This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
T
_1_ he marine salvage industry was conceived, raised, and supported by the shipping industry in order to save ships and cargoes and thereby to reduce insurance rates. Until World War II, the Navy depended upon industry to provide most salvage, maintaining its own forces only for the purposes of submarine salvage and limited ocean towing. These Navy forces did some excellent work, including the salvage of the submarines S-4, S-51, and Squalus. More conventional salvage, undertaken by inexperienced and often inappropriate forces, had a low success rate and occasionally resulted in the loss of life.
With global war imminent in 1939, a Navy study of the American salvage industry’s ability to support full-scale mobilization showed only one firm of major international stature, Merritt-Chapman-Scott. This company operated five ships, all from East Coast ports. The facilities were correctly judged to be inadequate for mobilization. Steps were taken immediately to develop adequate national resources; these included:
^ Initiation of a shipbuilding program for several classes of salvage ships and oceangoing tugs ^ Establishment of the basis for the Naval Salvage Service by letting a contract to Merritt-Chapman- Scott
^ Establishment of the office of the Supervisor of Salvage in the Bureau of Ships to oversee the salvage contract and to act as technical agent for salvage.
Early in the war, it was obvious that salvage forces w°uld make a significant contribution to victory. Salvors brought to port valuable military cargoes in damaged ships, eased the load on shipbuilding facilities, cleared blocked harbors, and rescued Gained crews. Under total mobilization, American •udustry and the military combined to build a large ar>d effective salvage force. The Naval Salvage Service
^‘et Cong sappers sank this tanker at Nha Trang Harbor in December 1969, but U. S. Navy salvors, working 16-hour day*, quickly had her up, patched, and back in action.
operated in American waters, while salvage operations overseas were conducted by harbor clearance units and by naval forces equipped with new salvage ships. These naval forces were largely composed of men trained by Merritt-Chapman-Scott on the wreck of the USS Lafayette (AP-53, ex-SS Normandie) in New York harbor.
In World War II, the short time it took to form an effective salvage force was, in reality, too long. Despite the full effort of national mobilization, it was 1943 before effective salvage forces were on station in all theaters. Ships, some of them major combatants, which could have been saved were lost. At the end of the war, the large salvage forces were rapidly dissipated. Except for the few required by the government for peacetime operations, the useful and versatile salvage ships were sold, chartered, scrapped, laid up, or otherwise disposed of. Harbor clearance units were decommissioned. Commercial salvage operators reduced their assets to those needed to operate profitably in commercial operations.
After World War II, Congress acted with an unusual combination of hindsight and foresight relative to the American salvage industry. Protective legislation was passed in a cabotage act. This act required that all salvage operations in the inland waters of the United States be conducted by American-flag ships. Another law, the Salvage Act, charged the Secretary of the Navy with maintaining salvage resources within the United States and gave him license to subsidize the industry. The two acts ensured that a suitable national base in marine salvage would exist both for mobilization and for services proportionate to peacetime requirements.
The increase in operations incident to the Korean War caused naval salvage forces to be expanded. The expansion was possible because only five years had elapsed between World War II and the Korean War. There were up-to-date salvage ships in active and reserve forces; great amounts of salvage equipment were available; trained people with experience in combat salvage were abundant. Effective salvage forces appropriate to limited war were on station
rr;
In three'wars in the author’s lifetime, naval salvage fdrces have proved invaluable to combat ~ Operations. Because the great forces built up in World Wav II were able to carry the ’requirements of Korea and Vietnam and because American industry was able to support them, a complacency has grown up that these forces will continue to be sufficient. But unless ~we do something, we won’t, be ready in the ' future. Vigorous, imaginative, and decisive * action to restore marine salvage as a- necessary component of our national maritime posture is
• f* ’ » • '
mandatory if the U. S. Navy is to be able to '-*pursue its combat roles. . -
*yJ£
VI
quickly. With the conclusion of hostilities, however, naval salvors were again reduced to those forces just adequate for peacetime logistic support.
Logistic support operations had become particularly important. Before World War II, the U. S. Navy was primarily a home fleet with limited overseas operations. Since that war, the United States has maintained—in the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, and other oceans—a naval presence requiring a substantial mobile logistic support force. This force has included units to conduct salvage and towing operations. Salvage forces, controlled by and responsive to U. S. naval authority, have been particularly important in areas where commercial salvage services were not available. The services were lacking either because they had not been restored after World War II or because the frequency of profitable casualties was insufficient to warrant maintaining salvage stations. By law, the Navy may provide salvage services where commercial salvors are not available. The law allowed the Navy to provide needed services in remote areas, to use casualties for valuable training, and to provide revenue to the government. Between the wars in Korea and Vietnam, Navy salvage forces were sustained by infrequent participation in naval and commercial mishaps. During this period, the stockpile of salvage machinery and rigging equipment purchased during World War II was used up or passed into obsolescence. A more significant asset began to disappear with the passage of time— experienced salvors. Some of the men who had learned salvage in World War II and Korea were retiring. Others stayed in the Navy but worked in different areas because there were so few active salvage billets.
As the United States eased into the war in Vietnam, it became apparent that salvage forces would have to be increased in size and modernized to participate effectively. Modern salvage machinery— pumps, generators, compressors, and the like—was needed to replace the aging gasoline-powered equipment purchased in World War II. Funding limitations required the pushing of the state of the art by purchasing “Power-Pak” equipment, a single diesel prime mover driving a variety of machines through different clutching and gearing arrangements. In the field, practical problems encountered in aligning prime mover gears and service units made the equipment marginally successful. This gear was soon replaced with fully integrated, diesel-driven salvage machinery. Adequate quantities of the latter were acquired to fully outfit all salvage forces and material pools. Concurrently, a modernization program was carried out on existing salvage ships, and the foundations were laid for a building program of the first new salvage ships in many years—thzEdenton (ATS-l) class.
New organizations were needed to support river and coastal operations, so Harbor Clearance Unit One was commissioned in February 1966 at Subic Bay. Outfitting the new unit presented some special problems. Tidal lift craft are useful in Southeast Asia because of water conditions there. No suitable lift craft were in the United States, but the technique is widely used in Northern Europe, so arrangements were made for the lease of four British Admiralty 750-ton lifting craft and for the purchase of two German heavy lift ships. Outfitting of HCU One also included the conversion of a large covered lighter to a salvage tender, of five LCUs to light lift craft, and of six LCM-6s to combat salvage boats. During its five years of service in the Western Pacific, the unit participated in almost 400 salvage operations and earned awards—two Navy Unit Commendations and a Meritorious Unit Citation—covering the entire period.
During the U. S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Harbor Clearance Unit One was reduced in size and in 1971 relocated to Pearl Harbor where its mission was revised to include airborne rapid response salvage throughout the Pacific. Floating assets no longer required were transferred to the Vietnamese, laid up, or returned to their owners. The success of Harbor Clearance Unit One led to the establishment of Harbor Clearance Unit Two at Little Creek, Virginia. HCU Two has performed yeoman work in many complex operations along the East Coast, in the Great Lakes, and on the rivers of the eastern United States. Consistent with the precedents of World War II and Korea, reduction in salvage forces following hostilities was general and has continued until the present. Salvage and towing ships in the U. S. Navy now number fewer than two dozen, the lowest level since
1939.
The requirements for these services have continued. Well-publicized peacetime operations have included the clearance of the Suez Canal, the recovery of the Coast Guard cutter Cuyahoga, and the removal of Navy ships which run aground. In addition salvage forces have participated in such work as target towing, the clearance of Apra Harbor in Guam after Typhoon Pamela, the removal of barges from the Mississippi River, and many other things which never make the headlines.
While providing support for peacetime operations, naval planners should weigh resources available against the requirement to provide sufficient salvage forces for mobilization. For the U. S. Navy to fulfil its mission of sustained combat operations, fleet forces must be able to react to:
► Battle damage to naval and support ships
► Obstruction of free access to harbors and sea lines of communication
► Casualties to mobile logistic support forces.
The primary naval effort in wartime is to provide salvage services to battle groups with specific attention to salvage and return to service of damaged units. Wartime naval operations to be supported by salvage forces include those inshore and in the open ocean. Salvage forces in direct support of battle groups must be near combat operations or support multiple battle groups from forward bases. In World War II, rescue salvage and towing for logistic forces was provided on an area basis; this type of support would be likely in future wars. To ensure continuous use of port facilities, harbor clearance units equipped with the specialized tools of that trade must be a part of advance base organizations. In combat, two salvage ships and one ocean tug would be able to deal with any realistic scenario which would result in loss of mobility, massive fire, grounding, or other salvage requirements by battle groups. Additional afloat Units would be required for harbor clearance and for such specialized operations as ocean search, deep recovery, and submarine rescue.
Naval salvage forces should be adequate to accomplish tasks which are reasonably assigned to them m peacetime and should provide a base for expansion m wartime. It would be poor business and poor use °f our tax dollars if naval salvage forces could not fulfill peacetime needs or if they exceeded those Uceds. Current and planned naval salvage forces are madequate to provide more than token support. If the Navy is to have salvage forces which can support peacetime, limited war, and full-scale mobilization, it is necessary to dramatically increase the forces available for direct support of naval operations. The total salvage posture of the nation—a measure of its ability to support full mobilization and operate in a maritime environment—is a function of naval and industrial capability. The Navy’s capability has fluctuated with military action. Civilian capacity has not followed the same pattern.
In the late 1940s, permissive legislation had been passed to ensure the United States’ position in the world salvage industry and to allow the Secretary of the Navy to subsidize the industry. After World War II, Merritt-Chapman-Scott returned to commercial salvage operations, and after the Salvage Act gave the Navy authority to contract for salvage services, held a Navy salvage services contract for many years. In the mid-1960s, the venerable salvage company became the victim of financial operations which left it in receivership. Merritt-Chapman-Scott went out of business, and more than 100 years of marine salvage passed into history. The assets of the company, including the famous Black Horse house flag, were purchased by the West Coast bridge builder, J. Phillip Murphy, and Murphy Pacific Marine Salvage, now defunct, was born. Murphy Pacific, operating salvage stations at Kingston, Jamaica, Key West, Staten Island, San Pedro, and San Francisco, was until
In order to support river and coastal operations in Vietnam, heavy tidal lift craft were needed. Hut because there were none in the United States, four were leased from the British Admiralty and two (below) were purchased from Germany.
'«4f» j |
|
|
|
| iLahIa . ' W. _ |
|
|
USS ORTOLAN
The salvage force needs an aggressive shipbuilding program to supplement the new fleet tug Powhatan (T-ATF-166), seen in the St. Lawrence Seaway on her maiden voyage earlier this year, and the Ortolan (ASR-22), one of only two modern submarine rescue ships in the fleet, both of which were commissioned in 1973.
recently the sole American member of the small family of international salvors. Other American salvage companies operated locally. Principal among these was Fred Devine Salvage of Portland, Oregon, which converted a surplus landing ship to a salvage ship tailored for conditions in the Pacific Northwest.
Despite government subsidies and support, the American salvage industry has been of decreasing importance since World War II. Today there is only one privately owned U. S.-flag salvage ship, Devine's Salvage Chief. All others which operate in U. S. waters are chartered from the government, or are point-to-point tugs converted on an ad hoc basis for salvage. In the late 1970s, the United States is not a strong competitor in the world salvage industry and has little capability to deal with marine casualties. There is little national base for mobilization of the American marine salvage industry. There are few trained or experienced civilian salvage personnel, because since World War II the Navy had supplied trained salvors to industry. If the United States and its Navy are to rebuild their position in marine salvage and related ocean engineering fields, definite effort in several different areas is required:
► Establishment, promulgation of, and adherence to a national policy for marine salvage
► Establishment and maintenance of strong leadership
► Development of a sound industrial base
\ Thorough definition of naval salvage requirements ^ Commencement of aggressive projects in ship-
58 building and equipment development.
The 80th Congress made a commitment to a national salvage capability and vested the responsibility in the Navy. This commitment should be reaffirmed in a positive statement of maritime policy.
While arguments could be developed for putting national salvage in the Department of Transportation or the Department of Commerce, the fact remains that the Navy is designated as the leader and should provide the necessary organization and leadership for both naval and commercial salvage.
The development of an industrial base requires special consideration. Stimulation of a lethargic industry by government can be accomplished only when there is a commercial base which can benefit from this support. Such a base exists in marine operations in American waters and is reinforced by legislation denying foreign salvors access to waters contiguous to the continental United States. The method chosen by the Navy to support industry has not been effective, in that it supported some companies while excluding others from subsidy benefits- This has been done by contract specifications which required large capital investments so that there was specialized equipment available and preemptive clauses which gave the Navy priority over commercial customers. The letting of area salvage contracts to foreign salvage firms has been destructive to American interests. Such contracts have allowed cost-effective coverage of U. S. interests and compliance with legal requirements in those few foreign areas where cabotage laws exclude all but national salvors. Unless contract specifications are more carefully written than they have been, a disservice may be done American salvors. It is not in the interests o the United States to have government salvage contracts which permit foreign-flag salvors to operate on government jobs in U. S. territorial waters overseas- imaginative contractual concepts are necessary- The intent of the Salvage Act was not only to provide government-interest salvage services, but also to give
Proceedings / December 197®
the Secretary of the Navy a means of ensuring an industry which could support any national requirement for marine salvage. In the years since World War II, the industry has become weak and the intent of the Congress perverted. Recent attempts by Navy contracting authorities to encourage competition in salvage contracts have not been effective. The division of the world into carefully specified areas has encouraged American government support of foreign salvors—support hardly intended by the Congress which passed the Salvage Act. The U. S. Navy can act within the intent of the Salvage Act and within the defense acquisition regulations by letting salvage contracts in a manner similar to Master Ship Repair Contracts, that is, numerous contracts to salvors for all areas. Particular tasks could either be bid, when time permitted, or directly tasked when appropriate. Under this scheme, American salvors could compete directly with foreign salvors for government work in foreign waters. Flexible and imaginative contracting will assist in reestablishing a national marine salvage industry and' the base required for wartime expansion. Without an effective subsidy system, the industry will continue its decline, and the Navy will be forced to maintain forces far in excess of normal peacetime requirements.
For the Navy to maintain a minimum capability, Experienced salvors are mandatory, for in salvage, nothing can replace human judgment. Salvage officers have, for many years, been poor relations in the unrestricted line and engineering duty officer communities. This status has not contributed to a professional group capable of readily filling a national need. With the establishment in 1978 of the special operations officer designator (1140) within the unrestricted line, salvage officers have a professional home. But there are few senior billets for salvage- oriented special operations officers. Senior salvage billets are filled by officers with designators other than 1140. For example, salvage officers are currently double-hatted in the maintenance divisions of fleet and surface force commander staffs. Logic would dictate that the salvage office be located in the opera- t*ons division and filled with full-time professional salvage officers. Other senior billets, including the Supervisor of Salvage, are most appropriately reserved for special operations officers. The special operations °fficers should be nurtured so that they become highly professional and experienced. If the special °perations (salvage) officer community is not eucouraged, the level of expertise in the Navy will continue to decline, and our ability to mobilize will c°ntinue to be degraded.
The final factor that will allow successful salvage operations is equipment. The technology of salvage equipment is necessarily keyed to the technology of the ships which become casualties. As ships grow and their equipment changes, so must the capabilities of salvage equipment change. The application of innovative technology has slowed without the impetus of combat operations. Unfortunately, the slowdown has come at a time when relevant ocean engineering technology driven by offshore oil is rapidly expanding. Constant and imaginative study of industrial development and its potential application to naval requirements, as well as use of the naval laboratories and other in-house facilities, can provide the technology the Navy requires for salvage.
A large portion of the equipment requirement is in the area of platforms. The salvage ship and tug building program of World War II left the U. S. Navy with many strong, capable hulls which have served well and have survived the stresses of alteration and modernization. The surviving hulls are now approaching 40 years of age—elderly even for the strongest ships. There have been three shipbuilding programs for ocean engineering ships since World War II; one produced the three Edenton-class vessels, another the two Pigeon (ASR-21)-class submarine rescue ships, and the last is now delivering the Powhatan (T-ATF-166)-class fleet tugs. These efforts, the best that budgets could support, have been token. A salvage force needs an aggressive shipbuilding program producing practical salvage ships which reflect modern technology and are responsive to today’s requirements.
As long as ships go to sea, some will become casualties. Inevitably, some of those casualties will be of interest to the United States. The need is clear; naval planning must provide relatively modest salvage resources in peacetime and a base for national expansion in wartime. When ships are sinking, it is too late to start building salvage forces.
f ' A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy (1959) and Webb Institute of Naval Architecture, Commander Milwee served at sea in the USS Twining (DD-540). Subsequent tours have included Harbor Clearance Unit One, the Navy Experimental Diving Unit, the office of the Supervisor of Salvage, and four years as Pacific Fleet salvage officer. Prior to his retirement from active duty in October 1979, he was repair officer at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. He is currently employed in the offshore industry. Commander Milwee's previous writing on naval salvage includes three Proceedings Professional Notes and several articles for other publications.