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Run Deep? Yea Run Silent? Nay
Get off my Back”—Revisited
Commander Gregory F. Streeter, U.S. avy-—In my opinion, the gut prob- err> in today’s Navy is the evolution of an a<Jversary relationship between the ships and the upper command echelons.
Requirements are levied by higher auth°rity with an implicit threat of retribution for non-compliance, rather than with an understanding of what is required to execute the requirements and a promise of help in doing so. Resources, moreover, are usually inadequate for meeting the requirements, while no allowance for those shortcomings is taken into considera- t*on by the higher authority. The demands on the men are naturally conVeyed by ship captains who, rightly or v,'r°ngly, are identified by their troops as getting ahead” at their expense.
. The primary cause of this problem ,s the inspection requirement system We have created. Actually, the work generated by the inspection is not the r®al problem. It is the perception of c e men at the deck plate that they are mcapable of doing their jobs without some short-duty clown looking over eir shoulders, writing discrepancies, c er> going home at night while the j-mw members work until midnight or eyond making corrections. This exercise is often followed by another, S|milar inspection (e.g., an inspection a°d survey following an operational impulsion plant examination) with j!et another set of inspectors and a dif- erent set of standards and requirements. The scenario continues until e to hell with it” attitude prevails. Questions such as "what the hell do mey want” and/or “why am 1 here ''’hen I could be out or home” become che main topics of conversation on the ckaning stations.
When a man is totally frustrated with his working environment and his perception of his worth to the organization, it doesn’t take long for him to come unglued when he goes home to hear his wife complaining about waiting three or four hours to see a doctor at the dispensary for a child burning up with a 103° temperature, or reading in the Navy Times that commissaries may be closed or that the President is fighting inflation by putting a 5.5% lid on military pay raises, etc., etc., etc. In summary, his “quality of life” at this point is lousy.
At the risk of proposing another study, what is needed is one initiative: a top-down inward look at what we are requiring of men and ships and our methodology for doing it. We do not need to reorganize. We need to structure our demands on people in accordance with the resources we can provide them.
There is much to be learned from the sea story of the ship captain who, upon taking command, instructed his officers to submit no required reports until the command received "gigs” for not doing so. Then, receiving gigs for about half of the reports previously submitted, the command subsequently wrote those that were missed. The captain cut his ship’s administrative work load in half.
Using this story as a guide, I suggest OpNav, fleet commands, type commands, etc., reduce all standing directives by 50%. No ifs, ands, or buts about it. I believe it can be done. Concomitantly, reduce all inspections by 50%—no ifs, ands, or buts about that either.
Let the captain work his people. He knows better than anyone when he can and cannot let people go.
Let the chief petty officers run liberty on all ships. I’ve seen it work well
Contents:
“Get off my Back”—Revisited Marines for the Future
The Navy’s Clouded Amphibious Mission
Containerized Weapons . . . and Merchant Warships
The Breakdown in Naval Shipbuilding
Seakeeping—and the SWATH Design
Mission to Mecca: A Postscript
The A-7E Aircraft/Pilot Team: 1 Man, 1 Machine, and 101 Missions
Is It Time To Sink the Surface Navy?
Some Thoughts from an Unrepentant Nuc
The LAMPShip Team
The Time Has Come To Revamp the Naval Reserve
United States Ship Oliver Hazard Perry
FFG-7: The Concept and Design
The Navy’s Newest Ship
Maintaining a Western Carrier Capability
The Destruction of the Battle Line at Pearl Harbor
on three ships, and the chiefs gain immeasurable prestige. They become, in fact, “the boss.” In turn, hold the chiefs accountable. Our CPOs are qualified enough to carry out this policy.
Establish personnel stability in ships. If a man advances in rate, often as a result of an effective command training program, don’t rip off the ship and disrupt the man and his family to satisfy the Navy manning plan on another ship.
The work load during regular overhaul (ROH) is not nearly as much of an issue as are the when and where the ROH is going to take place. Very often ships are notified of overhauls (and permanent change of station moves) only weeks or days in advance of the effective home-port shifts. Crew members’ personal plans become a shambles. Manifestations of this problem are the gripes about long working hours in ROH. It boils down to simple frustration caused by getting to a new home port in the first place.
Deployments are not so much an issue as are deployed schedules. Forget about separation due to deployment—that is not the real problem. Sailors join the Navy to see the world. What really irritates them is lack of liberty ports when deployed or lack of knowing where they might be sufficiently in advance to have their wives join them.
Inspections themselves do not necessarily aggravate the men; it’s having to correct the identified discrepancies within unrealistic time frames that causes aggravation. Forget the follow-up reports; simply check progress at the next inspection and then hold people accountable for non-performance. At the same time, rather than the ship’s personnel developing plans to fix the discrepancies, have the squadron commanders or the type commanders report what they intend to do to help the ship with resources/problems beyond the capability of the ship’s personnel to correct.
Knock off type command/squadron directives regarding military regs/ smartness. One document at the fleet level should suffice. Why should these regs be any different at the type command/squadron command level?
In fact, lack of consistency, fleet-to- fleet, and TyCom-to-TyCom (itself a degradation to quality of life), would be improved by using only one set of standards.
Stop changing the uniforms. Who knows anymore what uniforms are required for what rank/rate/rating?
Reduce assist visits. Despite all the public relations claims, assist visitors submit reports, and these visits, in effect, are inspections. Let the men who man the ship ask for help—they know when they need it—and don’t give the assistors pencil or paper.
In summary, if we want to improve the sailors’ quality of life, let’s make some assertions:
► Ships’ crews are capable of running their own affairs.
^ And, they, in the vast majority of cases, are doing their best with resources at hand.
So let’s gear up to help them when they ask for and need help—and get off their backs.
“Marines for the Future”
(See F. J. West, pp. 34-42, February 1978; C. Douglas, pp. 19-21, April 1978, Proceedings)
“The Navy’s Clouded Amphibious Mission”
(See R. S. Salzer, pp. 24-33, February 1978;
R. Peet, pp. 23-26, March 1978; C. Douglas, pp. 19-21, April 1978 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel G.D. Batcheller, U.S. Marine Corps—I read your February issue with more than the normal amount of interest because of the two leading articles on the future of the Marine Corps. Mr. West’s article was a disappointment. He joins a lengthening list of analysts who would fix a machine that isn’t broken. He shows an awareness of Title 10, U. S. Code, in his fourth paragraph, but has a curious theory that it constitutes a “reward” for past actions and is devoid of meaningful guidance for the future. He also writes as if the Marine Corps is treated differently, in this regard, than the other services. It is astounding to me that a professor at the Naval War College sees fit to ignore the statutory functions assigned in Title 10, the complementary relationship between the four services, and the amplification of these statutes in DoD Directive 5100.1, the "Functions Paper.”
Having failed to properly consider the existing mission of the Corps, it *s no surprise that his search for a replacement mission lacks both direction and depth. From his defective beginning, he proceeds to the incredible conclusion that the Marine Corps should be assigned to the Secretary o Defense, who would establish mission priorities and set a budget level. Pr0' fessor West then suggests that the marines should be left alone to spend their money in accordance with “their own ideas about warfare,” presumably with our own ships and aircraft and medical support and so forth.
Admiral Salzer’s article, on the other hand, is concerned not with a forced search for a new mission, but with a constructive attempt to improve the joint capability of the Navy and Marine Corps to execute a well- defined and demonstrably desirable old mission, i.e., “It ain’t broke, but it does need a tune-up.” Admiral Salzer focuses on the means of strategic mobility that gives range and depth to the combat-ready amphibious assault capability and suggests several steps to increase this “key element in our readiness [posture], . . . within the constraints set by peacetime budgetary and manpower limitations.” Those interested in enhancing the war-fighting capabilities of the United States will be far better served by the implementation of Admiral Salzer’s recommendations than those of Mr. West.
“Containerized Weapons . . • and Merchant Warships”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 133-136, March 1978 Proceedings)
Captain R. S. Reade, Jr., U.S. Naval Reserve—Congratulations to Mr. Polmar. His professional note is an excellent overview of possible uses of merchant ships to augment the accomplishment of the Navy’s mission.
An additional application of this concept is as an aircraft intermediate maintenance depot (AIMD) for the air- capable ships, described in the same lssue. CH-53 helicopters operating from the AIMD merchant ship could ^*fr damaged or hard-down vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft from their parent platforms and carry them to the AIMD for repair and quick return to operational service. In this way the merchant ship would serve as a “hangar deck” for the air- capable ships, centralizing the AIMD function.
This operational concept of using merchant ships must be pursued vigorously, especially in light of the present administration’s disastrous reductions of new ship construction. This concept would seem to be most cost effective as a Naval Reserve mission.
The Breakdown in Naval Shipbuilding”
@ee ]■ R. Newell, pp. 24-31, January 1978 Proceedings)
James A. Pennypacker, retired Manager f°r Estimating for Bethlehem Steel Corp., Shipbuilding Division—I congratulate che Naval Institute for publishing the authoritative article by John R. Newell, former president of the Bath Iron Works.
John’s article is clear, concise, and compelling. It traces in forthright language the gradual decline and fall °f the shipbuilding industry in private ar>d Navy yards. It expresses the author’s considered judgment that there *>11 be little improvement in shipbuilding until the attitude of Congress changes toward a cost-minded approach and until the private shipbuild- lng industry is again managed by trained shipbuilders who know the profession and have learned the busi- fess from the bottom up.
In World War II, control of the seas was vital to obtain victory. The cry was for ships, ships, ships! To speed production and reduce costs, large numbers of ships were designed alike so that a building yard could engage in mass production. Time of construction was also shortened. It was reported that 1,500 sea-going warships and 5,000 cargo carriers were built in American yards within a four-year period.
Some of the reasons for this outstanding achievement were the building of large numbers of identical ships, skilled management and trained personnel in the respective shipyards, close teamwork between the Navy and private builders, relatively few changes in specifications, and mutual goodwill between government and industry.
Current prices for Navy ships have sky-rocketed. The 1979 budget for a single Trident submarine is $1,186,000,000—and this is not the first of its class.
Shipbuilding in the United States is vital to our welfare and to our national defense. It must not be allowed to perish. John Newell is right! Naval shipbuilding has broken down, and it must be restored. ‘
“Seakeeping—and the SWATH Design”
(See S. R. Olson, pp. 139-146, March 1978 Proceedings)
Hallett R. “Dick” Stiles—I read with some amusement Commander Olson’s glib affirmation of the virtues of a superlatively tortured interpretation of a 3,400-ton SWATH ship.
The most serious disadvantage of the SWATH is speed, which is dismissed by Commander Olson as having no utility in a naval warfare environment.
The surface navy is drowning in the mire of 20 knots and the muck of poor design. The Navy’s mainstays are its submarines and airplanes. These are valuable in a combat environment, because they are difficult to hit.
The name of the game is no longer “damage control”; it is “don’t get hit!” And speed is the single factor that has made subs and planes relatively invulnerable.
But the surface navy pooh-poohs speed and exploits every opportunity to raise the nagging question of the utility of speed in the naval warfare environment. The Administration and the Congress are cutting increasingly into the budget for surface ship construction, and for good reason. But the surface navy continues to be unwilling to recognize its major weakness.
“Mission to Mecca:
A Postscript”
(See J. S. Keating, pp. 74-77, April 1978 Proceedings)
Mrs. William A. Eddy—l am very happy to see Captain Keating’s article in the Proceedings. I know he did a lot of work researching and writing it. I spoke to him many times and gave him access to Colonel Eddy’s papers. Captain Keating expressed an important point of view—the truth.
“The A-7E Aircraft/Pilot Team:
1 Man, 1 Machine, and 101 Missions”
(See F. J. West, pp. 102-105, April 1978 Proceedings)
Tommy L. Wilson—Your caption writer fell into a trap of sorts about the age of the A-7E Corsair II. The airplane is not 20 years old. The first flight of the A-7E was not until 25 November 1968. So that’s less than ten years ago; the fleet didn’t begin receiving A-7Es until 14 July 1969. [EDITOR'S Note: Mr. Wilson is correct. ]
Until the time the F-14 and S-3A began deploying in numbers to the fleet, the A-7 was very much the junior member of a ship’s inventory—and by a good number of years. The F-4s, RA-5S, A-4s, and RF-8S it flew alongside for years were all quite senior to any of the Corsair II series. With the service-life demands we now place upon our military aircraft, the A-7 is just a baby.
So while the F-18/A-18 controversy continues to rage on both sides of the Potomac, the young A-7Es continue to fly their daily missions at sea, just as they were designed to do.
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
(Continued from page 25)
Is it Time to Sink the Surface
Navy?”
{See w. S. Lind, pp. 62-67, March 1977
Proceedings)
®r- Bradford A. Becken, Chairman, Undersea Warfare Systems Division, American Defense Preparedness Association—I expect that my response will be just one of many which disagrees strongly with Mr. Lind’s suggestion that there may not be an ASW Mission for surface ships in the NATO conflict. That "an increasing number °f defense authorities have recog- ni2ed, a war in Europe . . . would be decided in a matter of weeks” is the basis of his argument from which stems his premise that surface ships wdl not be required to escort convoys.
other words, the war will be over before convoys can organize and sail, k would have been interesting if Mr. Lind had stated who he believed would win this short war in Europe. I toust assume he holds some optimism for NATO’s chances else he would have argued against our land and air arma- ttient expenditures in support of our NATO allies rather than against our surface ASW ships.
Might there be a short war? Yes, if 0ur forces were overrun. If, however, NATO forces after initial losses of territory can hold at the Weser River Line 0r the Rhine, as General Alexander Haig apparently believes firmly, what then is a likely scenario? Will the Soviet Bloc be content to stop there? We must assume that Bloc leadership, knowing that our in-Europe resources are limited to a “30-day” war scenario, will prepare for whatever is necessary to defeat such a 30-day strategy. If General Haig and NATO can contain a Soviet Bloc offensive, we can assume that such containment will be temporary only unless NATO received added support. We will face an awesome resupply problem which will tnake the frantic early days of the Korean conflict look like a leisurely Sunday picnic.
Admiral I.C. Kidd, in an address to a joint meeting of the American Defense Preparedness and National Security Industrial Associations in Jacksonville on 15 February, stated the problem quite succinctly. We must be able to move immediately two million men and the material to support them. Massive airlift can handle the men. Only ships can provide the material support. His estimate identifies the need for 1,000 cargo ship transits during the first 30 days. Considering probable Soviet countermeasures from air, surface, and especially submarine forces, our surface navy’s role would appear obvious. Merchant ship losses in such a situation, even with the best assumptions as to availability of friendly air, surface and submarine support, would still be high. Without support from all such elements, cargo transport losses would be unacceptable.
Accordingly, the question which should be asked is not “Is it time to sink the Surface Navy?” but “Will we fight for our NATO Allies if called upon?” An affirmative answer calls for far more realistic assessment of potential European scenarios than the retrenchment suggested by Mr. Lind.
“Some Thoughts from an Unrepentant Nuc”
(Set J. D. Jones, pp. 86-87, November 1977; K.W. Estes, pp. 21-22, February 1978; W.H. Russell, p. 19, April 1978 Proceedings)
“Run Deep? Yea Run Silent? Nay”
(See E. R. Callahan, p. 90, January 1978; K.W. Estes, pp. 21-22, February 1978;
K. H. Toepfer, pp. 88-89, April 1978 Proceedings)
Commander Daniel B. Branch, U. S. Navy—I can understand how interested officers such as Commander Callahan and Captain Estes would find it tough to keep pace with the changing role of submarines in naval warfare. With the mission tasks and electronic capabilities of submarines undergoing great change, nonsubmariners are hard-pressed to stay current in these and related matters.
Commander Callahan, who suggests that tactical, coordinated operations are new to submariners, may not know that most mid-seniority submariners qualified as surface warfare officers before entering submarines. Nearly all of us have experienced both kinds of operations and have had to adapt to various operational environments. Ten years ago, it was in fact difficult, as he noted, for submariners to communicate with surface forces to the degree of efficiency that would satisfy most surface commanders.
One of the basic misunderstandings of the surface officer has always been that submarines do not need to be constantly communicating to do the job. But today’s submarines, which operate in coordinated operations in support of high-value surface units, can and do communicate rapidly, on real-time basis, and with great efficiency. The problems that plagued submarines in coordinated operations 10 years ago were all basically related to the inability of surface ships and submarines to communicate efficiently. That is past history.
Commander Callahan charges submariners with being unwilling to adapt. I strongly suggest that he take time to study the changing pattern of submarines operating in the fleet which has been practiced in numerous fleet exercises in the past five years. 1 enjoyed working in this new operational environment as the commanding officer of a nuclear-powered attack submarine. I also communicated a lot. Apparently, Commander Callahan thinks that the secret to coordinated tactics success is to have all hands standing at the ready to pick up the radio telephone. Since the submarine operational experiences I had over the last five years were precisely the kind he recommended that submariners start doing, particularly in the area of communications in coordinated operations, I think he and others who share his views need to take the time to learn about antisubmarine warfare and submarines, at sea, and in an operational environment.
I agree with Commander Callahan that we cannot afford individualists and separate services when our overall desire is to promote better teamwork at sea. But talking about teamwork and recognizing our insufficiencies as naval officers will not solve the problem. All commanders and commanding officers need to take the time, and make the space, so that officers of different warfare specialties can get adequate indoctrination trips on the fighting platforms of other specialties. This is always tough to do, but exposure to each other’s warfare specialty is probably the only practical way for interested professionals to maintain at least a basic understanding of the other fellow’s capabilities and limitations. Captain Estes comments that my colleagues do not encounter other types of general purpose or strategic forces. This perception may stem from watching too many Hollywood World War II submarine movies based on fictional stories. His claim of knowledge about what submarines do and what submariners think—even though he has had shore duty with a few of them the last few years—doesn’t track.
Vice Admiral Steele’s article in The Washington Post on 16 May 1976, to which Captain Estes referred, was authored by an officer who commanded submarines, a carrier group, and the Seventh Fleet. I think Admiral Steele’s perspective is very much different and more well reasoned than that of a young officer who hasn’t had fleet experience.
All professional naval officers share Captain Estes’ concern for not being able to afford a balanced fleet. All of us want the proper balance to carry out our various mission tasks in defense of the country. We will always have some internal wrangling over who gets what share of the Navy’s defense dollar. But that is a continuing reality and not a conspiracy by one group of naval officers to hog the budget as Captain Estes seems to suggest.
Captain Estes seems to misunderstand Lieutenant Jones’s comments about “never gambling.” When one is working with a nuclear reactor plant, gambling with the safety of the reactor is a sure way to have a major safety incident or a disaster. Those who supervise reactor plants must thoroughly understand them—that is the price of safety, and as Captain Estes observes, that doesn’t come cheap- The potential hazard of an otherwise avoidable error is much more costly >n nuclear reactor plants than an equivalent error in a 1,200-p.s.i. steam plant.
COMBAT FLEETS OF THE WORLD 1978/79
Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament
Edited by Jean Labayle Couhat
The first English language edition of Combat Fleets of the World, published in 1976, had to be reprinted twice to satisfy the demand for this extraordinary reference. The new edition is ten percent longer with more than 450 new photographs and line drawings. Its 660 pages include construction histories and specifications of all known combat ships, aircraft, and armament—from those of the smallest defense force to those of the mighty fleets of the superpowers. Comprehensive, accurate, logically organized, and economically priced, Combat Fleets of the World 1978179 provides unique access to comparative data on the world's navies.
1978/660 pages/1,800 photos/65 line drawings
A Naval Institute Press Book List price: $49.50 Member's price: $39.60
Add $1.00 to each order for postage and handling.
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Captain Estes proposes that the line should be released of its "massive technological burden” in running reactor plants so that its officers coul “lead” and "command.” This attitude, that one commands by just being in charge, appears a bit dangerous to me. All naval officers need to be solidly schooled in their professions. Leadership and command imply professional
prints of articles from other publications, Proceedings readers should see exactly what I said. If given that opportunity, I believe they would realize
competence—with both the material arid the personnel aspects of the pro- ession. Taking ships and submarines t0 sea demands more of the commander because he is asked to operate ls command for extended periods Without support of the shore establishment.
If nothing else, Commander Calla- an s and Captain Estes’ comments point out how little the various officer communities routinely communicate. I hope their comments will stimulate all of us to take more time to talk among ourselves professionally. Continual cross training, at-sea cross pol- litiization, seminars, and detailed cross-warfare training are required of all of us if our overall professionalism aod intra-service understandings are to °e enhanced.
^ne Admiral George P. Steele, U.S. Navy (Retired)—It is hard for me to elieve that Captain Estes of the Marine Corps read my article in The ^ashington Post of 16 May 1976, since I*6 retitles it and misses its thrust. I did not, as he asserts, call "for a battle fleet entirely composed of nuclear Subs!" A famous news commentator is imported to have remarked that TV newscasts suffer from "distortion through compression.” Such distortion ,s evident here.
Reformers have sometimes generated the strongest feelings in defenders °f the established beliefs and order. Rut the world really was round rather than flat, and heavenly bodies do not afl revolve around the earth. There Was a time when it was thought that cavalry could charge into machine-gun Ate. It was argued that aircraft could n°t sink a battleship.
What should be a serious debate in the Proceedings about capabilities, r°les, and missions is turning into an unseemly exchange of invective. I urge members of the Naval Institute to debate the issues.
While I realize that it is not the practice of the Proceedings to run rethat my objective is a change in emphasis rather than glorification of the submarine to the exclusion of all else.
EDITOR'S NOTE: As Admiral Steele points out, we normally do not reprint articles which have appeared in other publications. However, because Admiral Steele's 16 May 1976 article (“A Fleet to Match Our Real Needs”) has been discussed many times on our pages, two of the article's five parts are reprinted here with the permission of The Washington Post. A copy of the complete article can be obtained by writing, Proceedings MT, U. S. Nava! Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402.
Battle-Worthy Subs
Today, and for many years to come, the really battle-worthy capital ship is the nuclear-powered submarine. It has the unique ability to get close enough to destroy the enemy surface ship, using missiles or torpedoes, without great risk, regardless of how much air power is ranged against it. The only adversary that it really need fear is another and better submarine, down in the sea with it, using the same advantages of mobility and stealth.
Suppose that this thesis had been accepted and acted upon in the crisis of October, 1973, in the Mediterranean. We would have withdrawn our aircraft carrier groups as quickly as possible, while U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarines steamed into the area in strength. Each major Soviet warship, surface ship or submarine, would have been tracked down by one of these American submarines. With sufficient strength in place, American submarines could show themselves in sequence to their adversaries and then break the contact to remain in the vicinity.
What a different outlook for the Soviet Mediterranean commander in these circumstances. The knife is at his throat, not the American commander's. The important Soviet ships are being dogged by submarines that can sink them in short order. Yet the Russian commander's capability to inhibit this attack or even to keep track of U.S. submarines is slight, given the qualitative superiority of the American undersea craft over Soviet counterparts and countermeasures. He cannot place his surface ships in contact with the vulnerable U.S. aircraft carriers and other surface units because they are well out in the Atlantic Ocean.
If hostilities begin, he can envision the destruction of most of his fleet, followed up by the reentry of the American aircraft carrier groups into a Mediterranean cleared of most surface and submarine opposition and blockaded by American submarines against new Soviet naval forces at the Atlantic and Black Sea entrances. Soviet maritime air power would remain a threat to the U.S. aircraft carriers, but one they are best capable of defeating.
In recent years the United States and the Soviet Union each have maintained a squadron in the Indian Ocean where the oil lifelines of Japan and Western Europe originate. . . .
U.S. submarines stationed near a Soviet surface squadron in the Indian Ocean would not need to hightail it away to avoid surprise attack. Remaining hidden until commencement of hostilities, they could sink their surface adversaries without fear of the enemy's guided missiles. Only the Soviet submarines would be dangerous; so far, however, U.S. submarines are markedly superior. Should Soviet forces be on the point of some intervention in another nation, the presence of a number of nuclear-powered U.S. submarines would let them know that the U.S. Navy had the power present to destroy the Soviet units without significant risk to itself.
This is not to say that the presence of surface warships in such remote areas is undesirable. There are times when the flag must be shown. And the submarine, powerful though it is at sea, is not the symbol which the apparently formidable surface warship provides to the peoples of unsophisticated nations; an unreasonable fear of nuclear propulsion also can inhibit port visits by nuclear-powered subs. Force posturing does have its uses, so long as we do not delude ourselves as to the fighting capability of the ships involved. We certainly will not delude the Kremlin.
The Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. James L. Holloway III, recently wrote, "We need ships in proper balance among types: carriers, surface combatants, submarines, amphibious and support ships. And, within a constrained budget, we need a careful balance between high- performance, general-purpose forces and less expensive, limited-mission ships we can procure and deploy in greater numbers. It is these two kinds of balance that go into the careful development of our shipbuilding programs. These programs will enable the Navy to maintain a modern fleet, sized to the needs of our future security requirements." (Italics added for emphasis.)
That statement is sound. The quarrel can only be over just what constitutes a “balance" and, perhaps, just what constitutes our "future security requirements.” There can be no doubt about the reality of
constrained budgets and, if we err in striking the balance by building great, expensive, vulnerable surface ships, there surely will not be enough money left to build an adequate number of "line-of-battle” submarines, the only type of ship that alone can stand up to the Soviet air-sea threat.
Our future naval security requirements can be boiled down to a first-priority need to be able to control the seas. If that requirement is not fulfilled, then all of our allies and friends, all of our overseas interests and all of our vital imports are subject to Soviet control. If the Soviet government successfully denies us the use of the sea, expensive but vulnerable forces for power projection ashore would be useless, if not already sunk. Our only recourse would be a self-defeating nuclear exchange—there would be no other way to get at the U.S.S.R.
Even without building the $2 billion aircraft carrier, we have a substantial number of aircraft carriers on hand. These ships and their embarked aircraft are individually much more potent and sophisticated in projecting power ashore than the older ships and planes that were recently retired. Considering the size of the threat to NATO, it may be advisable to concentrate the greater number of the carriers in the Atlantic Fleet, placing only those with nuclear power in the Pacific Fleet to be able to go to the aid of the Republic of Korea and Japan.
But we would first have to use our submarines to sweep away Soviet surface and submarine forces in NATO waters and the Pacific. The rub is that for years the rate of U.S. submarine building has been so low that we do not now have enough in being or programmed for effective action. These are the warships that count the most today and, without enough of them, the U.S. Navy does not and will not control the seas.
A Naval Formula
To regain control at sea, first emphasis in U.S. Navy shipbuilding should be placed on building a powerful force of nuclear-powered attack submarines. It is not necessary that they all be high- performance submarines; less expensive, limited-mission submarines are suitable for many tasks, but nuclear power is essential for all. Submarines alone cannot provide the flexibility required to exercise the control of the seas, and they cannot be allowed so much of the construction budget that other types of modest-sized ships are crowded out. But surface ships that cost enormous sums, such as the large aircraft carrier and the proposed strike cruiser,
should be eliminated.
We must redouble our efforts to regain supremacy for our surface forces in electronic warfare and in variety and sophistication of missiles. New surface ships should be designed to absorb punishment and still be able to fight. Since the present and projected Soviet sea forces are the clear danger, every decision about the fleet and aircraft we build should be tested for effectiveness in sea combat before capability in a land battle is considered.
Adm. Gorshkov has demonstrated the power of a tactical concept when implemented in the construction of sea forces. We must revise our tactics and modes of operation to meet the realities we now face at sea, taking particular care to free ourselves from the burden of our successful past naval actions against shore targets which has the U.S. Navy in a dangerous rut.
There is no reason why American innovation and technology cannot master the Soviet challenge at sea—if we have the brains, the vision and the will to use our money wisely.
“The LAMPShip Team”
(See R. E. Hammond and P. Tierney, pp. 154-158, March 1978 Proceedings)
Commander A. Van Saun, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Barbel (SS- 580)—The United States is currently building the Spruance-class destroyers as “primary ASW ships.” I predict that these ships will fall into the same failure pattern as their predecessor Prl' mary ASW ships,” the Knox-class frigates. Through all the fancy brochure- manship displaying bulbous sonar domes or dramatic surface ship ASW encounters at sea and through the urging of the leadership in the surface warfare community we have duped ourselves into actually believing it lS worth building a surface ship to be employed in the primary role of ASW.
In reality all the cards are stacked against such an endeavor before it begins. The most serious detractor (corn successful ASW is the surface ships ever-present visual/radar image. The visual image provides an enemy submarine with precise position information at ranges outside the surface ship’s ability to detect the submarine but inside the submarine’s weapon range. The radar image allows sophisticated surveillance systems the opp°r' tunity to maintain a nearly continuous track in areas of conflict, thereby removing any surface ship tactical advantage based on surprise.
This problem surface ASW ships have with the visual/radar image is compounded when faced with enemy surface and air threats. The detectability of the surface ASW ship dictates that if she is to survive in combat, she must have the ability to protect herself
or be escorted by someone who can protect her. To be effective in ASW it ls most advantageous for the surface ship to operate independently. This means that to survive and have the potential to be effective, a surface Asw ship must dedicate a great deal of her armament, perhaps 75% or more, to self-preservation against surface and a‘r threats. This leaves 25% or less of her armament to be employed in the surface ASW ship’s primary mission.
This percentage of armament can be compared with the weapon system of the surface ASW ship's adversary, the submarine. The attack submarine essentially has only one weapon system, the torpedo tube, which fires a selection of weapons. This allows 100% of the submarine’s armament to be dedicated to its primary mission, ASW, or, required, to self-defense against surface ASW ships. With the submarine’s ability to remove its visual and radar ‘mage and its ability to hide in the
depths of the sea, it is not currently worthwhile to produce a submarine weapon system against the air threat.
Surface ASW ship sensors are inappropriate for the role for which they are designed. Take active sonar where the laws of physics stack the deck in overwhelming favor of the submarine. In surface ASW ships we have consis- tantly gone with high-power and low- frequency sonars. When we try to employ these sonars we find that the main result is to give the submarine more precise information as to the position and identity of the surface ASW ships. We have dreams of convergence zone contact with the submarine at long range, but we ignore the facts that most of the oceans’ geography where submarines will be operating precludes the formation of convergence zones, and when convergence zone contacts are achieved they are of short duration. We also have dreams of bottom-bounce modes for active sonar but find that the bottom is less conducive in the use of these modes than the geography is to providing convergence zones. We are left with direct path transmissions which provide inadequate ranges to effectively attack the submarine. In summary, the vagaries of the physical propagation of sound in water force us to the conclusion that active sonar is not the answer.
Another consideration is passive sonar. Submarines have made extremely effective use of passive sonar arrays. This has caused the surface community to attempt to develop similar capabilities. The difference is that submarines, for practical purposes undetectable by surface and air units, have the tactical freedom to employ these devices to their optimum capability at medium to low speeds and constant courses when required. Surface ASW ships attempting to do this become sacrificial lambs to any subsurface, surface, or air threat. Passive operation of surface sonar systems may aid the surface ship in avoiding being detected and annihilated by submarines, but it contributes little to the surface ship’s ability to ferret out and offensively attack the submarine.
Much has been written about the potential success of the heralded current LAMPS helicopter system, but a close examination of this approach reveals some significant flaws. LAMPS is basically a reactionary system that requires specific knowledge of a target submarine’s location prior to employment. If it is to deliver a weapon on a target, its knowledge of the submarine’s location must be precise and maintained until weapon delivery. Add to this the complication of keeping one helicopter on a surface ASW ship ready for immediate employment and you come up with what you might expect, a fleet batting average of almost zero for LAMPS success in ASW. Given a larger LAMPS with much improved endurance and a better independent search capability, the system does have potential for a future in ASW. However, if it is ever to become a worthwhile investment, it must be divorced from the dependence on surface ships for initial contact.
All the inherent weaknesses of the surface ASW ships are compounded by the fact that they must refuel at sea. This requires an oiler and in return the oiler requires protection against all threats. When employing surface ASW ships we must create an armada to support the oiler and the surface ASW ships just in order to refuel the combatants and defend the armada itself. Should a submarine or any other enemy platform sink the oiler, the surface ASW ship’s effectiveness, severely limited as it is, becomes completely useless in a matter of days for want of fuel.
With some minor exceptions our surface warfare community is employing its ships to capacity and doing a
good job. What is wrong in surface ASW is the fact that the surface platform is inadequate for the task. The laws of physics above the surface, at the interface, and below the surface dictate that the submarine will have an overwhelming tactical advantage over any surface ship even before considering the state of weapon development.
If the facts of physics, the effects of the environment, and the referenced difficulties are not in themselves enough to render the surface ASW ship ineffective in ASW, our tactical employment of them is. With the obvious imbalance in capability in one- on-one encounters where the surface ASW ship is destined to defeat by the submarine, we continue to send search/attack units comprised of one or two surface ASW ships into probable submarine areas. Such tactics can be likened to the classic army patrol in Indian territory where one or two advance scouts are sent out only to be found killed, thereby reducing the patrol by one or two combat units every time a scouting mission is conducted.
The reasoning that some surface escorts are acceptable losses in conducting the ASW defense of a high-value unit has fallen into antiquity for several reasons. First, when this was an acceptable hazard in the ASW war, the surface ASW ship and the submarine were much more evenly matched and
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the sheet numbers of surface ASW ships made the chance of losing a single unit during prosecution an acceptable gamble. Today, this is not the case. The submarine’s ability to engage the surface ship effectively makes the employment of a surface ship in a probable submarine area a suicidal undertaking. In addition, our lack of escort numbers and the high cost of each escort make the escort itself a very important target. Once our limited escort force is defeated, high-value units are less likely to be able to carry out their mission.
And, finally, the surface ASW community, over the years, has fallen into the trap of relying upon the new system that will be installed next week, next month, or even five or ten years from now. This is due to continued failure of surface ASW ships to accomplish effective ASW regardless of the new systems installed. In the interim, submarine systems have advanced at such a rate that even the surface warfare community’s prediction of future success is outclassed by today’s submarine systems.
It is time for the professionals of the surface navy to think in terms of where they can make a viable contribution to fleet combat readiness: develop better antisurface and antiair escorts. It is time to drop the “primary surface ASW ship” sacred cow and allow money that is intended for ASW, and currently being used to build targets, to be placed where it can truly be effective—in the production of nuclear and non-nuclear ASW submarines.
“The Time Has Come To Revamp the Naval Reserve”
(See J. L, Hall, p. 21, January 1978; J. J. McGrath, p. 84, April 1978 Proceedings)
Lieutenant P. C. Emmons, Commanding Officer of the USS Jason (AR-8) DET 319 Ready Reserve Unit and former Commanding Officer of a Ready Reserve component assigned to the active fleet destroyer USS Agerholm (DD-826) — Mr. Hall’s premise that today’s Naval Reserve is primarily a paper-shuffling outfit is inaccurate. Today’s reserve officers can’t afford to spend valuable
drill weekends doing paperwork. The majority of reserve administrative paperwork is accomplished along with drill planning, between and prior to scheduled drills. Today’s reserve officer spends considerable off-drill time at drill sites to assure productive drills for unit personnel.
Mr. Hall seems to think that there is little or no training in the facets o shipboard evolutions. It has been my experience that general-purpose shipboard reserve units associated with ships like the Agerholm and Jason align their training requirements to those o the parent ship. Training requirements for the Ready Reserve component reflect the same personnel qualification standards and personnel advancement requirements as required for active duty shipboard personnel.
ACDUTRA (active duty for training) requirements for reserve units require strict performance on assigned mobih" zation platforms. Here again, the key emphasis is mobilization readiness. Class “C” schools and general damage control, firefighting, and other schools are available, if required, to reservists and can be scheduled for drills. The main responsibility of the reservist is to become competent in his billet assignment, mobilize with his unit f°r ACDUTRA, and to improve his area of expertise in preparation for advancement.
Recently, the Jason DET 319 Ready Reserve Unit, consisting of four officers and 61 enlisted personnel, assisted engineering personnel on short notice on board the USS Norton Sound (AVM-l). The Jason unit mobilized by phone recall on their scheduled drill and traveled at their own expense to assist active duty personnel on required ship repair work. This is not an isolated incident but rather a reflection of the kind of cooperation typical of and available from the Ready Reserve.
With today’s all volunteer force concept, the Naval Reserve is the only trained backup force available to our country in time of national crisis. Where else can fully mission-trained and capable men be found to operate our increasingly sophisticated military machinery and complex shore establishments on short notice?
The Oliver Hazard Perry-class, however, appears to break with the pattern °f the Knox and Spruance classes without rectifying the pattern’s weaknesses. For not only is the new frigate weakly armed in proportion to her s*ze, but the room for future growth Seems to be minimal. "Firepower to
United States Ship
Oliver Hazard Perry”
P'ct»rial, pp. 68-75, March 1978 Proceedings)
^U-7: The Concept and Design”
^ J. D. Beecher, pp. 148-150, March 1978 Proceedings)
The Navy’s Newest Ship”
(*c S. J. Duich, pp. 150-153, March 1978 Proceedings)
^ ‘ontenant Commander Bernard D. Cole,
'T Navy—The Proceedings’ excellent sorface warfare issue devoted consider-
U space to the Oliver Hazard Perry- c ass frigates. This is a commendable "'ay to note the advent of a new class 0 warship. Indeed, it was almost exactly eight years ago that similar attrition was focused on the Knox-class rigates (then called “destroyer- escorts ). At that time the Proceedings Published a “comment” in which I n°ted as had many other observ- trs that the /Cwox-class, while Possessing the physical space and potential for future growth into a for- o^dable warship, was, upon commis- Sl°ning, so lightly armed as to be of Paginal value in a multi-threat comat environment. Today, much of this Potential has been realized. The addition of LAMPS, variable depth sonar, Point defense systems, etc., makes a ^ox-class frigate a far more potent adversary.
A similar pattern is apparent with bte Spruance-class destroyers. Here we ave a cruiser-sized warship more ’ghtly armed than are most destroyers
the world’s navies. But here too, ^be potential for growth is present, ^o doubt, within a few years the Spruances will be capable of projecting a force of firepower more commensurate with their size.
This pattern, although not completely desirable, is understandable g‘ven budgetary constraints. And it does get hulls in the water.
tonnage” ratio does not describe with complete accuracy a warship’s combat capabilities, but it is indicative. Consider for instance, what would happen should an Oliver Hazard Perry-class, armed with her single 76-mm. gun, find herself—for whatever reason—in a one-on-one combat situation with one of the obsolete FRAM destroyers the United States has sold, loaned, or given to so many other countries. Given reasonable material condition and a well-trained crew, the FRAM would have a distinct advantage.
This is not to argue that the United States should build "all gun” destroyers. But it points up the question of what combat missions the 3,500- ton Oliver Hazard Perry is really capable of executing. Naval gunfire support and antisurface capabilities are marginal, at best. The lack of a powerful active sonar or, even more importantly, one with outstanding passive capability, restricts antisubmarine operations to serving as a support ship for LAMPS. Only the antiair warfare capability is significant.
“Maintaining a Western Carrier Capability”
(See J. L. George, pp. 31-40, October 1977; S. L. Morison, pp. 22-23, January 1978;
J. R. Eckelberry, p. 79, April 1978 Proceedings)
Norman Polmar, Editor, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, and Vice President, Santa Fe Corporation—Mr. Morison’s lengthy discussion ends with the statement that “the only way to maintain a Western carrier capability is to construct V/STOL carriers of the U.S. sea control type. This type of ship provides strike and ASW capabilities at minimum expense.”
The sea control ship (SCS) was to have been a 14,300-ton, 640-foot ship capable of 22-24 knots and carrying some 16 helicopters and three v/STOL aircraft (AV-8). This design was discarded by the U.S. Navy in 1975, after congressional opposition developed over the limited speed and air capabilities of the ship. This opposition was shared by several leading naval officers and analysts.
Subsequently, the Navy has proposed a V/STOL support ship (VSS) of some 23,000 tons, capable of 28-30 knots, and able to carry six helicopters, and at least 20 V/STOL aircraft. This larger air group is highly significant for the following reasons:
► Helicopters are speed limited; with longer sonar ranges, antiship weapon ranges, etc., a faster-reacting air ASW vehicle is vital.
► The increasing air threat from the U.S.S.R. (e.g., "Backfire”) and certain Third World countries means a better fixed-wing component than three Harriers is needed, even if only to chase off targeting “Bears” and “Badgers” (and later “Backfires”).
► The U.S. Navy is (hopefully) on course to develop the Type A V/STOL ASW/AHW aircraft and, later, Type B V/STOL fighter-attack aircraft; these planes will weigh on the order of 30,000-45,000 pounds.
Thus, from a viewpoint of V/STOL quality and quantity, Mr. Morison’s sea control ship is too little, too late for the U.S. Navy. Generally, his ship suffers from being too much for small navies and too little for larger navies.
Instead, the 23,000-ton, 28+ knot VSS appears to be a more reasonable ship for the U.S. Navy, and probably other carrier navies such as Britain, France, Canada, Japan, and possibly even Italy.
For smaller navies, the SCS does not appear to meet their needs, budgets, or manning capabilities. A more viable alternative could be one of the air-capable Spruance (DD-963) designs which are evolving. Grumman Aerospace and the Santa Fe Corporation have designed a Spruance variant that retains a full gun/standard missile capability forward and which could operate and support up to seven SH-2 LAMPS-type helicopters or probably four Type A V/STOLs or some combination of these. An “air group” of this size should be suitable for most small navy missions without tying up too large a fraction of their budgets or manpower.
The air-capable Spruance, now being referred to as DD-963AC or DD-963H, offers several advantages to small navies: the design, in service and production, provides certain economies
that Mr. George predicted. This “fact” opens a Pandora’s box of speculation: has there been a change >n
over a new design and certain training opportunities; the ship adds another destroyer to the navy, a multi-purpose ship and one with which most navies are familiar; at some 9,000 tons, the ship could be completed or even built in many of the small nations shipyards; and the ship has many (destroyer) uses for the nation awaiting helicopter or V/STOL deliveries or experience.
The issues of sea-based air are complex ones for the U.S. Navy, for carrier-capable foreign navies, and for smaller navies. The solutions will be more complex than those given by Mr. Morison.
Perhaps the most significant item in his commentary is the “fact that the Soviets will build only four Kiev- type carriers, and not the six (or more)
Soviet naval policy? Have the “marshals” won out in the Soviet budget debates? Have the anticarrier elements of the Soviet Navy won out? Has the design been unsuccessful and is lC being cut off, as was the Moskva class. Or, is a larger (or smaller) improved Soviet carrier in the offing?
The Destruction of the Battle Line at Pearl Harbor”
(See T.C. Hone and J.R. Beckenbach, pp. d-59, December 1977; L.V. Honsinger, p.
March 1978 Proceedings)
Theodore C. Mason—Professor Hone’s analysis of the loss of five battlewa- ^°ns was essentially sound, so far as 1 can judge from the twin vantage Points of participant and sometime student of naval history. But I must respectfully disagree with his state- jnent that “the California was sunk ecause of the performance of her offi- j-ers and crew.” Indeed, I would be acking jn respect for the memory of oay 98 long-dead shipmates, several of C em dose friends, were 1 to allow c at statement to go unchallenged.
The California (BB-44) was sunk beCause °f the previous errors of omis- Sl°n and the absence during the critical early stages of the attack of nearly all her senior officers, both ship and flag The performance of the Junior officers (mostly inexperienced 90-day wonders”) and the crew nearly all of whom were on board because of the midnight liberty curfew ' en in effect for enlisted men) was ‘sciplined, courageous, and often gal- •ant.
At the time of the attack, Vice dmiral W. S. Pye, Commander Bate Force, was not on board. Captain J- W. Bunkley was not on board. In act, according to Walter Lord (Day of nfamy), he had just “slipped into his gumming trunks for a prebreakfast 'P at the Halekulani Hotel. Com- ntander Earl E. Stone, the executive 0 ficer, was not on board, either.
The acting commanding officer for jLe first 50 minutes of the attack was Lieutenant Commander M. N. Little, ^he ships first lieutenant and damage control officer. Since Little was senior slup s officer on board, he found it necessary, before going to the bridge, j® order his chief yeoman, R. M. aldwin, “to assume command of the amage Control personnel in Central Station. ...” The training of a chief yeoman, as admirable as it was in those days, surely did not contemplate his assuming responsibility for damage control on a battleship under combat conditions.
Similarly, the counterflooding that prevented the California from capsizing following the two torpedo hits and the near-miss bomb alongside the port bow was directed by a Naval Reserve ensign, Edgar M. Fain. To Ensign Fain’s credit, this was accomplished in a "prompt though unorthodox” manner, according to Samuel Eliot Mori- son (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II).
Although 1 could quote example after example from the many pages of California survivor’s reports, the above should be sufficient to make one thing abundantly clear; the chaotic conditions that prevailed on board the California can be charged almost in their entirety to the absence of the senior ship and flag officers. Many junior officers and enlisted men were thrust without warning into life-and- death responsibility for combat roles outside their training. A rough analogy would be a professional football team playing in the Super Bowl without a head coach or assistant coach, with the middle linebacker playing quarterback, and with the defensive and offensive lines and backfields filled with substitutes or men playing out of position.
The events described by Professor Hone appear to have taken place in a sort of sterile, war-games environment: a mere technological contest of bombs and torpedoes versus outmoded battleship defensive systems. Nowhere does he suggest that this uneven contest was waged by real, flesh-and- blood sailors—men taken totally by surprise through the complacency and/or incompetence of their leaders up the entire chain of command to the Navy and State Departments and the White House.
Before condemning the performance of the California's crew, Professor Hone should be aware of the following facts. Fourteen Congressional Medals of Honor were awarded to Navy personnel for action at Pearl Harbor. Three of these—all posthumously— went to personnel of the California: Ensign Herbert C. Jones, U.S. Naval Reserve; Chief Radioman Thomas J. Reeves, U.S. Navy (a near-legendary figure who ran the 90-man ship/flag radio gang with awesome competence
and was more feared and respected within his division than the skipper himself); and Machinist’s Mate First Class Robert R. Scott, U.S. Navy. At least one Navy Cross was also awarded, to Commander Jesse D. Jewell, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy. In all, nearly 100 officers and enlisted men were cited for commendations by Captain Bunkley.
The material condition of the ship is another matter entirely—and here one does not have to search far to fix the responsibility. Although I could enter into a long and unprofitable discussion about why all the port-side doors and hatches on the third deck were not sealed, I do not dispute Professor Hone’s general conclusion:
"The California sank because a number of manhole covers to voids in the portside torpedo defense layers were off or not tightly secured, the third deck watertight compartments were not sealed, and there were not enough pumps on board the California or available in the harbor to stem the flooding which spread slowly throughout the ship.”
All the sources that I was able to consult agree that the California was not in battle readiness at the time of the torpedo hits. At least two, however, do not agree with Professor Hone’s subsequent statement:
There was no official material inspection scheduled for the California, and the ship’s log did not contain any references to maintenance of the vessel’s protective system. It seems fair to conclude that a minor oversight contributes significantly to the battleship’s sinking.”
It is just as fair to conclude that Professor Hone’s “minor oversight” was in fact culpable negligence on the part of senior officers who, in the face of numerous war warnings from Washington, continued to act as if they were swinging around the hook off the Long Beach breakwater. Admiral Morison, commissioned to write the official Navy history of World War II, certainly bent over backward to give blundering commanders the benefit of any possible doubts. But even he felt constrained to write:
“It is a well-known fact, although never publicly admitted, that battleships carrying admirals’ flags, although taut and smart in appearance, were commonly inferior to others in readiness and material condition because (1) of a practice of 'marking them up’—that is, overlooking shortcomings at material inspections, in order not to mortify or annoy the admiral; and because (2) admirals and their staffs demanded lots of ‘spit and polish.’ In the case of California, a material inspection was about to be made, and normal preparations required thorough ventilation of the tanks and voids. This explains the fact, reported by the commanding officer, that six manhole covers to the double bottom were off, and the securing nuts of 12 others slacked away.”
While Walter Lord’s Day of Infamy should not be considered authoritative (popular, people-oriented history without a single footnote), his report echoes Morison:
"Another [torpedo] crashed home farther aft. There might as well have been more—the California was wide open. She was due for inspection Monday, and the covers had been taken off six of the manholes leading to her double bottom. A dozen more of these covers had been loosened. The water poured in and surged freely through the ship.”
Like Admiral Morison, Vice Admiral Homer N. Wallin certainly had access to all the official sources when he wrote his book, Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal. Moreover, as a captain, he was material officer on the staff of Admiral Pye at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, and later did magnificent work as fleet salvage officer at Pearl. Yet when Wallin discusses the abysmal material
condition of the California, he becomes curiously vague:
“Unlike Nevada, California was not in battle condition at the time of maximum damage. Although attempts were made to assume condition Zed after the surprise attack was begun it must be realized that passing from X-ray to Zed at breakfast time on a Sunday morning was no easy task. The fact that unwatering showed many Zed closures open substantiates the fact that the ship never attained the proper closure.
“A number of the manholes of the port blisters were off or were loose, which contributed to the loss of the ship. This permitted fuel oil to flow up from the fuel tanks near the torpedo hits and eventually to find its way to the lower parts of the vessel. This together with nonclosure of 8-inch fuel lines and ventilation ducts, permitted gradual seeping of fuel oil and water to vital parts of the ship.
“California was well designed. The holding bulkhead near the torpedo holes was adequate to its task. Except for a few discrepancies in the location of fuel oil lines and water lines the ship was entirely able to withstand the punishment received on 7 December. Staying afloat for three days and drydocking without a single patch attests to the toughness and ability of the ship. Adequate pumping, if it could have been supplied at the time, would have kept the vessel afloat.”
The reason for the removal of the manhole covers is now, of course, academic; for the results were the same. Whether the open manholes were due to a “minor oversight,” as Professor Hone would have it, or to peacetime-era "spit and polish,” as Admiral Morison suggests, the responsibility rests upon one man alone: the ship’s captain. If I seem to be ex
tremely critical of Captain Bunkley, lC is no accident. A severe, remote, humorless man, he appeared to 1710 both at the time and in hindsight to be that type of officer who is more concerned with his perquisites than his responsibilities. He ran a taut ship with a full brig, but it was not a happy ship. And the “bottom hne will always read: one battleship lost* unnecessarily, with 98 dead and wounded.
I witnessed, during fleet maneuvers shortly before the attack, an incident that is revealing. At the conclusion o a gunnery exercise, after the ship h* been buttoned up for many hours, “Secure from General Quarters was announced over the P.A. system- spontaneous loud cheer echoe through the California from stem t0 stern. The captain appeared bewildered by this unseemly display 0 emotion. Turning to Lieutenant Commander H. E. Bernstein, he asked why the men were making al that noise. Gently and deferentially! Commander Bernstein explained that the men were happy because the long exercise was over and the ship was returning to port. Not a glimmer o understanding crossed the captain s face. It was clear to me that the behavior patterns of the men he commanded were to him as much a mystery as n they had been a troop of African baboons .
Although Professor Hone makes only an oblique mention of the fact, the California might still have got under way (and almost certainly would have been saved from sinking) but fot a command decision by the captain to abandon ship. This decision was apparently made after conferring with Admiral Pye. Here is Admiral Mori- son’s account:
"Owing to herculean efforts by the damage control party, light, power, and water pressure were restored at 0855, the men concentrated on fighting fires which they successfully brought under control, and California was ready to get underway by 0910, using four boilers. But before Captain Bunkley, who in the meantime had come aboard, could issue orders to unmoor, burning oil from the battle-
ship to windward floated down and engulfed the stern. So at 1002 the captain ordered Abandon Ship. Shortly after the wind blew this
pool of burning oil clear, and at 1015 the captain ordered all hands t0 return on board. Not everyone obeyed."
Had 1—and, no doubt, most of my * 'Pmates—known the true situation, would have stayed on board. The word we received in the battle top was that fire—started by the 550-pound 0rnb that exploded on the armored Sec°nd deck about 0845, killing many *^en' was running toward the power magazines and the ship was about t0 experience the fate of the Arizona.
Faced with this Hobson’s choice, We assembled on the quarterdeck and Prepared to chance the oily water, which was burning at the stern and to Port but not yet along the starboard S|de. Providentially, a ship whose name I cannot recall but whose skipper nonetheless earned my still- Undiminished gratitude, backed in toward Ford Island, cutting off the ames. Disdaining life jackets, for the roost part, we swam ashore—only to be ordered back within minutes to man bucket brigades against the fires.
This premature abandon-ship decision and the resulting delay in fire- and damage-control efforts proved fatal to the ship. On a personal note, it nearly proved fatal to me, as well, caught in the open on Ford Island under strafing attack. I dove headfirst into a bomb crater, on the theory that lightning is not likely to strike twice in the same spot.
I should add that, contrary to Mori- son, I did not see a single man fail to obey the order to return to the ship. If anyone did in fact stay ashore, it must be remembered that we crew members were returning to a ship that we thought was about to blow up, and one that we knew was commanded by badly confused officers. Professor Hone, of necessity, relied entirely on written reports for his article—and all too many reports about a catastrophe like Pearl Harbor are suspect. Many of them were composed by the very officers who had lost their commands and were most anxious to present their actions—or lack of same—in the most favorable light. The official hearings and investigations relied also on such reports and on the always incomplete, usually faulty, and sometimes self-serving testimony of a very few of those who were present. I have come to know firsthand the hazards of relying upon the recollections of even the most disinterested eyewitnesses. Naturally, no official group of observers was present to record immediately and with some degree of accuracy exactly what happened. Now only sketchy reconstructions can be attempted, for the true and complete story is sealed forever with the dead, and fading in the memories of the thousands of still-living but aging survivors.
I take no particular pride in being one of the fortunate survivors of the greatest defeat ever inflicted upon the U.S. Navy. I have no shame, either, for I did my duty, as did nearly all the young men of my generation. The pride I have is in my unforgettable memories of great comradeship and great events, in my membership in that stern and mystic brotherhood of arms, sealed in bonds of blood and steel that Sunday morning at Pearl Harbor.
Last Man Off the California ____________________________ ________________ __
Not all the memories of action at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 are terrifying or glorious or bitter. I have the slight honor of being the last man off the California (BB-44).
°w it: came about that a third class radioman was the last man off his abandoned ship makes a rather amusing counterpoint to the necessarily serious discussion of how and why cLat ship was lost.
The night of 7 December found me crouched in a hastily excavated dugout on Ford sland, copying the fleet broadcast as dirt filtered through the chinks in the dugout roof 0nto my typewriter and me. When I was relieved, perhaps around 2000, my communica- tlQns officer decided, or was ordered, for reasons now obscure, to put a man back on board the California. Lieutenant Sugg, an executive with one of the major radio networks in Lilian life, chose me. With helmet, gas mask, Springfield rifle, and two-way portable radio, I was taken alongside by whaleboat and clambered to the top of No. 2 turret for my lonely vigil.
On the slanting turret, my equipment and I kept sliding toward the sinister black waters t0 port. Around me the harbor periodically exploded into sound and fury as nervous antiaircraft gunners let go at every aircraft alarm. The great ship, dark and lifeless, creaked and groaned as she shifted and settled deeper into the mud of the harbor bottom with her 98 dead in their iron tomb.
After what seemed an interminable time my earphones crackled with the cheerful voice of Lieutenant Sugg.
“Mason,” he said, "I’m going to send a boat over to take you off. We have reports the California is about to capsize, and I don’t want to lose that valuable radio gear.”
Theodore C. Mason