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The Corps Under the Microscope: The Marine Corps is a deeply rooted national institution. It holds a special place in the American experience and for that reason alone will be around in one form or another for a long, long time. But, in the last three years or so, the corps has come under closer scrutiny (and greater criticism) than usual by a wide variety of observers. The character of this criticism is substantially different from that experienced during the armed forces “unification fight” of the late 1940s. Today’s critics are not out to “get” the corps. They do not aim to reduce it to a relatively ineffective force as a previous generation attempted to do three decades ago. They are, for the most part, exhibiting a genuine concern that the corps adapt itself to emerging international power dynamics. It is a healthy kind of criticism which should not be turned away by a retreat into the turtle shell of parochialism.
The 1976 Brookings study Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here? made the general suggestions that the amphibious capability be retained in the form of four regiments and associated air units, enough to match the Navy’s amphibious shipping; that marine tactical aviation be sharply reduced; and that most of the reserve marine amphibious force (MAF)1 be disbanded.
Brookings then offered several alternatives:
► Reduce the corps to an amphibious assault force of one .and one-third divisions and aircraft wings, eliminating the remaining one and two-thirds division-wing teams (and the reserve MAF).
► Replace the Army in Asia and the Pacific with the one and two-thirds marine divisions not involved in the amphibious mission.
► Assign the airborne mission to the corps, replacing the Army airborne division with a marine division and cutting the corps by about 28%.
► Assign an enlarged European role by moving one and two-thirds divisions from Okinawa and the West Coast to the East Coast and forming them into two marine mechanized infantry divisions, with reliance on the Air Force for tactical support by fixed-win^ aircraft.
The 1976 Culver Report2 also raised several issues about the corps. It pointed out that assault sealift problems are imposing, stating that it takes 48 amphibious warfare ships to embark one MAF. Navy holdings today total about 65, a portion of which are in shipyards at any given time, so that a 48-ship| requirement constitutes about 80% of all available] operational assets. Roughly half of these ships are] available in the Atlantic area and half in the Pacific.
Then Jimmie Bones, he gave a talk To all his men he said:
“We are shipping on a heavy sea With reefs and shoals ahead;
But all l got to say is this: Remember, you’re Marines,
’Cause water settles everything, And that’s what our name means.”
The Culver Report concluded that this deployment of shipping would impose about a two-month lead time to assemble and launch a division-size amphibious operation.
The report goes on to question whether such operations could succeed under high-intensity battlefield conditions. And a series of questions is left for the reader to ponder: “Does a three-division Marine Corps contribute significantly to the U.S./Soviet military balance? Would U.S. capabilities increase or decrease if the Army absorbed major Marine Corps functions? Are amphibious assault capabilities still an essential U.S. asset? What would we gain or lose by scaling back in this area? Do marine aircraft wings contribute significantly to the U.S./Soviet military balance? Would U.S. capabilities increase or decrease if the Air Force absorbed marine air missions?”
Another commentary appears in the Taft White Paper.3 The paper generally reflects congressional intent to bring greater influence to bear on foreign and national security policy. Former Senator Robert Taft made the case that the United States should adopt a seapower strategy and that land forces should receive major cuts. He suggested that the Army airborne division be eliminated and that all Army infantry divisions be converted to armor or be mechanized. He recommended retention of the three marine divisions but suggested that they be restructured as a mechanized force for high-intensity warfare. Senator Taft would have nine Army armored or mechanized divisions for what he calls the “prepositioned” mission, while the Marine Corps would take on the “io| terventionist” mission with its mechanized divisions
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) publishe( an issue paper early in 1977 which, among othe things, discussed the role of the corps.4 CBO posits that the likelihood of an amphibious landing in 1 NATO war is small, especially if the war is short an< there is little or no warning of Warsaw Pact attack The paper reflected CBO thinking at the time ths marine aircraft could supplement Air Force element supporting NATO land forces. Another CBO papef completed early this year, analyzed several sizing op tions for projection forces, including both Army an' marine units.
Finally, the Senate Armed Services Committee h£ shown a greater than usual interest in the future 0 marine forces, having asked for four analyses in tb1 past three years—manpower quality, mission an' force structure, sealift, and airlift/air assault.
Several doubts dominate these commentaries. 1( active hostilities, can we cross the seas in the face 0 Soviet sea control forces? Once across, can we ge ashore against opposition? Is the amphibious opera tion as we know it technologically obsolete? On tb1 other hand, some critics say we may need an art1 phibious operation somewhere, sometime; so, takin! into account available amphibious shipping, should cut the corps to fit the shipping and hope (° ta the best.
There is, also, a predilection toward viewing tb1 corps mainly in the NATO context. Mechanize tb1 corps, these observers say; heavy it up, so that it c»( fight as part of a land army against Warsaw Pac forces. Others say that if combined air/grourt' "'l marine forces cannot make it to the NATO fron1 e* marine air can and should be sent on alone to hell c° with the battle in Europe. Moreover, there is sub ^ stantial doubt in some quarters about the size 0 marine air. Several authorities have stated that cap' tal investment in the air arm is greatly unbalancing an
t‘le structure, to the detriment of the ground ele- rner>t. An additional point is occasionally made to fhe effect that marine air draws quality manpower away from the combat divisions. •
While some of these observations may be predicated on a narrow view of the threat in a complex a°d changing world, perhaps there is a deeper and Ir>0re fundamental question in all this—namely, where is the great innovativeness so characteristic of the corps in the past? And it is true that the Marine C°tps has been a highly innovative military institu- t'°n. Refusing to accept the conventional wisdom of the 1920s which said the Allied catastrophe at Gal- hpoli was proof positive that no landing of any size c°uld succeed against a defended coast, the corps developed a body of amphibious doctrine that in World ^at II enabled the United States to carry the fight across the Pacific and to open the campaign that led to European victory. Along with amphibious warfare ^°ctrine came the introduction and refinement of attack aircraft in the close support role. With time, cEis led to the marine air/ground team, a force unique among the world’s military organizations.
The smoke had hardly cleared from the battlefields World War II when the corps, sensing the great P0tential of the helicopter, developed a doctrine ^hich incorporated various forms of that vehicle into e,cpanded concepts of amphibious warfare and the c°nduct of land operations as well. Since the infraction of the helicopter and the development of Ctrine surrounding it, several major technological evelopments have been introduced into the corps ar>d the Navy’s amphibious forces. These include the
fixed-wing V/STOL (vertical or short takeoff and landing) aircraft, the heavy transport helicopter, the amphibious assault ship (general purpose) (LHA), ground controlled close air support bombing by radar, and several forms of precision guided munitions. Change, however, has been mainly evolutionary.5
Technological change has been overlaid on a force structure and a tactical philosophy that have remained relatively unchanged, and changes in the world power situation are reflected in these to only a limited degree. On the other hand, the corps’ overall philosophy—i.e., seeing itself as postured for contingencies anywhere on the globe, with flexibility of force and a high degree of readiness—has remained unchanged and is sound.
I
Functions of the Corps: No one can logically deny that the United States must be able to project conventional power across the seas and that those forces must be able to fight their way ashore if necessary. Some critics hold the mistaken idea, however, that such operations would be in the image of the 1945 Iwo Jima campaign. Moreover, they view the Marine Corps as thinking of itself almost solely in terms of the head-on amphibious assault. The present commandant has put the corps’ role in perspective by referring to it as a highly mobile air/ground force in readiness and possessing an amphibious expertise. This is a good description and implies a broad range of functions. Among these functions, the amphibious role is more important than the others but not overwhelmingly dominant to the degree it was in World War II.
In view of this and to provide a backdrop against which the corps can be better viewed, we suggest that four major functions be recognized. These reflect the spectrum of possibilities in a world in which the United States and the Soviet Union are the most powerful antagonists but also one in which there will be continuing diffusion of power among an ever growing number of small states. The marines must be prepared for high-intensity conflict typified by an attack from Warsaw Pact forces against those of the NATO nations. The marines must be just as prepared for a major contingency in the Middle or Far East—with or without the presence of Soviet or Chinese forces. While a European conflict would be the most damaging to both the Eastern and Western alliances, it is the lowest on the scale of probabilities. The likelihood of combat is much greater, it seems to
In any event, the author believes that the functions of the corps through the remainder of this century need recasting into four broad areas:
► Force Projection—the extension of marine forces into regions that are threatened or controlled by unfriendly forces. This function covers a broad range d operational scenarios from the small force protecting U. S. lives and property to a seaborne marine amphibious force landing on a hostile shore. Landing b) air, with or without sea support, would also lie if the spectrum covered by this function. Air movement is an important option, especially if the number of amphibious warfare ships remains abouf the same as at present and if the ships continue to b£ divided between the two major oceans.
► Geographic Control—the exercise of sufficient local or regional power to guarantee our use of land, sea.
or air space, while conversely denying its use t‘t
me, in the low- to mid-intensity range. Soviet proxy forces are wandering about Africa. Ferment continues in Southeast Asia. The Korean issue floats on, an unstable kite in a mild but gusty breeze. The Middle East’s petroleum is coveted by all. U.S. interests will inevitably be threatened in these areas. However, because of the rapid spread of sophisticated military hardware in the Third World,6 these kinds of conflicts will not be of the “bull cart” variety typified by Malaya and Vietnam.
another force. This is a function, for example, apple cable to the critical choke points on the sea-lanes the world. It could also be illustrated by a smal force landed on NATO’s northern flank for the puf; pose of holding an air facility from which continuinf aerial protection could be provided for friendly ship1 using the adjoining seas.
► Reinforcement—the function of providing comj plementary or supplementary forces to strengthen nc- U.S. or allied forces in a threatened area. This can be etv illustrated by the introduction of marine forces ashore in a NATO or a Korean crisis, cei ^ Presence—deployed force, either visible or just an- °ver the horizon and within short sailing distance of ; of a crisis area. Even without crisis conditions, the presing ence of forces afloat in such areas as the Mediterra- .nv nean, Caribbean, and Western Pacific can provide by 'mmediate and continuing evidence of readiness to in protect and support U.S. interests, ve-
thf Problems in Mobility and Structure—Now Through out ^ 985: Two major problems now face the Navy/ be Marine Corps team. One is mobility on or over the sea surface; the other is the structuring and weaponry icsJ f°r operations ashore.
lea- There is a serious asymmetry in the current means °f transporting troops and equipment from ship to shore. At one extreme is the transport helicopter, which provides an excellent, rapid means of transport fr°m ships which are over the horizon from the objective. At the other is the much slower amphibian tractor (LVT). Ancf in between are various types of landing craft which are not much faster than the old w°rkhorses of Iwo and Normandy. The LVT of today >s an excellent vehicle; but it is slow and, in tandem with its sister landing craft, requires troop debarkation from ships within sight of the shore. To land forces from farther offshore via LVT and landing craft m any kind of sea state would reduce troop efficiency for below acceptable levels. By increasing the helicopter lift, greater standoff capability could be achieved but only in light troop units. Tanks, self- Propelled artillery, engineer equipment, and other heavy items still will come by slower means, requir
ing much of the amphibious shipping to come fairly close ashore. Although the technology for much faster surface landing craft is at hand, the investment in research and development is such that these much- needed additions to the general purpose forces will not be in operational service until after 1985.
The land warfare problem is of a somewhat different nature and involves the three fundamental areas of firepower, mobility, and protection. Capabilities for the ship-to-shore movement and operations ashore for the next ten years must be optimized by doing the best we can with what we now- have. Between 1985 and 1990, some fairly revolutionary changes can be made if—and it is a big if—the country is willing to invest adequate money in research, development, and procurement of amphibious equipment.
Making Do With What We Have—The Next Decade: There can be only marginal improvements in the sea assault forces over the next decade. Some enhancement of force projection can be seen in the introduction of the Tarawa-class LHAs and the limited improvement in performance and extension of life expectancy of the current LVT family. But we will simply have to accept as a fact of life the continuing asymmetries of the ship-to-shore movement.
If the author ever has to go to war again, he would like to see his tanks come ashore from over the horizon in a high-speed air cushion vehicle rather than in an LCV as this M-60 did during a training exercise in Norway. And he sees a possible role for the F-18/A-18 along with a reduction in the number of Marine Corps fighter squadrons.
years.9 Despite the shortcomings of the LVT, this
A relatively inexpensive, lightweight, low-profile armored fighting vehicle, incorporating firepower and mobility, could be transported, as it is at right, by a CH-53E helicopter or by fixed-wing transport aircraft.
As seriously shortsighted as the national policy is, there is doubt that our gross amphibious lift capacity will exceed a one and one-third MAF lift, minus 15% for repair and overhaul. We can survive, however, at this level of shipping, provided airlift and other maritime lift can be made available as needed. But that is only marginal survival. On the other hand, adjustments in training and structure can be made which will enhance readiness for, and improve capabilities in mid- to high-intensity conventional fighting. To list all of these changes goes beyond the scope of this article, so we will restrict discussion to the major ones.
Even though the law calls for three marine divisions and three aircraft wings, there is no reason for three similar MAFs. Given today’s power dynamics, it makes much more sense to have a light MAF in the Pacific and two heavier MAFs situated in the United States. Small expeditionary forces could be deployed from these MAFs in key maritime areas.7 The light (or Pacific) MAF could consist of two brigades, with only helicopter transportable artillery, and with other light supporting units. Each of the two stronger MAFs should be so structured as to provide for the task organization of a brigade-size force with maximum attainable mobility and shock power.8 To fully mechanize a MAF would destroy its sea mobility, although it would increase its utility in reinforcing the NATO central front. To do what I suggest enables continuation of a “worldwide” posture and provides two highly useful forces for a mid- to high- intensity scenario, including the reinforcement role on the NATO flanks, or the force projection role in the Middle East. Furthermore, these two brigades would be ideal for use in Third World situations where increasing amounts of sophisticated weaponry in unsophisticated hands appear to be the order of the day.
The assault brigade could include two infantry battalions, two tank battalions (three companies ' each), an LVT battalion for infantry mobility, a self- propelled artillery battalion, a forward antiair defense platoon (Redeye or, later, the Stinger), and an appropriate service group. Although the LVT is not the greatest armored personnel carrier the world has seen, it is all the corps has and will simply be part of the make-do arrangement of the next eight or ten
mobile force would not only provide a unit that could operate in an independent situation, but i( would give the commanders of the two heavy MAFs a strong counterattack force or a breakout force, depending on the requirements of the moment.
To the author’s knowledge, there is no seniof Marine Corps officer on active duty today who has ever maneuvered a force with a complete tank battalion as a ground-gaining element of that force. It is essential that the corps accelerate and broaden thf thinking of its officers along these lines. Other majot changes would include a shift from four to three rifl£ companies in each infantry battalion and from three to four battalions in each of the infantry regiments if the two heavy MAFs. With the exception of low" intensity warfare, the four-company battalion is too large to handle efficiently on today’s battlefield, an<) the battalion, with its significant combat capability' will be the basic maneuver element on the mid- to high-intensity battlefield.
Although there has been an increase in weapon! used to counter armor, structure should be furthe1 adjusted by providing an antitank company to ead regiment and increasing the density of direct-fiff ” weapons appropriate to the various tactical levels the light antitank weapon (LAW) at company level^. the Dragon at battalion, and the tube-launched, opf'*£ tically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) weapon at regi'i ment.10 Reconnaissance elements require readjusts also. The force reconnaissance company mission ca1 be assumed by the division reconnaissance battalia and the latter reorganized and reequipped to provid1 a stronger combat capability to conduc‘d reconnaissance-in-force, counter-reconnaissanf screening, and economy-of-force missions.
In summary, the organization outlined above Would provide a modest increase in firepower and ttiobility, without significant change in resource requirements, and put the Marine Corps in the best attainable posture for worldwide responsibilities over che next decade.
The Corps from 1985 to 1999: Technological developments in sea surface mobility as well as those applicable to surface land warfare can provide substantial improvements in the future. The air cushion landing craft (LCAC), under development now, in tandem with a new assault amphibian (LVA) can for the first time give an over-the-horizon capability to the amphibious force. Rapid delivery of both airborne and seaborne assault elements will now be possible. The landing force will move not only by helicopter but at speeds up to 50 knots for the LCAC and 25 to 45 knots for the LVA. The LCAC, in particular, because of its capacity to cross over the shoreline and move directly inland, will vastly increase potential landing areas, thus providing much greater flexibility in selecting objective areas, as well as enhancing the possibility of surprise and complicating the defender’s planning and deployment of forces. The LCAC also will make possible the rapid landing of tanks and entire artillery batteries at sites inland from the shoreline.
The general fighting capability of the landing force will not only be increased by the greater flexibility and mobility provided by the LCAC and LVA, but the force can also be structured to provide greater surface mobility, firepower, and protection. Devel-
AEROSPACE DIVISION OF TEXTRON
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marine corps
In the author’s dreams—and in our enemy’s nightmares—are two apparitions that could carry the corps into the next century and onto a wide variety of shoreline configurations: the air-cushion landing craft (LCAC), above, and the air-cushioned, high-speed assault amphibian (LVA), left.
opments that are most promising are a lightweight armored fighting vehicle (AFV) with a powerful automatic cannon, a shoulder-fired antiair/antiarmor weapon, and much improved conventional munitions. Much more accurate artillery and naval guns and improved “smart” aviation ordnance will greatly increase the overall effectiveness of firepower.
There are those who maintain that the main battle tank and armored force doctrine and tactics will prevail through the end of this century. And there are those who claim that- the advent of precision guided weapons and scatterable mines heralds the end of the known concepts of armored warfare. The answer, of course, lies somewhere in between. It is well within the realm of technology to produce a relatively inexpensive, lightweight, low-profile AFV, with frontal protection against the best antiarmor rounds and with a rapid-fire cannon that will kill armor out to ranges beyond that of any current tank gun.11 This lightweight AFV could have several uses in addition to the armor-defeating role, reconnaissance being a prime one.
The lightweight AFV referred to above could be organic to the division and consist of a battalion headquarters, an antitank company armed with TOW, and four light AFV companies. The AFV could be transportable by CH-53E helicopters, and it would have a hydraulic power boost system that would enable a fast start and rapid maneuver when needed. The beauty of this system would lie in its firepower, its inherent mobility, and its adaptability to move by helicopter or fixed-wing transport aircraft. A mix of tanks with a large number of the lighter AFVs would make for a formidable force.12
For the period 1990-2000, and well beyond that, the Marine Corps can continue to be an extraordinarily effective strategic tool. The concept of two heavy MAFs and one light MAF would remain sound, but the character of the force can be much different from the "make-do” appearance of the 1980s. The marine division in each of the two heavy MAFs can be made capable of task organizing a brigade of two infantry battalions, a battalion of self-propelled artillery, a medium tank battalion, one or two battalions of AFVs (of the variety discussed above) and a battalion of LVAs. (The LVA, used ashore, is the weak link in this force. Capabilities would be improved if the corps also procured a more suitable vehicle for rapid, protected troop movement on land.) Such a force, supported by marine light and medium attack aircraft, would be effective on any mid- to high-intensity battlefield. It would be equally useful as an independent force in crisis situations where smaller but semi-sophisticated forces would be encountered. Finally, smaller increments of the brigade would be ideal for airlift to execute missions of the counter-terrorism variety, or for the surprise seizure of an airfield, for example.
Marine Air Through 1999: There is no way, either in the make-do period through the Eighties or the more promising period of the Nineties, that the Marine Corps can continue to be a fully effective force without both fixed- and rotary-wing aviation. We have already pointed out the essentiality of the CH-53E. Equally important are the troop transport helicopters and their escorts, as well as utility helicopters. Escort gunships can be used in a dual role if equipped with fire-and-forget missiles.
In order to release assets to use in more critical areas, reductions can be made in fighter/attack anti reconnaisance elements. A fighter/attack force of nine squadrons (compared with the present 12) would be adequate. The composite reconnaissance squadron is of value but, in my judgment, is low on the priority list and could be passed to the Navy, along with the requirement to provide that type of support to the landing force. The light attack force should be all V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing), and the medium, all-weather force as well as the EA-6 electronic warfare squadron should be retained.13
The fixed-wing squadron structure into the Nineties should include eight or nine fighter/attack (F-4; later possibly F-18), five medium all-weathef close support (A-6), one electronic warfare (EA-6). eight or nine light attack (AV-8A/B), three transport and three recon and utility (OV-10) squadrons. The helo squadron structure would include three escort, three utility, eight troop transport (CH-46 or its replacement), and six heavy transport squadrons (CH-53 with at least three squadrons of CH-53Es). Antiaif missile forces would include nine FAAD (forward antiaircraft defense) platoons (108 teams) and twC LAAM (light antiaircraft missile) battalions (eight batteries).
Conclusions: National interests through the remainder of this century require a Marine Corps with an amphibious capability. But the corps must think of itself as performing a broad variety of functions—' force projection, geographic control, reinforcement, and presence—all of which require movement across the seas. The corps must maintain strategic mobility by striking a balance between light infantry and armor. It can move in this direction by using weapon systems it now has to task organize mobile fighting units within each of its two heavy MAFs. Some lim' ited reduction can be made in the marines' air arm.
but the fighter/attack, medium all-weather attack, light attack, and electronic warfare roles are all essential, and a capability to execute such missions must be maintained.
Finally, the development of the air cushion landing craft and a high-speed amphibian tractor are essential to increase the world areas vulnerable to amphibious assault as well as to speed up the seaborne movement of forces ashore and to provide a much needed over-the-horizon capability. At the same time, we must invest in a light armored fighting vehicle with a powerful cannon, which along with sev- etal other potential weapons developments can enable an optimum balance in mobility, firepower, and protection in marine forces in the latter part of this century. Taken together, these changes can provide the United States with a highly effective force that can be utilized in the full spectrum of contingencies likely to arise in an uncertain and turbulent international arena.
General Haynes’s military career spans 35 years of Marine Corps history, including three wars. He first saw combat in the bloodiest of all amphibious assaults, I wo Jima, where he was a captain in the regiment that seized Mount Suribachi and raised the national colors there on 23 February 1945. He was an infantry battalion executive officer in Korea, and in Vietnam he 5th Marine Regiment and was G-3 (operations officer) of the Third Marine Amphibious Force. His varied career has included command, politico-military, logistics, intelligence, and diplomatic assignments. He served in Washington as well as in many parts of the globe. Since selection to flag rank, he has headed Marine Corps legislative affairs, commanded both the 2d and 3d Marine Divisions, been senior member of the U.N. Armistice Commission in Korea and commanded the large amphibious base at Camp Lejeune. His last assignment, before retiring on 1 January 1977, was Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Studies, where he also headed two major study boards, one on manpow-er quality and the other on missions and structure, both done as a result of Senate requests. General Hyanes holds a B.S. degree from Southern Methodist University, an M.A. degree from the George Washington University, and is a graduate of the Air War College. He currently is with TEAM, Inc., a corporation dealing in advanced energy applications as well as foreign policy and national security analyses. General Haynes lives in Arlington, Virginia.
There are now three active marine amphibious forces and *one reserve Marine amphibious force. The active MAFs are on the East Coast, the ^est Coast, and in the Pacific.
This is an extensive presentation of the U.S./Soviet military balance d°ne at the request of Senator John C. Culver by the Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, dated 21 January 1976. The report was P^pared by John M. Collins with the assistance of John Chwat.
A Modern Military Strategy for the United States,” 1976, published bV former Senator Robert Taft, Jr., of Ohio. This paper, prepared w'ith tbe assistance of William S. Lind, has been issued in a 1978 edition by Robert Taft, Jr., in cooperation w'ith Senator Gary Hart. ■* Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces: The Tactical Air Forces,’ Congressional Budget Office, January 1977, by Nancy Bearg, under the supervision of John Koehler and Robin Pirie. "U.S. Projection Forces: Requirements, Scenarios and Options,” Congressional Budget Office, April 1978, by Dov S. Zakheim under the general supervision of John E. Kohler and James R. Blaker.
C)f note in assessing the corps’s willingness to change are the following:
^ R is difficult to shake thinking in some quarters away from the fixed three-division/three-wing concept and to look instead at structures that are not mirror images.
^ Aviation structure is a hard nut to crack—especially fighter forces. This probably is a holdover from Guadalcanal days when Navy air departed the scene for a while, leaving a lasting impression that the corps had better have its own fighters in plentiful numbers.
^ A substantial number of recommendations of the 1975-1976 structure hoard have been adopted. There is a move to replace 105-mm. artillery "*th 155-mm. tubes, particularly in II MAF. There are great advantages to this, in all that divisional artillery will be capable of using improved ^unitions and of firing tactical nuclear weapons.
There are a surprising number of armored vehicles in the Third World. P°r example, Mediterranean and Mideast countries such as Algeria have 47°, Egypt 4,450, Iraq 2,900, Lebanon 300, Libya 1,440, Morocco ^0, Syria 3,600, Democratic Republic of Yemen 200.
force option recently advanced would reduce the Marine Corps by
one MAF. This would effectively reduce the Far East deployment to impotence. This would be political nonsense if the withdrawal of the 2nd Army Division from Korea is completed.
8I am suggesting that the marines provide for the capability to task organize a mobile assault force in two of its MAFs because the corps cannot remain "infantry” and survive. At present, infantry can defeat a mechanized force only under special circumstances, and the firepower of marine air, great though it is, cannot provide the margin of power required to survive on the mid- or high-intensity battlefield. (Only about 3% of the tanks defeated in the 1973 Mideast War were destroyed or crippled by aircraft.) The corps has remained relatively light, and although this makes for strategic mobility, it creates inflexibility on the modern battlefield.
9The usefulness of the LVT as a troop-carrying vehicle could probably be enhanced by hanging applique armor on it.
,0TOW systems would total about 200 in six companies, and 30 or so in two separate platoons. There would be nearly 800 Dragon systems. nI call this new- weapon system the Brute because it reminds me of retired Lieutenant General Victor ("Brute”) Krulak. Like him, it is small, moves fast, and packs a powerful wallop.
,2Using four LCACs over a 25-mile radius, 96 light AFVs could be landed in the same time that 32 M-60 tanks could.
,3The administration has attempted to make aviation adjustments in the fiscal year 1979 budget which w’ould move the AV-8B farther into the future and use instead more A-4s, an early model of which has already been earmarked for the National Air and Space Museum. I hold to the position that the all-V/STOL light attack force is essential. The fighter/ attack force should be reduced to accommodate the AV-8B, as well as additional ground firepower. The V/STOL is more survivable, has greater responsiveness and there is a real need for gaining further operational experience with this type of aircraft. Postponement of AV-8B procurement could herald the demise of a good program. If so, it probably becomes another example of the rule that if a service doesn't do selective paring of forces in peacetime, someone else will do the cutting—and it will be in the wrong place!