powered attack submarines, and state-of-the-art antisubmarine mines.
A GIUK barrier is a static system, and assuming Soviet submarines are predeployed, the barrier will have no immediate impact on submarine destruction or ship protection if it is not active prior to conflict. Because of its aggregate weapon systems effectiveness, the barrier will undoubtedly have the highest kill probability, and over the long term it is potentially the most efficient system for destroying submarines. However, the barrier cannot go to the submarines, and its effectiveness will be directly proportional to NATO’s ability to force Soviet submarines to transit the GIUK gap.
If Western Europe is the object of a surprise attack by Warsaw Pact nations, area search will be the only ASW tactic immediately available for going after submarines and protecting NATO shipping. In considering area search forces for shipping protection, two factors—the type of forces to use and the areas in which to search—must be determined. Given the size of the North Atlantic, there are only two kinds of areas worth searching: those in which a high concentration of submarines can be expected and those in which intelligence indicates submarines to be present. Concentrations of submarines can be expected in the shipping lanes in use and at choke points along their lines of resupply. Barriers are considered the more effective means of interdicting choke points, but area search forces could be used effectively to provide both direct and indirect support to merchant shipping. Methods for indicating where submarines are present are essentially limited to SOSUS (underwater surveillance system) probability areas, flaming datums (the spots where ships are known to have sunk), and sightings.
Area search forces will require speed to close contact areas rapidly, large sweep widths to enable rapid detection and localization, endurance for long on- station times, good sea-keeping ability, and effective flaming datum prosecution capability. No single ASW platform possesses all these characteristics; a combination of forces is required. An area search force composed of an ASW-configured carrier, patrol aircraft, and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) would satisfy this requirement. The use of surface escorts for their active sonar capability as well as enhanced carrier protection would be desirable. However, their inherent limitations in speed, endurance, and sea-keeping ability, as well as the
• ■ extend
numbers available, would limit their use in
area search missions. availa^e
Even though area search is immediately ^ } to counter the submarine threat, as a tactic over the low kill probability and is the least effective Ojes(.r0y long term. It is a reactive system designed ^jj^gpce submarines with the aid of hard site m and/or flaming datum information and is eS c0n-
useless without one or the other. Area sea jon tributes only a limited measure of indirect p to merchant shipping. only ot,e
Of the three systems, convoy screen is t*ie 0sUbdesigned to protect ships as opposed to sin ^ area marines. It has a higher probability of ki sy,ipS search, but contributes little initially, beca1 „ unes'
caught at sea on the first day of conflict
will be the
corted. In the long term, however, it 1S effective method for protecting ships. erCise The purpose of a convoy screen is to exe control over the region around the co A
sen
which an enemy submarine can launch an a^ ^ screen composed entirely of surface escorts vide a 50% probability of detection to 111 ^ the
torpedo attack range does nothing t0 C°1 unle5S missile-launching submarine. Surface esco ■ > the numbers are virtually unlimited, canpiernselveS' provide adequate convoy protection by r 1 jning Some mix of ASW forces is required. In ete ^ ^ctof the preferred mix of forces, the most sensit is the nature of the threat, and not necessa ^jth intensity; the screen must be capable of cop both torpedo- and missile-firing submarines- ^gj Submarines that avoid barriers and area a(iti' must pass through multiple layers of con ^-rllisC submarine defense to launch torpedo attac s^e all missile submarines do not have to Perjec0p- layers, and nuclear submarines can appr°aC ^ ft0111 voy from any direction. However, approa^e the side or rear require better surveillance, eed5> time, require larger patrol areas and hig1 and hence are noisier. With no surveillance^^ that tion and with patrol speeds equal to or less ^ coa' of the convoy, enemy approaches would tet^.£nter f°r centrate more toward the van. This led the ^ tbe Naval Analyses to conclude that if the bazar act1’ attacking submarine is about equal on any ‘ r she will prefer to approach from the fr°ntt0w^ fore, although defenses should be weig ed to
the frontal approach, they should also be ^aI-irie 0(1 give approximately equal hazard to the su
(O'
any approach.
an'1'
To be effective against long- and short ra ^Q^oj ship missile attack as well as torpedo atta^J^e^ screening forces should consist of long *
I Mar<=n
wing Patrol aircraft (VPs), carrier-based fixed- SuPport ^ a‘rcraft (VSs) and ASW helicopters, direct esc°rts nUt^ear attack submarines (SSNs), and surface ten, he|SOrne W't^1 airborne multipurpose sys-
s'8iecj t'C°^ters (LAMpS). The screen would be de- t0rPedQtO pr°v'^e ASW defense in depth from close-in Cruiseattack ranges out to submarine-launched (■'rate ^^s^e'firing ranges. VP/VS aircraft would op- intenj ^ p??ad of the convoy in the direction of PatfQiiej rnovement. The length of the front to be whatever W°U^ be a function of convoy width and f Siting lines of approach (LLOA) are
Two HPPr°priate- 1 0 direct-;
ayer of
support SSNs would provide the next
Sufficjen^^ defense. They would be assigned areas arkl [j. . T far enough ahead of the surface escorts terferetice the VP/vs barrier to preclude mutual in- fhe yp 6 tttistaken identity. An added benefit of CaPabiljtSSN ^nes defense is that they have the Marine P C° detect, localize, and prosecute a sub- ti°n of !‘thout compromising the presence or posi-
he|C°"VOy'
fear ditw 1CoPters and VSs would provide side and
agai
and
nst SS-n.
Pping
high-:
sonar and sonobuoy screens to guard speed nuclear submarine penetrations
lAMps u attack. Depending on the number of S°n°b e 0s available, they could be used in v; 7eens- as pouncers, or could be main- 'v0it]d b,0 Tor threat response. Surface escorts c°nv0y pVl<ae the closest-in layer of defense for the % cep t ^Ure ^ illustrates this convoy protection
direct c °nT*gured cVs would be assigned to provide ^0se. Tl,nV°^ support and antiship missile de- (be sea I £lr Secondary mission would be area ASW in et)uirem CS °T communication. Should amphibious auit , .ts Permit, platforms such as amphibious SuPpOrtS lpS COuid be configured for convoy ASW f'°n Or r°Perat*0ns> thereby either enhancing protec- leving a portion of the CV requirement. systetTlrces used this way, the aggregate weapon ffeCtlVeect'veness of the barrier makes it the most by cor,vrr'ethod for destroying submarines, followed ro°y ^creen and area search. Each system is tail- lrtlPaCt ' erent mission, and each has a different cbar,tr^e (°ng- and short-run aspects of mer- PoriVoy S'P Protection and submarine destruction. LlerchantCreen *S on*T system designed to protect the^ ,S.^’PS directly. Even though it does not ^Ore Sup *gbest kill probability, in the long term lf|g tl,anr?“r'nes 'will be destroyed by convoy screen- ^atingj T any other means simply because sub- 3r®as wkhave to challenge screening forces in re the defenders exercise sea control.
ass;
A specific number of screening units can exercise sea control only over a given sized area, and there will inevitably be merchant losses. However, if a trade-off must be made in allocating ASW forces for a shipping protection mission, the decision should be made in favor of convoy screening. But do equally effective alternatives exist for the protection of shipping that would not involve such a trade-off, would require fewer ASW forces, and would sustain higher shipping levels?
Independent shipping alternatives. One of the basic principles of shipping defense that emerged from World War II is that merchants steaming independently suffer heavy losses. From September 1939 until the defeat of the German U-boats in May 1943, 72% of the merchant ships sunk by U-boats were independents.5 Admittedly, several classes of today’s merchant ships are capable of extended transits at sustained speeds double those of World War II, but this does not necessarily afford an added degree of protection. Speed alone no longer enjoys the tactical advantage it once did against the submarine. According to Project Sea Express, Soviet submarines would take such a toll of even the fastest independent merchant ships that the United States must count on convoying seaborne reinforcements to Europe once hostilities commence. Some degree of added protection is required.
%
March 1980
51
Assuming sea lines of communication completely within VP range, is it feasible to sail one or several high-speed merchant ships behind a continuous moving sonobuoy barrier, thereby achieving a degree of direct protection? Several factors must be considered in addressing this alternative. First, is devoting any portion of a limited number of VP aircraft to the protection of a few ships the most beneficial method of employment? Probably not, because they would be better utilized as an added layer of defense in convoy protection, in antisubmarine barriers, and in SOSUS contact and flaming datum prosecution. Second, if Soviet submarines are deployed in a barrier across the sea lines of communication, the submarine has the tactical advantage until she is detected. More than likely, the submarine will be loitering or proceeding slowly and quietly in her patrol area, thereby producing a low figure of merit and keeping her detectability by passive means at a very low level. In addition, there may not be any SOSUS information to assist the VP. Because of the complex interaction of the many factors affecting the weapon system effectiveness of patrol aircraft, a detection may never occur.
Third, assuming Soviet SSNs achieve weapon system effectiveness at least equal to that of the Sturgeon (SSN- 637)-class SSNs, it is estimated that their probability of kill approaches unity against high-speed merchant ships. Adding a VP barrier alone seems to afford little added protection to the high-speed merchant.
Undoubtedly, the SSN is the best ASW weapon system in the inventory. A paucity of surface escorts has given rise to the suggestion of the SSN as an escort for a single high-speed merchant ship or small group of ships. To propose such an alternative demonstrates an appreciable lack of understanding of the conditional probabilities that comprise SSN weapon system effectiveness, the sonar equation, and the nature of the ocean’s acoustic environment.
With a speed of advance of 25 knots, the SSN could conceivably run at 25 knots, sprint four hours at 27 knots and listen for one half hour at 10 knots, or sprint four hours at 29 knots and listen one hour at 10 knots. In the first instance, the submarine is noise limited 100% of the time, in the second 88%, and in the third 80%. In effect, the SSN becomes no more than a noisy, high-speed transiting submarine, with a secure detection capability against a barrier submarine estimated to be less than .01, a very high probability of being killed, and a weapon system vulnerability of about .99. As the speed of advance is decreased, sprint time is decreased and listen time is increased. Nevertheless, as in the VP case, this does not seem a worthwhile trade-off for other, potentially more beneficial methods, in which a limited number
ppctio^
of SSNs could be employed to enhance the Pr of larger numbers of merchant ships.
Independent transit with indirect protection ^ area ASW forces is often discussed as an ec0^{Ct
alternative to convoying. An open ocean
ASW
ati°n of
could be employed in the sea lines of common^ or in the vicinity of the points of departure an ■■
val of merchant ships, thereby providing
degree
d to
un-
sink submarines, not to protect ships, and is 3j suitable alternative to convoying. The inerric ^ allocating forces for area ASW was well demons ^ during World War II. By the time the U-boa<^^ defeated, 27% had been destroyed by area AS^ ^ as compared with 65% by convoy forces.
1942, Admiral Ernest J. King, the Chief o ^ ^
Operations, had come to the conclusion ASW forces were “futile,” and that only a o
that
onvoy
sf'
tern offered any hope of grappling decisively
submarines. *
r>v°y 1
The misconception still persists that the c°n^ ^ a purely defensive ASW tactic. It is not. B>' ^ nature it is inherently offensive, forcing 0ftl>e marine to engage on escort terms in that Parr^erCjSe ocean over which convoy supporting forces £j,e sea control. Based on World War II experien^ convoy not only provides the best means o 1 ing shipping, but also the best tactic for c e ^ submarines. The pertinent question is whether
this is still true.
1974,
vef'
to-
Project Sea Express, completed in July
ified the results of World War II experience ^
eral &
for 0eL
day’s technology. The study considered seve
in
force allocations and shipping alternatives ^ ... chant ship protection. The study concluded r ^ terms of aggregate weapon system effectiven search forces are less effective than convoy s enforces and that merchant ship loss rate using voy system is significantly lower than the r®te independent transit with indirect support r ^ ASW forces. The study confirmed that with * ^ f0r number of ASW units, convoying is more er e protecting shipping and destroying submari £[fly area search. Of the independent shipping slaves, none is as effective as convoying. ^otqU ploy a convoy strategy for the sake of econom escorts is to invite bankruptcy through *!plac^ tion of war-essential shipping and irr 1 i5 equipment. In terms of trade-offs, concentra^ ^ the most effective use of limited numbers
units to protect shipping. The question remain
ing
this: Given a decision to employ a convoy str‘l^eCtive the close convoy/close screen still the most method?
^OtlVOy ah .
v°y strate • ert1attves- Essentially, there are two con- across tl ^ICS dlat COukl be used in seaborne resupply
the A I ■
Marine i C ant‘c during a period of intense sub- shippin , eat continuous shipping and pulsed Stea,flirf ^ontinuous shipping involves frequent Pulsed d!- °^. ^odd War II-sized convoys, and arge
very ja 'Pping involves infrequent steamings of 'V°UM alX C°nV°^[1] continuous shipping, there
'v'th hi,i ships at sea for the Soviets to attack;
PUI , ‘P0 ‘u* UK uuvicia iu aiiav-h,
.C shipping, there would be periods be- Ses during which the submarines would
bsses bytratC«y oh pulsed shipping could reduce COtltinuoijaS rnuc^1 as 50% over those sustained in Hnerch*5 S^’PP*nS and could result in a lower ratio 's, howev^ ^osses to submarine losses.[2] There Msec] s! er’• 3 th'reshold convoy size below which h'c SoVje^ln® offers no particular advantage. With ^rcshoitj r t'lreatthat NATO could expect, the ^00 ship, ^se s'ze would range from about 300 to shif>pi X)ve this size, the effectiveness of pulsed
increase raPidly-
ar8Urnent, tp,s s°unds promising, there are several c°nventj^S aSainst pulsed shipping. A credible NATO (^e fJrii deterrent relies heavily on the ability of bvStatCS to deliver military equipment ' ’ a warning or not, it
tty,
een
nave
tial
,0ad
Pin
Suest
y sea. Whether we had
l°nabl
tin.
stand 1 C wdetder time would permit the ini' and' °Wri 0p shipping required to assemble, lg strat ,C|>nv°y a 500-ship pulse. If a pulsed ship- Cgy’s to be considered seriously, then solu-
r»s
°ading XnraCt'Ca* problems such as port congestion, aVailabiljtn delivefy rates, warehouse capacity, ship y> and command and control must be iden-
tifii
ted
Th/'!? ‘"“Pkmented.
list'd sbjtTlder °h ships required for an effective number r‘Pping strategy, as compared with the
the
pulses; from saturation of the capacity of on-station submarines with the first pulse resulting in fewer encounters and lower exposure time; and from reduction of the threat against latter pulses caused by submarine attrition from first pulse encounters.[3]
Long-term improvements in loss rate are made at the expense of those ships sent in the first pulse. With 2,000 steamings in four pulses of 500 ships each, it is probable that more ships will be sunk in the first pulse than are required to satisfy short-term military equipment lift requirements. Although a pulsed shipping strategy does have long-run benefits, it is unacceptable in view of front load requirements.
Pulsing, however, does have some benefit when used in continuous shipping of multiple convoys across the Atlantic. Convoys could be pulsed to Europe in alternating groups of two and three. Multiple convoys would transit the Atlantic together, separated on an axis perpendicular to their direction of movement. This would reduce the number of convoys that can be attacked by each submarine and, assuming appropriate lateral spacing, would enable a single carrier to protect several convoys simultaneously. Close and expanded convoys can both be considered. The use of convoys of 35-50 ships with close screens and tight spacing is based on the principles of concentration of force and defense in depth. Soviet submarines will encounter the highest concentration of NATO ASW forces around the ships they are trying to attack.
One drawback of close convoy formations is the “haven effect” provided to submarines once inside the convoy screen. The acoustic interference caused by the close proximity and high background noise of merchant ships hampers effective prosecution of submarines under a close convoy. Escort maneuvers are also restricted by the ships they are trying to protect. Thus, after penetrating the screen, enemy submarines have a “haven” from which to launch attacks. Bunching of high-value ships provides long- range identification, thereby enhancing the opportunity for coordinated attack as well as long-range missile attack. If escorts use passive acoustic measures, the noise of many ships traveling together interferes with, and may preclude, passive detection of the submarine. If active acoustic measures are used, massed shipping and active sonar provide ready identification to ranges well over the horizon, as well as increased mutual interference.
In favor of tight formations is the fact that for a given number of ships, the tighter the spacing, the smaller the area over which ASW forces must exercise sea control. There is also the possibility that incoming conventional missiles may cluster on one or two
, s C^U'red to satisfy short-term lift require-
nts
tjuirgd an°ther argument. Fewer ships are
S,1°tt te ° Satisfy military lift demand in the critical NSe sj^ than are needed to satisfy the minimum > attaLu,CeSSary to reduce ship loss rate below 'V°’dd with 50-ship close convoys. Thus, it
fe,
*h,
the
aPPear u ----------------------- --------- “ 1 ------ ’
ould taL. r that the short-term lift requirement
Precedence over the long-term improve-
nt
B,
%
take *n loss
rate.
e °f the critical nature of short-term re-
lretn,
8Urnen(.tS ‘n a NATO resupply operation, a third ^an be made. Pulsed shipping is convoying til an . Scale. The reduction in loss rate results ,e threat;lnit’a^ merchant standdown during which t|()ri; froIs teduced by barrier and area search attri-
at,
^ a granjan made. Pulsed shipping is convoying °m anSr!,'“ ” ' ’ ’
lfeat ffQ
l),1Ser .'0vver convoy exposure times caused by a a standdown and longer times between
53
the convoy. Based on weapon system e
tea15
and mission effectiveness of the tactical AS^ , 0ffs
. . A ft*ziOc
considered, ASW force allocations ana
ifO-
then corn!T*W'ing
t
,•------- A ® • A ®
/ \ targets, preventing the destruction of many. Tight formations can also provide an added degree of close- in antiship missile defense. However, the high speed of the missile and short warning time available would prevent little more than last-ditch self defense. Hence, with the longer submarine attack ranges available, tight convoy formations will more than likely not produce the lethal prosecution for which they are designed. And what if the opposition elects to escalate to tactical nuclear warfare at sea? The broad answer is that some degree of dispersion is required, but in the form of similarly sized groups with expanded ship spacings that retain both an ASW and antiship missile defense capability.
To adopt a fully dispersed formation is to invite attack and destruction on a piecemeal basis by spreading a convoy so far apart that merchant ships are essentially independent and ASW forces assume a reactive area role rather than one of convoy escort. In expanded formations, ships can be separated by several miles. This reduces propulsion noise inside the convoy, enhances escort detection probability, reduces the “haven effect,” and gives ASW forces enough room to operate. According to Project Sea Express, submarines would be limited to about two attacks if they penetrate an expanded convoy.[4][5] [6] [7] 5 [8] [9] [10] 9 10 [11]
A hexagonal lattice expanded convoy formation is shown in Figure 2. Surface escorts are interspersed inside the convoy; along with available helicopters, they prosecute close-in sonar detections and flaming datums. The VP/VS and SSN lines of defense in the van are degraded somewhat, compared with those of
the close convoy, because of the longer Pj^wever, resulting from the expanded convoy front. ^ Jc- improved sensors should provide good PerleneratioO fense, especially against first and second gen Soviet nuclear submarines. , jjjfary
Sealift is essential for the rapid buildup 0 equipment and forces necessary to support ^juC. war. Protection of merchant shipping involves^ ^ ing to a minimum the area of ocean that controlled, increasing to a maximum the area^^f coverage, and exercising sea control in c^£^c[jyet>eSS
- • to P
should be made in favor of convoy screening ^ ^
tect NATO shipping. Effective convoy pr0teCt^, ^ be achieved only by concentrating a the'r
forces; by positioning them commensurate w0|
capabilities and limitations; by taking a va ^ the synergistic effects of complementary A ^ose in and platforms; and by designing an ASW depth that produces the highest detection pr for the conditions at hand.
Commander Mellin was Navy in 1964 after being gradua ^ t|i orado College at Colorado Spring* (t)P served shipboard tours in the US -aide
Whippoorwill (MSC-20 • ^ ^ 0
—————— tours as an advisor in South Vietnam,
fice of the Chief of Naval Operations, and in the ®utf tjng if0" Personnel, he attended the Naval War College, gr® serve‘^ the college of command and staff in 1976. He t ^4). C0'" executive officer in the USS Lamoure County (LST-^ £0[rlman‘1 mander Mellin is now flag secretary on the star Amphibious Group Two, at Norfolk.
[1]P. W. Gretton, "Why Don’t We Learn From History- College, August 1961, p. 15.
[2]Center for Naval Analysis, An Analysis of Pulsed Shipping a t0o, ^
ping Policies for a Period of Intense Submarine Threat (V) ^
28 June 1973), p. ix (unclassified section of secret docum
[3]Ibid. p. 63-74.
‘Captain Roland A. Bowling, USN, “Escorted Convoys Them?” Shipmate, November 1973, pp. 26-29- [ine: R|C
[5]Captain W. J. Ruhe, USN (Ret.), "The Nuclear Subma
High," Proceedings, February 1975, p. 58- __ ffi1
[6]U. S. Office of Naval Operations, Navy Accelerated Sealift pf-
Sea Express (LI) Washington: 25 July 1974), pt- C P- 1 p. 5 (unclassified section of secret document). Co1’’"' i
[7]Center for Naval Analysis, Force Mix/Convoy Study Adv^
tee, Memorandum (CNA) 00687-75, 7 May 1975, Pi SlP
section of secret document).
^Project Sea Express, pt. II, p. 391-
[9]Gretton, p. 15.
'Ibid. p. 14.
[11] Project Sea Express, p. 63.