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As the 1960s drew to a close, artists were envisioning sprawling containership facilities and containers modified to house personnel and equipment. From such ideas emerged the Arapaho concept—the use of Navy helicopters on board containerships to conduct ASW operations. Arapaho, then, may well be a good new idea whose time has come.
some
up over the years in attempts to provide 3”‘”aSed air cal solution to this growing problem. Land advocates have proposed vast armadas of af,d
range, extra-long endurance aircraft to esta maintain oceanic control. But far at sea, this ply impractical. The transit times are too 0 ^ times on station too short, the effectiveness weaponry too limited, and the overall cost
too
hign
can
be
The U. S. Navy planner of the 1980s will have an abundance of potential enemies to worry about, from oil pirates through international troublemakers to global opportunists. Tailoring a Navy adequate to face down any of these adversaries is difficult. Fashioning one to handle all of them, perhaps simultaneously, is well nigh impossible. Good new ideas are sorely needed.
The harried planner will find a common thread among all his concerns: the need for forces capable of that most basic naval mission, control of the seas. The primary reason for this universal sea control requirement lies in logistics—in the transport of vast tonnages of weapons, ordnance, fuel, food, and equipment, to say nothing of troops and their immediate combat requirements. Transportation requirements in almost any conflict situation demand that ships be used. Air transport can serve only 1-3% of the tonnage requirements, and then only when a vast, efficient, and friendly land-air base complex exists close to the combat arena.
The ships that will have to be used are the merchant ships of the United States and its allied nations. They will be needed in large numbers with effective military defense during their long transits. A number of “good new ideas” have been conjured
Some submariners believe that the problem ^ solved wholly within the murky underseas Unfortunately, this won’t work sen'
nuclear-powered submarines are too slow, c0nttol
sors are too fuzzy, and their command an^ ^on£y, are too haphazard. And they cost a lot 0 jarge take a long time to build, and requite number of well trained, highly skilled ct most of whom will have to be on active ^ e when the fight begins. Sea-based air a v ^
build
and <
of
equally parochial. Their answer is to duu“’ ^ds enough aircraft carriers, load them with hun antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, and se gut out to mother the merchant ships across budgets- in the pragmatic world of today s nava ^ sea' there simply are not enough aircraft carr'er(.jie m°st based ASW aircraft even to begin to matct
of
d to
to
conservative estimates of requirements, r jj^te1 so aircraft carriers we do have will be e e of the barriers, to the areas of major sea ba _capable supporting land warfare. Other large Al' _ and
ships, such as amphibious assault ships ^tS fof LHAs), will be filling Marine Corps requite01^.^ eS” support of amphibious landings. The few * ^afd corts which can be assigned to convoys wi ^ pressed to fill their tiny flight decks wit^ g^rskf helicopters now designed for this task r
SH-60B Seahawks. , nut tact>ca!
Obviously, ways must be found to P ^ and ASW aircraft to sea without building, 0180. TW° equipping new fleets of large aircraft car ^ First recent trends offer the potential to do just
ertie Merchant ships as bases for aircraft in war- s>ld ^ £er>cies.* A number of regular containers ^airiten reconstructed as berthing compartments, tariks * Ce workshops, washrooms, fuel and water Miners111155 ^ads> and supply storerooms. The con- Vetitilat^°U^ Imked with electrical power lines, la^er< n’ and communications, with doors and
fe -
“ties. I'ol.- r*------------------ 6--------------- &---------- r r
taslc> js r . lng helicopters to sea, while not an easy
The s 3*r^ stra‘ghrforward one.
World’s eC°n<^ tfend is the changing nature of the ^ercent rn°^ern merchant fleet. An increasingly large are Hot ^.5 today’s and tomorrow’s merchant ships Port facj|C .'suPP°rting; they must have established ^aV'n£ (jtleS t0 *oad and off-load cargo. Instead of c, CC^S cluttered with booms, winches, lr>0rerean COr>tainer carriers, each with 1,000 or °r 8 by g'^1®U^ar steel containers (8 by 8 by 40 feet Mds an<j ^ feet), locked into rails in below deck ^s'8ned p *n stacks topside. Most of the ships are fee ue0r cruising at 22-25 knots, and a few of tair»ersh' °nes Can make 33 knots. When these con- eTed navajS ^'rst began to appear in quantity, sharp- °f flat-t * aviat°rs took one look at the long expanse ^e thejv.^^^ COntainers and thought, “Aha! We can And aS a'fcraft carriers!”
^alyzedney can, up to a point. The idea has been Sah0 extensively over the past decade. The c°nveri. Concept proposes the use of temporarily
tjfjj Ced niPfA______________ , • . r ■ r ■
‘at
containers would provide a flight deck, and a hangar of sorts can be arranged using stacks of containers as bulkheads and cross-braces to support a light overhead cover. The type and number of aircraft for any particular Arapaho plan are critical. Until now, their selection usually marked the point where the Arapaho logic began to fall apart.
What kinds of airplanes are to be used? How are they to launch and recover? How are they to be supported? What kinds of missions will they carry out? Can they really be militarily effective on these missions? What kinds of weapons and sensors will they carry? How are they to be controlled on these missions? Who will be doing the flying, maintenance, testing, and ordnance loading? What will be the level of training of the personnel? Who will be in charge? What kinds of safety rules are needed? What kinds of communications are needed within the ship and within the convoy? What procedures are to be
followed when a plane can’t fly, or when one crashes on a landing or in flight? These questions, and many more of a similar vein, encompass what is generally referred to as an Operational Concept of Employment (OPSCON). Thus far, in more than ten years of studies, a realistic Arapaho OPSCON has yet to emerge.
The most common failing has been extravagantly optimistic expectations for operating and supporting the aircraft. Some plans have attempted to staff a ship with a dozen or more aircraft, paying little heed to the needed maintenance support, personnel, logistics, aviation fuel, and so forth. Other plans have blithely assumed that a merchant ship can turn into a handy wind and that pilots can fly airplanes off the flimsy flight deck just as the “big boys” on board the carriers do it. Few plans have recognized what a heavy roller the loaded containership can become and how difficult it can be to operate aircraft in heavy seas. Also, most plans have assumed that some magical system will be developed to enable the safe recovery of aircraft at night or in the middle of a fog bank.
Any OPSCON for Arapaho has to be simple. Everything about the system must be straightforward, sturdy, and dependable. The equipment, aside from the aircraft, has to be simple enough to sit idly in a container for 10-20 years, getting minimum upkeep and a few isolated exercises along the way. Yet it must be capable of being put into immediate and nearly continuous useful service at a moment’s notice. The containers must fit into whatever ship happens to be the one in port at the time the hostilities begin. The personnel and the aircraft have to be mustered in a matter of hours, and the entire team has to be put into operational service within a day or two.
The successful Arapaho OPSCON is also highly dependent on the mission. If the task is to fend off submarines, one set of constraints, practicalities, and equipment design is needed. If the task is to transport military gear to a distant beachhead for combat there, but not en route, wholly different constraints apply. The role of the selected merchant ship is equally vital to a successful Arapaho OPSCON. If the ship is to be assimilated into the naval service for the duration of the war, long-term investments in the form of modifications and alterations become practical. But if the ship is merely “appropriated” for that single transit, all the military equipment must be portable, and it must be the “last on and first off” in loadings. The load-out plan must account for the heavy military containers’ topside location, for the “flight deck” and hangar cover installation, for
dnance
bringing the personnel, aircraft, fuel, and or aboard, and the rest of the problems.
The U. S. Navy has shown only a rno1 interest in Arapaho. It’s only a paper program ^ attempt to make it real is bound to divert fun ^ ,
carriers, F-18s, Aegis cruisers, and all those ^ nrnpram<i for “real” chins and “real aifCr
dicum
of
Any
programs for “real” ships and “real ^e.
have far higher priorities. Besides, it s a ‘ ^offy serve program, so why not just let the reserves about it? tjons.
Reservists view Arapaho with mixed ern° ^ Some see it as a refuge for their fast JwinJl.nS th# dipping sonar helicopter squadrons. Others we should put whole families of modularize ^ ^
coH'
avail ternJ1 est
sive and defensive systems into merchant n ^ snuggled into the tracks normally used for C1 _ tainers, and have an “instant” surface warsh»r^rflal able for emergency use. But despite these
differences, the Naval Reserve is Arapaho s ^ booster. After all, reservists will be mannl^|ien a emergency call-up billets such as Arapaho ^ crisis arises. They will have to make it somehow. . rnuSt
The Royal Navy is very interested, because i^ ^j[S provide convoy protection with only a fragm veSted once-majestic fleet. The British also have a jjug interest in the vertical/short takeoff and a^jg!r (V/STOL) Harrier, the Western world s on Y performance aircraft of this type and a potenti* didate in some Arapaho ideas. . ifl'
The Maritime Administration (MarAd) *s v terested, because it will have to man:J^ansvi'ef peacetime subsidy program for Arapaho am ^ |t to Congress for its justification and effectiven^j 0f will also have to decide who will be in com ^
the Arapaho merchant ships and who says ^c
airplanes fly or don’t fly. It will have to v,rl legislation, mollify the shipowners and 1 j^y, shipmasters, and tend to most of the nitty unrewarding details. e it *s
The shipowners are acutely interested, t>eca^flt to their ships that will be affected. Shipowners ^ ^ know what modifications will be made; who ^ ajr-
rviiuw wuai iiiuciiiicaiiuiia win u * .
for them; how much cargo will be displace*-
craft and support; what kinds of insurance
cove
and ho*
and liability are involved; where, when, ai*u “ j Navy would take over and embark crews,
hundred other questions.
wh"
:ch
The U. S. Marine Corps has an interest ^j|. arises from its longstanding concern over t ^ ability of enough U. S. Navy ships to transp0ji0feS- support amphibious operations far from V- ^ The Marine Corps concept, much further ■IvefS'00 than the Navy’s, calls for near-wholesale c
19
i 0
elected
Compiernerc^ant ships into combat cargo carriers
Air Force, and a few in the Royal Navy and the Spanish Navy. Two American Harriers have been extensively modified into YAV-8B form by McDonnell Douglas and are undergoing testing. The Marine Corps wants the Navy to continue this program into a respectable production line. It likes the markedly improved performance of the YAV-8B over the AV-8A it now flies. The Navy is very reluctant to fund the new AV-8B program, arguing that the modified version is purely for Marine Corps use and that basing it on board small warships in naval roles is impractical. Regardless of the outcome of this interservee squabble, the number of high performance V/STOL aircraft which can be predicted as available before the year 2000 is miniscule. It is unrealistic to believe that these aircraft would be assigned to Arapaho when a dozen other uses with higher priorities would exist for them. For at least the next 20 years, then, Arapaho planners should be content with rotary wing aircraft and forget about V/STOL.
What can be done with helicopters for Arapaho?
Quite a lot. Rotary wing aircraft are flying off thousands of oil rig platforms, jury-rigged clearings in bush country, naval destroyers, frigates, and small amphibious force ships every day. Flying them off 30,000-ton containerships should present only minor problems. Why not build a lot more ASW helicopters for the Navy and allocate them to Arapaho?
The problem is money. Naval ASW helicopters such as the SH-60B Seahawk are not cheap. Because of cost, the U. S. Navy will be purchasing Seahawks at a pretty slow pace, implying that scores of frigates and destroyers will be steaming around with empty or half empty helo facilities for a long time. If the Navy can’t buy enough helos for its first-line fighting ships, it certainly won’t purchase any for Arapaho concepts.
iete :yators,
with helicopters, Harriers, troops, CL0,,ap3eTdUlari2ed Carg° containers, and even a (he Harrj^ ^durnP ramp to enhance performance of
^°nSress
flaring resP°nds to pressure by shipowners, Na:. 'USt I;kes'
elei
ently jjsta.r^d> and reserves, and sometimes appar- NaVy. ^ kkes to needle the conservative regular any M congtessional leaders, however, view al’PVVy'merchant mafine relationship with ation 3nd str‘ve valiantly to sponsor closer cooper-
There ar
do,J(i andr<i 0t^er irritating influences which further
tl0nal antiC°n^use Arapaho development. Some emo-
trteans tcarrier advocates see Arapaho as a devious
«rams anj ar<a rheir ends. “Cancel the carrier pro-
Catg° sj^. ^ake the damn naval prima donnas fly off
>?ue’'4hey might say. Then there is the
Certairi a^Ue' d'ke Navy’s carrier sailors are very un-
^tute r\<?Ut ^Tol. Some see it as the wave of the ■ * uth— ^
Off
ers feel that V/STOL is just another costly
ttaiclc th — ---------------------------- ’---------- ----- ~------- '
in ^ at combat-credible V/STOL is still way perfUtUre’ and that developing vertical-rising, ^tefui °rrnance naval aircraft is extravagantly nately, hav^^C novv' V/STOL and Arapaho, unfortu- This isa^ b[come almost synonymous.
^akes v,, t0° ^ad. In its most simple form, Arapaho t|ng niani g°°d sense. It provides a means for get- / rn°re aircraft to sea in times of emer- eIend theen they wdl be critically needed to help 0r>Cept CUrrently defenseless merchant ships. The e*travagantS aSr°und when it is “gussied up” with ex and impractical appurtenances.
11 the ent,Tlple is V/STOL. The total V/STOL resources sub‘re Western world today consist of less than *arine £ lc> limited performance Harriers in the rPs> about the same number in the Royal
the
Last
inefl’
;th£
are the conversions of containers to house the spare parts, the weapons and fuel, etc. ^ t0- overall plan to make the whole project gether. j^p, ^
The weapon system has to be simple, csllb- easily supported but useful against mo ^pet-
marines. If the idea encompasses a ^anC^’requite” modern capability to support all the AS^ the
commercial helo world. For several years, a revolution of sorts has been under way in this world. Its origins can be traced to the Vietnam War, when many helo pilots were trained by the services, and also to the growing marketplace represented by the new offshore oil rigs. Helicopters are far more efficient than ships, boats, or barges for providing the light duty, high priority services needed on board the isolated platforms. Then, too, as the airline world has turned more toward huge, wide-body transports and distant, confused, and cluttered airports, business executives have been turning more toward corporate helos to whisk their efficiency experts between outlying plants and downtown headquarters. The construction world has also discovered that the new helos can hoist very respectable loads to rooftops, remote mountain sites, or bridge towers. Nor have the military applications of the helicopter abated. Most of the world’s armies depend on helos for troop lift, close air support, communications, and surface-to-air missile hunting, as well as for traditional medical evacuation and high priority logistic chores. Despite reductions in the numbers of military helicopters, their application to military tasks has been constantly widening.
The helicopter world appears to have passed the crossover point between military and commercial development. By the mid-1980s, some 15,000 or more commercial helicopters are projected to be operating within the United States and Canada alone. In 1977, the actual number was 7,160. A flood of new designs of specialized helos is expected in coming years, each more dependable, more efficient, more useful, and more economical than its predecessor.
A realistic OPSCON for Arapaho can now begin to appear possible. If the U. S. Navy can earmark some of these helicopters for call-up in an emergency, if the reservist weekend warriors will man the units, and if MarAd and the shipowners will volunteer a number of containerships in each convoy for em-
• • . nIif lU1’
dients. First is the weapon system to p* jje*r helicopter to make it militarily useful in
ments for a single ship on independent tran ^ ^ system will be neither simple nor cheap an wholly unsupportable. But if the assumptm11 ^c0tte<* that convoys in the 1980s and 1990s will e ^ (pp- by Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)- and a>f"
963)-class ships, each equipped with a one °r borne, multipurpose system (LAMPS) team ^ cep- two SH-60B Seahawks and a good ASW comm^ ter, why can’t the commercial helo weapon ^ be designed only to directly support the LA in some way? Even if the commercial he 0 more than carry a torpedo and follow c si?" releasing the torpedo on command, it is ‘lc q( tbc nificantly to the overall ASW team effort• 0
commercial helo could carry a few blac £tl tl>e radio gear and station itself halfway t>et .nforrnil, SH-60B and the ship to act as a relay for r ie^jay af|1 tion link. Or it could carry other radio c0a navigational pods up to 10,000 feet above ^e«sW voy, thereby providing an antenna-* ^v* through which the convoy can communit^j frel°s gate, or be dispersed. Many new commer ^ yjjgl1' include good radar and full instrumef^ capabilities, both of which could be usefu ^(o\ search missions. The helos could ea^rt of sonobuoys, again on command from the es ^$ SH-60B, and they might even be made cap*1 ^ b1*c' rying relay equipment for sonobuoy monito
/ Mar<
cli
19'
e°
at the
helo sewS‘P’S command center. If the commercial in (Ji-q, Cted Were large enough, it might be useful of ar|j ln8 ar*d recovering distant ASW arrays ahead But °n C^e ^anbs °f the convoy.
Like the°W t'le *deas begin to become too fanciful. cannot ^airP^ane and the ship, the weapon system radios e. CornpIex. Its essential ingredients are rac]ar ,lnstrurnent flight capability, a good little boxes Some adaptability to carry pods, black Most 'j °n°bu°ys, and perhaps a night vision device. 'Mrem b°rtant of all, however, is the absolute
, crr>ent t' z-lamps.
re-
^UTement , all> I1UWCVCI, O L11C 4U5U1UIC
(he U]udsnat tbe systems be easily integrated into • It could be termed a “LAMPS Jr.” Even as the system won’t be cheap, but it would 0ne °L only two major investment costs for
tepte:
Junior
reali:
Th,
sent
Stic
At
Pred
tin;
Pres,
other
Arapaho OPSCON
ent.
tctio
ns
mvestment, of course, is the containers.
only a few dozen of them exist. Although
jr 8:nt of foU;
vary widely, supporting an Arapaho con-
to six commercial helos with LAMPS >0newould require about 40 to 50 containers. S on C,F" ^ a* cost and budget game from Lye ^ or each convoy, we might want three to Suppo ° COndn8ents’ or 120 to 250 containers.
sVsten
so
me ! 2' m to 20 simultaneous deployments, L.200 to
each.
’10°.ooo
SBfead
5,000 containers, at perhaps would be needed. The price tag,
^ 12q many years of procurement, could be
t\V|
$500
million, or roughly the cost of be-
ee
The e*fibt merchant ships.
S1gnificant requirement is the plan to Prep ■ Work- The reserves are the key. A few of ^ A g00jlnary steps needed would be a start:
^Uld Survey of the commercial helicopter world ^Ost ijfC(jrta'n exactly which types of aircraft are aJeqUat | I7 to be available in large numbers, i^'ch a<jaS*2ed and configured, and amenable to ^ select ?ta,t*°n' Perhaps two or three types could
th,
-■jab)^’ but tbat might complicate things. One S'76 Of .i y en°ugh. A guess now would be either the
is
Probably
> <;Bdl 222 ■ a,10uai nfeded *s a good scheme for providing some
Elected u SkJy t0 the commercial operators of the
Sllttetider VC0Pters> in return for their agreement to
^ititajpj U ^ °Perational helos on demand and to
'Vtapons°me military adaptability features for easy
^ A gJ*tn installation.
Xld . Pursonnel forecast of forthcoming decades ''’ill h.„, 'nrate how many Naval Reserve helo pilots
technician/operator group to work with the Naval Air Systems Command and contractors in search of the best design for the LAMPS Jr. weapon system.
^ At this point, a full scale reserve staff study would be required to estimate where and how the containers should be stored, periodically tested, and updated, where and how the weapons systems should be located, and where and how they should be installed. The eventual plan would probably call for outright purchase of a few civilian helos to be used in reserve drills and exercises.
^ With a reasonable plan in hand, a joint commitment could be made by the Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary of Defense, MarAd, and the shipowners to a sensible long-range Arapaho program. With such a commitment, Congress’s blessing (and funding) could be sought, the British and other allies approached, etc.
Beyond these initial steps lie many further tasks. These include the containers’ design and construction, the evaluations, the testing and specification criteria, the upkeep of the LAMPS Jr. systems, and the levels of subsequent modernization which might be required to reflect both the commercial world of ships and helicopters and the military world of developing threats.
All sorts of variations and expansions of the Arapaho concept can be visualized but should be scrupulously avoided for the time being. Modular weapon systems for ASW or antiair roles can be imagined, each built in cargo-container size, each totally independent of the ship itself. A complete amphibious operation could be supported with the right kinds of ships, cargo containers, and off-loading lift capabilities. Excess supertankers could be decked over and used for V/STOL interceptor airfields. But these are all in the dim future and may never even be needed. What is here today is a realistic potential for help to solve a realistic threat of today and tomorrow.
Arapaho is a good new idea!
I ^ w many iNcivai ivcacivc uciu piiuLa
h0vv \ y be actively flying in commercial jobs
'Vartim !hey might best be activated for emergency
► A duties. v separ
ate study would be needed by a small
A 1944 graduate of the Naval Academy, Captain O’Rourke served during World War II in the USS Hancock (CV-19), during the Korean conflict in the USS Lake Champlain (CV-39), and during the Cuban Crisis in the USS Enterprise (CVN-65). He commanded several all-weather fighter squadrons, an ammunition ship, and the USS Independence (CVA-62). He also served on the staff of Commander, Sixth Fleet. Prior to retirement in 1974, he directed the Navy Fighter Study Group. A frequent contributor to the Proceedings and a former member of the Naval Institute’s Board of Control, Captain O’Rourke is currently vice president of Maritime Associates, Inc., of Burke, Virginia.