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This month marks the 5 6th birthday of the Naval Research Laboratory, the first modern scientific research and development laboratory created within the U. S. Navy. From the development of high-frequency communications equipment, radar, and sonar before World War II to the exploration of space, nuclear energy, lasers, and a host of other new fields in recent years, NRL has worked along the frontiers of science to make the Navy’s technology the best and most advanced possible. Today, it operates directly under the Office of Naval Research and functions as the corporate research laboratory of the Navy. It conducts a broadly based, multidisciplinary program of research and development in four areas of science and technology: electronics, oceanology, space and communications, and material and radiation studies. Creating such an institution was not easy. A study of the laboratory’s origin not only explains why it was established but also provides illuminating historical insight into the complexities of forming Navy science policy.
Although it was Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels who broke the ground for NRL in 1920, it had been Thomas Edison who first put forth the idea for a laboratory five years earlier. Ironically, it was continuing opposition by Edison that delayed for years both the construction and the occupation of the five-building complex.
— - ----------------------- j . Ljjjze
during the wartime period (1914-1918) to tn° science on a national level. Later, other organiz* sI
would be created for the same general purpose, ^ notably the National Research Council, but in the Naval Consulting Board was unique. g£p-
Membership of the board was announced >n ^js tember. It was comprised of Edison as president, ^ special assistant, and 22 representatives of ma,°jvjSe tional engineering societies. Its charge was to a , the Navy on scientific matters and to direct t e p ers of civilian scientists to solving the Navy s te£j cal problems. Unfortunately, the political ni° for which the board had been created and t e ^ that it was established without the advice, c°n or support of either the chiefs of the Navy s ma ^ bureaus or other top Navy officers hampered t ganization’s operations. Although it remained ^ throughout the war, it never became an e
means of liaison between the Navy and civilian
’ , to
tists and engineers. However, one project the b
Thomas Edison and Josephus Daniels'. On 30 May 1915, The New York Times printed selections from an interview with Thomas Edison in which the famous inventor, then 68 years old, discussed the general state of American defense in light of the war raging in Europe. To prepare properly, he argued, America’s armed forces should enlist industry and science, not more soldiers. “Modern warfare,” he said, “is more a matter of machines than of men.”1 A significant part of Edison’s program for science was the creation of a government research laboratory. He stated:
“I believe that ... the Government should maintain a great research laboratory, jointly under military and naval and civilian control. In this could be developed the continually increasing possibilities of great guns, the minutiae of new explosives, all the technique of military and naval progression, without any vast expense.”2 This statement is the original expression of the concept that led to the creation of the Naval Research Laboratory.
In the early 20th century, newspaper reporters frequently interviewed Edison. His greatest inventions—the incandescent lighting system, the phonograph, motion pictures—were already being mass-produced, and they affected the life of almost every American in some way. Because of them, and because of his lively personality, Edison had become one of the most popular men in the nation.
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, read Edison’s thoughts in The New York Times with great interest. Having spent most of his career as editor of the Raleigh, North Carolina, News and Observer, Daniels followed newspaper reporting carefully. Now he perceived an excellent opportunity to enlist the assistance of the great Edison to help the Navy upgrade its technical expertise. He also recognized the political advantage of gaining Edison’s support. Daniels had been named Secretary of the Navy in 1913 as a reward for crucial early endorsement of Woodrow Wilson during the 1912 presidential campaign. The secretary had no broad experience in naval matters, but nonetheless he was determined to act independently and decisively. By 1915, his controversial reforms and unyielding insistence on strong civilian control of the Navy had embittered many top officers. Strife was further increased by the secretary’s neutralist stance in regard to the war in Europe. When Edison’s interview appeared, Daniels’s leadership was under vicious attack.
On 7 June, a week after the article was printed,
‘For footnotes, please turn to page 69
Daniels sent the inventor a letter in which e^g£j cussed the newspaper interview and then a Edison to assist him in forming within the a ^ “department of invention and development. u ^ organization, Daniels said, would allow the al|^nS use “. . . the natural inventive genius of ^rner^0^,0 to meet the new conditions of warfare as s abroad, . . .”3 The letter also specified that lS^
popularity was crucial to gain support for the P ^ Daniels clearly hoped that collaborating with ca mous inventor would help silence criticism, b ^ ce shrewd political move. Enlisting American and engineering under Edison’s leadership ' ^
allow the secretary to take a step toward PreP ness, yet it would not require any large-scale m ^ zation. Thus, he could act positively while ^ ^
same time retaining his basically neutralist PoS1 Edison agreed to help, and Daniels jSofl
formed the press. The news hit front pages. ^
Will Head Navy Test Board,” ran the hea ,n ^ The New York Times', “Best Engineering Genius 0 Nation to Act with Naval Officers in Strengt e^£(. Sea Power.”4 Daniels easily got the favorable c°.^ age he desired. Publicity was particularly exten because the Naval Consulting Board, as th^efnpc body was eventually called, was the first a
undertook did have a significant impact: the P build a research laboratory.
ofy
The Laboratory Project—Success'. The lab°ra py project differed from every other idea consider^ ^ the Naval Consulting Board in three s‘8n‘g0(c- ways. First, it was the board’s most ambitious e^oSt Second, whereas Edison had little interest m
bi
concer
s'gned
erations, he became deeply involved with those ning the laboratory. Finally, the plan was dei not just to help solve present problems, but ^ 'mportantly, to transform the manner in which ^Navy conducted its scientific research.
^ board members recognized the growing impor-
tnore
taiice of
and thei Such
research laboratories to American industry,
r intimate knowledge of the effectiveness of ^ establishments provided the context for their 1^. Ussions on building one for the Navy. Edison of e" been the pioneer in showing the power «*n*ed research, first at Menlo Park, New Jer- j ’ wbere he invented the phonograph and incan- Scent lighting system, and then later in his larger nent at West Orange, New Jersey. Willis R. Whit' an°ther member of the board, has been instru- q ntal 'n organizing the research laboratory at the Electric Company. Nor were Edison, Inc., neral Electric alone. By 1915, many other lng American firms had established research lab-
and Ge
leadi
°rati
n^ebcan Telephone and Telegraph in 1911, rrie the
0ries: Dupont in 1902, Kodak in 1910, and
to
Th
most important.
ing; only very limited funds were available for experimentation and research. And none of the facilities had the organization and specialized, highly trained staff that characterized the industrial research laboratories in the private sector. Indeed, the Navy primarily depended on inventors or private companies for improvements and new products. The Naval Consulting Board had good reasons for arguing that a specialized institution was required if the Navy was to keep its technology up to date.
Edison came to the initial board meeting, which was held on 7 October 1915, with an outline of the laboratory in hand; it was quickly accepted by the other members.’’ The new institution was to be directed by a naval officer, which is important, because Edison later changed his mind and insisted that a civilian be in charge. It was to be large and equipped for research, development, and limited production. Edison estimated that the initial cost would be $5 million and that the annual budget would be around $2.5 million.
Public reaction to the plan was generally favorable—even the Navy bureau chiefs, despite their mixed feelings about the Naval Consulting
faCj|- .
'ties for research and development. Some such |\[ Was going on at the Naval Torpedo Station in jn "Eort, Rhode Island; the Naval Ordnance Prov- p>e^ ^r°und, Indianhead, Maryland; the Ex- y 'rnental Model Basin at the Washington Navy [dr.’ the Fuel Oil Test Plant in Philadelphia; the CneerinR Experiment Station in Annapolis; and a cer<>ttler navy yards and stations. Many naval offi- fjCj ’ ,n fact, thought the existing establishments suf- ent- However, most of them concentrated on test-
Board, expressed support—but the cost was quickly attacked. Scientific American, for example, criticized the proposal as calling not for a laboratory, but for a whole new navy yard.6 In reaction, the board decided to ask initially for only $1.5 million.
The first important step was gaining congressional approval. For this, Edison was indispensable. On 15 March 1916, he went with Secretary Daniels and four other board members to testify before the House Naval Affairs Committee and request funds. The inventor made a strong impression as he spoke with complete confidence, even an air of bravado, while outlining the great things the laboratory would do. Equally important, the congressmen, like Secretary Daniels, understood his popularity. And lest they forget, another board member, W. L. Saunders, reminded them after Edison left:
“You heard this morning the testimony of the most distinguished scientist in the world, Mr. Edison. Nobody questions that to-day. Some think he is the greatest man in the world; he is certainly the greatest scientist in the world, and when we measure greatness, we must measure it by achievement.”7
Edison got what he wanted. The Naval Appropriations Act of 1916 included the following section:
“EXPERIMENTAL AND RESEARCH LABORATORY: For laboratory and research work . . . including the construction, equipment, and operation of a laboratory, the employment of scientific civilian assistants as may become necessary, to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy . . . $1,000,000 . . .
A supplemental appropriation of $500,000 later raised the total to $1.5 million. The Naval Consulting Board had the money it needed to build a research laboratory for the Navy. The quick, successful action that led to the granting of these funds was a major achievement. Unfortunately, it marked the high point of the attempt by the board to create the institution. Disagreement and delay followed.
The Laboratory Project—Failure: After obtaining funds for the laboratory, the board had to determine where it should be built and what, exactly, its organization and function should be. The appropriation contained only general instructions. So a committee was established and charged to make recommendations. Following several months of deliberation, two opposing views emerged, and on 9 December 1916, a pair of conflicting reports was presented to the Consulting Board for consideration. One was endorsed by Edison, the other by everyone else.8
The majority of the committee believed the laboratory should be built in Annapolis. This was a good
iolis
geographical choice, they reasoned, for Annap^ had an excellent harbor, yet at the same time ' ^ well protected by Maryland’s wide eastern s^ore^n, also a good psychological choice because ^
was
napolis was the home of the Naval Academy- a ^ ratory there could easily attract both visitors
i—$1.5 milli°n
--- rr--------------- -------- ------------ * * 1 . . j the
instead of $5 million—the majority argued t
support. In view of the appropriation- ^ ^
institution should concentrate on research alone >
Finally*
had to
leave development to other establishments. ^
everyone but Edison agreed that a naval officer a_^e be director of the facility for it to be effective- board’s own poor liaison with the Navy ma e
clear. . .I hi*
Edison believed the laboratory was basical y ^ project and that he had the right to decide w * ^ would be and how it would function. As he later
Secretary Daniels: of
“It is fixed in my mind, whether rig wrong, that the public would look to me to m the Laboratory a success, and that I would have ^ do 90% of the work. Therefore, if I cannot 0 proper conditions to make it a success, I w ^ not undertake it nor be connected with it 1 remotest degree, or be held responsible for its
cess.
favored
As a location for the laboratory, Edison Sandy Hook, an area on the northern tip of the ^ Jersey coast. A facility there would be locate Edison’s own lab at West Orange and would als° ^ near New York City, where labor, all cyPeSj.jy supplies, and well-trained technical men were rea
available. The inventor continued to insist that
Too
laboratory should concentrate on development - e much research, he thought, had already been . and recorded without having been put to use- nally, in his most important disagreement wlt£ 3 rest of the committee, Edison now insisted t ^ civilian be in charge. As he said in one comm1 meeting: been
“[The] laboratory always in my mind has for only one purpose, to work under civihan ^ ditions away from naval and government c° tions. ... [It is] not to have anything to do " ^ the Navy except that if any naval officer has idea he can go there and have it made.” n£jy This view, like Edison’s predilection for Hook, hardened in the future. q.
While all the causes for Edison’s growing tagonism toward the Navy are not clear, two ca ^ discerned. First, most of the suggestions he sending the material bureaus through Secr^^y Daniels were not being followed. Second, the was testing for use in submarines a new type 0
19'
m'nist,
rator
er a successful research and development labo-
8e battery being developed by Edison, Inc. On 15 January 1916, an explosion occurred in the only ves- ln which one of them had been installed, and four 111611 Were killed. Subsequently, a well-publicized in- ^lry put the blame squarely on Edison’s company, sPlte the inventor’s continual denial of responsibil- cy- For these and perhaps other reasons, he became lr>ced that no naval officer really understood sci- mntific research and that none could properly ad-
y.
g the December meeting of the Consulting °ard, both reports of the laboratory site committee discussed fully, but the majority report pre- th C<1 k°ar<J recommended to Secretary Daniels f fhe laboratory be built in Annapolis. Daniels heSe<1t0 act- While he favored the majority report, simply would not accept it unless Edison con- rted.12 The secre(;ary knew that breaking with the tw6ntor would be bad politics, and in addition, the the 01611 ^ecome g°°d friends. In determining toe.Plans for the laboratory, these considerations had ab 0 Wei^bed along with more rational judgments the best organization for Navy scientific reA
complete stalemate ensued. Despite repeated at- s . Pts by the board to compromise with Edison, ^ s actory arrangements could not be worked out. e ° ^rther progress had been made when the war |a^ec1, and then the board ceased to be active. If the ,lsh0rat°ry was to be built, the regular Navy estab- rnent would have to take the initiative.
Ad at>a^ ®ff‘cers Take Command: In late 1919, Rear to 111 William S. Smith, the Navy liaison officer che Naval Consulting Board throughout the war, g * action. He convinced the chiefs of the material Ureaus, who had stayed in the background while the Sulting board fought about the laboratory, to advise secretary to go ahead and build it. An official Ser)rri0randurn specifying their recommendations was ^ °n 1 October.13 The site the officers suggested ar)S t^*e °ne t^le^ always favored: the grounds of jy Navy magazine in the southernmost tip of the Strict of Columbia. There the laboratory would be
°se at hand and under their control.
Th' •
ms time, Daniels agreed, perhaps sensing that ess he acted now, rhe laboratory would never be ho ^ ls^e<^- 20 October, he authorized construc-
n °n the Washington site. After having made the 'riv Sl°n> wrote Edison asking his consent, but the entor was as adamant as ever. He replied:
I have not changed my mind in the least about e location of the Laboratory. Nor have I changed
my opinion that such a Laboratory should not be under the control of Naval officers, either directly or indirectly. I still think that the Secretary of the Navy only should have control through civilians. If Naval officers are to control it the results will be zero. This is my experience due to association with them for two years and noting the effects of the system of education at Annapolis.
“When you are no longer Secretary and have returned to business, I want to tell you a lot of things about the Navy that you are unaware of.”14
Despite Edison’s opposition, the project continued, albeit slowly. A contract for construction was finally granted in November 1920. Work began on 6 December, but then moved at a snail’s pace. The five buildings composing the institution would not be ready for use until mid-1923.
While Daniels’s action had finally ensured that the Naval Research Laboratory would exist, it did not settle the thorny question of how it would be administered. The naval officers naturally expected a naval officer to be in charge. The secretary, however, in a final attempt to get Edison’s support, sided with him and recommended a civilian be named director.1'’ Even this concession did not win the stubborn, now 73-year-old inventor’s support. Instead of cooperating, he resigned from the Naval Consulting Board altogether.16 Thus, he forfeited his final chance to help shape the policy of the institution that he had conceived and for which he had obtained congressional funding. With no support from either
niy
CoV
ov£f
head and salaries for a fraction of the empl°ye ,
■ • in-
aditur
Edison or the bureau chiefs, Daniels’s recommendation had little force. Besides, construction was so slow that the ultimate decision fell into the hands of Daniels’s successor, Edwin Denby.
Denby supported the officers. On 13 September 1921, although the laboratory was not finished, the new Secretary of the Navy named Rear Admiral Smith its first director. This meant, in addition, that Smith and the bureau chiefs would decide the permanent policy of the institution. Indeed, they already had a general order for this purpose in draft form. It circulated in the Navy Department and underwent slight revision, then was issued as General Order No. 84 on 25 March 1922. It was the basic statement of laboratory organization. Neither Edison nor any other member of the Naval Consulting Board had anything to do with writing it. “The Laboratory,” stated the order in part, “shall be under the direction of a naval officer, not below the rank of captain. . .”17
The Scientific Program: As important as who controlled the laboratory was what would be done there.
Like the administrative structure of the institujj0 the scientific program was formulated not by t or the Naval Consulting Board, but by naval of ice Yet while politics had ultimately determined 'v ^ type of director the institution would have, its gram was decided by the circumstances of poS defense spending. „„
Since the supplemental appropriation of 191 ’ additional monies had been allocated to the la j tory. And hopes for strong support were das when, as it neared completion, Congress initially^ fused to grant any funds to cover its operation. ^ all parts of the Navy, it suffered from the srr^c postwar trends of demobilization and disarmafl1 Without the war and without a popular advocate Edison, arguments for the special needs of sC'e0tfiey research had little effect on the legislators. No 1°° at all was appropriated for fiscal year 1923, anc^ °
numerous pleas to the Naval Appropriations ^ mittee shook loose $100,000 for fiscal year 192 • fact, only nominal yearly budgets for the institu were granted until the late 1930s. \\
The small direct appropriation could not c0!vet costs, as had originally been hoped, but only 0^
Thus, most personnel and research expenc would have to be assumed by the material bure^£y They would have to pay for whatever projects assigned to the laboratory. While each of the bur had initially wanted to have work done at the la tory, upon learning this condition all but one
68
Proceedings / July
tho
ri2ed in a bureau memorandum entitled “Cen-
|.^rre<^> for they realized that using the new estab- Went would mean curtailing existing programs
Elsewhere.
Th •
Se °e excePti°n was the Bureau of Engineering. veral high-ranking officers, led by the head of the 10 division, Commander Stanford C. Hooper, °ught the facility was an excellent location for reping and centralizing the bureau’s sound re- ch, which was primarily concerned with the de- i°n of submarines, and its radio research. Both ^ttvities had expanded during World War I, but ey had become scattered among numerous Navy Joh S an<^ stat‘ons- ^e bureau chief, Rear Admiral th n ^ Robison, was hesitant to commit funds to 1^. new institution, but finally agreed to the plan of ,s Subordinates. On 12 February 1923, it was au-
Qa I2atfon of Radio and Sound Research and Devel- g |nent at the U. S. Naval Research Laboratory at t , evue- 18 This document became the basis for es- •shing the original scientific program.
1„ nns, soon after the institution opened on 2 July o, the 24 men of the research staff were or- 12ed into two divisions. The Radio Division was R .P0se<^ personnel who had come from the Naval ard [1][2] [3] ^esearch Laboratory at the Bureau of Stands an<f the Aircraft Radio Laboratory at the Naval cr Station, Anacostia, D.C. The Sound Division ^ Prised men transferred from the Annapolis Ex- preIITlent Nation, where they had worked since being *°usly transferred from New London, Connecticut. When operations began, the men simply continued the work they had already been doing for the Bureau of Engineering.
Subsequently, the leaders of the laboratory pushed constantly to have its activities expand into all areas of science pertinent to the Navy, but their progress was extremely slow. Not until the years just prior to World War II did NRL begin to assume the broadranging capabilities that characterize it today.
In 1952, a bust of Edison was erected at the entrance of the laboratory to commemorate his role in its founding. It was a just tribute: NRL would never have been created without him. And undoubtedly he would be proud today of the institution and what it has done for the nation. Indeed, it is said that several years after it had begun operation, he wrote a gracious letter to the assistant director, stating that his objections to its location had apparently been without foundation.19 But perhaps there is a twist of unintended symbolism in the fact that the bust faces outward, and the laboratory facilities stand behind its back.
Mr. Allison earned a bachelor of arts degree summa cum laude from St. John's College in Annapolis, Maryland, in 1973. After a year of study at the Universite de Bordeaux in Bordeaux, France, he began graduate work in the history of science at Princeton University, where he received a master's degree in 1976. In July 1977, Mr. Allison began employment as the historian of the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D. C. In addition to this work, he is currently finishing his doctoral thesis, which will be an institutional history of radar at the Naval Research Laboratory.
19>6), p. 3378.
Ed
7’.- ^ Marshall, “Edison’s Plan for Preparedness,” The New York
ltnes Jn
2jl. ’ u May 1915, Section 5, p. 6.
v;;rp;.7-.
k^^0r,ginal is in box 1 of the series of records on the Naval Consulting
^est ln ^omas Edison Papers, Edison National Historical Site,
C^.^ge, New Jersey. A copy appears in Lloyd N. Scott, Naval
Off- ln^ ®0ard of the United States (Washington: Government Printing
and 6 PP- 286-288. This book is the official history of the board
reCe^C°nta'ns good factual information about its activities. Two more
El <ln<^ m°re incisive discussions are found in Thomas P. Hughes, lmer cv
^3 -> Perry; lnventor and Engineer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 197 1), pp. Cand Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific ExtaUn**y tn Modern America (New York: Knopf, 1978), pp. 102-138. Qrarchival records of the Naval Consulting Board are in Record ^ ^ *n the National Archives.
5*70 j. ew York Times, 13 July 1915, p. 1.
°W Naval Consulting Board debate on the Laboratory, see the H.eCoj.^at0ry section of the “Digest of Minutes” of the board, box 30, Ar^- S the Naval Consulting Board, Record Group 80, National
A Loi
I9,- ‘ 0ratory—Not a Navy Yard,” Scientific American, 23 October
%arf
fyth f the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives,
Ojfj (>riKress. lst Session, 1916 (Washington: Government Printing
[1]Copies appear in Scott, Naval Consulting Board, but it should be noted that the majority report was rewritten after the meeting to take into account the point of view in the minority report.
“Edison to Daniels, 22 December 1916, box 76, Daniels Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division.
‘“Notes on the meeting of the Laboratory Site Committee, 20 November 1916, p. 8, box 25, records of the Naval Consulting Board, Record Group 80, National Archives.
‘See reports in The New York Times beginning on 16 January 1916, section II, p. 1, and then in subsequent issues as the investigation proceeded.
'“Daniels to Edison, 20 December 1916.
Engineer-in-Chief, Chief Constructor, and Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance to the Secretary of the Navy, 1 October 1919, NRL Historical file, Historian s Office, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. ‘“Edison to Daniels, 7 November 1919, Daniels Papers.
'“Daniels to Edison, 19 November 1920, Daniels Papers.
‘“Edison to Daniels, 25 January 1921, Daniels Papers.
NRL Historical file, Historian's Office, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C.
‘“Ibid.
“A. Hoyt Taylor, The First Twenty-Five Years of the Naval Research Laboratory (Washington: Navy Department, 1949), p. 4.